Indeed the only way to prevent any fuel passing from a centre line hose into a receivers fuel galleries is to insert a bung in the pipery at the back of the probe nozzle. Just shutting off tank inlet valves will not stop the galleries pressurizing. I have a feeling this method was used in the early Tonka trials but my memory is not .........
|
Which, though crude, is rather safer than the problem which happened on an early Buccaneer....
Jolly matelot decided to trust his hand at prodding, since the jet proudly sported a shiny new AAR probe. Find Victor, frighten it with a wacky join, cleared astern, stabilise, trim, watch the references, slight addition of power, stabilise, clunk, nice contact, green on, fuel flows.... Or rather, call astern, hoof on the power and chase the basket. But make contact all the same. Hmm, thought our fishy friend, no more fuel showing in the master or slave tanks - silly old buggers in the Victor must have porked up. Disconnect and slope off back to the concrete boat and will have a dig at the crabs later. 45/25/25, 20psi blow, mirror on, 86+ HP, steady and steady lows going beeeeep, boop, boop on the ADD, thud, hmm, seems a bit of a firm landing even for a Bucc. Taxy in, fold wings, roll bomb door, shut down, get out.......:uhoh: A few minutes later, the jolly jack tars fold the nose to put the cab in the shed - and about 1000 lb of fuel pours out. It seems that the dockyard maties who installed the probe were from a different team who were supposed to install the plumbing from probe to fuel tanks. Never mind, I'm sure that a fuel-cooled Blue Parrot was no worse than an air-cooled version.....:hmm: |
Lay off those triangular tablets duuude........
:ok: |
RAF crews quit over 'unsafe' Nimrods
|
ORAC
I am the so-called ****-stirring journalist concerned and I would like to make a few points. A) I have every sympathy for the relatives concerned but as others have pointed out on this thread there are serious issues affecting those left behind which need to be addressed. If you dont think this is a serious issue that puts other people's lives at risk I suggest you go elsewhere. B) That article is an entirely accurate account of what my sources said, much of it confirmed by the MoD, which given the opportunity to deny the resignations notably failed to do so. It has nothing to do with ****-stirring it is an effort to get this important information out into the open so that there can be a debate. It is supposed to be what the media do, keeping the public informed of things that are going on that shouldnt be going on. C) Since I am a long-standing member of this forum I thought I was entitled to be treated courteously and your post does not do so. But I would be very happy for it to remain up here in its current form so long as the moderators allow this comment from me to remain up here in return. There have been a lot of comments made about the media on this forum following the crash, some of it falling very much into the "Good point well made" category, but far too much of it being as pathetic and ill-informed as your post. We all have a job to do in life. As some members already know, for 15 years of my life I was in the services. Now I'm a journalist. I was not responsible for that aircraft going down but I would be responsible if a second one went down and I had deliberately kept information I had that might have prevented it happening out of the public domain. Have a good day |
Mike Smith/ORAC
Unfortunately the post has been removed (ORAC), however, I feel it is a prudent time to comment.
1. In the civil world, an airline has to prove to a regulator (CAA?) that it has sufficent funds to carry out its operations and perform necessary maintenance. If it does not then its air operators approval will be withdrawn (I stand by to be corrected). 2. If an airline has an incident or accident it is investigated (by the independent AAIB) to determine the probable cause, identify mitigation and ensure it does not occur again. This is how formal regulation works. The RAF for years has been challenged to reduce costs. I am aware that operational requirements mean that the civil model is difficult to apply to the military environment. Please tell me how the MoD ensures compliance with 1 and 2? I am not a journo, know no journos, and do not have an opinion on journo's, but as a tax payer I am concerned that the Military are overstretched, under resourced, and constantly being challenged on cost. I welcome any journos who bring these issues to the focus of Joe Public. Rant Over. Sorry to drag this post on, but I think it is necessary. |
ORAC
I have no idea why the original post was taken down but if it was done by you please feel free to put it back up again. I am happy to let it stand as long as my response to it does. |
My origal post, which I removed because I did not want to get into an argument due to the sensitives of the subject related to this article and the comment I regarded it as ****-stirring, without amplification. I had replied privately to Mr Smith, for the same reason. He, in reply, accused me of lying as to my reason for withdrawing and for failing to place my reasons here. I now do so.
The implication is that the aircraft is being flown when unsafe. I consider that a slur on both engineers and authorisers. Previous posts have discussed the difference between unserviceability and safety. The second implication is that aircrew knew it was unsafe, in the period between the crash and the next leak, and resigned in protest at being made to fly it. Whilst that is possible, it implies that, within days of the accident, sufficient was known about the accident to make such decisions. That is not borne out by this thread. The thrown in anonymous comment regarding a startling "lack of care" raises the accusation to the level of culpable negligence. It may or not be true that the Nimrod has a deficient fuel tank fire prevention system, or that it requires one in its operating envelope and based on previous incidents, or that one is feasible. But the implication, again, is that the omission of one is a further proof the aircraft is unsafe. Pending the result of the BOI, and with AAR already suspended, I regarded the article's claim the aircraft continues to be unsafe as unproven, alarmist, insulting to those involved and likely to be distressing to the families of those on the fleet. |
I didnt accuse you of lying ORAC. You said in your PM that the article would upset the relatives and I pointed out in response that if you really believed that was a reason for not writing the article you wouldn’t have posted it on this thread.
I have dealt with the argument on the relatives in my previous post. I'm not going over it again. You now claim I am blaming the aircrew. It is difficult to see how that could be the case given the fact that the article says that aircrew are resigning as a result of their concerns. You also claim that the article makes a number of other implications. The article doesn’t imply anything it simply states a number of very worrying facts, which include the facts that the preliminary BOI report said there was a leak in the fuel pipe during or immediately after AAR; that the MoD has confirmed that there was a second such incident on 8 November and that AAR has been suspended as a result. Like your original post, your PM was in fact largely taken up with the completely baseless suggestion that I was somehow misrepresenting the resignations which were at any event an irrelevance. My response to that was as follows: "The fact that a number of aircrew have resigned over the issue - and it is a fact - shows how importantly it is taken as an issue among the aircrew. "MoD was asked about the second leak, the suspension of AAR and the resignations by email. My only reference to the resignations in my email soliciting a comment from the MoD was "I also understand that a number of aircrew at Kinloss have put in their resignations since the crash." "The response to that should have been one of the following: a) there have been no resignations since the crash; b) there have been resignations since the crash but they had nothing to do with the crash; or even c) there have been resignations since the crash but we are unable for legal reasons to say why the personnel concerned have resigned. "It was none of the above. The response was: "I cannot stand up your assertion that resignations have gone up. There has been no marked increase in the number of aircrew applying to leave the RAF in the wake of the Nimrod crash." "This is typical MoD. I had in fact made no such assertion and the response was standard MoD evasion" |
You now claim I am blaming the aircrew. It is difficult to see how that could be the case given the fact that the article says that aircrew are resigning as a result of their concerns. The article doesn’t imply anything it simply states a number of very worrying facts SEVERAL RAF aircrew have resigned amid serious concerns over the safety of the force’s ageing Nimrod spy plane It is understood RAF crews were worried about the decision to allow the Nimrods to resume flying three days after the Afghan crash. A number of servicemen resigned after the crash and before the latest incident. “The lack of duty of care is startling. Checks that were carried out immediately following the crash revealed further evidence of fatigue issues within the pipework.” Similar implication reference a fuel tank suppression system. Just as the title of the article, ‘unsafe’ Nimrods, with the unsafe in brackets.... |
Del Mode
“1. In the civil world, an airline has to prove to a regulator (CAA?) that it has sufficient funds to carry out its operations and perform necessary maintenance. If it does not then its air operators approval will be withdrawn (I stand by to be corrected). 2. If an airline has an incident or accident it is investigated (by the independent AAIB) to determine the probable cause, identify mitigation and ensure it does not occur again. This is how formal regulation works. Please tell me how the MoD ensures compliance with 1 and 2?” I can assure you there are very simple, concise and mandated rules to ensure such compliance for Item 1. I’ve just looked at my old copy and it’s about 15 pages, plus a few appendices dealing with attrition, wastage, RSD&P and such like. The basic premise underpinning the above is that each item in the inventory is seen to be “owned” by an identified individual whose primary role is to ensure compliance. This is not hundreds of staff, but typically around six for a single Service. Or was when I did it many summers ago. (Probably is hundreds nowadays, given the rampant inefficiency we see every day). Then reality kicks in, usually in the form of benchmark rulings from on high. Among the better known are, for example, that it is unnecessary to ensure an aircraft or equipment is safe when delivered off contract, or that it can be supported properly through-life or for the aircrew to be trained adequately. That there are relatively few problems in the aircraft world is often not down to routine implementation, but to staffs being prepared to ignore instructions not to implement them. I’d say the rules governing Item 2 are more robust in their implementation but I still know of cases where the mitigation was identified in advance of the accident, and ignored. Luckily, only one that I can recall was fatal. |
ORAC, surely 'implication' is somewhat subjective?
I'm not quite sure why you're rising to cross swords with Mick - he seems to be doing a very fair job in exposing the truth about the way things are. Very useful to have an on-side journo who is both knowledgeable and sympathetic, I would have thought? |
Originally Posted by BEagle
(Post 2975075)
Very useful to have an on-side journo who is both knowledgeable and sympathetic
|
As someone who has just a few hours in the Nimrod, and I have enjoyed every minute of them, I can get quite defensive about the aircraft. Yet......there has to be time to call it a day. Remember the Bahama Mama, the aircraft with the "impossible" total electric failure that went to Istres. I am sure there is a few more which I can't remember offhand.
It is not the fault of anyone at the front-line if there is now a problem with the aircraft. It worries me immensely that there was evidence of a post AAR fuel leak recently, if its the first, or the unfortunate case of the loss of 230 I don't know. But it may be time for a "capability holiday" wrt to AAR until this is sorted. You can't blame the groundcrew, or the aircrew or the authoriser. All will run with the best advice available at the time from the relevant specialist authorities but the constant dilution of experience on every front at ISK seems to herald time. |
Surely if there is doubt there is no doubt. I fail to see the difference between the first fuel leak and the 2nd incident. Why decide to continue flying AAR after the loss of an aitcraft doing AAR and yet cease AAR only after a 2nd incident. All the facts could not have been known after the crash and yet the crews were sent up there almost immediately.
|
Supposing there was another model of the Nimrod, based on the same era of air frame, still being flown which was also AAR capable...would they be having the same problems?
|
ORAC for one who claims to worried about the sensitivity of the families you have done a very good job of turning this thread into a slanging match. They were my friends and so are the Air Eng's that have PVRed. :*
nigegilb The RTS has been revised to allow AAR in exceptional circumstances only. |
SB, so it all comes down to military risk, something about which I have a great deal of experience. A military under pressure at a time of war. The temptation is always to press on, in this case we almost had a 2nd tragedy. When will we learn from our American allies? You cannot do war on the cheap, it costs lives.
Has the new Nimrod got fuel tank protection? It bloody well should have. The decision to continue flying AAR in exceptional circumstances did not affect operational flying because the 2nd incident occurred in theatre. Did the AAR course at Kinloss continue? If so, will someone care to explain the exceptional circumstances? |
Originally Posted by nigegilb
(Post 2975819)
SB, so it all comes down to military risk,
You cannot do war on the cheap, it costs lives. Has the new Nimrod got fuel tank protection? It bloody well should have. |
Just to underline your point Chug. Approx 2/3rds of the Herc fleet is being fitted with foam at a cost of around £18m. We have lost 2 Hercs in the last 22 months. The cost of a replacement SF Herc off the shelf is around £50m!
Now then, Nimrod 4 is costing an awful lot of money. I have lost track but I believe around £300m each. You don't need to be good at maths to realise, in the case of the Herc £600,000 per ac, foam fitted is very good value. Of course, the USN have fitted foam to the P3 Orion MAR, but then all of their mil ac are protected. |
All times are GMT. The time now is 20:17. |
Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.