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Originally Posted by WE Branch Fanatic
(Post 11448899)
Once upon a time NATO started to see the GIUK Gap as being like the Maginot Line, which would have put NATO on the back foot and almost abandoned Norway. I am talking about the 1980s plans to put the carriers forward into the Norwegian Sea to fight the Bears and Backfires.
https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....1262b08561.png The plan called for the forward deployment of carriers into the Norwegian Sea and amphibious forces to Norway during a period of tension, and allied contributions included the forward deployment of British SSNs up North, an ASW group centred one or two of our ASW carriers in the Eastern Atlantic, and amphibious forces being sent to Norway. Other non US contributions included a Spanish ASW group further to the South and a French carrier in the Mediterranean. https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....cf337e585b.png Source: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents As for CVS/Sea King/Sea Harrier - you are right. The RN led ASW group was meant to be operating behind air cover from the USN Tomcats, if and when it went forward into the Norwegian Sea. This is why arguments saying that we should have built new carriers the same size as the Invincible class were not sensible. As for the SSGN menace - see Kamikazes - The Soviet Legacy SSGNs were evidently considered in the West to be the safest asset of the Soviet Navy during an attack, but it was not the case. The problem was hiding in the radio communications required: two hours prior to the launch, all the submarines of the PAD were forced to hold periscope depth and lift their high frequency-radio and satellite communication antennas up into the air, just to get the detailed targeting data from reconnaissance assets directly (not via the staffs ashore or afloat); targeting via low- or very-low-frequency cable antennas took too much time and necessarily involved shore transmitting installations, which could be destroyed at any moment. There was little attention paid to buoy communication systems (because of the considerable time under Arctic ice usual for Soviet submarines). Thus the telescoping antennas in a row with the periscopes at the top of the conning tower were the submarine’s only communication means with the proper radio bandwidth. Having all ten or fifteen boats in a PAD at shallow depth long before the salvo was not the best way to keep them secure. Also, the salvo itself had to be carried out in close coordination with the surface fleet and MRA divisions. So that was two hours in which the Bear could be intercepted, and two hours in which the submarines were at periscope depth with masts up, and vulnerable to detection by airborne radars. WEBF, this was 43 years ago! Hardly relevant to 2023, it was a different world. |
the amount of potential "trade" is pretty small - TBH the Russian navy isn't that much bigger than the RN these days if you look at post 1990 vessels and that's the whole fleet - including those in the Black Sea, the Baltic the Med and the Far East
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Originally Posted by SLXOwft
(Post 11452121)
I do wonder, given the technical demands of many RN branches and the high participation rates in Higher Education if an incentive of reimbursing student loan deductions and writing off a proportionate amount of the remainder and the basis of return of service should be added to sponsorship/cadetship. Even in the dark ages when I joined some tiffies were better qualified than officers on entry. I wonder how widespread the message that entry can be up to 39 depending on role and the starting salary for an accelerated apprenticeship (start as probationary leading hand) is above the UK median salary. There's even direct entry POET(ME) for those with relevant experience, personally and I suspect I'll be seen as a heretic, I think late recruitment at a higher rate/rank on probation for those with transferable skills with a 'Navalization' course has to be seriously considered.
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Last year the UK MoD published a policy paper The UK’s Defence Contribution in the High North which clearly has a forward deployment view talking about the GIUK gap and presence in the Arctic.
The Royal Navy has the capability to project force using a variety of assets in the High North, dependent on the location, season, and threat, including Littoral capabilities. The Defence Command Paper announced major investments in a new generation of Anti-Submarine Warfare frigates and support shipping, enabling us to project UK force into the High North, and ensuring our freedom to operate in the North Atlantic. Additionally, the UK will maintain an ability to operate under the Arctic ice. The Royal Navy is investing heavily in military data gathering capabilities for use in all environments, to better understand the High North underwater environment, protect our underwater critical national infrastructure and improve our ability to detect threats in the High North. These include the purpose-built Ice Patrol Ship HMS Protector, and the new Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance capability announced in the 2021 Defence Command Paper. The Army has increased its cold weather training, including as part of its enhanced Forward Presence deployment in Estonia, where Army cold weather doctrine has been tested and refined alongside the Estonian Defence Forces. Army exercising with JEF partners, including Finland, Norway, and Sweden, enhances its cold weather capabilities, building on Royal Marine and Joint Helicopter Command expertise in the High North. The Royal Air Force has the capacity to rapidly deploy and operate in the High North. The Royal Air Force’s fleet of nine P-8A Maritime Patrol Aircraft, as well as F35 Lightning II, including aboard HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales, will contribute to the UK’s capabilities in the region. New opportunities exist following the procurement of three E7 Wedgetail aircraft and the Protector RG Mk1, which enters service in 2024. Both will further contribute to the UK’s capabilities and support our enhanced situational awareness in the region. Longer-term, MOD will exploit the current and future opportunities offered by space technologies and UK industrial strength to meet Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) requirements, as well as identifying opportunities for collaboration with industry and international partners where appropriate. We will leverage the additional 10-year, £1.4Bn investment in the Defence Space Portfolio to address our National requirements, including for the High North. Especially pertinent is the £970M additional investment in cutting edge space-based ISR. This has the potential for a ‘Responsive Space Launch’ capability, which would enable launch from the UK and British Overseas Territories. |
with Sweden and Finland joining NATO that surely means the situation in Norway is a lot better than it was a couple of years back?
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I would assume that when Sweden and Finland joined JEF in 2017, like Norway, they understood that JEF would be able to be deployed in their defence as well as having an out of area role.
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The Swedes have always specialised in Anti-ship missiles - very useful add-on to NATO oop North
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Originally Posted by pr00ne
(Post 11456794)
WEBF, this was 43 years ago! Hardly relevant to 2023, it was a different world.
Sea Control is difficult to achieve without carrier aviation. Geography, Mathematics, and Physics show that attacking aircraft are best dealt with using fighters to kill the archers, not the arrows, and that the best chance of stopping anti ship missiles is to engage the launch platform. Similarly constant helicopter ASW operations are best supported by a big deck with multiple helicopters, and Physics shows that modern long range sonars need to work in conjunction with dipping sonar to achieve their potential - and vice versa.
Originally Posted by A56
the amount of potential "trade" is pretty small - TBH the Russian navy isn't that much bigger than the RN these days if you look at post 1990 vessels and that's the whole fleet - including those in the Black Sea, the Baltic the Med and the Far East
As Vladimir Putin’s disastrous and ill-advised aggression against Ukraine continues to chew away at Russia’s ground forces, with no likelihood of rapid force reconstitution even when the war eventually ends, it is easy to see Russia’s military capabilities as wholly degraded. However, not only does Russia retain its strategic arsenal but, beyond some embarrassing losses in the Black Sea, its navy is almost wholly intact. If Moscow wishes to project power or simply reassure itself that it is still a power of consequence in the future, it is likely to have to rely all the more heavily on its naval assets. This is something of an irony, as Russia has never been a major maritime power, its navy being regarded much more directly as an adjunct to its land operations. But given that the Kremlin currently considers itself as being, in effect, at war with free and open countries, and that it thus will develop its strategies on a global rather than theatre basis, the likelihood is that tensions in Europe will drive confrontation in the world’s oceans. Future defence planning – not least, the refresh of the United Kingdom’s (UK) Defence Command Paper, expected this summer – will have to reflect this continued and in some cases expanded maritime challenge... You may have also noticed this: UK and Netherlands to explore opportunities around new ships for amphibious operations - Royal Navy |
WEBF - it may be "intact" but it's not very big.
In ships post 1990 you have 1 carrier - in dock not operational 1 destroyer 17 frigates 5 SSBN 4 SSN At best a small to medium sized navy especially spread out over 4 seas |
Interesting to compare tto the RN post 1990 (all mid 2022 numbers):-
2 carriers - one in dock non oper 6 destroyers 12 frigates 4 SSBN 4 SSN and France post 1990 1 carrier 20 Frigates 4 SSBN 1 SSN |
https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....8f9ce17b0a.jpg
https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....e807a67d94.jpg # WEBF Would it be appropriate to broaden the scope of this Future Carrier thread to open a conversation in regard to the Littoral Response Groups (CHF are the obvious aviation element) and Argus/Albion replacement platforms. My understanding is LRG (North) will operate anywhere from the Baltic to the Mediterranean and LRG (South) will be forward deployed East of Suez (Duqm?). What is the current status. Has the Littoral Strike Ship concept definitely been abandoned in favour of Multi Role Support Ships. |
Originally Posted by sfm818
(Post 11460948)
What is the current status. Has the Littoral Strike Ship concept definitely been abandoned in favour of Multi Role Support Ships. |
Originally Posted by Asturias56
(Post 11460877)
Interesting to compare tto the RN post 1990 (all mid 2022 numbers):-
2 carriers - one in dock non oper 6 destroyers 12 frigates 4 SSBN 4 SSN and France post 1990 1 carrier 20 Frigates 4 SSBN 1 SSN You might want to look a little deeper at the "frigate" numbers you're so fond of. Six of the MN ships are Floreal patrol ships, slightly bigger than River Batch 2s, but not massively different in terms of capability. The MN shipborne AD capability is also fairly limited (2 Horizon and 2 FREMM). One assumes that you'd also ping CdG as non-operational when she's in dock - generally every three years - as well? Or does that only count for PWLS? |
Originally Posted by sfm818
(Post 11460948)
What is the current status. Has the Littoral Strike Ship concept definitely been abandoned in favour of Multi Role Support Ships.
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"No idea what you're trying to demonstrate with these "post-1990" numbers "
that the Russian Navy is not overwhelmingly full of modern warships (ok younger than 33 years old) TBH no navy is but there's a tendency to think of them as a massive force - they're not. There are lots of arguments about the relative value of different classes of ships but numbers are relatively easy to ascertain. Source is World Naval Review 2023 |
Originally Posted by Asturias56
(Post 11461200)
"No idea what you're trying to demonstrate with these "post-1990" numbers "
that the Russian Navy is not overwhelmingly full of modern warships (ok younger than 33 years old) TBH no navy is but there's a tendency to think of them as a massive force - they're not. There are lots of arguments about the relative value of different classes of ships but numbers are relatively easy to ascertain. Source is World Naval Review 2023 They haven't been a massive force since 1990. They're still capable of putting a task group to sea though - although given how their comrades have performed on and over Ukraine, not sure how much credence I'd give them. Where they are a threat is in their naval air force and their submarines (few though they are). |
Sorry - I should have put it all in one post
It rather surprised me when I went looking for the numbers. IIRC their naval airforce was rebuilding some bases in the Kola just about the start of Covid - but the Russians seem to take even longer to build things than the West. |
Most of the old USSR fleet rotting away…
Photos showing status of the ex. Pacific Fleet's Project 956 Sarych/Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyer Burny (778) moored at the pier in Fokino, near Vladivostok, awaiting disposal. All photos by Alexander Kharon, exact date unknown. Burny was laid down on November 4, 1983, launched on December 30, 1986 and commissioned on November 9, 1988. Starting from 2005 Burny was under repair at the Dalzavod plant in Vladivostok, and finally decommissioned in 2019. https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....7de1fc1c8.jpeg https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....08b7f47ae.jpeg |
The pacific fleet is in really poor nick.
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that's a shocking set of pictures - looks like its just being left to rot in situ
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