Except with the loss of the Bonhomme Richard, the USN are struggling for capacity themselves...

Sad to acknowledge the death of actor comedian John Bird who did a marvelously prescient sketch on the aircraft carriers with John Fortune. Always good for a laugh.

Prescient in what way?

1. The cheap shot about the number of Admirals was inaccurate even then, and based on only counting certain types of ships.

2. The Navy leadership knew exactly what they were for - for sea control and power projection. Presumably the sketch writers bought into the end of history idea when everyone could put flowers in their hair and hold hands.

3. The CVF and FCBA projects started at pretty much the same time - and F-35B was always very likely.

4. Typical nonsense about the F-35B and technical issues.

5. Cobblers about Harriers - and ignoring the fact that the Sea Harrier (scrapped by then) had real air defence capability.

6. No mention of the latent threat from Russia, Iran, and so on.

7. No mention of ASW.

I could go on...Here is a video of ex F-14 Tomcat RIO Cdr Ward Carroll USN (Rtd) talking to a Surface Warfare Officer (later an Engineering Duty Officer) involved with early work on the new Ford class aircraft carriers. At 2.27 the mission needs statement is mentioned:

Independent of land bases, the aircraft carrier's airwing must simultaneously perform surveillance, battle-space dominance, and strike in sustained combat operation forward.


Not too dissimilar from our own planning:

MARITIME OPERATING CONCEPT - THE MARITIME FORCE CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTEGRATED OPERATING CONCEPT

Under section 5 - Force Level Outputs - page 50

The Maritime Force will be organised around four Force Level Outputs: Homeland and Operational Advantage in the North Atlantic; Persistent Engagement; Carrier Strike; Littoral Strike.

Carrier Strike - page 54

The heart of the Maritime Force’s – and NATO’s – warfighting capability Built around the Queen Elizabeth Class Aircraft Carriers. Carrier Strike: Homeland Defence/Contingency/ Warfighting. Contribute to OANA. Through deployments to strategic locations across the globe, promote UK interests, deter adversaries and prevent conflict.

• Project decisive air power from a protected maritime task group, including gaining and retaining the necessary degree of sea control to ensure Freedom of Manoeuvre.
• Demonstrate Global Britain, with regular deployments openly demonstrating British will to engage and resolve to act.
• Contribute to UK/NATO warfighting capability, as a more lethal and more integrated Maritime Force.
• Enable and execute Special Operations.

Sea control is a carrier role - as discussed at length on this discussion about carriers and the NATO sea control mission.

Please don't. You may not have realised that this was a joke ...

"The first of a long-awaited 6-part documentary series “The Warship: Tour of Duty” covering the Royal Navy’s Carrier Strike Group deployment (May-December 2021) will be broadcast on BBC Two and iPlayer on Sunday 22nd January 2023 at 9pm." https://www.navylookout.com/bbc-to-b...up-deployment/

do you think they'll do one on the PoW 's stay in Scotland?

The ship had a mechanical failure and is being repaired. Get over it.

How long to get over it though?

Seems it was not just a wee repair.....but rather a critical design fault that is forcing a modification to the Ship.

Are both shafts being replaced with improved versions?

Does that same design fault exist in the sister ship?

After the one is repaired and back in service....and have to undergo testing and work up training to be Operational....does the other ship get pulled in to the repair facility and have its two shafts replaced?

Source?

"The ship had a mechanical failure and is being repaired. Get over it."

Hmmm - we seem to have a history of "mechanical Failures" - they're still fixing the T45's no?

Now there is an enlightened response for you.

Seems some rather serious teething problems cropping up between floodings (plural) and shaft problems (plural) and lengthy dry dock periods for major repairs with direct negative effects upon training and deployment schedules.

New ships do encounter problems during shakedown cruises but usually are somewhat minor.....but six month or longer repair periods seem to challenge the notion of minor or being simple mechanical failures.

Can we look to the "new" 2023 deployment schedule for the two Carriers and the 2022 alterations as an indicator of how minor these problems are?

But don't feel bad....we have our own Ford Class to consider that is behind schedule and over budget and having lots of problems.....all so typical of a US Navy NavSea procurement process.

Hopefully they do not prove to be as minor as the Type 45's have encountered.

Still waiting on the source for the claim that "Seems it was not just a wee repair.....but rather a critical design fault that is forcing a modification to the ship".

It is indisputable that PWLS has not been a "lucky" ship thus far. However, the cause of the "flooding" (singular) is well known and understood - the consequence of it understandable if you know what happened.

The latest issue on the shaft is fairly unique (including in commercial experience) - hence the query wrt your contention that it is a "critical design fault". The length of docking is almost certainly down to supply chain issues, rather than anything else.

NAB,

You skipped over the question....what changes to the 2022 and 2023 planned deployments of both of the Carriers have occurred due to the ongoing problems?

Saying the delay is due to "supply chain problems" is a sop as the cause is the failure...not the redesign or repair work that it caused.

Now...being the pessimist that I am....what will be the excuses offered if upon leaving dry dock the ship experiences a second shaft failure on the other side (assuming it was a repair only and not a re-design)?

Both from the same root cause and only one of any consequence. I can't wait for you to explain how the "fire control system" flooded and caused damage to her cabling.

Au contraire my friend. Your question was preceded by the statement "Seems it was not just a wee repair.....but rather a critical design fault that is forcing a modification to the Ship." I merely asked for the source of this revelation. Knowing one or two things about what occurred and what is happening, I was somewhat taken aback by this and wondered where it had come from.

Given what happened was "unusual" to put it mildly, see if you can guess what one of the first things that were checked post-incident was. You also need to distinguish between "design" failures where something has been wrongly specified or calculated and manufacturing failures where - for whatever reason - an artefact has been delivered with a flaw that subsequently causes an issue.

WRT supply chain issues, the cause is indeed the "failure". However, the assumption that redesign work is or was necessary is not necessarily correct. Not all of the items needed for repair are necessarily available OTS - not least perhaps because the probability of said failure is best described as very small indeed.

So - please - outline the source of your contention that there is some sort of critical design fault that is forcing a modification to the ship.

We should have two serviceable and young carriers in service.

We only seem to have one, and no timeline on the second. .... was there not talk of a period of routine maintenance at Portsmoth after the fault repair?

Where does the buck stop, or do the RN just say "unlucky"?

If I paid something like the cost of the P o W I would want a warranty [well, I did pay towards it, so have a dog in the fight!].

That's akin to suggesting that we should have every single Typhoon we've ever bought on the flightline ready for ops irrespective of any Cat 3/4/5 incidents.

WRT warranty, I suspect that's beyond date. Not that it makes much difference if the cause of the delay is an ILS issue in a contract specified by MoD.....

I rather think it is, if anything, akin to half the Typhoon fleet u/s and likely to be so for several months.