Cdr N D 'Sharkey' Ward DSC, AFC RIP
WEBF - you just have to trawl through many many comments on here about Ward's later contributions to the defence debate to see how he was seen - and I'm afraid it tarnished his outstanding fighting record.
Dryden's words come to mind:-
A daring pilot in extremity;
Pleas'd with the danger, when the waves went high
He sought the storms; but for a calm unfit,
Would steer too nigh the sands, to boast his wit.
Great wits are sure to madness near alli'd;
And thin partitions do their bounds divide:
Else, why should he, with wealth and honour blest,
Refuse his age the needful hours of rest?
Dryden's words come to mind:-
A daring pilot in extremity;
Pleas'd with the danger, when the waves went high
He sought the storms; but for a calm unfit,
Would steer too nigh the sands, to boast his wit.
Great wits are sure to madness near alli'd;
And thin partitions do their bounds divide:
Else, why should he, with wealth and honour blest,
Refuse his age the needful hours of rest?
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Can't see that as poor tast at all; far from it, it is a relevant and rather poignant thought very elegantly put by Dryden. It is entirely in keeping with an accurate and honest rather than syrupy, sugar-coated tribute to the rather un-syrupy and not at all sugar-coated Cdr Ward.
Tributes need to be honest and realistic, surely?
Tributes need to be honest and realistic, surely?
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I was raised to speak well of the dead as it shall be my turn one day.
I was also raised to honor those who put their life on the line in defense of country and especially honor those who did so with great gallantry and effect.
"Sharkey" as a Royal Navy Harrier Pilot earned our respect for his service in the Royal Navy and especially during the Falklands combat.
He was a stalwart and quite vocal advocate about Naval Aviation and earned the right to speak on the issues surrounding the Naval Service and its needs and shortcomings as he understood them.
Sharkey was a Fighter Pilot with all that embraces and was decorated for gallantry during combat aerial operations.
I did not know Sharkey but I have known many Military Aviators that walked in the same kind of boots as did he.
We should all accept we have lost a Man that we would want to serve with when facing an aggressive capable enemy in combat.
You may not have agreed with him but you should respect him.....I do unreservedly.
I believe that when we take the measure of a Man we must take a full measure and not just pick the parts we wish.
Hand Salute, Commander Ward! Fair Winds and Following Seas!
I was also raised to honor those who put their life on the line in defense of country and especially honor those who did so with great gallantry and effect.
"Sharkey" as a Royal Navy Harrier Pilot earned our respect for his service in the Royal Navy and especially during the Falklands combat.
He was a stalwart and quite vocal advocate about Naval Aviation and earned the right to speak on the issues surrounding the Naval Service and its needs and shortcomings as he understood them.
Sharkey was a Fighter Pilot with all that embraces and was decorated for gallantry during combat aerial operations.
I did not know Sharkey but I have known many Military Aviators that walked in the same kind of boots as did he.
We should all accept we have lost a Man that we would want to serve with when facing an aggressive capable enemy in combat.
You may not have agreed with him but you should respect him.....I do unreservedly.
I believe that when we take the measure of a Man we must take a full measure and not just pick the parts we wish.
Hand Salute, Commander Ward! Fair Winds and Following Seas!
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Asturias56
Not being one for poetry I have no idea what that is meant to say. However I will say from my own life experience, and observations of others, that most of the problems I have encountered in life have been due to me assuming that other have known what I considered basic facts, or from other assuming that I knew things that they considered basic facts. Perhaps this aspect of the human condition is why we need forgiveness?
Quoting Sea Harrier Over The Falklands:
There were essentially three elements of naval warfare which had to be controlled and directed from the Ops Room: Above the Surface (Air), On the Surface, and Under the Surface (Anti submarine). These were very much interbred and interdependent, thanks to the variety of modem weapons available to the fleet and the sophistication of the modern threat. It was therefore no easy task to collect and collate the information from all the ship's sensor (including aircraft sensors and information from other platforms) and present them to the Command in an easily digestible fashion. All friendly units in each element had to be continuously plotted and information from the separate levels of defence recorded, so that in extremitis the Command could judge priority and take the appropriate action.
Defence in depth had become the war fighting philosophy of the day. Against the air threat, the outer layer of defence could be air to air and surface to air systems provided by a third party and deployed some point between the source of the threat and the fleet at sea. In the South Atlantic there was no such layer available and the Task Group had to rely on its organic defensive weapon platforms.
The outer layer of air and surface defence was the Sea Harrier on Combat Air Patrol. Whenever the threat assessment made air attack highly possible, or probable, then CAP aircraft would be stationed up threat to deter and/or engage the attackers. (Should a surface attack be predicted then the SHAR would be dispatched over the horizon to search for the enemy units.) Air defence radar pickets (warships fitted with suitable sensors and weapon systems) would also be stationed up threat, but inside the CAP stations, to provide information to the CAP and the Carrier Group itself. These pickets would be armed with a variety of surface to air weapons and represented a second line of defence. The next layer of defence was the the medium or long range surface to air ship borne missile system. Sea Dart fulfilled this role for the Group. Attackers or their air to surface missiles that managed to penetrate through the outer layers of defence would then face the next designer system - the Short Range or Point Defence Missile Systems such as Sea Wolf. And, as a last ditch defence (on the hard kill side), high rate of fire, radar directed guns such as Phalanx fitted bill. Soft kill options, such as jamming and chaff were also an important integral part of the air defence in depth scenario.
If one analyses the probabilities of engagement and kill of each of the layers of defence, and calculates the overall probabilities of engagement and kill of the cumulative system, it is easy to demonstrate mathematically and in practice that money spent on defence in depth is far better than spending the same amount on a single 'all singing, all dancing' weapon system. The latter can never be perfect or 100% efficient and if it has weaknesses, which it surely will, the threat will be certain to capitalise on these deficiencies and circumvent the system. The separate layers of defence in depth each act as a deterrent to an enemy, and each are capable of causing attrition to attacking forces.
It is the Commander Task Group's job to ensure that where possible he does not place his force in a position that denies that force the full benefit of its defence in depth systems, whether by geographical location or by misuse of a particular asset or layer.
The under surface threat had to be approached in the same manner as the air threat, using third party resources, long range sensors such as Towed Array Sonar, ASW frigates as a screen between the threat and the group, anti submarine helicopters on the screen and at other locations around the group, and last but not least sonars fitted to the ships in the main body. Each of the anti submarine platforms must be capable of not only locating the threat submarine but also of prosecuting it with appropriate weapons. And with the submarine threat being ever present and very difficult to detect, the various level of defence have to be working at 100 per cent efficiency for twenty four hours a day when in a threat zone.*
There were, of course, no third parties of any description providing defence for the Task Force in the South Atlantic; no Nimrods, no air defence fighter barriers, and no shore based Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft.#
*Technological developments since 1982 have changed things and increased the range at which submarines can be detected, with the advent of things such as low frequency active sonar. The longer range comes at the expense of resolution, which is where the helicopter with dipping sonar comes into its own.
#The Sea Harrier, and the CVS, was expected to operate in the GIUK Gap and Norwegian Sea, with Tomcats from USN carriers and two squadrons of RAF Phantoms (dedicated to maritime air defence) providing the bulk of the air defence, supported by AEW. The Nimrods sent South in 1982 were mostly used in ASuW roles.
That description of defence in depth puts his credibility far above many other frequently quoted defence 'experts' - such as those who insist that warships with anti air missiles make having fighters aboard the carrier unnecessary, or that the Navy only needs carriers. Similarly his brief mention of ASW puts him far above those who insist that you either can do without frigates or that you can easily do ASW without a carrier, or without frigates. He also has never said that the RAF is not needed - which some people seem think that he said.
meleagertoo
Yes of course - but with forgiveness and an awareness of the mismatch between what they think we know, and what we think they know. Too err is human - to forgive is divine.
SASless
Well said. If we cannot forgive others how can be expect to be forgiven ourselves?
Cdr Ward was involved in the development of the Sea Harrier - which had a place in the NATO war plans. He had been a NATO nuclear planner, so he was no doubt aware that not only did pushing naval forces forward into the Norwegian Sea and a renewed emphasis on maritime strategy and the Northern Flank not only provided the most effective defence against the Soviet Navy and in particular its submarines and bomber force, but took pressure off the NATO central front by posing a threat to the Soviet homeland.
Not being one for poetry I have no idea what that is meant to say. However I will say from my own life experience, and observations of others, that most of the problems I have encountered in life have been due to me assuming that other have known what I considered basic facts, or from other assuming that I knew things that they considered basic facts. Perhaps this aspect of the human condition is why we need forgiveness?
Quoting Sea Harrier Over The Falklands:
There were essentially three elements of naval warfare which had to be controlled and directed from the Ops Room: Above the Surface (Air), On the Surface, and Under the Surface (Anti submarine). These were very much interbred and interdependent, thanks to the variety of modem weapons available to the fleet and the sophistication of the modern threat. It was therefore no easy task to collect and collate the information from all the ship's sensor (including aircraft sensors and information from other platforms) and present them to the Command in an easily digestible fashion. All friendly units in each element had to be continuously plotted and information from the separate levels of defence recorded, so that in extremitis the Command could judge priority and take the appropriate action.
Defence in depth had become the war fighting philosophy of the day. Against the air threat, the outer layer of defence could be air to air and surface to air systems provided by a third party and deployed some point between the source of the threat and the fleet at sea. In the South Atlantic there was no such layer available and the Task Group had to rely on its organic defensive weapon platforms.
The outer layer of air and surface defence was the Sea Harrier on Combat Air Patrol. Whenever the threat assessment made air attack highly possible, or probable, then CAP aircraft would be stationed up threat to deter and/or engage the attackers. (Should a surface attack be predicted then the SHAR would be dispatched over the horizon to search for the enemy units.) Air defence radar pickets (warships fitted with suitable sensors and weapon systems) would also be stationed up threat, but inside the CAP stations, to provide information to the CAP and the Carrier Group itself. These pickets would be armed with a variety of surface to air weapons and represented a second line of defence. The next layer of defence was the the medium or long range surface to air ship borne missile system. Sea Dart fulfilled this role for the Group. Attackers or their air to surface missiles that managed to penetrate through the outer layers of defence would then face the next designer system - the Short Range or Point Defence Missile Systems such as Sea Wolf. And, as a last ditch defence (on the hard kill side), high rate of fire, radar directed guns such as Phalanx fitted bill. Soft kill options, such as jamming and chaff were also an important integral part of the air defence in depth scenario.
If one analyses the probabilities of engagement and kill of each of the layers of defence, and calculates the overall probabilities of engagement and kill of the cumulative system, it is easy to demonstrate mathematically and in practice that money spent on defence in depth is far better than spending the same amount on a single 'all singing, all dancing' weapon system. The latter can never be perfect or 100% efficient and if it has weaknesses, which it surely will, the threat will be certain to capitalise on these deficiencies and circumvent the system. The separate layers of defence in depth each act as a deterrent to an enemy, and each are capable of causing attrition to attacking forces.
It is the Commander Task Group's job to ensure that where possible he does not place his force in a position that denies that force the full benefit of its defence in depth systems, whether by geographical location or by misuse of a particular asset or layer.
The under surface threat had to be approached in the same manner as the air threat, using third party resources, long range sensors such as Towed Array Sonar, ASW frigates as a screen between the threat and the group, anti submarine helicopters on the screen and at other locations around the group, and last but not least sonars fitted to the ships in the main body. Each of the anti submarine platforms must be capable of not only locating the threat submarine but also of prosecuting it with appropriate weapons. And with the submarine threat being ever present and very difficult to detect, the various level of defence have to be working at 100 per cent efficiency for twenty four hours a day when in a threat zone.*
There were, of course, no third parties of any description providing defence for the Task Force in the South Atlantic; no Nimrods, no air defence fighter barriers, and no shore based Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft.#
*Technological developments since 1982 have changed things and increased the range at which submarines can be detected, with the advent of things such as low frequency active sonar. The longer range comes at the expense of resolution, which is where the helicopter with dipping sonar comes into its own.
#The Sea Harrier, and the CVS, was expected to operate in the GIUK Gap and Norwegian Sea, with Tomcats from USN carriers and two squadrons of RAF Phantoms (dedicated to maritime air defence) providing the bulk of the air defence, supported by AEW. The Nimrods sent South in 1982 were mostly used in ASuW roles.
That description of defence in depth puts his credibility far above many other frequently quoted defence 'experts' - such as those who insist that warships with anti air missiles make having fighters aboard the carrier unnecessary, or that the Navy only needs carriers. Similarly his brief mention of ASW puts him far above those who insist that you either can do without frigates or that you can easily do ASW without a carrier, or without frigates. He also has never said that the RAF is not needed - which some people seem think that he said.
meleagertoo
Yes of course - but with forgiveness and an awareness of the mismatch between what they think we know, and what we think they know. Too err is human - to forgive is divine.
SASless
Well said. If we cannot forgive others how can be expect to be forgiven ourselves?
Cdr Ward was involved in the development of the Sea Harrier - which had a place in the NATO war plans. He had been a NATO nuclear planner, so he was no doubt aware that not only did pushing naval forces forward into the Norwegian Sea and a renewed emphasis on maritime strategy and the Northern Flank not only provided the most effective defence against the Soviet Navy and in particular its submarines and bomber force, but took pressure off the NATO central front by posing a threat to the Soviet homeland.
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Quite a coincidence but I met up with one of my airline colleagues, last Thursday, like myself a former RAF QFI but he had been one of Sharkey’s instructors at Linton. Seems Cdr Wards talents shone through even then.
Like my former RAF mate Al Curtis , lost in the suspected collision in the South Atlantic, may he rest in peace.
Like my former RAF mate Al Curtis , lost in the suspected collision in the South Atlantic, may he rest in peace.
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Always viewed the bashing of Cdr. Ward on these pages as nothing but the usual inter service scrapping by mostly juveniles, unbecoming.
I found myself on YouTube this weekend, listening to Sharkey talking about the falklands. Worth a listen and perhaps raising a glass - after all the measure of civility is having a serious debate and sharing a drink afterwards.
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Thanks for the heads up about the videos. The other three below:
Royal Navy Sea Harrier Falklands War - #2 of 4 'Sharkey' Ward.
Royal Navy Sea Harrier Falklands War - #3 of 4 'Sharkey' Ward.
Royal Navy Sea Harrier Falklands War - #4 of 4 'Sharkey' Ward.
Royal Navy Sea Harrier Falklands War - #2 of 4 'Sharkey' Ward.
Royal Navy Sea Harrier Falklands War - #3 of 4 'Sharkey' Ward.
Royal Navy Sea Harrier Falklands War - #4 of 4 'Sharkey' Ward.
Also from the IWM Collections, here is a sound file from the April to June 1982 period:
Ward, Nigel David (Oral history)
Audio diary recorded by commanding officer of 801 Naval Air Sqdn, Fleet Air Arm aboard HMS Invincible in South Atlantic during Falklands War, 4/1982-6/1982
REEL 1 Audio diary recorded by commanding officer of 801 Naval Air Sqdn, Fleet Arm aboard HMS Invincible in South Atlantic during Falklands War, 4/1982-6/1982: 5/4/1982: reaction to send off of Naval Task Force; start of combat training; morale; attitude to Lord Carrington's resignation; members of squadron; anticipated role of squadron; sings parody of song 'Don't Cry For Me Argentina' composed by 820 Naval Air Sqdn, Fleet Air Arm; reasons for recording audio diary; need for unit to get onto war footing; disappointment in rejection of John Nott's resignation; talking to journalists on board; adjusting to demands and pressures of war. 6/4/1982: poor flying conditions; outcome of conversation with Lieutenant Mike 'Soapy' Watson. 7/4/1982: day's activities; achievements of squadron; briefing duties; opinion of squadron's readiness. 9/4/1982: previous day's meeting on board HMS Hermes; air intercept role of squadron; missile firing practice; night flying.
REEL 2 Continues: opinion of Boscombe Down's testing of Hawker Siddeley Sea Harrier FRS.1; outcome of weapons testing. Saturday: reads part of progress report sent to Naval Task Force commander. Monday: review of weekend's activities; disarray amongst 800 Sqdn, Fleet Air Arm; importance of influencing Captain Lin Middleton. 18/4/1982: belief Argentineans might still back down; problems with fuel during landing during night flying; further air combat and air intercept training and discussions; obtaining allocation of Aim-9 Sidewinder Missile; dissimilarities between Fleet Air Arm squadrons; opinion of his unit. 19/4/1982: opinion of performances in combat training operations involving HMS Hermes and 800 Naval Air Sqdn.
REEL 3 Continues: Airborne recording from cockpit during mock combat with 800 Naval Air Sqdn and comments. 20/4/1982: previous nights training exercise; question of 800 Naval Air Sqdn's lack of knowledge of weapons system; discussion with Captain Jeremy Black regarding media coverage; comments of air interception by 800 Naval Air Sqdn against Argentine Air Force reconnaissance aircraft; differing radar pick-ups between 800 and 801 Naval Air Sqdns; reaction to operational status of 800 Naval Air Sqdn; reaction to non-arrival of Aim-9 Sidewinder Missiles; equipping with automatic pistols. 23/4/1982: state of readiness; intercepting Argentinean reconnaissance aircraft; loss of helicopters removing Special Air Service from South Georgia; ditching of Westland Sea King helicopter and search for missing crewman; anxieties about role of HMS Hermes; Aim-9 Sidewinder Missile supply problems. 26/4/1982: attacks on Argentine Navy submarine ARA Santa Fe on South Georgia, 25/4/1982; reaction to recapture of South Georgia; receiving permission to shoot down Argentine Air Force reconnaissance aircraft; writing paper advising on role of Hawker Siddeley Sea Harriers; discussions with Lieutenant Commander Robin Kent on board HMS Hermes; questions aims of Task Force and role of Hawker Siddeley Sea Harrier squadrons.
REEL 4 Continues:2/5/1982: air activities during 1/5/1982; Flight Lieutenant Paul Barton's first squadron kill; shooting down of Argentine Air Force English Electric Canberra by Lieutenant Al Curtis; air attacks on Port Stanley; further air activities; waiting for retaliation; daily routine, 2/5/1982. 9/5/1982: circumstances of strike on HMS Sheffield, 3/5/1982; death of Lieutenant Nick Taylor, 3/5/1982; opinion of allocation of aircraft from HMS Hermes; question of over-tasking of squadron, 4/5/1982; loss of squadron pilots in probable air to air collision, 6/5/1982; attacks on Darwin and Fox Bay; reaction to Royal Navy ship locking weapons onto his aircraft; question of staff's use of Hawker Siddeley Sea Harrier FRS1; question of 800 Naval Air Sqdn's performing aerobatics during combat air patrols.
REEL 5 Continues: attack and capture of Argentine Navy trawler ARA Narwal, 9/5/1982; accommodation of ARA Narwal's crew on board HMS Invincible. 11/5/1982: concerns over 800 Sqdn's use of radar and tasking; opinion of Staff Aviation Officer (SAO) Chris Hunneyball. 22/5/1982: strike on HMS Ardent; air combats and personal kills; squadron morale and kills. 25/5/1982: recap of previous days actions including Royal Navy losses; manning aircraft during attack on SS Atlantic Conveyor, 4/6/1982: levels of flying and fatigue; shooting down of Flight Lieutenant Ian Mortimer; loss of aircraft on frozen deck; chasing Argentine Air Force Lockheed C-130 Hercules.
REEL 6 Continues: shooting down of Argentine Air Force Lockheed C-130 Hercules aircraft. Cockpit recording, 5/5/1982: Avro Vulcan strike on Stanley Airfield; Sea Harrier visual searches; shooting down of Lieutenant Nick Taylor; loss of HMS Sheffield; ineffectiveness of helicopter torpedoes; question of being tasked away from duties; question of frequencies being changed for security; opinion of command; further aspects of Naval Task Force operations; atmospheric and noises from cockpit.
REEL 7 Continues: atmosphere and noises from cockpit.
Ward, Nigel David (Oral history)
Audio diary recorded by commanding officer of 801 Naval Air Sqdn, Fleet Air Arm aboard HMS Invincible in South Atlantic during Falklands War, 4/1982-6/1982
REEL 1 Audio diary recorded by commanding officer of 801 Naval Air Sqdn, Fleet Arm aboard HMS Invincible in South Atlantic during Falklands War, 4/1982-6/1982: 5/4/1982: reaction to send off of Naval Task Force; start of combat training; morale; attitude to Lord Carrington's resignation; members of squadron; anticipated role of squadron; sings parody of song 'Don't Cry For Me Argentina' composed by 820 Naval Air Sqdn, Fleet Air Arm; reasons for recording audio diary; need for unit to get onto war footing; disappointment in rejection of John Nott's resignation; talking to journalists on board; adjusting to demands and pressures of war. 6/4/1982: poor flying conditions; outcome of conversation with Lieutenant Mike 'Soapy' Watson. 7/4/1982: day's activities; achievements of squadron; briefing duties; opinion of squadron's readiness. 9/4/1982: previous day's meeting on board HMS Hermes; air intercept role of squadron; missile firing practice; night flying.
REEL 2 Continues: opinion of Boscombe Down's testing of Hawker Siddeley Sea Harrier FRS.1; outcome of weapons testing. Saturday: reads part of progress report sent to Naval Task Force commander. Monday: review of weekend's activities; disarray amongst 800 Sqdn, Fleet Air Arm; importance of influencing Captain Lin Middleton. 18/4/1982: belief Argentineans might still back down; problems with fuel during landing during night flying; further air combat and air intercept training and discussions; obtaining allocation of Aim-9 Sidewinder Missile; dissimilarities between Fleet Air Arm squadrons; opinion of his unit. 19/4/1982: opinion of performances in combat training operations involving HMS Hermes and 800 Naval Air Sqdn.
REEL 3 Continues: Airborne recording from cockpit during mock combat with 800 Naval Air Sqdn and comments. 20/4/1982: previous nights training exercise; question of 800 Naval Air Sqdn's lack of knowledge of weapons system; discussion with Captain Jeremy Black regarding media coverage; comments of air interception by 800 Naval Air Sqdn against Argentine Air Force reconnaissance aircraft; differing radar pick-ups between 800 and 801 Naval Air Sqdns; reaction to operational status of 800 Naval Air Sqdn; reaction to non-arrival of Aim-9 Sidewinder Missiles; equipping with automatic pistols. 23/4/1982: state of readiness; intercepting Argentinean reconnaissance aircraft; loss of helicopters removing Special Air Service from South Georgia; ditching of Westland Sea King helicopter and search for missing crewman; anxieties about role of HMS Hermes; Aim-9 Sidewinder Missile supply problems. 26/4/1982: attacks on Argentine Navy submarine ARA Santa Fe on South Georgia, 25/4/1982; reaction to recapture of South Georgia; receiving permission to shoot down Argentine Air Force reconnaissance aircraft; writing paper advising on role of Hawker Siddeley Sea Harriers; discussions with Lieutenant Commander Robin Kent on board HMS Hermes; questions aims of Task Force and role of Hawker Siddeley Sea Harrier squadrons.
REEL 4 Continues:2/5/1982: air activities during 1/5/1982; Flight Lieutenant Paul Barton's first squadron kill; shooting down of Argentine Air Force English Electric Canberra by Lieutenant Al Curtis; air attacks on Port Stanley; further air activities; waiting for retaliation; daily routine, 2/5/1982. 9/5/1982: circumstances of strike on HMS Sheffield, 3/5/1982; death of Lieutenant Nick Taylor, 3/5/1982; opinion of allocation of aircraft from HMS Hermes; question of over-tasking of squadron, 4/5/1982; loss of squadron pilots in probable air to air collision, 6/5/1982; attacks on Darwin and Fox Bay; reaction to Royal Navy ship locking weapons onto his aircraft; question of staff's use of Hawker Siddeley Sea Harrier FRS1; question of 800 Naval Air Sqdn's performing aerobatics during combat air patrols.
REEL 5 Continues: attack and capture of Argentine Navy trawler ARA Narwal, 9/5/1982; accommodation of ARA Narwal's crew on board HMS Invincible. 11/5/1982: concerns over 800 Sqdn's use of radar and tasking; opinion of Staff Aviation Officer (SAO) Chris Hunneyball. 22/5/1982: strike on HMS Ardent; air combats and personal kills; squadron morale and kills. 25/5/1982: recap of previous days actions including Royal Navy losses; manning aircraft during attack on SS Atlantic Conveyor, 4/6/1982: levels of flying and fatigue; shooting down of Flight Lieutenant Ian Mortimer; loss of aircraft on frozen deck; chasing Argentine Air Force Lockheed C-130 Hercules.
REEL 6 Continues: shooting down of Argentine Air Force Lockheed C-130 Hercules aircraft. Cockpit recording, 5/5/1982: Avro Vulcan strike on Stanley Airfield; Sea Harrier visual searches; shooting down of Lieutenant Nick Taylor; loss of HMS Sheffield; ineffectiveness of helicopter torpedoes; question of being tasked away from duties; question of frequencies being changed for security; opinion of command; further aspects of Naval Task Force operations; atmospheric and noises from cockpit.
REEL 7 Continues: atmosphere and noises from cockpit.
Also from the IWM Collections, here is a sound file from the April to June 1982 period:
Ward, Nigel David (Oral history)
REEL 7 Continues: atmosphere and noises from cockpit.
Ward, Nigel David (Oral history)
REEL 7 Continues: atmosphere and noises from cockpit.
Only 7 reels? He got off lightly.
Mog
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Cdr Ward was in this 1986 BBC documentary, part of the Horizon series, that covers the technical issues relating to the fight against Argentine aircraft in the Falklands. Many of the lessons are still relevant - such as the need to engage at maximum range, the need for fighters, the need for Airborne Early Warning, defence in depth, and so on.
Cdr Ward also featured in this episode of the BBC documentary Decisive Weapons:
Cdr Ward also featured in this episode of the BBC documentary Decisive Weapons:
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 10th Jun 2024 at 20:13.
