Soviet activity when we were busy elsewhere
Thread Starter
Soviet activity when we were busy elsewhere
Was there any increase in probing by the Soviet forces when of the UKADR when we were busy in the Falklands or GW1?
And how were the gaps filled?
And how were the gaps filled?
The following users liked this post:
1) It's clearly to do with Military Aviation and has a direct relevance to current events in the world;
2) There have been multiple other , highly regarded and attended, Falkland and GW threads on this forum in the recent past;
3) The people who will have the answer are more likely to be here rather than AH&N;
4) Who died and left you in charge? Don't like it - don't read it!
2) There have been multiple other , highly regarded and attended, Falkland and GW threads on this forum in the recent past;
3) The people who will have the answer are more likely to be here rather than AH&N;
4) Who died and left you in charge? Don't like it - don't read it!
The following 3 users liked this post by OvertHawk:
I think it's widely believed that the Soviets also had assets in the South Atlantic in 1982, seeing what they could learn about our capabilities. No idea what they were up to in GW1, and obviously the Soviet Union was past its peak, but they'd have been stupid not to have some resources in the general area.
The feedback I remember from those days was a brief from someone, whose credentials I cannot remember, who said the that after the Falklands a lot of midnight oil was burnt in the Kremlin. It seems that beforehand the Russians did not think we would or could, So when we did, they had to have a major rethink. It seems that they had underestimated just how determined, inventive and bloody minded the British can be.
The following users liked this post:
Although we were busy with Falklands and GW1, it is a measure of how much bigger the RAF was then that we conducted those operations without seriously compromising high priority UK and RAFG tasks. I would imagine that the use of pretty much all of the Victor tankers in the Falklands had an effect on UK AD activities but I wasn’t in that business.
I read Gordon Brown profile (It is right under his name) as this: Join Date: Jul 2006 | Location: Number 10 No longer | Age: 72 | Posts: 58 |
New? Some folks read more than they post.
As to the topic:
I read a translated Lessons Learned, from the Russian side, when I was at staff college. It had been made available after The Wall fell .
One of my takeaways from that was their pointing directly to the poor training of the Argentine sub crews; given the number of torps launched but ships not hit. Their own diesel sub fleet was still pretty sizeable at the time.
Been years, but they also IIRC noted two other things:
Task Force Air Defense issues for the RN
The usefulness of the carriers with Harriers, etc.
^^^^^^ I have always wondered if their later carrier developments were informed by the RN experience in the South Atlantic.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 18th Dec 2023 at 18:59.
The following 2 users liked this post by Lonewolf_50:
"Who died and left you in charge?"
Edit: poor spolling.
The 135s at Mildenhall took over Op Tansor for a while.
Off we went and RV'd with the 135. I found it very difficult to align with the drogue; every time I missed the boom operator moved the wretched thing. Finally I asked her just to keep things still so that I could get a reasonable picture... I made contact, with some very kind words of encouragement from my Nav. But then you have to push in so that the hose is moved sufficiently to open the valves at the drogue and tanker ends - totally unlike receiving from any other tanker. After a couple more sessions of 'teach yourself BDA AAR' we were off to find the Bears only to hear that they'd left the area... So RTB for tea.
The 'QWIL' asked what my problem had been, as it was 'just another tanker'.... I told him in words of few syllables.
Sometime later whilst holding in Ops prior to my VC10K course conversion, I happened to see a signal which had been sent to USAFE, thanking them for a recent BDA course which the author said was essential before any operational AAR was conducted with their tankers. Fine - in 2-tank fit, whereas I'd had a heavy 3-tank jet with 8 missiles!
We also prodded Vulcan tankers, which were excellent refuelling platforms! Then on one occasion we were about to launch the squadron against a USAF tanker, only to be told that it was actually a KC-10. No problem, we all had a go and found it ever so easy peasy. But someone at a higher level heard what we were doing and demanded to know why - as the KC-10 at the time wasn't cleared for our Phantoms! OC Ops rang our boss and said "I hope that only a few of you have been prodding?" Whereupon our boss replied "Oh no, we've all had a go - in fact the first pair has just launched again!". There was a sharp intake of breath before OC Ops said "Recall them - and don't do any more as you haven't got a release to service for KC-10 prodding". This the boss did, he was highly amused later to hear that OC Ops had got it in the neck for not having sufficient knowledge of the flying programme - and he had been asked to fly down to Boscombe to talk to the TPs. Not long after, we had full clearance against the KC-10!
In order of preference for tanking (before the VC10k came into service), I would say:
1. KC-10
2. Vulcan
3. Victor HDU
4. Victor pods
5. KC-135 BDA!
(Sorry if I've bored you with my tales from 40 years ago, Gordon Brown!)
The following 7 users liked this post by BEagle:
A few years ago, I was talking to a Polish historian, ex-Polish Navy, a specialist in mine and anti-submarine warfare.
The conversation turned to the 1982 war and my question was: What interested you about the war (he was active at the time), the Exocet?
He told me that no, they were not interested in missiles, that they estimated that the first salvo of their (Warsaw Pact) missiles in the Baltic alone would be 200 launches and that they could get little out of 5 missiles in the South Atlantic.
What interested them was how the British, in no time at all, transformed their merchant fleet to support the war effort. They had no idea they could do it. That led them to modify part of their war plans.
The conversation turned to the 1982 war and my question was: What interested you about the war (he was active at the time), the Exocet?
He told me that no, they were not interested in missiles, that they estimated that the first salvo of their (Warsaw Pact) missiles in the Baltic alone would be 200 launches and that they could get little out of 5 missiles in the South Atlantic.
What interested them was how the British, in no time at all, transformed their merchant fleet to support the war effort. They had no idea they could do it. That led them to modify part of their war plans.
The following 3 users liked this post by Marcantilan:
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: Hanging off the end of a thread
Posts: 33,021
Received 2,900 Likes
on
1,242 Posts
The feedback I remember from those days was a brief from someone, whose credentials I cannot remember, who said the that after the Falklands a lot of midnight oil was burnt in the Kremlin. It seems that beforehand the Russians did not think we would or could, So when we did, they had to have a major rethink. It seems that they had underestimated just how determined, inventive and bloody minded the British can be.
