USAF Lessons from Ukraine
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Thread Starter
USAF Lessons from Ukraine
Skipping over the SAW/SAM parts (important but I think already well covered), I found the emphasis on FOB/dispersed operations interesting. The USMC already doing road trials with the F-35B* - maybe we need to be reinventing the RAFG Harrier model...
* https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...-coast-highway
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...nder-in-europe
Top Ukraine War Lessons From USAF’s Commander In Europe
With neither side in the now 542-day-old war in Ukraine able to achieve air superiority, the U.S. and NATO are gathering valuable lessons for how they may have to fight on the continent in the future, the general in charge of U.S. and NATO air operations in Europe said Friday.
The U.S. and NATO will have to improve methods to counter integrated air defenses, defend against incoming threats, communicate and move assets around the continent under the U.S. doctrine of Agile Combat Employment (ACE). Those were the conclusions delivered by U.S. Air Force Gen. James Hecker - head of U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), as well as NATO's Allied Air Command and U.S. Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA) - Friday during a Defense Writers Group virtual briefing.....
.....One of the main reasons the Ukrainian Air Force has been able to stay in the fight is its ability to move its aircraft around the country and still have the enough airstrips with stocked supplies capable of sustaining air combat operations.
Hecker said that success shows the U.S. and NATO need to step up their ACE efforts.
ACE has been around “way before the Ukraine-Russian war started,” said Hecker. “And it was mainly in response to the situation in the Indo-Pacific, knowing that China had several cruise missiles, very capable cruise missiles and things like that, and we had to move or else - you know we don’t want to lose all our aircraft on the ground.”
“So enter Ukraine, and now we kind of see how they're doing and what's being effective for them by them moving their airplanes around against the threat that we’d most likely face - definitely face - if we go to Article Five [NATO collective defense agreement]. We need to make sure that we can do that as well.”
The U.S. and NATO employ ACE to some extent in Europe as well, said Hecker. But nowhere as much as Ukraine.
“We have to make sure we can be as proficient as they are,” he said of the Ukrainians, who employ their own version of ACE every day, throwing off Russia's ability to target their aircraft with standoff weapons.
“Now as weapons get a lot more accurate, etc, they can just hit every single aircraft even if it's dispersed,” said Hecker. “So what we have to do now is disperse our aircraft amongst different airfields and potentially even on highways and these kinds of things that Finland brings to the plate.”...
The U.S. had more of that capability during the Cold War, when there were more bases in Europe for U.S. combat aircraft to land, receive needed maintenance and rearm. Restoring that ability is a priority, said Hecker.
“We're going to start off with 20 to 25” such bases, said Hecker. “Of course, I'm not going to tell you where they're at. But they're in strategic locations around Europe.”
Those bases will be supplied with equipment common “to any aircraft,” said Hecker.
“We're going to work with the nations and their maintenance so that we can get interoperable on different kinds of aircraft like we were able to do 30-40 years ago.”
Last, but not least, the U.S. and NATO need more robust communications, Hecker said.
"How are we going to command and control all these units, especially if they're taking off and landing at other airfields using the ACE concept? How are we going to make that happen? And especially if we get denied communications, because that will cut off from that from a cyber attack, etc."....
* https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...-coast-highway
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...nder-in-europe
Top Ukraine War Lessons From USAF’s Commander In Europe
With neither side in the now 542-day-old war in Ukraine able to achieve air superiority, the U.S. and NATO are gathering valuable lessons for how they may have to fight on the continent in the future, the general in charge of U.S. and NATO air operations in Europe said Friday.
The U.S. and NATO will have to improve methods to counter integrated air defenses, defend against incoming threats, communicate and move assets around the continent under the U.S. doctrine of Agile Combat Employment (ACE). Those were the conclusions delivered by U.S. Air Force Gen. James Hecker - head of U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), as well as NATO's Allied Air Command and U.S. Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA) - Friday during a Defense Writers Group virtual briefing.....
.....One of the main reasons the Ukrainian Air Force has been able to stay in the fight is its ability to move its aircraft around the country and still have the enough airstrips with stocked supplies capable of sustaining air combat operations.
Hecker said that success shows the U.S. and NATO need to step up their ACE efforts.
ACE has been around “way before the Ukraine-Russian war started,” said Hecker. “And it was mainly in response to the situation in the Indo-Pacific, knowing that China had several cruise missiles, very capable cruise missiles and things like that, and we had to move or else - you know we don’t want to lose all our aircraft on the ground.”
“So enter Ukraine, and now we kind of see how they're doing and what's being effective for them by them moving their airplanes around against the threat that we’d most likely face - definitely face - if we go to Article Five [NATO collective defense agreement]. We need to make sure that we can do that as well.”
The U.S. and NATO employ ACE to some extent in Europe as well, said Hecker. But nowhere as much as Ukraine.
“We have to make sure we can be as proficient as they are,” he said of the Ukrainians, who employ their own version of ACE every day, throwing off Russia's ability to target their aircraft with standoff weapons.
“Now as weapons get a lot more accurate, etc, they can just hit every single aircraft even if it's dispersed,” said Hecker. “So what we have to do now is disperse our aircraft amongst different airfields and potentially even on highways and these kinds of things that Finland brings to the plate.”...
The U.S. had more of that capability during the Cold War, when there were more bases in Europe for U.S. combat aircraft to land, receive needed maintenance and rearm. Restoring that ability is a priority, said Hecker.
“We're going to start off with 20 to 25” such bases, said Hecker. “Of course, I'm not going to tell you where they're at. But they're in strategic locations around Europe.”
Those bases will be supplied with equipment common “to any aircraft,” said Hecker.
“We're going to work with the nations and their maintenance so that we can get interoperable on different kinds of aircraft like we were able to do 30-40 years ago.”
Last, but not least, the U.S. and NATO need more robust communications, Hecker said.
"How are we going to command and control all these units, especially if they're taking off and landing at other airfields using the ACE concept? How are we going to make that happen? And especially if we get denied communications, because that will cut off from that from a cyber attack, etc."....
The following 3 users liked this post by GeeRam:
The following 2 users liked this post by ROC man:
Those bases will be supplied with equipment common “to any aircraft,” said Hecker.
“We're going to work with the nations and their maintenance so that we can get interoperable on different kinds of aircraft like we were able to do 30-40 years ago.”
Last, but not least, the U.S. and NATO need more robust communications, Hecker said.
"How are we going to command and control all these units, especially if they're taking off and landing at other airfields using the ACE concept? How are we going to make that happen? And especially if we get denied communications, because that will cut off from that from a cyber attack, etc."....
“We're going to work with the nations and their maintenance so that we can get interoperable on different kinds of aircraft like we were able to do 30-40 years ago.”
Last, but not least, the U.S. and NATO need more robust communications, Hecker said.
"How are we going to command and control all these units, especially if they're taking off and landing at other airfields using the ACE concept? How are we going to make that happen? And especially if we get denied communications, because that will cut off from that from a cyber attack, etc."....
So....the UK is closing bases right and left....which seems contrarian to the strategic goal of NATO.
Can NATO or the USAF take possession of some of these bases being closed and run them on a Standby basis?
Is the USAF closing bases of its own?
Inter-operability allowing for the sharing of "common" parts.....now there is a mouthful.
As the CH-47 is a very "common" aircraft.....operated by probably every NATO Member (no I did not google it)....just how "common" are the parts among the many versions of the Chinook being operated? (Just one example)
If you really for dispersal....how does one communicate reliably and maintain stockage of those common parts....and who pays for them?
Who pays for those "dispersed" locations (not necessarily "Bases" but perhaps preplanned roadside lagers or similar) and keeps them prepared for use?
Now...consider high performance FJ's, large Transport aircraft, and major repair facilities not to mention industrial capability to produce urgent repair parts.
Seems a daunting task for a multi-national force to iron out the wrinkles in the effort.
The following users liked this post:
it was never proven to be a drone at all - it was a very windy day IIRC and people kept claiming they'd seen something but nothing was ever found
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Often in Jersey, but mainly in the past.
Age: 79
Posts: 7,810
Received 136 Likes
on
64 Posts
Dispersed Operaions …
Some 30 years ago my team in War Plans and Policy were looking into the subject. No idea whether any real progress has been made in UK. We looked at near off-base dispersal, decoys, camouflage, distant dispersal (Civil airfields and disused Mil) … and a whole load of other aspects including C3.. It all came down to the manpower, logistics, engineering and a host of rat-**** that makes these cute demos look great … until you start punching the numbers.
Are the days of big fixed bases over? Certainly CSTOL offers options, but most NATO air forces are, I suspect, decades behind where certain Nordic nations have been for ages.
Are the days of big fixed bases over? Certainly CSTOL offers options, but most NATO air forces are, I suspect, decades behind where certain Nordic nations have been for ages.
Skipping over the SAW/SAM parts (important but I think already well covered), I found the emphasis on FOB/dispersed operations interesting. The USMC already doing road trials with the F-35B* - maybe we need to be reinventing the RAFG Harrier model...
* https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...-coast-highway
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...nder-in-europe
Top Ukraine War Lessons From USAF’s Commander In Europe
With neither side in the now 542-day-old war in Ukraine able to achieve air superiority, the U.S. and NATO are gathering valuable lessons for how they may have to fight on the continent in the future, the general in charge of U.S. and NATO air operations in Europe said Friday.
The U.S. and NATO will have to improve methods to counter integrated air defenses, defend against incoming threats, communicate and move assets around the continent under the U.S. doctrine of Agile Combat Employment (ACE). Those were the conclusions delivered by U.S. Air Force Gen. James Hecker - head of U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), as well as NATO's Allied Air Command and U.S. Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA) - Friday during a Defense Writers Group virtual briefing.....
.....One of the main reasons the Ukrainian Air Force has been able to stay in the fight is its ability to move its aircraft around the country and still have the enough airstrips with stocked supplies capable of sustaining air combat operations.
Hecker said that success shows the U.S. and NATO need to step up their ACE efforts.
ACE has been around “way before the Ukraine-Russian war started,” said Hecker. “And it was mainly in response to the situation in the Indo-Pacific, knowing that China had several cruise missiles, very capable cruise missiles and things like that, and we had to move or else - you know we don’t want to lose all our aircraft on the ground.”
“So enter Ukraine, and now we kind of see how they're doing and what's being effective for them by them moving their airplanes around against the threat that we’d most likely face - definitely face - if we go to Article Five [NATO collective defense agreement]. We need to make sure that we can do that as well.”
The U.S. and NATO employ ACE to some extent in Europe as well, said Hecker. But nowhere as much as Ukraine.
“We have to make sure we can be as proficient as they are,” he said of the Ukrainians, who employ their own version of ACE every day, throwing off Russia's ability to target their aircraft with standoff weapons.
“Now as weapons get a lot more accurate, etc, they can just hit every single aircraft even if it's dispersed,” said Hecker. “So what we have to do now is disperse our aircraft amongst different airfields and potentially even on highways and these kinds of things that Finland brings to the plate.”...
The U.S. had more of that capability during the Cold War, when there were more bases in Europe for U.S. combat aircraft to land, receive needed maintenance and rearm. Restoring that ability is a priority, said Hecker.
“We're going to start off with 20 to 25” such bases, said Hecker. “Of course, I'm not going to tell you where they're at. But they're in strategic locations around Europe.”
Those bases will be supplied with equipment common “to any aircraft,” said Hecker.
“We're going to work with the nations and their maintenance so that we can get interoperable on different kinds of aircraft like we were able to do 30-40 years ago.”
Last, but not least, the U.S. and NATO need more robust communications, Hecker said.
"How are we going to command and control all these units, especially if they're taking off and landing at other airfields using the ACE concept? How are we going to make that happen? And especially if we get denied communications, because that will cut off from that from a cyber attack, etc."....
* https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...-coast-highway
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...nder-in-europe
Top Ukraine War Lessons From USAF’s Commander In Europe
With neither side in the now 542-day-old war in Ukraine able to achieve air superiority, the U.S. and NATO are gathering valuable lessons for how they may have to fight on the continent in the future, the general in charge of U.S. and NATO air operations in Europe said Friday.
The U.S. and NATO will have to improve methods to counter integrated air defenses, defend against incoming threats, communicate and move assets around the continent under the U.S. doctrine of Agile Combat Employment (ACE). Those were the conclusions delivered by U.S. Air Force Gen. James Hecker - head of U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), as well as NATO's Allied Air Command and U.S. Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA) - Friday during a Defense Writers Group virtual briefing.....
.....One of the main reasons the Ukrainian Air Force has been able to stay in the fight is its ability to move its aircraft around the country and still have the enough airstrips with stocked supplies capable of sustaining air combat operations.
Hecker said that success shows the U.S. and NATO need to step up their ACE efforts.
ACE has been around “way before the Ukraine-Russian war started,” said Hecker. “And it was mainly in response to the situation in the Indo-Pacific, knowing that China had several cruise missiles, very capable cruise missiles and things like that, and we had to move or else - you know we don’t want to lose all our aircraft on the ground.”
“So enter Ukraine, and now we kind of see how they're doing and what's being effective for them by them moving their airplanes around against the threat that we’d most likely face - definitely face - if we go to Article Five [NATO collective defense agreement]. We need to make sure that we can do that as well.”
The U.S. and NATO employ ACE to some extent in Europe as well, said Hecker. But nowhere as much as Ukraine.
“We have to make sure we can be as proficient as they are,” he said of the Ukrainians, who employ their own version of ACE every day, throwing off Russia's ability to target their aircraft with standoff weapons.
“Now as weapons get a lot more accurate, etc, they can just hit every single aircraft even if it's dispersed,” said Hecker. “So what we have to do now is disperse our aircraft amongst different airfields and potentially even on highways and these kinds of things that Finland brings to the plate.”...
The U.S. had more of that capability during the Cold War, when there were more bases in Europe for U.S. combat aircraft to land, receive needed maintenance and rearm. Restoring that ability is a priority, said Hecker.
“We're going to start off with 20 to 25” such bases, said Hecker. “Of course, I'm not going to tell you where they're at. But they're in strategic locations around Europe.”
Those bases will be supplied with equipment common “to any aircraft,” said Hecker.
“We're going to work with the nations and their maintenance so that we can get interoperable on different kinds of aircraft like we were able to do 30-40 years ago.”
Last, but not least, the U.S. and NATO need more robust communications, Hecker said.
"How are we going to command and control all these units, especially if they're taking off and landing at other airfields using the ACE concept? How are we going to make that happen? And especially if we get denied communications, because that will cut off from that from a cyber attack, etc."....
The following users liked this post:
"until you start punching the numbers."
this is true in "normal" times - but in a real war - such as Ukraine - the numbers mean zero - it's can you keep the force active
the evidence shows that a few fixed bases are a shooting gallery for missiles and drones - you have to shoot and scoot
this is true in "normal" times - but in a real war - such as Ukraine - the numbers mean zero - it's can you keep the force active
the evidence shows that a few fixed bases are a shooting gallery for missiles and drones - you have to shoot and scoot
Punching the numbers can mean you find you need a lot more personnel and equipment to support deployed ops than you do you to run main base ops. If you haven't got the guys and gals or the kit to do it, you cannot make more out of thin air in anything like the required timescale and throwing money at the problem will not help.
The following 2 users liked this post by Ninthace:
What I find interesting about this is the quasi recognition that threatened and/or redundant airfields shouldn't necessarily be saved per se. Almost the contrary.
The ones which have already been turned into industrial estates and those thus threatened could quite reasonably be turned back into support facilities. Even if just for drones and missiles. With a rough operating strip masquerading as a truck parking area or access route.
Widened highways in the forest are still quite identifiable by satellite. But imagine having to go around every fenced off brown site, trying to figure out if its tractor parts or pointy things theyre producing. Or if its diesel or avgas they're storing.
Cooch
The ones which have already been turned into industrial estates and those thus threatened could quite reasonably be turned back into support facilities. Even if just for drones and missiles. With a rough operating strip masquerading as a truck parking area or access route.
Widened highways in the forest are still quite identifiable by satellite. But imagine having to go around every fenced off brown site, trying to figure out if its tractor parts or pointy things theyre producing. Or if its diesel or avgas they're storing.
Cooch
Ouch.
The take-home was it is only Ukraine that doesn't warrant the protection of CAS and better air cover, or means to interdict arty nearby.
The munitions capable UAVs from within your own (RuSSia's) lines are going to make a fashion statement for the future, wherever there is a potential 5th column, bases, particularly the big, centralised ones will become ideal targets that are worth the effort to cause some mayhem with. There are systems that are in place to counter that, but the capability of the attacker is growing fast, and it is a distributed threat, gonna cause some sleepless nights.
Singapore has had the ability to decentralise their operations to highways all around the island for years, and they practice that routinely. The concept of retaining some capability at the airbases that may be closed for cost saving seems to be too obvious to get any support from the numpties that seem to be placed by the great unwashed into the positions responsible for the security of the realm. It is too sensible to survive the gestation period in the back pocket of the pollies we have empowered in most of our lands. Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Sweden, they actually have some pollies that are worth providing oxygen to, when they are not on fire. [Brexit, thanks for nuthin']
The KA-52 is a curiosity, has it taught us that the AH-64 is worth the effort, or is not? I doubt that the Apache is more survivable than the -52, and we have seen at least one ejector seat actually function correctly out of a 'gator, seems an expensive way to get an extra set of boots into the middle of a firefight. The concern the Ukrainians indicate on the anti tank work by the 'gator suggests that it has some merit in the field, good for the AH-64, and maybe even the AH-1, but maybe, just maybe, the lowly old Loach with a bunch of TOWs is a really tiny target and able to survive by not being seen, it appears that if targeted, a parachute is a handy thing to have, so not being targeted would be ups there in the to-do list.
Am a fan of the A-10, but, the Su-25's have taken a beating, and not in a good way. The FEBA has always been a difficult place to be, but the only thing that is surviving flying over it for any period of time at present are the DGI drone drivers.
The Switchblade series were outclassed in spectacular fashion by a bunch of enthusiasts with an intent to actually save their country from criminal invasion, and while the US's 250K a pop switchblade systems were getting all packaged up neatly, a couple of $500 3D printers and a few dollars of PET filament and some 40mm grenades were clipped to $500 quad copters and actually went and messed up with the Vlads sand pit, and seem to still do so. What happened to the share price of the Switchblade OEM? DGI is not the solution for the west, but there isn't much in out that cannot be picked up from Phidgets and applied by some resourceful types. If the operators have the ability to close to a target, they make for a compelling case.
The Iranian drones are adding... nothing much new, although they do make the case that swarm attacks will require responses by defenders, it took Ukraine a couple fo days to get on top of that, and since then, Vlad continues to waste much of his effort with proving that the Ukrainians have a fair solution to his bad temper. Adaptability is the strength that Ukraine has shown, just a bit behind ingenuity. RuSSia has made it easy for Ukraine to keep up morale, Vlad finds new and inventive ways to pour more gasoline onto the reputation of the Russian
Lessons learned, most have been learnt before, and we habitually forget.
The following 2 users liked this post by fdr:
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Often in Jersey, but mainly in the past.
Age: 79
Posts: 7,810
Received 136 Likes
on
64 Posts
From the F-35 SI ...
And that's just one sqn [with 8 ac] going aboard QNLZ with all it's resources. Now try doing bare-base dispersal of assets in numerous locations. Where do the people [mainly engineers] come from, when 617 had to borrow from 207 to put their handful of jets on board.
1.4.151
Since its inception the UK F-35 workforce was under resourced.
This resulted in an inability to generate sufficient aircraft to deliver the required operational capability. The establishment was below that required, resulting in insufficient availability of workforce. ...[snip]... Even to deploy 113 personnel on Op FORTIS, 617 Sqn had to borrow personnel from 207 Sqn.
Since its inception the UK F-35 workforce was under resourced.
This resulted in an inability to generate sufficient aircraft to deliver the required operational capability. The establishment was below that required, resulting in insufficient availability of workforce. ...[snip]... Even to deploy 113 personnel on Op FORTIS, 617 Sqn had to borrow personnel from 207 Sqn.
The RAF is only configured for the deployed 'war of choice' type of operation, nothing more. There is nothing configured to defend the UK itself, should we endure that kind of conflict.
For those older ex-service members on this forum you can forget the days of 'survive to fight', defending bases, hardened facilities, dispersed operations, engineering bays (let alone the days of hardened bays), fleets of MT, military logistics or base defence. All of it was disposed of for the sake of 'political hope', albeit with a nod that we would be able to re-grow, should the need arise, within 10 years. The point being that we could regenerate faster than a threat could present itself.
Of course, we passed that 10-year tipping-point nearly 2 decades ago. We did not regenerate and the cuts continued. Some things have remained the same of course. Warfare still looks to target the adversary's ability to fight. In the case of the RAF that means that adversaries will not be targeting our military logistics, engineering, stockpiles and alike, hardened, dispersed or otherwise - we destroyed them ourselves. The targets the RAF provides for tomorrow are civilian contractor facilities such as those for Raytheon, Boeing, LM, BAE Systems, MBDA, Northrop Grumman et al. We know exactly how our adversaries can 'fight' the UK. Whilst whilst fleets of bombers, cruise missiles and alike do feature on the threat board they are probably less likely than techniques already used against the UK and others.
Want to impact the UK's ability to fight - direct message the social media of civilian contractors, telling them not to go to work. Dope a few more door handles and add additional warmth to some tea again to bolster the message. Clearly I am only posting publicly-known threats but be mindful that the UK used to include protection, resilience and redundancy of critical UK infrastructure, when it was still in public hands. That too has changed, beyond all recognition.
For those older ex-service members on this forum you can forget the days of 'survive to fight', defending bases, hardened facilities, dispersed operations, engineering bays (let alone the days of hardened bays), fleets of MT, military logistics or base defence. All of it was disposed of for the sake of 'political hope', albeit with a nod that we would be able to re-grow, should the need arise, within 10 years. The point being that we could regenerate faster than a threat could present itself.
Of course, we passed that 10-year tipping-point nearly 2 decades ago. We did not regenerate and the cuts continued. Some things have remained the same of course. Warfare still looks to target the adversary's ability to fight. In the case of the RAF that means that adversaries will not be targeting our military logistics, engineering, stockpiles and alike, hardened, dispersed or otherwise - we destroyed them ourselves. The targets the RAF provides for tomorrow are civilian contractor facilities such as those for Raytheon, Boeing, LM, BAE Systems, MBDA, Northrop Grumman et al. We know exactly how our adversaries can 'fight' the UK. Whilst whilst fleets of bombers, cruise missiles and alike do feature on the threat board they are probably less likely than techniques already used against the UK and others.
Want to impact the UK's ability to fight - direct message the social media of civilian contractors, telling them not to go to work. Dope a few more door handles and add additional warmth to some tea again to bolster the message. Clearly I am only posting publicly-known threats but be mindful that the UK used to include protection, resilience and redundancy of critical UK infrastructure, when it was still in public hands. That too has changed, beyond all recognition.
The following 7 users liked this post by Just This Once...:
As in 9/11 when the US discovered it hadn't any means of deploying to find and intercept aircraft WITHIN its borders.
Move to having a viable small and economic drone force, able to swamp defences, as the V1 almost did even with RAF and USAAF fighters deployed all over the South of England.
Remember you only have to be lucky once, and your enemy unlucky only once.
Move to having a viable small and economic drone force, able to swamp defences, as the V1 almost did even with RAF and USAAF fighters deployed all over the South of England.
Remember you only have to be lucky once, and your enemy unlucky only once.
Not just aircraft knocking down the V1. Once the guns were deployed to the coastal belt very high percentages were achieved, 60 plus? Defences were hard pushed but not overwhelmed.
Proximity fusing for the AA had a big effect on V1 interception rate, but they were some the biggest top secret and it only came out after the war
And that's just one sqn [with 8 ac] going aboard QNLZ with all it's resources. Now try doing bare-base dispersal of assets in numerous locations. Where do the people [mainly engineers] come from, when 617 had to borrow from 207 to put their handful of jets on board
We fail to learn (think), or only change very slowly - see ref; 'Preface and Introduction, pages 19 - 30
And we rarely fight the war which we plan for.
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Por..._the_Pale_.pdf
And we rarely fight the war which we plan for.
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Por..._the_Pale_.pdf
Administrator
notasmodnoradmin
In the not-too-distant future, I expect that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be much sought after, in terms of offering training and lessons learned, by professional military organizations all over the world.
In the not-too-distant future, I expect that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be much sought after, in terms of offering training and lessons learned, by professional military organizations all over the world.
The following 5 users liked this post by T28B: