RAF v RN - Falklands
Mog
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As an outsider and participant in some other situations involving adversarial engagements with various military and non-military forces to include some foreign militaries.....the one thing that binds us all together is the fact that plans and planning are effective up to the first contact with the enemy at which point pretty much all the existing plans become fit for lining the bottoms of bird cages.
It would appear the RAF and RN....followed by the Army seemed to be caught a bit flat footed upon the occupation of the Falklands by Argentine forces.
What is most admirable is the way the UK Military stood up forces and achieved a very daunting challenge so far away from friendly bases and ports.
While the back and forth goes on here.....please don't forget or minimize what was achieved by all of the UK Military forces during the Falklands Situation.
That there was confusion and conflicting orders coming down from above comes with the turf when the Starting Bell gets rung by the Opposition be it on the small unit level or at the Seat of Government level.
It would appear the RAF and RN....followed by the Army seemed to be caught a bit flat footed upon the occupation of the Falklands by Argentine forces.
What is most admirable is the way the UK Military stood up forces and achieved a very daunting challenge so far away from friendly bases and ports.
While the back and forth goes on here.....please don't forget or minimize what was achieved by all of the UK Military forces during the Falklands Situation.
That there was confusion and conflicting orders coming down from above comes with the turf when the Starting Bell gets rung by the Opposition be it on the small unit level or at the Seat of Government level.
Last edited by SASless; 13th Apr 2023 at 17:00.
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Originally Posted by [email protected]
Yes, some of our SAR rearcrew were on the MERT dets and their tales of recovery under fire are hair-raising - maybe TN could just remind us what the RN helicopters were doing at the time?
why, did I miss something?
Thank you SASless for finally bringing an element of sense to this sometimes ridiculous thread........
"please don't forget or minimize what was achieved by all of the UK Military forces during the Falklands Situation"
I have remained deep and silent since this thread appeared and I do not wish to enter - again - a debate that has been going on for years - it would take too much time and be of little interest to many.
But just to answer the question which started this thread by tartare - yes, there were problems between the RN and RAF - but not at working level. On HERMES, the problem started at the top and was largely kept there, although the autocratic nature of RN command at sea made balance very difficult. But the sailors and airmen worked seamlessly together to keep the Harriers flying, and the different shades of uniform colour at and below Lt Cdr/Sqn Ldr were transparent, irrelevant and caused absolutely no problems - we all worked together to achieve the common aim.
I agree with Mog's assessment of the "three wars" on HERMES which is a nice way of putting it - there are other aspects of Mog's comments with which I disagree, but I am not prepared to get into a pi55ing contest. If you are reading Jerry Pook's book tartare, look at the pictures in it. The one taken by Mark Hare - sadly now no longer with us - on about the 15th page of the piccies - shows that the Crabs did know how to fly low. Mark at that stage was a first tourist, and the height he was flying at when he took that picture was representative of the heights we were all flying at. It was not a contest to see who could fly the lowest.
Back to the SASless comment - let me add the RFA folk and the crews of the STUFT who did some remarkable things, and who almost certainly have not received just recognition for what they did.
And finally, to chip in with who has the best helicopter crews - the RAF, the Army, the RN and the RM all have some quite excellent crews - but I doubt that anyone would question the efforts of the crews of BN in 82, or the quite amazing things that Chinook crews - and many others - have done since in Afghanistan and other places.
I return to "deep and silent"
"please don't forget or minimize what was achieved by all of the UK Military forces during the Falklands Situation"
I have remained deep and silent since this thread appeared and I do not wish to enter - again - a debate that has been going on for years - it would take too much time and be of little interest to many.
But just to answer the question which started this thread by tartare - yes, there were problems between the RN and RAF - but not at working level. On HERMES, the problem started at the top and was largely kept there, although the autocratic nature of RN command at sea made balance very difficult. But the sailors and airmen worked seamlessly together to keep the Harriers flying, and the different shades of uniform colour at and below Lt Cdr/Sqn Ldr were transparent, irrelevant and caused absolutely no problems - we all worked together to achieve the common aim.
I agree with Mog's assessment of the "three wars" on HERMES which is a nice way of putting it - there are other aspects of Mog's comments with which I disagree, but I am not prepared to get into a pi55ing contest. If you are reading Jerry Pook's book tartare, look at the pictures in it. The one taken by Mark Hare - sadly now no longer with us - on about the 15th page of the piccies - shows that the Crabs did know how to fly low. Mark at that stage was a first tourist, and the height he was flying at when he took that picture was representative of the heights we were all flying at. It was not a contest to see who could fly the lowest.
Back to the SASless comment - let me add the RFA folk and the crews of the STUFT who did some remarkable things, and who almost certainly have not received just recognition for what they did.
And finally, to chip in with who has the best helicopter crews - the RAF, the Army, the RN and the RM all have some quite excellent crews - but I doubt that anyone would question the efforts of the crews of BN in 82, or the quite amazing things that Chinook crews - and many others - have done since in Afghanistan and other places.
I return to "deep and silent"
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the decodes for abbreviations perhaps?
Timelord, the belief that the RAF had used deceit and underhand tactics in the 60s was communicated to me as an OUT by BRNC staff in the early 80s, I trust later generations were more enlightened.
Just to be clear, I think I understand why the were like they were, but that doesn't excuse discourtesy to the members of other services.
(AT the risk of restarting another hamsterwheel) Sharkey is the one I don't understand, though I suspect some thing he has said/written are just for effect. He had served with men in light blue when on 892, in his Falklands book he had complementary things to say about Wittering, Ian Mortimer, and Bertie Penfold, and nothing negative about the members of 1F he mentions. He is unpleasant about the RAF as an institution and members he met fleetingly or not at all. In someways I think he was redirecting frustration with the RN higher ups. He had however seen the end of the RN's Advanced, Operational and CO/SPLOT/QWI training squadrons and the apparent end of fleet carriers. His clearly has a very narrow field of view and is only concerned with preservation of fixed wing RN flying and does not care who he offends and how flaky some of the 'evidence' he quotes is and how ridiculous he appears. It is a shame he wasn't content with the recognition he deserved for his role in introducing SHAR and as CO 801.
I would think most WAFUs were more worried the Fishheads would have no qualms selling us out if it was in their interests than being threatened by the light blue.
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why, did I miss something?
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Rather like the meeting of the heads with Maggie on 2nd April 82, where CAS said he couldn’t help, head pongo said he would require 30k troops to retake the islands and 1SL said “We will sail on Monday Ma’am”. (I paraphrase!) And we did. The only SHARs left behind were still on the production line at Dunsfold.
Mog
Mog
Last edited by Expatrick; 14th Apr 2023 at 15:25.
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I think it is a combination of that (although 2nd Lt Nott 2GR Rtd had already changed his mind on the LPDs but Four One Commando had already been disbanded in '81) - the RAF were net winners under CMD 8288: retention of 4 F-4 AD squadrons alongside Tornado ADV and 3 extra Nimrod MR2 conversions - and the fact that that generation of senior captains and admirals had lived through the destruction of the Carrier and (warm) Blue Water navies by Maj Healey RE Rtd apparently under the belief the RAF could do the same job more cheaply and equally effectively. Although a career submariner Fieldhouse, had been first lieutenant of Hermes when the 1st Wilson government was trying to sell her to Australia in the mid 60s and Lyn Middleton was CO 809 NAS (Hermes Buccaneer squadron) at the same time. There appears to have been a climate of fear that this was the last chance to save the Navy having any role outside North Atlantic ASW and the SSBNs'; any substantial avoidable involvement of the other services had to be forestalled.
Timelord, the belief that the RAF had used deceit and underhand tactics in the 60s was communicated to me as an OUT by BRNC staff in the early 80s, I trust later generations were more enlightened.
Just to be clear, I think I understand why the were like they were, but that doesn't excuse discourtesy to the members of other services.
(AT the risk of restarting another hamsterwheel) Sharkey is the one I don't understand, though I suspect some thing he has said/written are just for effect. He had served with men in light blue when on 892, in his Falklands book he had complementary things to say about Wittering, Ian Mortimer, and Bertie Penfold, and nothing negative about the members of 1F he mentions. He is unpleasant about the RAF as an institution and members he met fleetingly or not at all. In someways I think he was redirecting frustration with the RN higher ups. He had however seen the end of the RN's Advanced, Operational and CO/SPLOT/QWI training squadrons and the apparent end of fleet carriers. His clearly has a very narrow field of view and is only concerned with preservation of fixed wing RN flying and does not care who he offends and how flaky some of the 'evidence' he quotes is and how ridiculous he appears. It is a shame he wasn't content with the recognition he deserved for his role in introducing SHAR and as CO 801.
I would think most WAFUs were more worried the Fishheads would have no qualms selling us out if it was in their interests than being threatened by the light blue.
Timelord, the belief that the RAF had used deceit and underhand tactics in the 60s was communicated to me as an OUT by BRNC staff in the early 80s, I trust later generations were more enlightened.
Just to be clear, I think I understand why the were like they were, but that doesn't excuse discourtesy to the members of other services.
(AT the risk of restarting another hamsterwheel) Sharkey is the one I don't understand, though I suspect some thing he has said/written are just for effect. He had served with men in light blue when on 892, in his Falklands book he had complementary things to say about Wittering, Ian Mortimer, and Bertie Penfold, and nothing negative about the members of 1F he mentions. He is unpleasant about the RAF as an institution and members he met fleetingly or not at all. In someways I think he was redirecting frustration with the RN higher ups. He had however seen the end of the RN's Advanced, Operational and CO/SPLOT/QWI training squadrons and the apparent end of fleet carriers. His clearly has a very narrow field of view and is only concerned with preservation of fixed wing RN flying and does not care who he offends and how flaky some of the 'evidence' he quotes is and how ridiculous he appears. It is a shame he wasn't content with the recognition he deserved for his role in introducing SHAR and as CO 801.
I would think most WAFUs were more worried the Fishheads would have no qualms selling us out if it was in their interests than being threatened by the light blue.
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Once upon a time there was the purple concept.
I am sure the informed taxpayer liked it.
I am sure the informed civilian adjunct liked it.
But greedy, small minded, jealous inbred airships and RN / Army equivalents have never bought in to the simple fact that they are paid large salaries to ensure defence of the realm.
Sad but true,
I am sure the informed taxpayer liked it.
I am sure the informed civilian adjunct liked it.
But greedy, small minded, jealous inbred airships and RN / Army equivalents have never bought in to the simple fact that they are paid large salaries to ensure defence of the realm.
Sad but true,
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I think it is a combination of that (although 2nd Lt Nott 2GR Rtd had already changed his mind on the LPDs but Four One Commando had already been disbanded in '81) - the RAF were net winners under CMD 8288: retention of 4 F-4 AD squadrons alongside Tornado ADV and 3 extra Nimrod MR2 conversions - and the fact that that generation of senior captains and admirals had lived through the destruction of the Carrier and (warm) Blue Water navies by Maj Healey RE Rtd apparently under the belief the RAF could do the same job more cheaply and equally effectively. Although a career submariner Fieldhouse, had been first lieutenant of Hermes when the 1st Wilson government was trying to sell her to Australia in the mid 60s and Lyn Middleton was CO 809 NAS (Hermes Buccaneer squadron) at the same time. There appears to have been a climate of fear that this was the last chance to save the Navy having any role outside North Atlantic ASW and the SSBNs'; any substantial avoidable involvement of the other services had to be forestalled.
Timelord, the belief that the RAF had used deceit and underhand tactics in the 60s was communicated to me as an OUT by BRNC staff in the early 80s, I trust later generations were more enlightened.
Just to be clear, I think I understand why the were like they were, but that doesn't excuse discourtesy to the members of other services.
(AT the risk of restarting another hamsterwheel) Sharkey is the one I don't understand, though I suspect some thing he has said/written are just for effect. He had served with men in light blue when on 892, in his Falklands book he had complementary things to say about Wittering, Ian Mortimer, and Bertie Penfold, and nothing negative about the members of 1F he mentions. He is unpleasant about the RAF as an institution and members he met fleetingly or not at all. In someways I think he was redirecting frustration with the RN higher ups. He had however seen the end of the RN's Advanced, Operational and CO/SPLOT/QWI training squadrons and the apparent end of fleet carriers. His clearly has a very narrow field of view and is only concerned with preservation of fixed wing RN flying and does not care who he offends and how flaky some of the 'evidence' he quotes is and how ridiculous he appears. It is a shame he wasn't content with the recognition he deserved for his role in introducing SHAR and as CO 801.
I would think most WAFUs were more worried the Fishheads would have no qualms selling us out if it was in their interests than being threatened by the light blue.
Timelord, the belief that the RAF had used deceit and underhand tactics in the 60s was communicated to me as an OUT by BRNC staff in the early 80s, I trust later generations were more enlightened.
Just to be clear, I think I understand why the were like they were, but that doesn't excuse discourtesy to the members of other services.
(AT the risk of restarting another hamsterwheel) Sharkey is the one I don't understand, though I suspect some thing he has said/written are just for effect. He had served with men in light blue when on 892, in his Falklands book he had complementary things to say about Wittering, Ian Mortimer, and Bertie Penfold, and nothing negative about the members of 1F he mentions. He is unpleasant about the RAF as an institution and members he met fleetingly or not at all. In someways I think he was redirecting frustration with the RN higher ups. He had however seen the end of the RN's Advanced, Operational and CO/SPLOT/QWI training squadrons and the apparent end of fleet carriers. His clearly has a very narrow field of view and is only concerned with preservation of fixed wing RN flying and does not care who he offends and how flaky some of the 'evidence' he quotes is and how ridiculous he appears. It is a shame he wasn't content with the recognition he deserved for his role in introducing SHAR and as CO 801.
I would think most WAFUs were more worried the Fishheads would have no qualms selling us out if it was in their interests than being threatened by the light blue.
Although certainly a "career submariner", Admiral Fieldhouse was also a very distinguished "career commander". before becoming CINCFLEET, having served as a Captain of the 3rd Frigate Squadron in HMS DIOMEDE, as a Commodore as COMSTANAVFORLANT (the forerunner of SNMG1), and as a Rear Admiral as Flag Officer Second Flotilla, before becoming Flag Officer Submarines and then Controller of the Navy. Rather than being First Lieutenant of HMS HERMES, he was actually the Executive Officer, or second in command, in the rank of Commander and, having been provisionally selected for promotion to Captain in 1967, additionally took temporary command of HERMES, including covering the withdrawal from Aden, between the departure of the then Captain Lewin (later Admiral of the Fleet - and CDS to Fieldhouse's CINCFLEET) and the arrival of Captain (later Rear Admiral Parker).
Add to the foregoing, Admiral Fieldhouse was both Deputy Director and then Director of Naval Warfare before becoming Flag Officer Second Flotilla, all of which I believe makes clear that he was indeed a very distinguished and well-rounded seagoing commander, whether above or below the waves. No wonder he subsequently became First Sea Lord, CDS, and he would almost certainly have become an outstanding Chairman of the NATO Military Committee if ill health had not unfortunately intervened
Jack
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Thread Starter
R/e Hermes Captain's three wars - without speaking ill of the dead - we are talking about RA Linley Middleton?
Really appreciate all the input to the original question gents.
There's something very British about this war - dreadful as it was - and not meant in a misty eyed way at all.
Enormous challenge, overwhelming odds (I read somewhere the Americans were pretty much convinced the taskforce would be defeated).
Improvisations at time bordering on Heath Robinson lash ups.
Under resourced, in some cases very outdated or unreliable equipment (GR3 radios and IFF!).
Terrible climate, brutal fighting.
Against such odds - you would have expected another story of glorious British failure.
Yet, Britain won.
Really appreciate all the input to the original question gents.
There's something very British about this war - dreadful as it was - and not meant in a misty eyed way at all.
Enormous challenge, overwhelming odds (I read somewhere the Americans were pretty much convinced the taskforce would be defeated).
Improvisations at time bordering on Heath Robinson lash ups.
Under resourced, in some cases very outdated or unreliable equipment (GR3 radios and IFF!).
Terrible climate, brutal fighting.
Against such odds - you would have expected another story of glorious British failure.
Yet, Britain won.
Last edited by tartare; 14th Apr 2023 at 04:19.
Lyn M didn’t suffer fools gladly.. be it light or dark blue, Crab Harrier pilot or ASW 2nd tourist. And continued to do so when he went on to become FONAC after leaving the ‘Happy H’. He did reserve a particular animus for Air Force officers whom he considered gash ill mannered shags… a gross generalisation of course. But a view which we’d all had drilled in to us to some extent as we progressed through the training system, which was conducted in the main at RAF establishments until we reached Culdrose, Portland or VL, or embarked. Was this view nonsense. ? Of course it was… I’ve served with enough RAF exchange officers to know that the enmity was misplaced. It was however, prevalent, and was probably a result of being in the minority at these establishments.
All that said, and by way of example, the bollocking that he handed out to a Sea King crew ( and CO and TOSK) that had ditched unnecessarily whilst conducting night FCS malfunctions at the dip ( a nonsense frankly as there was no real ASW threat and that’s what sims are for) was a thing to behold. As was the order to get back in to the aircraft ( that had stayed upright ) and recover it back to the carrier.
At the end of the day by its very nature it was always going to an RN/RM/ARMY campaign with some elements of Air Force involvement. Certain parts of the RAF involvement ( the effort involved in bombing Stanley from long range being a prime example) were ‘bigged up’ in my view to justify the time and effort. The runway continued to be used almost until the surrender by Arg Hercs. Whether it prevented them deploying other assets to the FI is another question and probably worthy of a whole new thread of its own.
All that said, and by way of example, the bollocking that he handed out to a Sea King crew ( and CO and TOSK) that had ditched unnecessarily whilst conducting night FCS malfunctions at the dip ( a nonsense frankly as there was no real ASW threat and that’s what sims are for) was a thing to behold. As was the order to get back in to the aircraft ( that had stayed upright ) and recover it back to the carrier.
At the end of the day by its very nature it was always going to an RN/RM/ARMY campaign with some elements of Air Force involvement. Certain parts of the RAF involvement ( the effort involved in bombing Stanley from long range being a prime example) were ‘bigged up’ in my view to justify the time and effort. The runway continued to be used almost until the surrender by Arg Hercs. Whether it prevented them deploying other assets to the FI is another question and probably worthy of a whole new thread of its own.
Last edited by MENELAUS; 14th Apr 2023 at 09:21.
Lyn M didn’t suffer fools gladly.. be it light or dark blue, Crab Harrier pilot or ASW 2nd tourist. And continued to do so when he went on to become FONAC after leaving the ‘Happy H’. He did reserve a particular animus for Air Force officers whom he considered gash ill mannered shags… a gross generalisation of course. But a view which we’d all had drilled in to us to some extent as we progressed through the training system, which was conducted in the main at RAF establishments until we reached Culdrose, Portland or VL, or embarked. Was this view nonsense. ? Of course it was… I’ve served with enough RAF exchange officers to know that the enmity was misplaced.
All that said, and by way of example, the bollocking that he handed out to a Sea King crew ( and CO and TOSK) that had ditched unnecessarily whilst conducting night FCS malfunctions at the dip ( a nonsense frankly as there was no real ASW threat) was a thing to behold. As was the order to get back in to the aircraft ( that had stayed upright ) and recover it back to the aircraft.
At the end of the day by its very nature it was always going to an RN/RM/ARMY campaign with some elements of Air Force involvement. Certain parts of the RAF involvement ( the effort involved in bombing Stanley from long range being a prime example) were ‘bigged up’ in my view to justify the time and effort. The runway continued to be used almost until the surrender by Arg Hercs. Whether it prevented them deploying other assets to the FI is another question and probably worthy of a whole new thread of its own.
All that said, and by way of example, the bollocking that he handed out to a Sea King crew ( and CO and TOSK) that had ditched unnecessarily whilst conducting night FCS malfunctions at the dip ( a nonsense frankly as there was no real ASW threat) was a thing to behold. As was the order to get back in to the aircraft ( that had stayed upright ) and recover it back to the aircraft.
At the end of the day by its very nature it was always going to an RN/RM/ARMY campaign with some elements of Air Force involvement. Certain parts of the RAF involvement ( the effort involved in bombing Stanley from long range being a prime example) were ‘bigged up’ in my view to justify the time and effort. The runway continued to be used almost until the surrender by Arg Hercs. Whether it prevented them deploying other assets to the FI is another question and probably worthy of a whole new thread of its own.
Very interesting thread, though!
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Menelaus, I probably shouldn't have got involved; I was in the processs of getting in when others were risking their lives and never had the command responsibilities of Lord Fieldhouse and Linley Middleton nor the privilege of meeting them. Though, I do remember the advice, 'you can be either friendly or tough with your subordinates but you MUST be consistent' - which from your account LM was. As a man who survived three crashes off Eagle in less than a year and flew the death trap that was the Scimitar and also has a reputation as an excellent desk officer, I can't help but admire him. However, I acknowledge that EFJ and his colleagues had an unpleasant experience while flying dangerous missions. As to Lord Fieldhouse, what I have heard about him suggests the country was very fortunate to have him in charge of Op Corporate. I do wonder if there was an element of the late Duke of Edinburgh's brand of naval officer sense of humour involved.
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Exactly. In a similar vein to Op Chastise and the Doolittle Raid, some operations have an effect upon respective morale (civilian and military), present a statement of national resolve, and disrupt the enemy's strategic planning far beyond any materiel damage inflicted.
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Menelaus, I probably shouldn't have got involved; I was in the processs of getting in when others were risking their lives and never had the command responsibilities of Lord Fieldhouse and Linley Middleton nor the privilege of meeting them. Though, I do remember the advice, 'you can be either friendly or tough with your subordinates but you MUST be consistent' - which from your account LM was. As a man who survived three crashes off Eagle in less than a year and flew the death trap that was the Scimitar and also has a reputation as an excellent desk officer, I can't help but admire him. However, I acknowledge that EFJ and his colleagues had an unpleasant experience while flying dangerous missions. As to Lord Fieldhouse, what I have heard about him suggests the country was very fortunate to have him in charge of Op Corporate. I do wonder if there was an element of the late Duke of Edinburgh's brand of naval officer sense of humour involved.
Thank God I never had him as a boss.
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