1966: That Time A QRA Mirage IVA Took Off With A Live Nuke
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1966: That Time A QRA Mirage IVA Took Off With A Live Nuke
Reading coverage of the French air force's nuclear exercise (Poker) at the moment I came across this:
https://www.lopinion.fr/blog/secret-...ualise-3-25009
In 1966, the AdlA had a serious incident with the Mirage IV QRA based in Orange. A split-flap indicator board - like the classic airport/railway station ones - was used to display alert states via some sort of landline from the HQ in Taverny. Due to a lightning strike, the board clattered round to display "DG" in black on red on one dispersal only, the equivalent of "Scramble QRA", and the crew responded. Their C3 procedures required them to respond immediately to the board and to only accept ad hoc orders from senior officers on site after completing a special authentication. As a result, they ignored efforts by the squadron commander and ops officer to stand them down, took off and escaped from the vicinity of the base, before heading for their tanker bracket over the Alps. Various VSOs called up on the radio but they were also ignored as standing orders required radio silence at this point. However, the AdlA operated a similar positive control protocol to that used in the V-Force - on reaching the bracket the a/c was meant to call in to get positive confirmation of the strike order, and failing that, RTB. As a result the jet returned safely after either burning off or dumping fuel.
A couple of interesting things - their SOPs seem quite similar to British ones notably the centralized telebrief-like C2, the requirement to treat ad-hoc orders with suspicion (this comes up in several stories in the various V-threads here), and the positive control procedure. In other ways they weren't - note the indicator board rather than the voice of the Bomber Controller. Apparently de Gaulle was unexpectedly pleased as the crew had responded without hesitation and had followed the SOP strictly in not listening to someone randomly waving his hands on the taxiway or begging them to stop on the radio.
Of course France had some very good reasons to worry about a senior officer turning up and trying to give direct orders to the aircrew - this was only 3 years after the 1962 coup attempt in Algiers.
https://www.lopinion.fr/blog/secret-...ualise-3-25009
In 1966, the AdlA had a serious incident with the Mirage IV QRA based in Orange. A split-flap indicator board - like the classic airport/railway station ones - was used to display alert states via some sort of landline from the HQ in Taverny. Due to a lightning strike, the board clattered round to display "DG" in black on red on one dispersal only, the equivalent of "Scramble QRA", and the crew responded. Their C3 procedures required them to respond immediately to the board and to only accept ad hoc orders from senior officers on site after completing a special authentication. As a result, they ignored efforts by the squadron commander and ops officer to stand them down, took off and escaped from the vicinity of the base, before heading for their tanker bracket over the Alps. Various VSOs called up on the radio but they were also ignored as standing orders required radio silence at this point. However, the AdlA operated a similar positive control protocol to that used in the V-Force - on reaching the bracket the a/c was meant to call in to get positive confirmation of the strike order, and failing that, RTB. As a result the jet returned safely after either burning off or dumping fuel.
A couple of interesting things - their SOPs seem quite similar to British ones notably the centralized telebrief-like C2, the requirement to treat ad-hoc orders with suspicion (this comes up in several stories in the various V-threads here), and the positive control procedure. In other ways they weren't - note the indicator board rather than the voice of the Bomber Controller. Apparently de Gaulle was unexpectedly pleased as the crew had responded without hesitation and had followed the SOP strictly in not listening to someone randomly waving his hands on the taxiway or begging them to stop on the radio.
Of course France had some very good reasons to worry about a senior officer turning up and trying to give direct orders to the aircrew - this was only 3 years after the 1962 coup attempt in Algiers.
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Ah, memories in Waddo Tower of “This is the Bomber Controller, <redacted blah blah blah>“ coming from the ‘Bomber Box’.
I had an NCO controller who was, for some strange reason, incapable of repeating (on Local frequency) the messages verbatim, despite his Assistant passing him a chinagraph plaque with the standard full wording and the relevant codes written on it. Fortunately the crews took more cognisance of what they received via ‘other means’.
I had an NCO controller who was, for some strange reason, incapable of repeating (on Local frequency) the messages verbatim, despite his Assistant passing him a chinagraph plaque with the standard full wording and the relevant codes written on it. Fortunately the crews took more cognisance of what they received via ‘other means’.
I remember an old friend (sadly no longer with us) telling me a story about being at a Norwegian base in the middle of a NATO exercise (with a Canberra) when a French Air Force Mirage IV did an emergency landing, very short of fuel having become unsure of his position.
In the bar later, the captain was given the title "To Lose Le Track".
In the bar later, the captain was given the title "To Lose Le Track".
Fortunate to watch a 'live' scramble when visiting one of 'those bases' (1970/71). The whole base went into immediate lockdown - hooters everywhere; our hosts with some embarrassment asked us look the other way, but did not object to a grandstand view together with their proud commentary.
What was surprising was that the tanker was airborne before the bombers - by a few seconds - with better than air defence QRA reaction times.
The overall impression was of a very professional and effective force; and nothing to suggest that the two aircraft were not 'live'.
What was surprising was that the tanker was airborne before the bombers - by a few seconds - with better than air defence QRA reaction times.
The overall impression was of a very professional and effective force; and nothing to suggest that the two aircraft were not 'live'.
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Ah, memories in Waddo Tower of “This is the Bomber Controller, <redacted blah blah blah>“ coming from the ‘Bomber Box’.
I had an NCO controller who was, for some strange reason, incapable of repeating (on Local frequency) the messages verbatim, despite his Assistant passing him a chinagraph plaque with the standard full wording and the relevant codes written on it. Fortunately the crews took more cognisance of what they received via ‘other means’.
I had an NCO controller who was, for some strange reason, incapable of repeating (on Local frequency) the messages verbatim, despite his Assistant passing him a chinagraph plaque with the standard full wording and the relevant codes written on it. Fortunately the crews took more cognisance of what they received via ‘other means’.
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I remember an old friend (sadly no longer with us) telling me a story about being at a Norwegian base in the middle of a NATO exercise (with a Canberra) when a French Air Force Mirage IV did an emergency landing, very short of fuel having become unsure of his position.
In the bar later, the captain was given the title "To Lose Le Track".
In the bar later, the captain was given the title "To Lose Le Track".
I like a good pun and "To lose le track" is a sublime classic, especially as it was conjured in the moments of it happening. As an aside, I always found the Mirage IV to be both beautiful and very menacing in equal parts.
An interesting thread, but this source portrays the incident in a slightly different light :
https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet...ommunications/
The source also provides some very interesting (some might say disturbing) information regarding French release authentication systems.
YS
Beyond those incidents, a story suggests that a pilot of the Forces aériennes stratégiques took off with nuclear weapons under his wings thinking he had received an order to go when actually that was not the case.
The source also provides some very interesting (some might say disturbing) information regarding French release authentication systems.
YS
