Army F-35?
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Army F-35?
US Army general quoted / hinted that the army aviation branch may want the F-35 for CAS.
https://www.foxnews.com/tech/the-us-...se-air-support
It brings back memories of their 1950s/60s attempts to have their in-house FAC with the likes of the T-37, A-4, N156 and Fiat G91
And of course participating in the Kestrel program.
cheers
https://www.foxnews.com/tech/the-us-...se-air-support
It brings back memories of their 1950s/60s attempts to have their in-house FAC with the likes of the T-37, A-4, N156 and Fiat G91
And of course participating in the Kestrel program.
cheers
Beyond the headline (which itself is ambiguous), there is nothing in that story that says the US Army wants to operate the F-35. What the general says is that the F-35 can provide effective support for his troops, but that's not even close to him saying the US Army should fly it.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
It was the same with the Barrier in RAFG, a division level asset.
However do the maths stack up? Using a hugely expensive sledge hammer to hit a very cheap nut?
However do the maths stack up? Using a hugely expensive sledge hammer to hit a very cheap nut?
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First off, the Army is not even considering operating the F-35. They're just saying they are satisfied the F-35 can do the CAS job.
Secondly, even if they were it would never happen. USAF would see this as Army trespassing on their exclusive turf and scream bloody murder. The Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) program was an Army program to replace several small Army fixed wing cargo aicraft. The Army selected the JCA configured C-27J Spartan from Alenia. USAF protested saying C-27J was too much airplane for the Army and violated the roles and missions rules. It took only two years before USAF took over the program which they then immediately killed. The 14 aircraft already contracted for by the Army flew directly from the factory to the Davis Monthan boneyard for storage. Coast Guard eventually got them.
Secondly, even if they were it would never happen. USAF would see this as Army trespassing on their exclusive turf and scream bloody murder. The Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) program was an Army program to replace several small Army fixed wing cargo aicraft. The Army selected the JCA configured C-27J Spartan from Alenia. USAF protested saying C-27J was too much airplane for the Army and violated the roles and missions rules. It took only two years before USAF took over the program which they then immediately killed. The 14 aircraft already contracted for by the Army flew directly from the factory to the Davis Monthan boneyard for storage. Coast Guard eventually got them.
The General did not say the US Army wants to operate its own F-35's, he simply said they look forward to them being used for CAS etc and he thinks its characteristics are a potential game changer..the operator could be USAF/USMC/USN [or coalition too I'd say]
The latter paragraphs of the story degenerate into some of the uttermost 
that has ever been written on the subject, and that is a high bar.
The writer seems unaware that - at the present moment and until some unspecified future date - any aircraft with a current-generation targeting pod and ROVER capability has better sensors and comms for CAS than an F-35. But even that's not the worst:
Could it draw upon its “hovering” technology to loiter near high-value target areas? To what extent could it keep flying in the event that major components, such as engines or fuselage components, were destroyed in war?
//weeps softly, bangs head on desk....
that has ever been written on the subject, and that is a high bar. The writer seems unaware that - at the present moment and until some unspecified future date - any aircraft with a current-generation targeting pod and ROVER capability has better sensors and comms for CAS than an F-35. But even that's not the worst:
Could it draw upon its “hovering” technology to loiter near high-value target areas? To what extent could it keep flying in the event that major components, such as engines or fuselage components, were destroyed in war?
//weeps softly, bangs head on desk....
In fairness, I think that's meant rhetorically, the implied response being, "Of course it can't, so please don't take away our A-10s"
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Regarding the Army/USAF turf wars, keep in mind how the A-10 came to be. After the 1966 Army/Air Force agreement restricting Army operation of fixed wing aircraft and USAF operation of rotary wing aircraft, Army developed the AH-56 Cheyenne helicopter. But there were two political problems: 1) the Cheyenne had eye watering performance and was going to be a fantastic aerial tank killer. USAF viewed aerial tank killing as their exclusive turf, never dreaming a helicopter could do that mission. 2) the Cheyenne was a compound helicopter with a pusher prop and small fixed wings, which USAF argued violated the 1966 agreement. The turf battle raged for years and was finally resolved when Army agreed to cancel the compound Cheyenne and develop the AAH pure helicopter tank killer, which ultimately became the AH-64 Apache, and USAF agreed to develop the fixed wing A-X tank killer, which became the A-10. The turf wars have calmed down considerably, but not enough for USAF to ever allow Army to operate F-35s. The F-35 operates on turf which USAF views as forever and always belonging exclusively to them.
Frankly, I suspect that attempting to operate any F-35 variant from anyone's turf would be a messy failure and would up the turf good and proper.
Historical note: the AH-56 itself survived the Air Force's challenge, emerging unscathed from the 1971 Senate review of different service CAS requirements. I believe it was the Army's decision, in the light of technical problems and combat experience, to replace the AH-56 with the AAH, which became Apache.
up the turf good and proper. Historical note: the AH-56 itself survived the Air Force's challenge, emerging unscathed from the 1971 Senate review of different service CAS requirements. I believe it was the Army's decision, in the light of technical problems and combat experience, to replace the AH-56 with the AAH, which became Apache.
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Historical note: the AH-56 itself survived the Air Force's challenge, emerging unscathed from the 1971 Senate review of different service CAS requirements. I believe it was the Army's decision, in the light of technical problems and combat experience, to replace the AH-56 with the AAH, which became Apache.
And then Cheyenne #7 with the new AMCS (advanced mechanical control system) flew and showed it had resolved the Cheyenne's controllability and stability issues, improved handling, improved maneuverability, and reduced pilot workload. It also reached a speed of 215 knots in level flight and 245 knots in a dive, very good numbers to this day. But Cheyenne was dead as a program. Lockheed tried to resurrect it by competing for AAH with a modified Cheyenne with two engines and no pusher prop, but failed. And this killed Lockheed's attempt to get into the helicopter market. McDonnell Douglas used a different approach to get into that market. It bought Hughes Helicopters which had a line of both commercial and military helicopters. But McDonnell never understood the commercial aviation business and ended up slowly killing both their commercial airliner and helicopter businesses by failing to invest.
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Besides the turf wars between USAF and Army, USAF engaged in turf wars with USN. P-8A Poseidon was originally intended to include WARP (Wing Aerial Refueling Pods) and have a fleet aerial refueling mission. The P-8s were to be assigned to tactical air wings and follow a carrier as it deployed. P-3s would provide not only ASW, ASuW and ISR support, but also tanking support whenever there were flight ops. USAF cried foul stating they were the sole providers of strategic tanking. USN responded this was tactical, not strategic tanking, but to no avail. The tanking capability was removed from the P-8's requirements.
