USMC MV-22 Osprey down off the QLD coast
Chief Bottle Washer
An update with the release of some footage of the fatal crash:
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...-crash-emerges
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...-crash-emerges
That is an old 2017 video, see comments below by the poster on YouTube.
On August 5, 2017, a United States Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 265 with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, took off from the amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard and headed for the USS Green Bay as part of an exercise when, with almost no warning, everything went sideways. The Osprey struck the USS Green Bay and crashed in Shoalwater Bay on the east coast of Australia. Although a heroic effort resulted in the rescue of twenty-three personnel, there had been twenty-six aboard the accident aircraft. By the end of joint-US and Australian Navy recovery operations, three marines were confirmed dead. This video presents two cell phone camera videos of the tragic mishap, video of the accident aircraft's recovery, and new photographs from a number of other MV-22 Osprey mishaps. The mishap report is available at
IG
On August 5, 2017, a United States Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 265 with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, took off from the amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard and headed for the USS Green Bay as part of an exercise when, with almost no warning, everything went sideways. The Osprey struck the USS Green Bay and crashed in Shoalwater Bay on the east coast of Australia. Although a heroic effort resulted in the rescue of twenty-three personnel, there had been twenty-six aboard the accident aircraft. By the end of joint-US and Australian Navy recovery operations, three marines were confirmed dead. This video presents two cell phone camera videos of the tragic mishap, video of the accident aircraft's recovery, and new photographs from a number of other MV-22 Osprey mishaps. The mishap report is available at
IG
I find it quite distressing that some should find videos of people dying to be of interest as, probably, do their relatives and friends. My choice is not to watch them.
Videos of people dying are not of interest to me - I will actively avoid them wherever possible.
However - as a professional aviator I do have an interest in learning from the experiences of others and therefore I will watch footage of aviation accidents in order that I may learn from them. That this often involves death is an unfortunate inevitability that I do not relish.
However - as a professional aviator I do have an interest in learning from the experiences of others and therefore I will watch footage of aviation accidents in order that I may learn from them. That this often involves death is an unfortunate inevitability that I do not relish.
I guess the US Navy's preference for keeping aircraft accident investigation reports away from the public is still alive and well.
A former colleague tells quite a different witness story as to who was to blame and it wasn't those on-board the Osprey. Many crews and squadrons had expressed repeated concerns as to what they were frequently tasked and ordered to do, over many years. Deck-spotting rotary aircraft should not start by clearing the deck of the rule book and all the testing that underpinned it.
Aside from the casualties out the closest to truth in the article is that the MV-22 was directed to land on spot 5 (...ish).
RIP to those who lost their lives due to the actions of those above them.
The investigation report makes clear that no one was at fault in the incident and that all three personnel died in the line of duty...
Aside from the casualties out the closest to truth in the article is that the MV-22 was directed to land on spot 5 (...ish).
RIP to those who lost their lives due to the actions of those above them.
Last edited by Senior Pilot; 4th Jul 2022 at 19:33. Reason: Fix quote font colour
General question: is there any data on this V-22 loss?
That is a reasonable choice. The images appear to show a very high pitch on the port prop-rotor coincident with it starting to depart to port. The report and data on this accident would be interesting to evaluate, as it may be that the rotor needs some help within the operational envelope.
General question: is there any data on this V-22 loss?
General question: is there any data on this V-22 loss?
IIRC, the pilot identified a sink rate but was unable to arrest it with the power available. He was #3 in a three-ship and was apparently caught in a strong downdraught.
I saw this sitting on the wharf after being unloaded off the salvage ship. Watched over the next few days as they cut off bits off (engines, cocpit) and assumed they were loaded onto cargo planes and returned the US.
Yes, a full transcript of the inquiry, it must be downloaded and launched in PDF Viewer
Osprey Inquiry
IG
Osprey Inquiry
IG
1746 pages that fail to explain why a deck cleared for up to 4 x H-1 type helicopters (ie spots 3,4,5 & 6) or a normal clearance for up to 2 x V-22 type aircraft on the larger spots (1 & 2, which straddle the space for the 4 smaller spots) somehow became suitable for 5 x H-1 types on deck and then expect a V-22 to land on what remained of spot 5 - from a particularly non-standard approach angle.
It was a bit of a surprise for the investigation to claim that the 5 aircraft on deck were all folded, when 2 were still fully spanned - including the UH-1Y on spot 3 that was visible on the video. As an aside, the types on deck should have had their blades folded and fully secured to avoid damage from V-22 downwash but 2 were not. They had got as far as socking the tail rotor on spot 3, before it was all sliced apart. The 4-blades just take longer and more equipment to secure than when the aircraft had just 2; but who in command wants to hear that.
Returning to the non-standard approach angle I mentioned above (at around 40 to 45 deg off to starboard rather than over the stern) this is a particularly tricky thing for a V-22 to do. Even when operated from the comfort of solid ground the V-22 has a relative airspeed limit of 20kts from about 30º off the nose; beyond that and your are in the 'Avoid' arc and ultimately the straight-to-crash arc.
Things are considerably more tricky for boat ops as this 'relative' airspeed limit can be eaten by the boat / wind alone or by a resultant of boat plus aircraft approach and manoeuvring airspeed. Even without all the airflow oddities around a rear deck and the differing ground-effect patterns from the V-22 rotors and residual nacelle thrust, you can get into difficulties even if you think you can stay out of the 'Avoid' zone whilst reasonably heavy. The 'escape' manoeuvre requires space to the front to accelerate into, which is now occupied by helicopters, people, equipment and the ship itself. If you make lateral inputs instead you induce a thrust imbalance that will reduce both the total thrust available and drop a wing / nacelle.
How long had this been going on... enough for every ship of this class to have scorch-marks at an odd angle outboard and aft of spot 5.
This was a serviceable aircraft, with a competent crew, in relatively benign conditions, by day and on a training exercise. The boat had a full hangar, an overly full deck, aircraft not fully secured and folded, plus the habit of trying to squeeze a V-22 on a spot that was large enough for a Huey.
It was a bit of a surprise for the investigation to claim that the 5 aircraft on deck were all folded, when 2 were still fully spanned - including the UH-1Y on spot 3 that was visible on the video. As an aside, the types on deck should have had their blades folded and fully secured to avoid damage from V-22 downwash but 2 were not. They had got as far as socking the tail rotor on spot 3, before it was all sliced apart. The 4-blades just take longer and more equipment to secure than when the aircraft had just 2; but who in command wants to hear that.
Returning to the non-standard approach angle I mentioned above (at around 40 to 45 deg off to starboard rather than over the stern) this is a particularly tricky thing for a V-22 to do. Even when operated from the comfort of solid ground the V-22 has a relative airspeed limit of 20kts from about 30º off the nose; beyond that and your are in the 'Avoid' arc and ultimately the straight-to-crash arc.
Things are considerably more tricky for boat ops as this 'relative' airspeed limit can be eaten by the boat / wind alone or by a resultant of boat plus aircraft approach and manoeuvring airspeed. Even without all the airflow oddities around a rear deck and the differing ground-effect patterns from the V-22 rotors and residual nacelle thrust, you can get into difficulties even if you think you can stay out of the 'Avoid' zone whilst reasonably heavy. The 'escape' manoeuvre requires space to the front to accelerate into, which is now occupied by helicopters, people, equipment and the ship itself. If you make lateral inputs instead you induce a thrust imbalance that will reduce both the total thrust available and drop a wing / nacelle.
How long had this been going on... enough for every ship of this class to have scorch-marks at an odd angle outboard and aft of spot 5.
This was a serviceable aircraft, with a competent crew, in relatively benign conditions, by day and on a training exercise. The boat had a full hangar, an overly full deck, aircraft not fully secured and folded, plus the habit of trying to squeeze a V-22 on a spot that was large enough for a Huey.
the marines are short of blade stands on the AH-1Z? Machine shop out of stock? It's not going to hurt the blade, and the loads aren't much on the bearings, but it relies on the rotor brake a little bit to avoid embarrassment, the design still puts a load onto whatever surface acts as a droop stop.
the marines are short of blade stands on the AH-1Z? Machine shop out of stock? It's not going to hurt the blade, and the loads aren't much on the bearings, but it relies on the rotor brake a little bit to avoid embarrassment, the design still puts a load onto whatever surface acts as a droop stop.
