Sentries grounded
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Taken from the article....
" The aircraft are not technically grounded but are rather unservicable.
That's one way of putting it....although there are more succinct engineering terms available.
" The aircraft are not technically grounded but are rather unservicable.
That's one way of putting it....although there are more succinct engineering terms available.
How long will it take for the die-hard conspiracy nuts to claim that the new variant of the Russian Air Force Ilyushin 22 (IL-22PP) fried the E-3s?
https://sputniknews.com/military/201...-AWACS-planes/
In other words, just as NATO decided to deploy over a dozen AWACS planes in Turkey to keep an eye on Syria, Russia rolled out several new aircraft allowing Moscow to jam NATO intelligence gathering operations at the flick of a switch. And that's not even counting the jamming capabilities of ground-based systems already deployed. Whether Russia decides to use this equipment selectively or on a mass scale remains to be seen, but one thing is certain: NATO officials probably won't be the ones to admit that their surveillance operation in Syria isn't gathering as much useful info as they hoped they would get.
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On a positive note ...
It only takes about 4 hours to convert a weapons controller onto the ground-based system (UCCS), so at least those stuck on the ground will continue to able to be useful members of society by working from Scampton (a short drive away) whilst the jets are grounded. 
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Excellent, good excuse to scrap this one trick pony, save Sentinel and buy more P-8s!
Seeing as we need that particular trick available now and in the future. What needs examining is why the older NATO AWACS aircraft don't have the same problem. Is it down to a lack of maintaining them to the same degree?
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Excellent, good excuse to scrap this one trick pony, save Sentinel and buy more P-8s!
So you think we should get rid of AEW. Yeah that worked well last time we tried it. NOT.
Given that all the 70-odd 707-320B based E-3 AWACs airframes were ‘new-build’ between 1970 and the mid 90s, one might presume that the entire airframe history, and servicing, repair and modification records should still be in the possession of the original purchasers. Meaning, none are second-hand, such that any airworthiness or safety problems might be blamed on a ‘murky past.’
Presuming for the moment that the electrics haven’t actually been ‘fried by sputnik,’ this somewhat awkward situation begs a couple of questions.
Is this problem unique to the six remaining RAF airframes, or is it shared by any of the other four operators ? The report says ‘other nations are not thought to be affected’ but it does not explain why not. It certainly seems to be an urgent safety issue for the RAF.
So how is it that apparently only the RAF has encountered this problem ? Has it already been met and rectified elsewhere without the knowledge or engagement of the MoD ? Or is it something that has been introduced this side of the pond ?
I note that in 2009 ‘the MoD cancelled plans for an upgrade’ (I assume this was the 2006 Project Eagle) ‘because it was unaffordable’ and then did not join the ‘Block 40/45 modernisation’ either. This I think, attracted suggestions that having fallen so far behind, it would be difficult to play catch-up at a later date, which was probably why MoD seemed to lose interest in the whole Sentry programme a while back.
Coming to their senses a year ago, it was announced that a so far undefined ‘upgrade path’ (so presumably unique to the RAF) would be undertaken from 2020, to extend its service life ten years beyond the previously announced date of 2025.
Seeing that Northrop Grumman UK has just been awarded a contract to run the UK Sentry WLSP out to 2025, one hopes that there is now a coherent long-term plan, at least until the next Defence Review.
This grounding, apparently for technical issues related to the integrity of electrical wiring and cabin conditioning system, seems to have been a surprise. Given that only one UK Rivet Joint is currently operating while some folks are at the same time dissing the Sentinel, it seems we have been caught short again, intelligence-wise. It is to be hoped that rectification will be both speedy and effective to return the RAF E-3Ds to safe service.
Whatever next ?
...................
Presuming for the moment that the electrics haven’t actually been ‘fried by sputnik,’ this somewhat awkward situation begs a couple of questions.
Is this problem unique to the six remaining RAF airframes, or is it shared by any of the other four operators ? The report says ‘other nations are not thought to be affected’ but it does not explain why not. It certainly seems to be an urgent safety issue for the RAF.
So how is it that apparently only the RAF has encountered this problem ? Has it already been met and rectified elsewhere without the knowledge or engagement of the MoD ? Or is it something that has been introduced this side of the pond ?
I note that in 2009 ‘the MoD cancelled plans for an upgrade’ (I assume this was the 2006 Project Eagle) ‘because it was unaffordable’ and then did not join the ‘Block 40/45 modernisation’ either. This I think, attracted suggestions that having fallen so far behind, it would be difficult to play catch-up at a later date, which was probably why MoD seemed to lose interest in the whole Sentry programme a while back.
Coming to their senses a year ago, it was announced that a so far undefined ‘upgrade path’ (so presumably unique to the RAF) would be undertaken from 2020, to extend its service life ten years beyond the previously announced date of 2025.
Seeing that Northrop Grumman UK has just been awarded a contract to run the UK Sentry WLSP out to 2025, one hopes that there is now a coherent long-term plan, at least until the next Defence Review.
This grounding, apparently for technical issues related to the integrity of electrical wiring and cabin conditioning system, seems to have been a surprise. Given that only one UK Rivet Joint is currently operating while some folks are at the same time dissing the Sentinel, it seems we have been caught short again, intelligence-wise. It is to be hoped that rectification will be both speedy and effective to return the RAF E-3Ds to safe service.
Whatever next ?
...................
Last edited by Lordflasheart; 6th Nov 2016 at 09:30. Reason: layout only. no content change
The issues of Kapton and flammable blankets do not apply to USAF aircraft as they are a different build standard. The do overlap with NATO aircraft (blankets) but NATO followed Boeing advice and modified their aircraft and the French have similar programmes in line with the various airworthiness directives.
The DE&S response was to fund programs to show that Boeing could be wrong, to try and prove airworthiness directives do not apply to the MoD and using the number of recorded fires on U.K. Sentry to date as evidence that not all fires are catastrophic and that the crew's ability to fight fires could be used to meet the safety target.
They even funded a programme to set fire to a representative configuration in an effort to prove the FAA, Boeing, Airbus, CAA, EASA and Transport Canada wrong. A few made efforts to suggest fixing the wiring and removal of the flammable material may have been better options, but DE&S preferred to spend money on safety case manipulation and fighting the opinion of all other airworthiness bodies.
The DE&S response was to fund programs to show that Boeing could be wrong, to try and prove airworthiness directives do not apply to the MoD and using the number of recorded fires on U.K. Sentry to date as evidence that not all fires are catastrophic and that the crew's ability to fight fires could be used to meet the safety target.
They even funded a programme to set fire to a representative configuration in an effort to prove the FAA, Boeing, Airbus, CAA, EASA and Transport Canada wrong. A few made efforts to suggest fixing the wiring and removal of the flammable material may have been better options, but DE&S preferred to spend money on safety case manipulation and fighting the opinion of all other airworthiness bodies.
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The issues of Kapton and flammable blankets do not apply to USAF aircraft as they are a different build standard. The do overlap with NATO aircraft (blankets) but NATO followed Boeing advice and modified their aircraft and the French have similar programmes in line with the various airworthiness directives.
The DE&S response was to fund programs to show that Boeing could be wrong, to try and prove airworthiness directives do not apply to the MoD and using the number of recorded fires on U.K. Sentry to date as evidence that not all fires are catastrophic and that the crew's ability to fight fires could be used to meet the safety target.
They even funded a programme to set fire to a representative configuration in an effort to prove the FAA, Boeing, Airbus, CAA, EASA and Transport Canada wrong. A few made efforts to suggest fixing the wiring and removal of the flammable material may have been better options, but DE&S preferred to spend money on safety case manipulation and fighting the opinion of all other airworthiness bodies.
The DE&S response was to fund programs to show that Boeing could be wrong, to try and prove airworthiness directives do not apply to the MoD and using the number of recorded fires on U.K. Sentry to date as evidence that not all fires are catastrophic and that the crew's ability to fight fires could be used to meet the safety target.
They even funded a programme to set fire to a representative configuration in an effort to prove the FAA, Boeing, Airbus, CAA, EASA and Transport Canada wrong. A few made efforts to suggest fixing the wiring and removal of the flammable material may have been better options, but DE&S preferred to spend money on safety case manipulation and fighting the opinion of all other airworthiness bodies.
glad rag:-
Glad to hear that glad (clever eh?), but others still do doubt despite this being the third fleet grounding recently; Nimrod (permanently), ACO Gliders (ditto?), and now Sentry. Tuc has been banging the drum that this is the result of a systemic problem, while the MOD line is that every occurrence is unique and the fault of manufacturers, aircrew, named SOs, etc. The fault lies with those who set out to plunder the Air Safety budgets, order that the regs be suborned to save time and money, and rid themselves of the experienced and trained cadre of engineers who would not comply. We are now left with those that produced the fiasco that JTO recounts, and which I don't doubt either.
I don't doubt a word of it but...
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Excellent, good excuse to scrap this one trick pony, save Sentinel and buy more P-8s!
One presumes that, in their absence, we will be having to pay our fair share of the costs for the remainder of the force and its use. I doubt there are any savings, and with the remaining duplication in infrastructure it probably absorbs additional cost, not a saving.