Why doesn't the UK have any SAM's other than Rapier?
Money does have something to do with it, but the primary reason that the RAF doesn't have Medium range SAM (MSAM) is more to do with operational reasons. MSAM and the manned fighter compete for the same airspace, which limits the operational capability of both. Seeing that a manned fighter with Beyond Visual Range weapons is by far the more effective weapon system, the MOD decided in around 1975 that the best mix for UK air defence was a proper AEW aircraft, fighters with look down radar and Snap up / Snap down MRAAM (MRCA ADV back in those days) and SHORAD like Rapier.
The UK land based MSAM story is a catalogue of changing requirements as the threat was always ahead of it. The weapon which became Bloodhound started out as a ‘Super’ Sea Slug for the Navy (as at the start of the project that was the only fully defined operational requirement for a Surface to Air Guided Weapon (SAGW) in the MOS’s in tray). Where the Armstrong Withworth lead 502 team who developed the weapon that became ‘Sea Slug’ were working to a tight technical specification to build a missile system as quickly as possible, the Bristol Ferranti team were tasked to build a weapon which was the best technically possible on a longer time frame. Added to this was a second operational requirement for a land based SAGW for the Army called ‘Heathen’ which was for a 50 mile range missile. The MOS refused to accept it until the Army shorten the range requirement as it was felt that such a missile would take far too long to develop. English Electric by this time had started to do a project to meet the Heathen requirement, which became ‘Red Shoes’. Bloodhound (then known as ‘Red Hand’) was then touted as a Joint service Ramjet powered weapon which could fit in between Sea Slug and Heathen, however it was soon found that the forward mounted boost motors required to meet the navy’s storage and launcher requirement would have got in the way of both the operation of the Ramjets and pulse Semi – Active radar homing guidance system that the Bristol - Ferranti team had selected (plus the Navy were only really interested in a beam rider).
Thus the project became an army sponsored one and was renamed ‘Red Duster’ to meet the ‘Heathen’ requirement which had been much reduced in maximum range required. All changed in 1953 when the RAF were given control of all SAGW to be based in the UK primarily because the army refused to integrate the command and control aspects with the fighter force. The RAF had been looking into long range SAGW, but they were looking at a very long range missile that could be used to break up raids as soon as they came within radar cover. They also wanted the system to have low level capability and good resistance to ECM. Red Shoes and Red Duster had none of these. By 1954, the Chiefs of Staff Committee had decided that neither weapon would go into quantity production, but would be used for small scale trials. However a number of the Operational Requirements Branch at the Air Staff felt that felt that the service had to get into the guided weapon field as quickly as possible and large scale trials system could both get a lot of servicemen experienced in the field very quickly and also provide a measure of air defence capability that could not be met by manned fighter. It would also allow the industry to survive and act as a lead into an operational Stage 2 weapon which did met the RAF’s requirement (said weapon was very much like the USAF Bomarc but with an active Continuous Wave (CW) radar seaker). As Red Duster’s ramjet propulsion promised a weapon with much longer range, it was selected as the RAF’s Stage 1 SAGW system as the Stage 2 weapon would have been ramjet powered. The RAF did want to can ‘Red Shoes’, but the Army decided to take it on as a training weapon for field force use. Also in 1954, the MoS suggested a couple of interim Stages as they couldn’t see the Stage 2 weapon being operational before the mid to late 1960s.
These were Stage 1 ½ which was Red Shoes with a CW semi active radar homing system for the Army and Stage 1 ¾ which would have been a long range ‘Red Duster’ type missile with some form of mid-course guidance and a CW terminal semi – active Radar homing system for the RAF. Both would have good resistance to ECM, have low level capability and be ready to deploy in 1961-63.
800 Red Duster missiles were ordered in late 1955, along with the equipment for a large trials station to be set up at North Coates. It was also decided that 6 operational sites were to be set up to do a barrier defence from the Humber to Dover and the weapon was officially named Bloodhound. The purpose of the SAM belt was to shoot down the bombers before they crossed the coast, so that they couldn't drop an H-bomb on land if the bomber crew decided to take as many Brits as possible with them if they got shot down). However it was also around this time that it was found that the main threat to the UK was not going to be free fall bombs from supersonic Soviet bombers, but stand-off attacks with Blue Steel type ASMs and IRBM’s. As none of the SAGW’ under development could deal with the ASM’s (The target radar cross section wasn’t big enough for the missile’s guidance receiver to track and the missiles didn’t have the cross range capability to deal with anything other than a head on engagement), the decision was made to enlarge the fighter’s interception zone forward of the Missile Engagement Zone. This meant that the fighter interception zone and the recovery area overlapped the MEZ, which was a very bad idea. This, plus the decision to make the primary AD task of the RAF be the defence of the deterrent (1957 defence review), plus the wish to ensure that any infrastructure built could be used for an future point defence Anti Stand off bomb / ABM system for the Class A airfields saw the Bloodhound Sites being place close to the V Force airfields and Thor Sites.
Bloodhound Mk 1 didn’t become operational until November 1960 and the full force of 11 squadrons was declared to SACEUR in May 1962, however 28 days later North Coates came of alert and their squadron was disbanded a few months later to allow Bloodhound 2 Trials to start. The rest of the Mark 1 force started to draw down in June 1963 and by June 1964 it was gone. The Army did buy Red Shoes as Thunderbird, but the original Mk 1 buy was 200 missiles, of which only 140 were live and were earmarked for service evaluation and Regimental troop firing practices at Trials Establishment Royal Artillery, (Guided Weapons) (TERA(GW)) at Ty-Croes on Anglesey and the rest were basically acquisition drill rounds
Bloodhound Mk 2 was not the original follow on weapon. That was a missile called Blue Envoy, which looked like a cross between Bloodhound and a Saab Drakken (it was fitted with a large double delta wing). The missile was planned as a replacement for both Bloodhound Mk 1 and Sea Slug, however the navy pulled out because it was way too big and the RAF got cold feet because it couldn’t deal with the powered bomb threat. That, plus technical problems and a lack of money killed it in May 1957. The RAF then were looking at the Army’s Stage 1 ½ Weapon which was codenamed Yellow Temple and ordered 150 Thunderbird Mk 1’s for training (the order was cancelled a year later). However Bristol’s put up a number of proposals for improvements to Bloodhound which exceed Yellow Temple across the board, including a modification for the latter quarter of the Mk 1 order which doubled its range, a Command Guided (CG) bloodhound with new longer airframe and more powerful engines, plus nuclear warhead, that could deal with the powered bomb threat and a CW homing version of the latter. Some of the ideas in the improved Mk 1 made it into the RAF missiles as modifications, The CG version became the Mk 3, while its CW version with a conventional warhead became the Mk 2. The RAF jumped at the offer and both weapons got initial short term development funding. The Yellow Temple program for the Army became VR725 which entered service as Thunderbird Mk 2 (they had a total of around 27 launchers on 9 missile batterys!!). Bloodhound Mk 3 was canned in May 1960 due to budget cuts, though it is unlikely there ever would have been warheads for them as the UK didn’t have enough fissile material for the offensive weapons, let alone any defensive systems.
May 1960 also saw a change in the UK Air Defence policy with the main aim of the UK air defences being the stopping of pre-strike reconnaissance efforts as there was no way to deal with the IRBM threat. Bloodhound Mk 2’s main raison d'être became as a deployable system for defence of overseas bases in limited war were the manned bomber was the main threat, though a UK training and trials capability and playing a role in UK Air Defence were also in the operational requirement. Bloodhound Mk 2 reached IOC in late 1965 and was used by 112 and 41 Sqn with three operational missile sections for UKAD between 1966 and 1968. North Coates’s 25 Sqn was mainly a training and trials squadron, but could become operational in time of war. When Polaris became operational in 1968, the number of operational sections defending the V Force was reduced to one at West Raynham and that was switched off the day after the V Force came off QRA in 1969. The 2 squadrons in the Far East were just becoming fully operational in 1967 when the East of Suez policy saw 33 Squadron at Butterworth withdrawn and the 3 mobile sections of 65 Sqn at Seletar being returned to the UK. (The other three fixed site sections at Seletar were sold to Singapore). 112 Sqn was deployed to Cyprus in 1967 after it was confirmed that the RAF were staying there and were withdrawn in 1975 when the V bombers were removed.
The plan was for the rest of the force of mobile sections (6 sections with 4 launchers apiece) to be used for contingency overseas deployment use. However the requirements of the new NATO flexible response policy saw a requirement for SAM defences on the RAFG airfields (to open a pot of NATO money for airfield hardening). Seeing Bloodhound was the only thing available (Bar 48 Sqn RAF Regiment with Tigercat) the two remaining UK Squadrons (41 and 25) were joined up as 25 Sqn and deployed to defend the Clutch airfields. Rapier followed the Bloodhound into RAFG the mid 1970’s, but that was the Field Standard A model which was a daylight only system. There was UK based system at West Raynham for trials use that did have an emergency operational capability between 1970 and 1975, but that was it until the start of 1976 when the UK force built up again to meet NATO requirements of Air defence of SACEUR bases (and of course opened the coffers for airfield hardening). The RAF couldn’t afford the cost of the Rapier kit required or the manpower, so they agreed with NATO to do an area defence with up to 7 Bloodhound Mk 2 sites. Originally the siting was to also cover USAFE assets, however it NATO policy that the user to provide the point SAM defences and not the host nation. The RAF defended sites outside the Bloodhound cover with Rapier (Leuchars, Lossiemouth and Leeming). While the USAF (who couldn’t operate SAM below 100 mile range) paid for 3 RAF Regiment squadrons to defend their bases in the UK. When Rapier with the Blindfire radar system became available, the Germany Bloodhound squadron was withdrawn to the UK between 1981 and 83 and deepened the MEZ coverage. Bloodhound was scheduled for OSD in 1985, however 2nd hand missiles were procured from Sweden in 1977, plus former Thunderbird Mk 2 AD-10 and Swedish PE-44 Target Illumination radar were modified to RAF Type 86 standard and they allowed the OSD to be pushed back to 1992.
Though the MOD Air and Treasury had by 1975 decided that Bloodhound would not be replaced with a new MSAM system, studies were done on a possible replacement in the late 1970s. There was simply nothing to replace it with. Patriot was a point defence system and though it met the ECM requirement it couldn’t give 360 coverage without having 3 radars on each site and the smallest aircraft in the West that it could be moved in without being taken to bits was the C-5!!!!! It was also mega expensive!! (The Bloodhound was air transportable in a Hercules, Belfast, Beveley and all bar the radars could be got into an Argosy. The missiles themselves could be moved in a Britannia!!!) The only British MSAM in production was the Sea Dart Mk 1 which didn’t work over land and would have needed a complete new fire control system, launcher and radar. IHAWK didn’t have the range or altitude required. A small buy of Patriot was approved on a UOR for GW 1, but them killed by the Treasury. The removal of the NATO requirements in 1989/91 for airfield defence saw Bloodhound get the chop (shortly followed by the USAF funded Rapier squadrons).
In fact the RAF don’t even have Rapier anymore, but that was not the RAF’s decision. The government decided that it would fall to one service to operate it. The RAF Regiment put together the best business case to operate it by far, and lost out because the Army had already had too many cuts. Totally proved when it took the Army two years to get their act together to man the Falklands deployment which had been run by the RAF since 1982.
Needless to say, MSAM is still required by ships for a number of very good reasons.
The UK land based MSAM story is a catalogue of changing requirements as the threat was always ahead of it. The weapon which became Bloodhound started out as a ‘Super’ Sea Slug for the Navy (as at the start of the project that was the only fully defined operational requirement for a Surface to Air Guided Weapon (SAGW) in the MOS’s in tray). Where the Armstrong Withworth lead 502 team who developed the weapon that became ‘Sea Slug’ were working to a tight technical specification to build a missile system as quickly as possible, the Bristol Ferranti team were tasked to build a weapon which was the best technically possible on a longer time frame. Added to this was a second operational requirement for a land based SAGW for the Army called ‘Heathen’ which was for a 50 mile range missile. The MOS refused to accept it until the Army shorten the range requirement as it was felt that such a missile would take far too long to develop. English Electric by this time had started to do a project to meet the Heathen requirement, which became ‘Red Shoes’. Bloodhound (then known as ‘Red Hand’) was then touted as a Joint service Ramjet powered weapon which could fit in between Sea Slug and Heathen, however it was soon found that the forward mounted boost motors required to meet the navy’s storage and launcher requirement would have got in the way of both the operation of the Ramjets and pulse Semi – Active radar homing guidance system that the Bristol - Ferranti team had selected (plus the Navy were only really interested in a beam rider).
Thus the project became an army sponsored one and was renamed ‘Red Duster’ to meet the ‘Heathen’ requirement which had been much reduced in maximum range required. All changed in 1953 when the RAF were given control of all SAGW to be based in the UK primarily because the army refused to integrate the command and control aspects with the fighter force. The RAF had been looking into long range SAGW, but they were looking at a very long range missile that could be used to break up raids as soon as they came within radar cover. They also wanted the system to have low level capability and good resistance to ECM. Red Shoes and Red Duster had none of these. By 1954, the Chiefs of Staff Committee had decided that neither weapon would go into quantity production, but would be used for small scale trials. However a number of the Operational Requirements Branch at the Air Staff felt that felt that the service had to get into the guided weapon field as quickly as possible and large scale trials system could both get a lot of servicemen experienced in the field very quickly and also provide a measure of air defence capability that could not be met by manned fighter. It would also allow the industry to survive and act as a lead into an operational Stage 2 weapon which did met the RAF’s requirement (said weapon was very much like the USAF Bomarc but with an active Continuous Wave (CW) radar seaker). As Red Duster’s ramjet propulsion promised a weapon with much longer range, it was selected as the RAF’s Stage 1 SAGW system as the Stage 2 weapon would have been ramjet powered. The RAF did want to can ‘Red Shoes’, but the Army decided to take it on as a training weapon for field force use. Also in 1954, the MoS suggested a couple of interim Stages as they couldn’t see the Stage 2 weapon being operational before the mid to late 1960s.
These were Stage 1 ½ which was Red Shoes with a CW semi active radar homing system for the Army and Stage 1 ¾ which would have been a long range ‘Red Duster’ type missile with some form of mid-course guidance and a CW terminal semi – active Radar homing system for the RAF. Both would have good resistance to ECM, have low level capability and be ready to deploy in 1961-63.
800 Red Duster missiles were ordered in late 1955, along with the equipment for a large trials station to be set up at North Coates. It was also decided that 6 operational sites were to be set up to do a barrier defence from the Humber to Dover and the weapon was officially named Bloodhound. The purpose of the SAM belt was to shoot down the bombers before they crossed the coast, so that they couldn't drop an H-bomb on land if the bomber crew decided to take as many Brits as possible with them if they got shot down). However it was also around this time that it was found that the main threat to the UK was not going to be free fall bombs from supersonic Soviet bombers, but stand-off attacks with Blue Steel type ASMs and IRBM’s. As none of the SAGW’ under development could deal with the ASM’s (The target radar cross section wasn’t big enough for the missile’s guidance receiver to track and the missiles didn’t have the cross range capability to deal with anything other than a head on engagement), the decision was made to enlarge the fighter’s interception zone forward of the Missile Engagement Zone. This meant that the fighter interception zone and the recovery area overlapped the MEZ, which was a very bad idea. This, plus the decision to make the primary AD task of the RAF be the defence of the deterrent (1957 defence review), plus the wish to ensure that any infrastructure built could be used for an future point defence Anti Stand off bomb / ABM system for the Class A airfields saw the Bloodhound Sites being place close to the V Force airfields and Thor Sites.
Bloodhound Mk 1 didn’t become operational until November 1960 and the full force of 11 squadrons was declared to SACEUR in May 1962, however 28 days later North Coates came of alert and their squadron was disbanded a few months later to allow Bloodhound 2 Trials to start. The rest of the Mark 1 force started to draw down in June 1963 and by June 1964 it was gone. The Army did buy Red Shoes as Thunderbird, but the original Mk 1 buy was 200 missiles, of which only 140 were live and were earmarked for service evaluation and Regimental troop firing practices at Trials Establishment Royal Artillery, (Guided Weapons) (TERA(GW)) at Ty-Croes on Anglesey and the rest were basically acquisition drill rounds
Bloodhound Mk 2 was not the original follow on weapon. That was a missile called Blue Envoy, which looked like a cross between Bloodhound and a Saab Drakken (it was fitted with a large double delta wing). The missile was planned as a replacement for both Bloodhound Mk 1 and Sea Slug, however the navy pulled out because it was way too big and the RAF got cold feet because it couldn’t deal with the powered bomb threat. That, plus technical problems and a lack of money killed it in May 1957. The RAF then were looking at the Army’s Stage 1 ½ Weapon which was codenamed Yellow Temple and ordered 150 Thunderbird Mk 1’s for training (the order was cancelled a year later). However Bristol’s put up a number of proposals for improvements to Bloodhound which exceed Yellow Temple across the board, including a modification for the latter quarter of the Mk 1 order which doubled its range, a Command Guided (CG) bloodhound with new longer airframe and more powerful engines, plus nuclear warhead, that could deal with the powered bomb threat and a CW homing version of the latter. Some of the ideas in the improved Mk 1 made it into the RAF missiles as modifications, The CG version became the Mk 3, while its CW version with a conventional warhead became the Mk 2. The RAF jumped at the offer and both weapons got initial short term development funding. The Yellow Temple program for the Army became VR725 which entered service as Thunderbird Mk 2 (they had a total of around 27 launchers on 9 missile batterys!!). Bloodhound Mk 3 was canned in May 1960 due to budget cuts, though it is unlikely there ever would have been warheads for them as the UK didn’t have enough fissile material for the offensive weapons, let alone any defensive systems.
May 1960 also saw a change in the UK Air Defence policy with the main aim of the UK air defences being the stopping of pre-strike reconnaissance efforts as there was no way to deal with the IRBM threat. Bloodhound Mk 2’s main raison d'être became as a deployable system for defence of overseas bases in limited war were the manned bomber was the main threat, though a UK training and trials capability and playing a role in UK Air Defence were also in the operational requirement. Bloodhound Mk 2 reached IOC in late 1965 and was used by 112 and 41 Sqn with three operational missile sections for UKAD between 1966 and 1968. North Coates’s 25 Sqn was mainly a training and trials squadron, but could become operational in time of war. When Polaris became operational in 1968, the number of operational sections defending the V Force was reduced to one at West Raynham and that was switched off the day after the V Force came off QRA in 1969. The 2 squadrons in the Far East were just becoming fully operational in 1967 when the East of Suez policy saw 33 Squadron at Butterworth withdrawn and the 3 mobile sections of 65 Sqn at Seletar being returned to the UK. (The other three fixed site sections at Seletar were sold to Singapore). 112 Sqn was deployed to Cyprus in 1967 after it was confirmed that the RAF were staying there and were withdrawn in 1975 when the V bombers were removed.
The plan was for the rest of the force of mobile sections (6 sections with 4 launchers apiece) to be used for contingency overseas deployment use. However the requirements of the new NATO flexible response policy saw a requirement for SAM defences on the RAFG airfields (to open a pot of NATO money for airfield hardening). Seeing Bloodhound was the only thing available (Bar 48 Sqn RAF Regiment with Tigercat) the two remaining UK Squadrons (41 and 25) were joined up as 25 Sqn and deployed to defend the Clutch airfields. Rapier followed the Bloodhound into RAFG the mid 1970’s, but that was the Field Standard A model which was a daylight only system. There was UK based system at West Raynham for trials use that did have an emergency operational capability between 1970 and 1975, but that was it until the start of 1976 when the UK force built up again to meet NATO requirements of Air defence of SACEUR bases (and of course opened the coffers for airfield hardening). The RAF couldn’t afford the cost of the Rapier kit required or the manpower, so they agreed with NATO to do an area defence with up to 7 Bloodhound Mk 2 sites. Originally the siting was to also cover USAFE assets, however it NATO policy that the user to provide the point SAM defences and not the host nation. The RAF defended sites outside the Bloodhound cover with Rapier (Leuchars, Lossiemouth and Leeming). While the USAF (who couldn’t operate SAM below 100 mile range) paid for 3 RAF Regiment squadrons to defend their bases in the UK. When Rapier with the Blindfire radar system became available, the Germany Bloodhound squadron was withdrawn to the UK between 1981 and 83 and deepened the MEZ coverage. Bloodhound was scheduled for OSD in 1985, however 2nd hand missiles were procured from Sweden in 1977, plus former Thunderbird Mk 2 AD-10 and Swedish PE-44 Target Illumination radar were modified to RAF Type 86 standard and they allowed the OSD to be pushed back to 1992.
Though the MOD Air and Treasury had by 1975 decided that Bloodhound would not be replaced with a new MSAM system, studies were done on a possible replacement in the late 1970s. There was simply nothing to replace it with. Patriot was a point defence system and though it met the ECM requirement it couldn’t give 360 coverage without having 3 radars on each site and the smallest aircraft in the West that it could be moved in without being taken to bits was the C-5!!!!! It was also mega expensive!! (The Bloodhound was air transportable in a Hercules, Belfast, Beveley and all bar the radars could be got into an Argosy. The missiles themselves could be moved in a Britannia!!!) The only British MSAM in production was the Sea Dart Mk 1 which didn’t work over land and would have needed a complete new fire control system, launcher and radar. IHAWK didn’t have the range or altitude required. A small buy of Patriot was approved on a UOR for GW 1, but them killed by the Treasury. The removal of the NATO requirements in 1989/91 for airfield defence saw Bloodhound get the chop (shortly followed by the USAF funded Rapier squadrons).
In fact the RAF don’t even have Rapier anymore, but that was not the RAF’s decision. The government decided that it would fall to one service to operate it. The RAF Regiment put together the best business case to operate it by far, and lost out because the Army had already had too many cuts. Totally proved when it took the Army two years to get their act together to man the Falklands deployment which had been run by the RAF since 1982.
Needless to say, MSAM is still required by ships for a number of very good reasons.
Last edited by MAINJAFAD; 8th Aug 2016 at 03:26.
With a range of about 15nm the new CAMM with the highly capable Giraffe Radar will outsrip the current Rapier. However, if CAMM-ER is bought, with a rough 30nm range then that will be MSAM.
CAMM has also been christened Land CEPTOR to go alongside the maritime version Sea CEPTOR. The CAMM program will also see an improvement to ASRAAM as well
Here is a piccy of it in trials with the Gunners:
CAMM has also been christened Land CEPTOR to go alongside the maritime version Sea CEPTOR. The CAMM program will also see an improvement to ASRAAM as well
Here is a piccy of it in trials with the Gunners:
With a range of about 15nm the new CAMM with the highly capable Giraffe Radar will outsrip the current Rapier. However, if CAMM-ER is bought, with a rough 30nm range then that will be MSAM.
CAMM has also been christened Land CEPTOR to go alongside the maritime version Sea CEPTOR. The CAMM program will also see an improvement to ASRAAM as well
Here is a piccy of it in trials with the Gunners:
CAMM has also been christened Land CEPTOR to go alongside the maritime version Sea CEPTOR. The CAMM program will also see an improvement to ASRAAM as well
Here is a piccy of it in trials with the Gunners:
Thread Starter
Thank you for that comprehensive briefing.
Only on PPRuNe...
Is Rapier highly regarded?
WWW
Only on PPRuNe...
Is Rapier highly regarded?
WWW
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UK MSAMs
The wonder is not that UK now has no MSAM, but that in 1949 UK funded 3.
The pits of life for W.Europe was after the Berlin Airlift (over, 30/9/49), before 26/6/50 outbreak of the Korean dress rehearsal for WW3. Though NATO - d'Artagnan: all for one, one for all - became visible as uniforms in SHAPE/Paris 24/8/49, there was nothing tangible to keep US in, Germany down, Russia out. Yet we then diverted resources of one of few UK industries making things of $-earning value: electronauts GEC/Marconi/Ferranti/Cossor/EKCO...from brown goods (radiograms) to GW...on Seaslug and on (to be) Thunderbird and Bloodhound.
Ministers eased the Task with Burns/Templer Data Exchange (!Ha!?) Agreements 2/50, accessing i.a propulsion and aero-controls for Bloodhound. But US, then and later, offered licence deals for Sparrow AAM, Nike/Ajax land- , Terrier marine-SAMs. Ministers rejected all - yes, the same suits so traduced by many Aero-scribes as being anti-Aero: Terrier was declined 7/51 due to “bad effect (on UK) GW industry” S.R.Twigge,Early Devt of GW in UK,’40-60, Harewood, 1993, P.164 plus uncertainty US “would supply” E.J.Grove,Vanguard to Trident, Bodley Head,1987,P121. But Ministers chopped and changed priorities in funding and resources allocation: Seaslug, for example, slimed between equal-highest and no priority vs. Bomb/Bombers and their base defenders, so no Capability was derived from any of the 3 until 1960-62.
MIM-23 Hawk, funded 1952, deployed 1959, was sold to every friendly-body, built by NATO Consortium SETEL to 1971 (HSD repaired them for years), in Japan to 1978. Including MIM-23B Improved Hawk, >40,000 rounds, some still with a dozen Users in 2012...ah, well, now we have MOTS.
The pits of life for W.Europe was after the Berlin Airlift (over, 30/9/49), before 26/6/50 outbreak of the Korean dress rehearsal for WW3. Though NATO - d'Artagnan: all for one, one for all - became visible as uniforms in SHAPE/Paris 24/8/49, there was nothing tangible to keep US in, Germany down, Russia out. Yet we then diverted resources of one of few UK industries making things of $-earning value: electronauts GEC/Marconi/Ferranti/Cossor/EKCO...from brown goods (radiograms) to GW...on Seaslug and on (to be) Thunderbird and Bloodhound.
Ministers eased the Task with Burns/Templer Data Exchange (!Ha!?) Agreements 2/50, accessing i.a propulsion and aero-controls for Bloodhound. But US, then and later, offered licence deals for Sparrow AAM, Nike/Ajax land- , Terrier marine-SAMs. Ministers rejected all - yes, the same suits so traduced by many Aero-scribes as being anti-Aero: Terrier was declined 7/51 due to “bad effect (on UK) GW industry” S.R.Twigge,Early Devt of GW in UK,’40-60, Harewood, 1993, P.164 plus uncertainty US “would supply” E.J.Grove,Vanguard to Trident, Bodley Head,1987,P121. But Ministers chopped and changed priorities in funding and resources allocation: Seaslug, for example, slimed between equal-highest and no priority vs. Bomb/Bombers and their base defenders, so no Capability was derived from any of the 3 until 1960-62.
MIM-23 Hawk, funded 1952, deployed 1959, was sold to every friendly-body, built by NATO Consortium SETEL to 1971 (HSD repaired them for years), in Japan to 1978. Including MIM-23B Improved Hawk, >40,000 rounds, some still with a dozen Users in 2012...ah, well, now we have MOTS.
