Another day another delay in the Chilcot Report - Beeb
BEagle,
Having read the thing, or as much as you can read of a 2.6 million word document with a 150 page exec summary between 8am and now, I'd guess that Sir John Scarlett, the rest of the JIC and a lot of VSO's are doing a LOT of squirming right now!
Having read the thing, or as much as you can read of a 2.6 million word document with a 150 page exec summary between 8am and now, I'd guess that Sir John Scarlett, the rest of the JIC and a lot of VSO's are doing a LOT of squirming right now!
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The main points are:
- The UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort.
- Military action might have been necessary later, but in March 2003: There was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; The strategy of containment could have been adapted and continued for some time; The majority of the Security Council supported continuing UN inspections and monitoring.
- Judgements about the severity of threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction - known as WMD - were presented with a certainty that was not justified.
- Intelligence had "not established beyond doubt" that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons.
- Policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence assessments. It was not challenged, and should have been.
- The circumstances in which it was decided that there was a legal basis for UK military action were "far from satisfactory".
- The invasion began on 20 March 2003 but not until 13 March did then Attorney General Lord Goldsmith advise there was on balance a secure legal basis for military action. Apart from No 10's response to his letter on 14 March, no formal record was made of that decision and the precise grounds on which it was made remain unclear.
- The UK's actions undermined the authority of the United Nations Security Council: The UN's Charter puts responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the Security Council. The UK government was claiming to act on behalf of the international community "to uphold the authority of the Security Council". But it knew it did not have a majority supporting its actions.
- In Cabinet, there was little questioning of Lord Goldsmith about his advice and no substantive discussion of the legal issues recorded.
- There was "little time" to properly prepare three military brigades for deployment in Iraq. The risks were neither "properly identified nor fully exposed" to ministers, resulting in "equipment shortfalls".
- Between 2003 and 2009, UK forces in Iraq faced gaps in some key capability areas - including armoured vehicles, reconnaissance and intelligence assets and helicopter support.
- It was not sufficiently clear which person in the department within the Ministry of Defence had responsibility for identifying and articulating such gaps.
- Delays in providing adequate medium weight protected patrol vehicles and the failure to meet the needs of UK forces for reconnaissance and intelligence equipment and helicopters should not have been tolerated.
- On 28 July 2002, the then Prime Minister Tony Blair assured US President George W Bush he would be with him "whatever". But in the letter, he pointed out that a US coalition for military action would need: Progress on the Middle East peace process; UN authority; and a shift in public opinion in the UK, Europe, and among Arab leaders.
- Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were "wholly inadequate".
- The government failed to achieve the stated objectives it had set itself in Iraq. More than 200 British citizens died as a result of the conflict. Iraqi people suffered greatly. By July 2009, at least 150,000 Iraqis had died, probably many more. More than one million were displaced.
- The report sets out lessons to be learned: It found Mr Blair overestimated his ability to influence US decisions on Iraq; and the UK's relationship with the US does not require unconditional support.
- It said ministerial discussion which encourages frank and informed debate and challenge is important. As is ensuring civilian and military arms of government are properly equipped.
- In future, all aspects of any intervention need to be calculated, debated and challenged with rigour. Decisions need to be fully implemented.
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"there were no substantive discussions of the military options, despite promises by Mr Blair, before the meeting on 17 March" - that was less than a week before the war began.
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
•Between 2003 and 2009, UK forces in Iraq faced gaps in some key capability areas - including armoured vehicles, reconnaissance and intelligence assets and helicopter support.
•It was not sufficiently clear which person in the department within the Ministry of Defence had responsibility for identifying and articulating such gaps.
•It was not sufficiently clear which person in the department within the Ministry of Defence had responsibility for identifying and articulating such gaps.
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It seems, from far away, that the issue is exaggerated. We all know that it's a mixture of good intentions and bad implementations. And as the time goes on, more and more mistakes become clear that could hardly be visible at the time when emotions prevailed.
E.g., was it good to remove Suddam as a figure? Sure, but who could predict at that time that this would trigger formation and strengthening of IS? Bad side of this is that no lessons were learned and after that the same game was played in Lybia and now is played in Syria. For the benefit of IS and likes.
WMD in the Saddam's hands? We in Russia never believed that the "chemical stuff" shown by Gen Powell in UN was indeed a proof of that (that turned out to be true - Iraq did not have them). But with the UK establishment having such a blind faith in "big brother" there was no surprise that the forces would be sent.
All the rest is just a fruitless and never ending discussion between pacifists and "hawks". After the troops are sent to war,everyone should be ready for losses. I assume that in UK all the servicemen and women are volunteers, nobody is caught in the street and told "you are in the army now". And that everyone understands the risk.
Thus, all those talks should not end with just handing out "labels"- bad or good guy Mr. X or Y is. Strategic issues and consequences should be analyzed and corrective actions made in the current policy. While in some aspects the situation is getting worse now. E.g., it is written that "Intelligence had "not established beyond doubt" that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons". And "Policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence assessments. It was not challenged, and shoul dhave been."
Nowadays, instead of professional multi-check on the intel reports, information from social networks is often taken into account, nightmare.
E.g., was it good to remove Suddam as a figure? Sure, but who could predict at that time that this would trigger formation and strengthening of IS? Bad side of this is that no lessons were learned and after that the same game was played in Lybia and now is played in Syria. For the benefit of IS and likes.
WMD in the Saddam's hands? We in Russia never believed that the "chemical stuff" shown by Gen Powell in UN was indeed a proof of that (that turned out to be true - Iraq did not have them). But with the UK establishment having such a blind faith in "big brother" there was no surprise that the forces would be sent.
All the rest is just a fruitless and never ending discussion between pacifists and "hawks". After the troops are sent to war,everyone should be ready for losses. I assume that in UK all the servicemen and women are volunteers, nobody is caught in the street and told "you are in the army now". And that everyone understands the risk.
Thus, all those talks should not end with just handing out "labels"- bad or good guy Mr. X or Y is. Strategic issues and consequences should be analyzed and corrective actions made in the current policy. While in some aspects the situation is getting worse now. E.g., it is written that "Intelligence had "not established beyond doubt" that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons". And "Policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence assessments. It was not challenged, and shoul dhave been."
Nowadays, instead of professional multi-check on the intel reports, information from social networks is often taken into account, nightmare.
[QUOTE]
Between 2003 and 2009, UK forces in Iraq faced gaps in some key capability areas - including armoured vehicles, reconnaissance and intelligence assets and helicopter support.
It was not sufficiently clear which person in the department within the Ministry of Defence had responsibility for identifying and articulating such gaps.[QUOTE]
If he genuinely believes this, he's been seriously misled. AbbeyWood is full of people who could point him to the endorsed requirements, and the political decisions to cancel. Long before 2003.
Between 2003 and 2009, UK forces in Iraq faced gaps in some key capability areas - including armoured vehicles, reconnaissance and intelligence assets and helicopter support.
It was not sufficiently clear which person in the department within the Ministry of Defence had responsibility for identifying and articulating such gaps.[QUOTE]
If he genuinely believes this, he's been seriously misled. AbbeyWood is full of people who could point him to the endorsed requirements, and the political decisions to cancel. Long before 2003.
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Originally Posted by A Van
All the rest is just a fruitless and never ending discussion between pacifists and "hawks". After the troops are sent to war,everyone should be ready for losses. I assume that in UK all the servicemen and women are volunteers, nobody is caught in the street and told "you are in the army now". And that everyone understands the risk.
'All the rest' is not just a "fruitless and never ending discussion between pacifists and "hawks"", it's an insight into the decision making process, with the hope that the lives of those that serve are given a little more respect in the decision making processes of the future.
Military forces in a democratic nation don't mutiny en masse. That's for the general population to decide.
...............But still as ham an actor as we witnessed in his "Sigh, Pause, Slighly broken voice" scripted Princess of Hearts monologue of nearly 20 years ago.
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E.g., was it good to remove Suddam as a figure? Sure, but who could predict at that time that this would trigger formation and strengthening of IS?
BUS
Were you allowed to give evidence? I submitted a few things and, for example, was pleasantly surprised to see that Chilcot effectively called Hoon and his merry men liars (although too polite to use the word) by stating that the limitations of Snatch Land Rovers had been identified "before 2002". (Government and MoD were claiming 4 years later they were perfectly adequate). He could have dated it more precisely (it was in the mid-90s) and he could have added that there was a long-standing endorsed programme to replace them, but that's as far as these inquiries go I'm afraid. But if the families are on the ball, they'll realise he has opened the door for them. Interesting that Hoon was wheeled out last night. I wonder if he realises he's been fingered?
Were you allowed to give evidence? I submitted a few things and, for example, was pleasantly surprised to see that Chilcot effectively called Hoon and his merry men liars (although too polite to use the word) by stating that the limitations of Snatch Land Rovers had been identified "before 2002". (Government and MoD were claiming 4 years later they were perfectly adequate). He could have dated it more precisely (it was in the mid-90s) and he could have added that there was a long-standing endorsed programme to replace them, but that's as far as these inquiries go I'm afraid. But if the families are on the ball, they'll realise he has opened the door for them. Interesting that Hoon was wheeled out last night. I wonder if he realises he's been fingered?
No I was not invited to give evidence but if I was a cynical man I would guess that my version of the truth may have been inconvenient, just as my comments on shortcomings in leadership in Iraq in 2007 that contributed to fatalities at the cob were ignored
Last edited by Big Unit Specialist; 7th Jul 2016 at 19:08.
BUS
Agreed. I saw parallels with, for example, the report into the Chinook Mk3 fiasco (seeing as this is an aviation forum). There, the PAC said the person with management oversight couldn't be identified. Chilcot said responsibility for identifying and closing capability gaps wasn't clear. Stage 1 - look at the telephone directory. Stage 2 - phone them. If that doesn't work, Stage 3 - walk into AbbeyWood or Main Building and ask the first person you see.
Agreed. I saw parallels with, for example, the report into the Chinook Mk3 fiasco (seeing as this is an aviation forum). There, the PAC said the person with management oversight couldn't be identified. Chilcot said responsibility for identifying and closing capability gaps wasn't clear. Stage 1 - look at the telephone directory. Stage 2 - phone them. If that doesn't work, Stage 3 - walk into AbbeyWood or Main Building and ask the first person you see.