RAF's now severed head speaks about cuts (to defence)..
There have been 'yes men' on the 5th Floor; certainly the last CAS was particularly weak and was prepared to hang out officers to dry when politically expedient to do so (having witnessed that at first hand 5 years ago). However, our current CAS is from a different breed. Vast operational and command experience 'in the thick of it'. He innately understands jointery (as do all the Chiefs) and understands - as they all do - that cuts cannot be made in isolation. For example (and no, I am not opening a new MPA thread), removing the Nimrods from the ORBAT appears to have a direct impact on NAVY MOs. Similarly a reduction in CA has a direct impact on (potential) Land and littoral operations.
I just hope that the 'lessons identified' in SDSR 2010 are re-read and applied this year. If there's no money, well, there's no money. Reduction of FWA (fraud, waste and abuse) could help; at present accrual accounting methods do not understand (it seems) programme investment - in equipment, infrastructure and personnel (the Defence Lines of Development, if you like). We can all cite cases where huge investment has been made in, say, infrastructure (the new hangar at St Athan, for example) only for it to abandoned because someone else has a good idea. We call all think of examples where personnel have been incredibly expensively trained and then to be woefully mis-employed and then ultimately lost to the Service.
We can all think of examples of 'for want of a nail...' and 'spend to save' concepts that could make huge budgetary gains, but the funding wasn't available because of arcane rules, or an administrative system that promotes banality and actively discourages calculated risk management.
Main Building decision-making has improved but it is, I understand, still sclerotic. I contrast it with the organisation I work for now. I get asked for 'lines to take' (no, not cocaine) for Ministerial and HOGs-level meetings; there's no circular AH/1* Working Group/2* Steering Group/DB staffing. My principal goes 'WP - what should we get the Minister to bring up when he speaks with his opposite number tonight?' I give my points, based on experience and on what I garner from conversations and briefings from Whitehall and that's it. My boss doesn't then say 'lets spend the next two weeks circulating this to people who have a peripheral interest in the subject'. Desk officers have, in the past, wondered why I wouldn't return to the mainstream RAF...
I just hope that the 'lessons identified' in SDSR 2010 are re-read and applied this year. If there's no money, well, there's no money. Reduction of FWA (fraud, waste and abuse) could help; at present accrual accounting methods do not understand (it seems) programme investment - in equipment, infrastructure and personnel (the Defence Lines of Development, if you like). We can all cite cases where huge investment has been made in, say, infrastructure (the new hangar at St Athan, for example) only for it to abandoned because someone else has a good idea. We call all think of examples where personnel have been incredibly expensively trained and then to be woefully mis-employed and then ultimately lost to the Service.
We can all think of examples of 'for want of a nail...' and 'spend to save' concepts that could make huge budgetary gains, but the funding wasn't available because of arcane rules, or an administrative system that promotes banality and actively discourages calculated risk management.
Main Building decision-making has improved but it is, I understand, still sclerotic. I contrast it with the organisation I work for now. I get asked for 'lines to take' (no, not cocaine) for Ministerial and HOGs-level meetings; there's no circular AH/1* Working Group/2* Steering Group/DB staffing. My principal goes 'WP - what should we get the Minister to bring up when he speaks with his opposite number tonight?' I give my points, based on experience and on what I garner from conversations and briefings from Whitehall and that's it. My boss doesn't then say 'lets spend the next two weeks circulating this to people who have a peripheral interest in the subject'. Desk officers have, in the past, wondered why I wouldn't return to the mainstream RAF...
And of course, under the "Duty Holder" construct, there IS identified, named individual responsibility, which can extend for life!!
To quote from the scary-ish letter sent by AOCs to DDHs: Quote:
To quote from the scary-ish letter sent by AOCs to DDHs: Quote:
As such [DDH] you are personally legally responsible and accountable [for all activities that may pose a Risk to Life] through me and the SDH [CAS] to the S of S.
The key question is; what happens in practice if you report a problem? We know for certain what occurred when the thread subject was in power. You were threatened with dismissal! MoD have never denied this as it was the subject of an internal audit report in June 1996. They have, however, confirmed no action was taken. Implement recommendation #13 and prrune would have been a boring place this last 15 years. But many aircrew would still be alive. Who was CAS and who was Chief Engineer? Who lied over MoK? No prizes......
21 years today.
Sorry, wanted to add I agree with the "extend for life" bit, but MoD says it doesn't. An MP on the Military Covenant Committee asked this a couple of years ago. That is why BoI/SI presidents do not have to report if they receive new evidence or evidence that was withheld from them that would have changed their report. Tornado ZG710 (Patriot 2003) was used as the example if I recall. Sir Brian Burridge declined to act despite evidence he'd been lied to.
