Procurement sucesses
Bloodhound Mk 1. 11 Squadrons fully operational by the end of the 1961 in the production contract signed in late 1956, All 11 Sqn's operational in Nov 1961. Plus the Government took money off Ferranti as they made excess profit on the fixed price production contract (about £4M in 1964 prices). Government would have stung BAC as well, had they not been able to hide their excess profits. Both Bristol and Ferranti redesigned their equipment to make production cheaper after the contract had been signed.
Last edited by MAINJAFAD; 20th Nov 2014 at 17:41.
My personal list runs to 131. You don't really want to read them all, do you?
Someone mentioned Apache.... You can't count those programmes where the ISD and even the product itself was redefined to make it look as if it was achieved. And delivering training and long term support is an integral part of the programme. On Apache, Westland were asked to cut the production rate in half, extending that phase by years. They refused. I guess that means the perceived success was DESPITE MoD, not because of them!
Someone mentioned Apache.... You can't count those programmes where the ISD and even the product itself was redefined to make it look as if it was achieved. And delivering training and long term support is an integral part of the programme. On Apache, Westland were asked to cut the production rate in half, extending that phase by years. They refused. I guess that means the perceived success was DESPITE MoD, not because of them!
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"Have there been any procurement success where a project has come in on time and or under budget?" ... And delivered with the required capability
S-D
How good India does it? I don't know, but one thing is certain. They do it a
lot better than us.
Don't forget who won the prestigous USN Fleet Challenge this year!For anyone who is interested, it was a RAF MPA crew with a 'borrowed' US P-8 aircraft.
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Surprised to see Apache being talked about. I seem to recall hangars full of them for months or years with no trained crew to fly them. Had it been a commercial procurement deal, everyone connected would have been visiting their jobcentre
Surprised to see Apache being talked about. I seem to recall hangars full of them for months or years with no trained crew to fly them. Had it been a commercial procurement deal, everyone connected would have been visiting their jobcentre
1. Training should not be considered part of ILS. If the LS date is (typically) 3 months before ISD, and it takes (say) 6 months to train a pilot, then pitching up with a sim 3 months before notional ISD is of no use. You need to get training away from the ILS mindset. To this end, procurement rules state the sim is considered the 3rd aircraft, after the TI and PI. The only person who can change this is the Service owner (the named individual who makes materiel and financial provision, and he'd only do it if, for some reason, there was more than one TI or PI). A simple rule which, if followed, removes so much risk. Show me someone in DE&S who knows this rule, never mind follows it!
2. Blind adherence to PFI dogma. Another concurrent programme in the same Directorate (which should be top of any such list!) was told to PFI its Trainer. The response was to fill in the waiver form, then forget PFI. How many Apache sims, at the same spec as ours, have been sold overseas? None? Then the waiver would have taken 5 mins and it would have been ready on time. They were told, but didn't want to upset the 2 Star. Apache is NOT a good example of how to run a programme.
Tuc, the rest of - the great majority of - the Apache story was actually pretty impressive c.f most projects, given the UK specific mods (of which engines were the most high profile, but by no means only, challenges). Initial assessment 1994, Apache chosen 1995, Initial RTS 1999. ISD was then delayed from what it could have been by that training issue, but the capability releases did not stop in the meantime.
Speaking of the RTM322 integration, I think RR (and in particular the couple of Mesa on-site engineers who undertook the integration tweaking) should have got much more kudos for what they achieved in a short time. It was so smooth, it looked easy - and so many people may have thought it WAS easy.
McBoeing were worried, given the problems they had moving from -701 to -701C engines for the US Army. As it turned out, the 322 was working well in a fraction of the time that program(me) took.
Hoodie
I would certainly agree with that. But the project initiation, which is what sets the tone, was a disaster. Apache was sold to UK as a simple build to print job. That meant 2 Star jumped at the perceived opportunity to run it on a shoestring. (Same person, same decision on Chinook HC Mk3!). For example, not a single avionic specialist in the team. In about August 1996 word of that got to the Sea King ASaC project manager and he asked to see the proposed Appendix A (to the Aircraft Spec). He pointed out all the obsolescent (and even obsolete) kit the US was proposing to offload on us, removed from their old variants following upgrade. For example, someone had agreed to buy a VHF radio that the RN had struggled to support for 15 years with a policy of "repair by cannibalisation", and were actively replacing in an ongoing project, in the same Directorate. Talk about lack of communication. That's a hell of a red flag. That embarrassed 2 Star into resourcing it better, and the contract had to be changed to "Air Vehicle" instead of "Aircraft", while the avionic component (quite important in Apache) started over again. Much of the programme then proceeded well, but due to firefighting rather than good planning. But it was too late to overturn the PFI nonsense.
Frostchamber. Quite right. What made it a success? The right people. The RN officer who led was superb. He was my boss a couple of years later. You learn more in a week from guys like that than in a 2 year tour in most jobs.
I would certainly agree with that. But the project initiation, which is what sets the tone, was a disaster. Apache was sold to UK as a simple build to print job. That meant 2 Star jumped at the perceived opportunity to run it on a shoestring. (Same person, same decision on Chinook HC Mk3!). For example, not a single avionic specialist in the team. In about August 1996 word of that got to the Sea King ASaC project manager and he asked to see the proposed Appendix A (to the Aircraft Spec). He pointed out all the obsolescent (and even obsolete) kit the US was proposing to offload on us, removed from their old variants following upgrade. For example, someone had agreed to buy a VHF radio that the RN had struggled to support for 15 years with a policy of "repair by cannibalisation", and were actively replacing in an ongoing project, in the same Directorate. Talk about lack of communication. That's a hell of a red flag. That embarrassed 2 Star into resourcing it better, and the contract had to be changed to "Air Vehicle" instead of "Aircraft", while the avionic component (quite important in Apache) started over again. Much of the programme then proceeded well, but due to firefighting rather than good planning. But it was too late to overturn the PFI nonsense.
Frostchamber. Quite right. What made it a success? The right people. The RN officer who led was superb. He was my boss a couple of years later. You learn more in a week from guys like that than in a 2 year tour in most jobs.
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Examples of procurement success? Pretty much every major airliner purchase. Granted you never hear about them because they are competently managed and even where the aircraft encounters significant delays this rarely is allowed to hurt the customer. And interestingly, since PFI in the military concept seems to be a dirty word, almost all privately financed.
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Super Hornet for the RAAF and the C-17 for both the RAAF and RAF. The Super Hornet was ahead of time and under budget and work as advertised in service. the C-17 for the RAAF has been a fantastic capability and the only problem seems to be they never have enough of them. The MH-60R for the RAN is coming along well too. All three programs are off the shelf and nobody has tried to Australianise them.
Procurement sucesses
Well they got it right in 1951 when I joined up, witness this shoe brush issued to me in March 1951 and still in regular use.
It must have been successful to have lasted this long - 64-years!
ISTR the big arrow on the brush indicates it was made in prison, probably to keep prisoners gainfully occupied.
It must have been successful to have lasted this long - 64-years!
ISTR the big arrow on the brush indicates it was made in prison, probably to keep prisoners gainfully occupied.
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I know most people in here would not care a jot, but the USAS to USASII Logistics IT System project was, in 2001, the only MoD IT project that came in on time and on budget. A huge capability that is only now being rolled out to the other 2 Services in anything other than aviation support.
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atn #10, RN Polaris, and s1,#33, airline purchasing, are a tad unfair.
Few airlines buy "off the drawing board", ahead of the certification process. When BOAC/BEAC were required to do so, when they were instruments of State policy, much anguish ensued.
USN procurement process for Polaris and its SSBNs were unprecedented successes (4.5 years, ITP to deployment); RN's (5.25 years) followed a largely-blazed trail, with a near-blank cheque: unused contingency funds yielded the savings: these boats were estimated by bloat R.Moore, RN & Nuclear Weapons, Harwood, 2001, P17: Programme Manager: “I hadn’t the faintest idea (of hull build cost) so I took projected cost of Valiant (SSN) and doubled it.”
When the State buys de-bugged Commercial Off the Shelf, daring to settle for 80% of ideal Spec., that often works and we hear nothing about it. Trouble arises (not only, though always, in IT) when Ministers are lured into bespoke. The problem is that, for combat kit, bad guys may already have COTS.
Few airlines buy "off the drawing board", ahead of the certification process. When BOAC/BEAC were required to do so, when they were instruments of State policy, much anguish ensued.
USN procurement process for Polaris and its SSBNs were unprecedented successes (4.5 years, ITP to deployment); RN's (5.25 years) followed a largely-blazed trail, with a near-blank cheque: unused contingency funds yielded the savings: these boats were estimated by bloat R.Moore, RN & Nuclear Weapons, Harwood, 2001, P17: Programme Manager: “I hadn’t the faintest idea (of hull build cost) so I took projected cost of Valiant (SSN) and doubled it.”
When the State buys de-bugged Commercial Off the Shelf, daring to settle for 80% of ideal Spec., that often works and we hear nothing about it. Trouble arises (not only, though always, in IT) when Ministers are lured into bespoke. The problem is that, for combat kit, bad guys may already have COTS.
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On the contrary, without a solid base of airline orders a new airliner isn't going to be built these days so there won't even be a certification process. I agree with your comment re. BOAC/BEA anguish but even there it was the builder rather than the customer which suffered the anguish.
Of course if there's a near-blank cheque, there's not going to be an overrun. Polaris was a National imperative and nobody was going to moan too much even if costs had risen. (That's if anyone found out; official secrecy would keep out any public or press snotty noses).
Of course if there's a near-blank cheque, there's not going to be an overrun. Polaris was a National imperative and nobody was going to moan too much even if costs had risen. (That's if anyone found out; official secrecy would keep out any public or press snotty noses).
