Tornado TFR question
As contemporaries of a sort, how did the Tornado TFR compare to that on the F-111?
With a very different flying environment in Australia, we could (and did) TFR in IMC or at night pretty much anytime, provided we'd deconflicted properly with other operators. The TFR was a very good system, once you got used to seeing car headlights above you and having things go whizzing past very close laterally.
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In other words, glad rag - having maligned and slandered one of the crew members, you then admit that the crash was due to the EM interference susceptibility of the Tornado as built, and not in any way the fault of the crew.
You might want to look up the crash of a US Army UH-60 in Germany in 1987 (and 4 others from 1982-1987) - which caused the Army to modify all of its Blackhawks to provide some level of EM protection.
The USN, on the other hand, from the start demanded that its Sea Hawks be heavily shielded from electronic interference.
Apparently there are radar and radio transmitters close to where Navy helicopters are operating when aboard ship... imagine that.
Ordinary Radio Waves Allegedly Can Knock Down Combat Copter - Los Angeles Times
The Risks Digest Volume 5: Issue 56
You might want to look up the crash of a US Army UH-60 in Germany in 1987 (and 4 others from 1982-1987) - which caused the Army to modify all of its Blackhawks to provide some level of EM protection.
The USN, on the other hand, from the start demanded that its Sea Hawks be heavily shielded from electronic interference.
Apparently there are radar and radio transmitters close to where Navy helicopters are operating when aboard ship... imagine that.
Ordinary Radio Waves Allegedly Can Knock Down Combat Copter - Los Angeles Times
The Risks Digest Volume 5: Issue 56
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TORNADO
"I don't think the information on ZA603 is altogether accurate - my memory from the accident report
was that the navigator had been reading an article on the effect of high power HF transmissions on
'fly by wire' aircraft (the HF radios on Tornados were at one time inhibited because transmitting
caused the right hand engine to go into reheat) just prior to the sortie and noted that the routing
took them quite close to some radio masts.
He was actually looking down at his knee pad map when the pilot made an aggressive manoeuvre to
avoid the A10 and thought the aircraft had gone out of control. He immediately ejected and as the
command ejection system was set to 'both' he ejected the pilot as well. "
Funnily enough that was what we, at the crash scene, were briefed on as well; the most impressive aspect was the distance the gun barrels went.
The shockwave went over the top of the hill and struck some houses on the down slope causing considerable damage, however the "locals" were not too fazed and we were made very welcome, at least having the Brits around made a change from the septics driving over everything in their Abrams and Bradleys.....we just dropped a tonka on their heads 
If I remember correctly, the radio transmitter tower that said Tonkas flew close to actually belonged to Radio Free Europe - am I right?
Somewhat ironic if so...
Somewhat ironic if so...
GK121
The RAF Tornado crash was in Nov 84 (Aircraft was ZA603 from 27 Sqn) Navigator ejected both crew from the serviceable aircraft on command ejections having been head down in the cockpit when pilot took sudden maneuvering actions to avoid an A-10 that suddenly appeared in front of them. Accident report is below.
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.g...603_8nov84.pdf
The Luftwaffe Tornado that crashed due to suspected HIRTA was an IDS(T) 'twin stick trainer' 43+93 from JBG31 on 6th July 1984. Both crew Major Manfred Wegenast (Pilot) and Hptm Wolfgang Klupp (WSO) were killed.
ASN Aircraft accident 06-JUL-1984 Panavia Tornado IDS(T) 43+93
There was a bit of a scandal about the crash in the German press as because from what I can work out from this article, the British had found that there was a possible problem with the Tornado control systems and HIRTA before the German Tornado crash.
DER SPIEGEL*33/1986 - An die Nieren
The google translation is as follows:
The RAF Tornado crash was in Nov 84 (Aircraft was ZA603 from 27 Sqn) Navigator ejected both crew from the serviceable aircraft on command ejections having been head down in the cockpit when pilot took sudden maneuvering actions to avoid an A-10 that suddenly appeared in front of them. Accident report is below.
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.g...603_8nov84.pdf
The Luftwaffe Tornado that crashed due to suspected HIRTA was an IDS(T) 'twin stick trainer' 43+93 from JBG31 on 6th July 1984. Both crew Major Manfred Wegenast (Pilot) and Hptm Wolfgang Klupp (WSO) were killed.
ASN Aircraft accident 06-JUL-1984 Panavia Tornado IDS(T) 43+93
There was a bit of a scandal about the crash in the German press as because from what I can work out from this article, the British had found that there was a possible problem with the Tornado control systems and HIRTA before the German Tornado crash.
DER SPIEGEL*33/1986 - An die Nieren
The google translation is as follows:
AIRFORCE
The renal
Defense Wörner delayed the investigation of a "Tornado" -Absturzes. His house had been forewarned. *
Shortly before his holiday in France instructed Defense Minister Manfred Wörner his armor-Secretary of State, to answer a letter which had lain for five weeks pending on his desk.
Manfred Timmermann did as he was told. "Dear Mr. Deputy," he wrote last Monday the SPD defense expert Horst young man, "the Minister has to decide whether and which confidential documents of the house is transferred to the Defence Committee, even reserved." Therefore, the Member should be patient.
But this does not do Jungmann: "My patience is torn."
For over two years, CDU and SPD deputy strive in vain defense committee to clarify the mysterious Tornado crash on July 6, 1984 at the Upper Bavarian wooden churches in the vicinity of the station "Radio Free Europe". The first report was the "General Aviation Safety" parliamentarians on September 19, 1984:
"The on 06 07 84 in Wooden churches in the vicinity of"
"Transmitter" Free Europe "accident happened one falls out of the"
"framework. During this accident was the tactical number. 1 a"
"Duo performances by overflight of the transmitter from the"
"Straight flight abruptly into a descent over, rolled"
"Simultaneously strongly to the left and crashed. The"
"Rescue system was not activated. The crew was"
"Killed."
The pilot of the second machine, the Major Jochen Both, confirmed this account: The formation was, as then, regulation, flown at 500 feet above the antenna system, warning lights would not blink. Both: "The 136 points that we no longer allowed to fly over now been announced in the squadron until later."
The CDU deputy Willy Wimmer wanted to then know if there were warnings before the accident, to fly over the transmitting equipment. The responses of the Air Force Inspector Eberhard Eimler ("An unhappy marriage of circumstances") were as soft as wax, that the Defence Committee requested a new report.
But the left says Wimmer, many questions unanswered. He knew now that the British had warned before the accident. Wimmer according to the minutes:
"The information is also on the German Luftwaffe"
"Gone., But the implementation in the flight planning"
"Pilots and entry in the cards had so"
"Delayed that the pilots who had crashed, no"
"Would have been possible, the circumstances in their plans"
"Integrate."
Wimmer wanted "to the day" know when warning the British and discussed what had happened.
Now the Tornado crash was suddenly declared to be a "top priority". Eimler advised the Minister to put the Defence Committee all the documents on the table, Wörner hesitated - for whatever reason.
If it had, the investigation Hardthöhe, not only one but two warnings from the British.
The first was from March 1984, the second on 12 June 1984. sender of the second was the technical department of the London Ministry of Defence, the receiver NAMMA in Munich, which manages the development and production of the German-British-Italian fighter aircraft. The NAMMA-clerk took the recommendation to continue to fly around the transmitter in a greater safety margin, after all so seriously that he forwarded without delay to Bonn and Rome.
Who on the Hardthöhe receive this message and what he has then caused, nor stood in the third report, which was discussed on 25 June 1986 at the Defence Committee (SPIEGEL 27/1986).
The Air Force leadership had in fact, as it turned out in the meeting, must shorten the report of 120 on 28 pages. The transfer had come to the surprise of the officers directly from the ministerial office. Justification: The Deputies should not be bothered with "technical details". _ (For wooden churches (Upper Bavaria).)
The indignation of the deputies was unanimous. After all, the Minister and the Air Force officers had to admit that warning the British was, split of 12 June 1984 on July 10, four days after the crash of wooden churches, without any modification to the squadron.
If the accident was therefore to be avoided if the British considered and recommendations had been passed immediately after the principle of "safety first" to the pilots?
Eimler any case clarified:
"The accident investigation found that the crash"
"By an electromagnetic disturbance in the flight control system"
"Due to the strong short-wave radiation from the transmitter Free"
"Must be caused Europe."
The suspicion that something could be wrong with the tornado-control was evident come the leaders even before the British recommendations; they had been given in 1981 its own investigations in order. In August 1984, six weeks after the accident, the System Supervisor for the Tornado was in a "progress report" report, the "testing of (electromagnetic interference) further hardened flight control system" was close to completion. The pilots but knew nothing of all this.
On June 25th of this year Wörner promised the deputies finally, he would now consider really exactly who did what, when known, and caused or prevented. The matter finally go him just to the kidneys as the deputies. Done but he has nothing so far.
Wörner was the young man-letter lie on 27 June, was between a regimen of 3 to July 24th and the beginning of the holiday on August 3, but time to pursue his greatest pleasure of flying. Wörner turned with an American F-16 in "Top Gun" style again some loops.
The deputy young man wants to crash again on the agenda of the Committee: "Wörner disregarded the parliamentary rights of control." It would come to suspect that the Minister "cover up their own failures" may.
On the Hardthöhe another version, however, is heard. The Jet Pilot Wörner ("Dear one hour in the 'Starfighter' than ten hours at a desk") protect his aviator comrades on the Hardthöhe, because that would have given him back the military pilot's license, to his predecessor Hans Apel had once revoked. Reason: "The Aviator fun of some parliamentarians is too expensive MPs belong to Parliament and not to the cockpit.."
In Holzkirchen (Upper Bavaria).
The renal
Defense Wörner delayed the investigation of a "Tornado" -Absturzes. His house had been forewarned. *
Shortly before his holiday in France instructed Defense Minister Manfred Wörner his armor-Secretary of State, to answer a letter which had lain for five weeks pending on his desk.
Manfred Timmermann did as he was told. "Dear Mr. Deputy," he wrote last Monday the SPD defense expert Horst young man, "the Minister has to decide whether and which confidential documents of the house is transferred to the Defence Committee, even reserved." Therefore, the Member should be patient.
But this does not do Jungmann: "My patience is torn."
For over two years, CDU and SPD deputy strive in vain defense committee to clarify the mysterious Tornado crash on July 6, 1984 at the Upper Bavarian wooden churches in the vicinity of the station "Radio Free Europe". The first report was the "General Aviation Safety" parliamentarians on September 19, 1984:
"The on 06 07 84 in Wooden churches in the vicinity of"
"Transmitter" Free Europe "accident happened one falls out of the"
"framework. During this accident was the tactical number. 1 a"
"Duo performances by overflight of the transmitter from the"
"Straight flight abruptly into a descent over, rolled"
"Simultaneously strongly to the left and crashed. The"
"Rescue system was not activated. The crew was"
"Killed."
The pilot of the second machine, the Major Jochen Both, confirmed this account: The formation was, as then, regulation, flown at 500 feet above the antenna system, warning lights would not blink. Both: "The 136 points that we no longer allowed to fly over now been announced in the squadron until later."
The CDU deputy Willy Wimmer wanted to then know if there were warnings before the accident, to fly over the transmitting equipment. The responses of the Air Force Inspector Eberhard Eimler ("An unhappy marriage of circumstances") were as soft as wax, that the Defence Committee requested a new report.
But the left says Wimmer, many questions unanswered. He knew now that the British had warned before the accident. Wimmer according to the minutes:
"The information is also on the German Luftwaffe"
"Gone., But the implementation in the flight planning"
"Pilots and entry in the cards had so"
"Delayed that the pilots who had crashed, no"
"Would have been possible, the circumstances in their plans"
"Integrate."
Wimmer wanted "to the day" know when warning the British and discussed what had happened.
Now the Tornado crash was suddenly declared to be a "top priority". Eimler advised the Minister to put the Defence Committee all the documents on the table, Wörner hesitated - for whatever reason.
If it had, the investigation Hardthöhe, not only one but two warnings from the British.
The first was from March 1984, the second on 12 June 1984. sender of the second was the technical department of the London Ministry of Defence, the receiver NAMMA in Munich, which manages the development and production of the German-British-Italian fighter aircraft. The NAMMA-clerk took the recommendation to continue to fly around the transmitter in a greater safety margin, after all so seriously that he forwarded without delay to Bonn and Rome.
Who on the Hardthöhe receive this message and what he has then caused, nor stood in the third report, which was discussed on 25 June 1986 at the Defence Committee (SPIEGEL 27/1986).
The Air Force leadership had in fact, as it turned out in the meeting, must shorten the report of 120 on 28 pages. The transfer had come to the surprise of the officers directly from the ministerial office. Justification: The Deputies should not be bothered with "technical details". _ (For wooden churches (Upper Bavaria).)
The indignation of the deputies was unanimous. After all, the Minister and the Air Force officers had to admit that warning the British was, split of 12 June 1984 on July 10, four days after the crash of wooden churches, without any modification to the squadron.
If the accident was therefore to be avoided if the British considered and recommendations had been passed immediately after the principle of "safety first" to the pilots?
Eimler any case clarified:
"The accident investigation found that the crash"
"By an electromagnetic disturbance in the flight control system"
"Due to the strong short-wave radiation from the transmitter Free"
"Must be caused Europe."
The suspicion that something could be wrong with the tornado-control was evident come the leaders even before the British recommendations; they had been given in 1981 its own investigations in order. In August 1984, six weeks after the accident, the System Supervisor for the Tornado was in a "progress report" report, the "testing of (electromagnetic interference) further hardened flight control system" was close to completion. The pilots but knew nothing of all this.
On June 25th of this year Wörner promised the deputies finally, he would now consider really exactly who did what, when known, and caused or prevented. The matter finally go him just to the kidneys as the deputies. Done but he has nothing so far.
Wörner was the young man-letter lie on 27 June, was between a regimen of 3 to July 24th and the beginning of the holiday on August 3, but time to pursue his greatest pleasure of flying. Wörner turned with an American F-16 in "Top Gun" style again some loops.
The deputy young man wants to crash again on the agenda of the Committee: "Wörner disregarded the parliamentary rights of control." It would come to suspect that the Minister "cover up their own failures" may.
On the Hardthöhe another version, however, is heard. The Jet Pilot Wörner ("Dear one hour in the 'Starfighter' than ten hours at a desk") protect his aviator comrades on the Hardthöhe, because that would have given him back the military pilot's license, to his predecessor Hans Apel had once revoked. Reason: "The Aviator fun of some parliamentarians is too expensive MPs belong to Parliament and not to the cockpit.."
In Holzkirchen (Upper Bavaria).
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#24, 42: origins of Tornado TFR.
You will find assertions that TFR was: developed by Ferranti for TSR.2; or: invented by Texas Instruments and patented in 1959. I now tell you that, in UK, Basic Research in airborne radar was led by RAE/RRE, inc. flight trials at Pershore on quite odd platforms like a taildragger HP Hermes. In this sector, as in almost all, UK Defence Establishments worked closely with US', such that it is pointless to try to DNA-any paternity. Suffice that by 1957 UK judged that strike missions could be flown in the weeds and Specified TSR.2; US did ditto in 1960, to be F-111A.
Ferranti won TSR.2 TFR, chopped 6/4/65; dribbled on as a Research exercise. Texas won F-111A/B/E TFR (AN/APQ-110: the Mark I system, GE mapper), into combat, 3/68 (not happily); radar systems on F-111C/D (and abortive F-111K, the Mark II system) were Autonetics+Sperry; by 1971 a Mark IIB system was in development for FB-111/F-111F (GE+TI).
In 1970 tenders were invited for (to be) Tornado: TFR+Ground Mapping Radar, constrained into a small space. Autonetics bid a single antenna solution; TI, 2 dishes and boxes. Hughes (who?) bid, GE did not. W.Germany caused Electronique M.Dassault (who?) to bid. UK shot-gunned a bid, Ferranti-led (TFR)+Elliott (GMR). Both were stalwarts of the Electronics Engineering Association, which as policy opposed Govt's Requirement that (Tornado) bids must be collaborative, aligning with Project funding % (W.Germany, 42.5%, Italy 15%). EEA said neither Nation possessed an avionics industry, so their bids would be as US Trojan Horses: Ferranti ignored tender terms, bid solo-UK, effectively cost-plus in Development, and what-it-might-be in Production. So they were deleted. Elliott fired 500 staff. Autonetics and TI did as asked, offering fixed price development+ licenced production. TI was cheaper, so won.
Systems Integration was a collaboration between the 3 airframers comprising Panavia, plus 3 Systems Houses, EASAMS, ESG, SIA, who were owned by black box firms. That was the job which so delayed RAAF F-111C. So, whether the TI kit was good or not, what mattered was making the boxes on the bus talk to each other. Tornado was the first to do so, digitally. Very low level was the job of the Command and Stability Augmentation System, jointly Elliott and (FIAT's avionics Unit) FIAR, who were nobody's Trojan Horse.
You will find assertions that TFR was: developed by Ferranti for TSR.2; or: invented by Texas Instruments and patented in 1959. I now tell you that, in UK, Basic Research in airborne radar was led by RAE/RRE, inc. flight trials at Pershore on quite odd platforms like a taildragger HP Hermes. In this sector, as in almost all, UK Defence Establishments worked closely with US', such that it is pointless to try to DNA-any paternity. Suffice that by 1957 UK judged that strike missions could be flown in the weeds and Specified TSR.2; US did ditto in 1960, to be F-111A.
Ferranti won TSR.2 TFR, chopped 6/4/65; dribbled on as a Research exercise. Texas won F-111A/B/E TFR (AN/APQ-110: the Mark I system, GE mapper), into combat, 3/68 (not happily); radar systems on F-111C/D (and abortive F-111K, the Mark II system) were Autonetics+Sperry; by 1971 a Mark IIB system was in development for FB-111/F-111F (GE+TI).
In 1970 tenders were invited for (to be) Tornado: TFR+Ground Mapping Radar, constrained into a small space. Autonetics bid a single antenna solution; TI, 2 dishes and boxes. Hughes (who?) bid, GE did not. W.Germany caused Electronique M.Dassault (who?) to bid. UK shot-gunned a bid, Ferranti-led (TFR)+Elliott (GMR). Both were stalwarts of the Electronics Engineering Association, which as policy opposed Govt's Requirement that (Tornado) bids must be collaborative, aligning with Project funding % (W.Germany, 42.5%, Italy 15%). EEA said neither Nation possessed an avionics industry, so their bids would be as US Trojan Horses: Ferranti ignored tender terms, bid solo-UK, effectively cost-plus in Development, and what-it-might-be in Production. So they were deleted. Elliott fired 500 staff. Autonetics and TI did as asked, offering fixed price development+ licenced production. TI was cheaper, so won.
Systems Integration was a collaboration between the 3 airframers comprising Panavia, plus 3 Systems Houses, EASAMS, ESG, SIA, who were owned by black box firms. That was the job which so delayed RAAF F-111C. So, whether the TI kit was good or not, what mattered was making the boxes on the bus talk to each other. Tornado was the first to do so, digitally. Very low level was the job of the Command and Stability Augmentation System, jointly Elliott and (FIAT's avionics Unit) FIAR, who were nobody's Trojan Horse.
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Originally Posted by RAFEngO74to09
Pious Pilot,
You might be interested in RAF - Operation Granby which includes a Campaign Diary. Also, the book Thunder & Lightning by Charles Allen HMSO ISBN 011 701 625 X was put together drawing on the personal experiences of 150 RAF personnel who were involved at all relevant locations - there is even a pic of me in it !
You might be interested in RAF - Operation Granby which includes a Campaign Diary. Also, the book Thunder & Lightning by Charles Allen HMSO ISBN 011 701 625 X was put together drawing on the personal experiences of 150 RAF personnel who were involved at all relevant locations - there is even a pic of me in it !
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So, posts #38-#40 were referring to the GAF EM interference crash. Then in post #41 glad rag - without mentioning that he is suddenly talking about a completely different accident in a different nation's air force (RAF), says "Was it not a unanticipated maneuver alongside a somewhat agitated aircrewmember with a paranoia over high power transmissions?"!
It was completely logical to think he was referring to the German aircrew.
Now that we have established that there WAS a GAF EM-caused crash, and an aircrew-error-caused RAF crash, I finally understand just what the $^&%$$&^%$ glad rag was talking about.
It was completely logical to think he was referring to the German aircrew.
Now that we have established that there WAS a GAF EM-caused crash, and an aircrew-error-caused RAF crash, I finally understand just what the $^&%$$&^%$ glad rag was talking about.
Gents - there was an earlier reference to using TFR in manual mode.
What does that mean?
What does that mean?
Originally Posted by itsnotthatbloodyhard
At least in the case of the F-111, the 'Auto TF' switch was independent of the TF radar switches, so you could have the TFRs on but still be hand flying. You'd get pitch commands on the flight director, and also high & low pitched beeps which corresponded to pitch up/down commands. You could also just fly off the e-scope by keeping the ZCL (zero clearance line) above the terrain returns, but that wasn't something you'd make a habit of. Generally we'd either be hand flying with the TFs off (because it was day VMC and we could see where we were going), or on full auto TF (because it was night or IMC and we couldn't see where we were going).
In the GR1, the switchery was a bit mandraulic but the HOTAS in the GR4 means that once you've set the system up, it's a one-handed/3-button job to turn the TFR ON/Off & route it through the autopilot.
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Tornado Manual TF - simple: pilot uses ski slope to avoid obstacle paints on E-scope, flying manually. Nav goes into verbal overdrive about upcoming terrain, GMR cutoffs and increased height monitoring.
Incidentally, during GW1 the II(AC)/13 recce misions were flown by some crews down to 100' agl using manual TF, supplemented by NVGs (both crew memebers). Reason for being so low - the recce kit (IRLS/SLIR) was not configured for medium level. On the other hand I personally considered that 100' was unnecessarily low, especially as the speeds flown (520-540) could lead to gaps in the imagery (V/H).
Ken: if you're getting a bit historical, don't forget that the Vulcan had a little nipple on the nose to provide (rudimentary) TFR (again supplemented by nav commentary from both radar and plotter); it was quite effective.
Mister B
Incidentally, during GW1 the II(AC)/13 recce misions were flown by some crews down to 100' agl using manual TF, supplemented by NVGs (both crew memebers). Reason for being so low - the recce kit (IRLS/SLIR) was not configured for medium level. On the other hand I personally considered that 100' was unnecessarily low, especially as the speeds flown (520-540) could lead to gaps in the imagery (V/H).
Ken: if you're getting a bit historical, don't forget that the Vulcan had a little nipple on the nose to provide (rudimentary) TFR (again supplemented by nav commentary from both radar and plotter); it was quite effective.
Mister B
