A-400 tanker, first plug
why can not the military accept that updating and upgrading old kit does not work? Buying new kit is the answer but not on stupid PFI contracts.
Also, there is an old adage "never modify a mod". Not set in stone by any means. But intended as a bloody great red flag to force you to think of the pitfalls. Think Nimrod MRA4.
PFI? How many even look at the simple form you can fill in to seek an exemption? No overseas sales potential of the proposed build standard? Walk away and force the politicians to overrule themselves; and record that decision on the front page of every paper or report the programme produces. MoD(PE)/DPA/DE&S, if only they knew it, are not responsible for most of the cock-ups. They are too readily blamed.
OK pitot, there is nothing "dewy eyed" about wasting £Billions when we did not need to, IMO.
Maybe you think a hyper expensive new tanker is better than MPA or ship-borne VSTOL capabilities?
Do not confuse airline seat-mile costs and sixteen hour a day utilisation, with military tanking/transport with a dozen airframes and hardly a fraction of the best civi utilisation rate. Additionally, the military tanker/transport task did not really need the slim advantage of better fuel burn where the aircraft we had was FREE (paid for in 1984) against the £1.5 million pounds PER DAY for 25 years of the FSTA!
Yes, TriStar would have needed some investment, virtually nothing was spent on it for 30 years, but it would have been a fraction of the PFI cost.
OAP
Maybe you think a hyper expensive new tanker is better than MPA or ship-borne VSTOL capabilities?
Do not confuse airline seat-mile costs and sixteen hour a day utilisation, with military tanking/transport with a dozen airframes and hardly a fraction of the best civi utilisation rate. Additionally, the military tanker/transport task did not really need the slim advantage of better fuel burn where the aircraft we had was FREE (paid for in 1984) against the £1.5 million pounds PER DAY for 25 years of the FSTA! Yes, TriStar would have needed some investment, virtually nothing was spent on it for 30 years, but it would have been a fraction of the PFI cost.OAP
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And it is your muddled logic OAP that has caused the spiralling out of control of MoD budgets that had to be stopped. Commercial operations modelling can only be used for some of the military activity but sticking an AAR asset in a block of airspace at a given time is one of those activities that can be. I am not talking about PFI here I am talking about modern reliable efficient kit that can be turned around in a couple of hours rather than days because it is waiting for more spares and engineering resources.
Pitot old chap, I am telling you (and everyone who cares to read) that for a small fraction of the cost of the FSTA, we could have had an updated and enhanced fleet of TriStar tankers that, for a sensible timescale, would have prevented the PFI requirement and also avoided some of the "credibility lack" we see today!
As it happens, without the PFI, I believe that this would represent better VFM.
BTW, have you applied your idea of commercial modelling to the South Atlantic tanker, or to the exclusivity clause?
OAP
As it happens, without the PFI, I believe that this would represent better VFM.
BTW, have you applied your idea of commercial modelling to the South Atlantic tanker, or to the exclusivity clause?
OAP
we could have had an updated and enhanced fleet of TriStar tankers
It really is that simple.As for the USAF and their KC135s and KC10s, well the USAF tried to ditch the latter just last year and the former will all be going under KC-X, KC-Y and KC-Z programmes. You have heard of these, haven't you? Of course the USAF need new tankers and they are planning to get some!!
As for Tristar v FSTA, well I suppose the Tristar did have an air eng!!
roland pulfrew and just another jocky I rather think you missed the point of ian16th's little tongue in cheek joke about not seeing the drogue under the A400's wing. However I am sure he was grateful for your explanation on the probe and drogue method of AAR. He'd be far too polite to point out that he was working on Valiant tankers when most of us on here were still in short pants - if indeed actually born!
Yes Roland, it would have required an enhanced fleet, as I have always said. The Mk32 pods would also have gone on. As designed!
Yes, the two Pilots with Air Eng and the Loady was a great min crew!
It is a great opportunity lost...at huge expense, in more ways than the obvious.
OAP
Yes, the two Pilots with Air Eng and the Loady was a great min crew!
It is a great opportunity lost...at huge expense, in more ways than the obvious.
OAP
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Regards Tristar (or any other clapped out tanker/transport) then it doesn't matter how cheap the capability if that capability is never available! And, yes, I hear the argument about investment but not sure that any bespoke fleet of such a small size is really viable long term (and completely different to the 707/135 family for which support is still widely available).
That said I do fully take the point that the economics of FSTA really don't add up. Perhaps, when the deal was specc'd years ago, and we had a reasonable size air force, it had some potential but with a future FJ force of just 6 sqns it just seems crazy to be locked into this type of long term deal.
That said I do fully take the point that the economics of FSTA really don't add up. Perhaps, when the deal was specc'd years ago, and we had a reasonable size air force, it had some potential but with a future FJ force of just 6 sqns it just seems crazy to be locked into this type of long term deal.
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Sure, TriStar had well documented reliability and maintainability issues that significantly affected dispatch and mission effectiveness.
In addition, with the RAF being the last fleet operator in the World it placed the full burden of risk upon MoD/MCE to ensure that bespoke fleet remained airworthy and compliant with current and future regs - don't underestimate the effort (and cost) incurred in the post XV230 world of risk averse mil airworthiness. As an aside I well remember looking at Victor K2s, seeing them leaking like a sieve with "putty" all over the place and thinking "how the hell do those things stay in the air?". Obviously they did but I think you get my point that the appetite for risk associated with maintaining "clapped out" old warhorses no longer exists!
In addition, with the RAF being the last fleet operator in the World it placed the full burden of risk upon MoD/MCE to ensure that bespoke fleet remained airworthy and compliant with current and future regs - don't underestimate the effort (and cost) incurred in the post XV230 world of risk averse mil airworthiness. As an aside I well remember looking at Victor K2s, seeing them leaking like a sieve with "putty" all over the place and thinking "how the hell do those things stay in the air?". Obviously they did but I think you get my point that the appetite for risk associated with maintaining "clapped out" old warhorses no longer exists!
Quote andrewn..."Sure, TriStar had well documented reliability and maintainability issues that significantly affected dispatch and mission effectiveness."
Thanks for that. I can assure you that these issues were primarily caused by the RAF's choice of low spares holdings, and lean-to-the-bone engineering manpower!
Would you like to explain how the Afghan trooping task impacted on AAR availability?
OAP
Thanks for that. I can assure you that these issues were primarily caused by the RAF's choice of low spares holdings, and lean-to-the-bone engineering manpower!
Would you like to explain how the Afghan trooping task impacted on AAR availability?
OAP
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OAP - my understanding is that there was a period towards the end (post VC-10 pax license expiry and prior to FSTA ramp up) where the maintenance of the Afghan airbridge was prioritised above all else, due to lack of suitable alternate transport into theater.
IMO, if a fleet of 8/9 frames was struggling to maintain a twice weekly rotation then it was probably time to go.
Just my opinion of course.
IMO, if a fleet of 8/9 frames was struggling to maintain a twice weekly rotation then it was probably time to go.
Just my opinion of course.
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An aircraft isn't "free" even if the capital cost was paid decades ago. On a good day how many serviceable airframes can you generate from this orphan fleet and at what cost in support? One on a good day with 6 on the tarmac. At what expense and effort is required when it goes tech out of base? I've been on the receiving (non receiving end) of unreliable AAR and AT support too many times and that was 15 years ago. Let it go and either make a case for the proper kit or let the politicians decide what capability they are going to gap but don't try and paper over the cracks and patch up airframes long past their sell by date.
Would somebody please like to explain the UK requirement for AAR
Of course such an eventuality could never arise nowadays
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It's not only pointy things that need fuel
Although the Voyger is no doubt a fine tanker, what it can't do, but the A400 can do is AAR helicopters....
Now, we appear to have made a national decision not to have that capability but we DO have 2 helo types in service that are AAR compatible, Merlin and CH47, seems a shame not to have that possibility or even interoperability.
DM
Now, we appear to have made a national decision not to have that capability but we DO have 2 helo types in service that are AAR compatible, Merlin and CH47, seems a shame not to have that possibility or even interoperability.
DM
Perhaps when the mighty atlas is in service this is the uor that will be the answer to breaking the monopoly. A Pfi exclusive only applies to requirements that the fleet can meet. 
Last edited by dagenham; 31st Aug 2014 at 08:51. Reason: Far fibgers small phone
So, here we are with the usual load of misinformation and legacy peeves, all topped off with AirTanker propaganda and MoD pro FSTA spin.
For a start, you probably dont know the specific requirements of the airbridge airframes, and I am not going to say here. Suffice it to say that the FSTA required a huge effort to try and meet them, failed, had loads more work done and still only achieved a lower standard than TriStar. The historic lack of investment by the RAF in TriStar and engineering manpower and spares meant that when one of the few airframes was U/S, the movements were delayed. The official view was that this was acceptable because it was the most cost-effective!
The two men and a dog worked their arses off but, could not do miracles and so, the tanker tasking fell to rock bottom. I say again, this was not the airframes fault, it was due to verneer-thin support expenditure.
It is revealing to read how peeved people can feel 15 years after their trip was delayed. Similar to the feeling at the terminal when your airline flight is delayed, probably for the same reasons that RAF AT and AAR get delayed!
Yes, it is a pain, and dispatch performance was always a high priority but, without better engineering resources, you can only achieve so much.
TriStar would have been so much better with some more support in the RAF.
Is the hyper-expensive FSTA scheme really just an opt-out by the RAF because it cannot run AT/AAR properly?
OAP
For a start, you probably dont know the specific requirements of the airbridge airframes, and I am not going to say here. Suffice it to say that the FSTA required a huge effort to try and meet them, failed, had loads more work done and still only achieved a lower standard than TriStar. The historic lack of investment by the RAF in TriStar and engineering manpower and spares meant that when one of the few airframes was U/S, the movements were delayed. The official view was that this was acceptable because it was the most cost-effective!
The two men and a dog worked their arses off but, could not do miracles and so, the tanker tasking fell to rock bottom. I say again, this was not the airframes fault, it was due to verneer-thin support expenditure. It is revealing to read how peeved people can feel 15 years after their trip was delayed. Similar to the feeling at the terminal when your airline flight is delayed, probably for the same reasons that RAF AT and AAR get delayed!
Yes, it is a pain, and dispatch performance was always a high priority but, without better engineering resources, you can only achieve so much.
TriStar would have been so much better with some more support in the RAF.
Is the hyper-expensive FSTA scheme really just an opt-out by the RAF because it cannot run AT/AAR properly?
OAP
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Comparing the inconvenience of a delayed departure to Malaga with your family to delayed or cancelled operations and/or multiple national exercises are not quite the same in my book. However, you are still missing the point OAP. What is the difference in the manning and engineering support to operate x number of tristar hours compared to x number of hours on a modern airframe? What is the difference in fuel burn? I don't have the figures you might but they are huge. Why does the military never learn its lessons about fiddling around with old airframes?