Vietnam & Israeli air war studied by RAF/RN fast jet students
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Vietnam & Israeli air war studied by RAF/RN fast jet students
Just wondered off hand, how much of the air war in Vietnam and the Mid East was used as examples in lectures by QFIs and AWI to their students during the 60s and 70s, say at Brawdy and Chivenor?
As in "this is how they did it and this is how we could adapt" etc. Apart from the usual rotations of Vietnam vets to USAFE units and exchange pilots, did anyone particular ace or aces come to talk at Cranwell to IOT or staff students at Bracknell, Greenwich etc etc, to share their experiences?
Did the then Lt Cunningham and Lt JG Driscoll (first Top Gun graduates ) come over to the UK and talk to crews at Yeovilton or Conningsby,
Likewise with the AAC, aside from the Personnel Exchange Program, any famous Vets come along to Middle Wallop and chat about their experiences in the boonies -, gunship development and employment, experimental use of INFANT (Iroquois Night Fighting and Tracking)UH-1M Hueys and the employment of AS-11 and the first use of TOW by a Huey?
Cheers
As in "this is how they did it and this is how we could adapt" etc. Apart from the usual rotations of Vietnam vets to USAFE units and exchange pilots, did anyone particular ace or aces come to talk at Cranwell to IOT or staff students at Bracknell, Greenwich etc etc, to share their experiences?
Did the then Lt Cunningham and Lt JG Driscoll (first Top Gun graduates ) come over to the UK and talk to crews at Yeovilton or Conningsby,
Likewise with the AAC, aside from the Personnel Exchange Program, any famous Vets come along to Middle Wallop and chat about their experiences in the boonies -, gunship development and employment, experimental use of INFANT (Iroquois Night Fighting and Tracking)UH-1M Hueys and the employment of AS-11 and the first use of TOW by a Huey?
Cheers
I certainly recall a USN captain and his wife visiting the Towers in the 60s - he started his part - "Biggest mistake in my life was to eject over the Vietnamese village I had just bombed" - the start of 6 or 7 years in captivity - his wife did the "yellow ribbon" bit. Impressive lecture that has stayed with me.
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Am pretty sure Brig Gen Robin Olds (Google Op BOLO) gave a talk at Cranwell in 1970. I was on leave at the time and missed it. However, my instructor was the USAF exchange officer, and I got the stories from him. Olds' biography, written by his daughter, is an excellent read.
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I was talking with my Nav studes 25 years ago about hardened shelters and their origin as a result of the 6-day war.
Blank looks.
Israeli 6-day war in 1967.
Blank looks.
Israeli air strikes eliminating the Egyptian Air Force.
Blank looks.
These guys had been through Cranditz and only 22 years after that war but had no knowledge that the absolute wipe out of aircraft lined up on the ground led directly to hardened shelters and dispersal plans throughout NATO and the WPC.
Interestingly, Russia did not build shelters on airfields away from the Fronts.
Blank looks.
Israeli 6-day war in 1967.
Blank looks.
Israeli air strikes eliminating the Egyptian Air Force.
Blank looks.
These guys had been through Cranditz and only 22 years after that war but had no knowledge that the absolute wipe out of aircraft lined up on the ground led directly to hardened shelters and dispersal plans throughout NATO and the WPC.
Interestingly, Russia did not build shelters on airfields away from the Fronts.
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The more important study should focus upon the Political decisions made by both the Politicians and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as understanding the McNamara Effect upon Operations by the USAF and US Navy.
Target selection was being done by the President for Crying Out Loud!
Sortie Count had to be maintained even if the Aircraft was carrying a Single Bomb due to shortage of Bombs.
The rejection of Inertia Nav by the USAF that forced it to use predictable routings and timings was another issue that gets ignored.
As to the Helicopter War, when you have a Hammer everything looks like a Nail.
Generals like to move Divisions and Regiments about the place and not just Squads and Platoons. Thus, we fought the War with the wrong Strategy, Tactics, and tried to use "conventional" tactics to fight an un-conventional War. Indeed, there were times we experienced large unit confrontations but the bulk of the War would have been best fought if we had scattered small units all over the place and used them to confront the "guerrilla" forces.
Under Westmoreland we focused upon killing people and ignoring their weak link which was their Logistical Trains. Unlike Western Militaries who put the Troops out front and the Logistics Tail behind them, the Vietnamese had to do it exactly the opposite. They had to position their supplies ahead of operations and then move Troops into the area after their logistical base was in place. Abrams understood that and changed our focus to going after the Logistical Structure.
Even then he missed the real way to success. He allowed the NVA/VC to return to their Sanctuaries after destroying their Logistics. We should have not only cut them off from the Supplies but also cut them off from the Safe Areas and defeated their Main Force Units by isolating them from both.
The American Vietnam War should be a Case Study on the failure of Senior Leadership and not focus upon the symptoms of that failure. We had the Means and Military forces to Win that War. Yet, we were unable to decisively defeat the Vietnamese due to our own Leadership.
I can provide a good Reading List for those interested.
I see similarities between Vietnam then and Iraq and Afghanistan today and would suggest we have not learned our lessons from Vietnam.
Target selection was being done by the President for Crying Out Loud!
Sortie Count had to be maintained even if the Aircraft was carrying a Single Bomb due to shortage of Bombs.
The rejection of Inertia Nav by the USAF that forced it to use predictable routings and timings was another issue that gets ignored.
As to the Helicopter War, when you have a Hammer everything looks like a Nail.
Generals like to move Divisions and Regiments about the place and not just Squads and Platoons. Thus, we fought the War with the wrong Strategy, Tactics, and tried to use "conventional" tactics to fight an un-conventional War. Indeed, there were times we experienced large unit confrontations but the bulk of the War would have been best fought if we had scattered small units all over the place and used them to confront the "guerrilla" forces.
Under Westmoreland we focused upon killing people and ignoring their weak link which was their Logistical Trains. Unlike Western Militaries who put the Troops out front and the Logistics Tail behind them, the Vietnamese had to do it exactly the opposite. They had to position their supplies ahead of operations and then move Troops into the area after their logistical base was in place. Abrams understood that and changed our focus to going after the Logistical Structure.
Even then he missed the real way to success. He allowed the NVA/VC to return to their Sanctuaries after destroying their Logistics. We should have not only cut them off from the Supplies but also cut them off from the Safe Areas and defeated their Main Force Units by isolating them from both.
The American Vietnam War should be a Case Study on the failure of Senior Leadership and not focus upon the symptoms of that failure. We had the Means and Military forces to Win that War. Yet, we were unable to decisively defeat the Vietnamese due to our own Leadership.
I can provide a good Reading List for those interested.
I see similarities between Vietnam then and Iraq and Afghanistan today and would suggest we have not learned our lessons from Vietnam.
ISTR there was also a problem with tour lengths - enlisted men did a year in theatre and officers, 6 months, to give more officers battle experience. Did not go down with the enlisted guys too well. ISTR that Maj Bob Pomeroy the USAF lecturer at the Towers in the early 60s lost his life in Vietnam as did my three hosts at the UASF Academy on our 1965 visit
Good post, BB. When I worked in one of your county's headquarters, the senior military folk there were saying exactly the same thing about Afg and Iraq. But the pressure from the top suggested that they had not taken the lessons fully on board. Some of the senior military May have been too career orientated (oriented) to challenge the men in the Whitehouse. Much like the UK's.
Chopper,
I give a "lessons identified" paper to the UK and European QHTI courses; we cover Korea, Algeria, Vietnam, Iran/Iraq, Falklands, Gulf and Afghanistan. It's a bit of a canter through, but it gets them (hopefully...) to dig a bit deeper. The recurring theme is, in some areas, how little has changed - tactics employed in Algeria still have merit today. I'm never ceased to be amazed by the US observers on the course who've never heard of the Howze Board, but, there you go...Of course, most of the guys I lecture nowadays are combat veterans themselves (albeit in one Theatre in most cases...).
Happy to run you through it Chopper next time we have a brew/beer....
BTW - Old's book is superb and he's a constant in my "Dream dinner party" line up...a comparison between Olds and Boyd is an amusing way to while away a few hours...
I give a "lessons identified" paper to the UK and European QHTI courses; we cover Korea, Algeria, Vietnam, Iran/Iraq, Falklands, Gulf and Afghanistan. It's a bit of a canter through, but it gets them (hopefully...) to dig a bit deeper. The recurring theme is, in some areas, how little has changed - tactics employed in Algeria still have merit today. I'm never ceased to be amazed by the US observers on the course who've never heard of the Howze Board, but, there you go...Of course, most of the guys I lecture nowadays are combat veterans themselves (albeit in one Theatre in most cases...).
Happy to run you through it Chopper next time we have a brew/beer....
BTW - Old's book is superb and he's a constant in my "Dream dinner party" line up...a comparison between Olds and Boyd is an amusing way to while away a few hours...
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The Key to the Howze Board is the full unqualified support given the Board by SecDef McNamara.
The key to accurate analysis is being able to have a completely open and objective mindset and not be held captive by "conventional wisdom" alone.
When the British Apaches prepared to head to Afghanistan, I recall a very pitched debate here about what Tactics would be used.
It was suggested by some that a very close review of US Army Lessons Learned in Iraq and a study of US Army Attack helicopter Tactics in Vietnam would prove very beneficial. To say that notion did not receive complete welcome by the British is an understatement.
Fulda Gap ain't the Sandbox is the simple version.
Hovering and launching off Hellfires is not very useful either.
Especially crucial is the concept of Danger Close application of Rockets and Gunfire when supporting Troops in Contact. The important part of that is accepting that those missions are rarely easy to pre-plan and carry out as Close Combat can be a very fluid and confusing situation to all concerned.
The US Army actually brought back Vietham Era Attack Pilots to give Seminars.
Some old ways are still good and are enhanced by modern technology. Knowing how to combine the two is the key.
The key to accurate analysis is being able to have a completely open and objective mindset and not be held captive by "conventional wisdom" alone.
When the British Apaches prepared to head to Afghanistan, I recall a very pitched debate here about what Tactics would be used.
It was suggested by some that a very close review of US Army Lessons Learned in Iraq and a study of US Army Attack helicopter Tactics in Vietnam would prove very beneficial. To say that notion did not receive complete welcome by the British is an understatement.
Fulda Gap ain't the Sandbox is the simple version.
Hovering and launching off Hellfires is not very useful either.
Especially crucial is the concept of Danger Close application of Rockets and Gunfire when supporting Troops in Contact. The important part of that is accepting that those missions are rarely easy to pre-plan and carry out as Close Combat can be a very fluid and confusing situation to all concerned.
The US Army actually brought back Vietham Era Attack Pilots to give Seminars.
Some old ways are still good and are enhanced by modern technology. Knowing how to combine the two is the key.
I learnt a huge amount from (then) Capt Tad Oelstrom at Brawdy in the early 70s. He told some great Da Nang stories about strafe in the F4 when every weapon station on the aircraft was fitted with a Vulcan cannon. Pulling the trigger must have been amazingly orgasmic.
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USAF F-4's were as dangerous to the Infantry as were the enemy. USMC F-4 Pilots were very much better and could actually hit Vietnam unlike the Zoomies.
Now the old Farts flying the F-100's could put their bombs smack on the smoke.
Cobra and Huey Gunships sometimes got as close as 15 Meters from the good guys (on purpose).
Now the old Farts flying the F-100's could put their bombs smack on the smoke.
Cobra and Huey Gunships sometimes got as close as 15 Meters from the good guys (on purpose).
As ever...
......ask and ye shall get the answer. Thank you for swift replies. Having spent my 35 years aviating over the ocean chasing black tubes this was not a field I ever was involved with.
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Thread Starter
Cheers guys,
Though six months for officer tour of duty in-county, I was not aware of that. For the Tonkin Gulf Yacht Club, I guess it was the regular 6 month det and was it the same for the land based sailors - those who flew with the Seawolves, Black Ponies, VP squadrons (
@ Rossian - did you see / learn about Market Time P-3A patrol ops lol ??
Might explain why some of the bios of leaders in our rotorcraft industry kinda served so short service in the Navy from gaining their commission - AOCS / ROTC do 1 year of flight school from T-28/T-34 to TH-13, TH-57A then tour of duty, then back stateside ferrying a/c to and fro Barbers Point to the mainland and then leave the service and move onto the offshore and onshore marketplace.
@Eval, much appreciated will take the tab on that!
Yep I remember reading that US Army Aviators, our AAC and RAF went on field trips to Algeria to learn what the French did. IIRC, it was probably the first use of armed helos in conflict, bar the odd mounting of a Gimpy in a OH-13 Sioux during the Korean War.
So no IDF/AF aces came over to say how they held their own during the Six Day or Yom Kippur War and won the air war. Or cos at the end of WW2, when the State of Israel was born a lot of the fighter pilots who went over were by any chance Battle of Britain aces? I am thinking the tactics and strategy employed by us during the dark days of the War - were taken on by the new IDF/AF and modified which is why they were successful against the Arab nations.
Cheers
Though six months for officer tour of duty in-county, I was not aware of that. For the Tonkin Gulf Yacht Club, I guess it was the regular 6 month det and was it the same for the land based sailors - those who flew with the Seawolves, Black Ponies, VP squadrons (
@ Rossian - did you see / learn about Market Time P-3A patrol ops lol ??
Might explain why some of the bios of leaders in our rotorcraft industry kinda served so short service in the Navy from gaining their commission - AOCS / ROTC do 1 year of flight school from T-28/T-34 to TH-13, TH-57A then tour of duty, then back stateside ferrying a/c to and fro Barbers Point to the mainland and then leave the service and move onto the offshore and onshore marketplace.
@Eval, much appreciated will take the tab on that!
Yep I remember reading that US Army Aviators, our AAC and RAF went on field trips to Algeria to learn what the French did. IIRC, it was probably the first use of armed helos in conflict, bar the odd mounting of a Gimpy in a OH-13 Sioux during the Korean War.
So no IDF/AF aces came over to say how they held their own during the Six Day or Yom Kippur War and won the air war. Or cos at the end of WW2, when the State of Israel was born a lot of the fighter pilots who went over were by any chance Battle of Britain aces? I am thinking the tactics and strategy employed by us during the dark days of the War - were taken on by the new IDF/AF and modified which is why they were successful against the Arab nations.
Cheers
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IDF F4 losses
Slight thread drift, slight...
During the (I think) 1973 Yom Kippur (spelling) war, the early IDF F4 losses to Egyptian SAM's were frightening. Then overnight, the loss rate dramatically reduced. The Egyptians were unable to work out how a successful missile strike no longer brought down the Isreali F4's.
An IDF engineer suggested a simple and quick mod, the powers immediately accepted the idea, and overnight, F4's were modified.
The heat-seeking SAMs were still flying up the F4's jet pipes and then exploding...but the bit of jet pipe they had entered was an easily attached and sacrificial extension. SAM blows extension off, F4 returns to base...mostly. Believe there are pictures on the net somewhere.
Was this in-service survival mod passed on or even generally discussed in training or on operational units in the west?
Camlobe
During the (I think) 1973 Yom Kippur (spelling) war, the early IDF F4 losses to Egyptian SAM's were frightening. Then overnight, the loss rate dramatically reduced. The Egyptians were unable to work out how a successful missile strike no longer brought down the Isreali F4's.
An IDF engineer suggested a simple and quick mod, the powers immediately accepted the idea, and overnight, F4's were modified.
The heat-seeking SAMs were still flying up the F4's jet pipes and then exploding...but the bit of jet pipe they had entered was an easily attached and sacrificial extension. SAM blows extension off, F4 returns to base...mostly. Believe there are pictures on the net somewhere.
Was this in-service survival mod passed on or even generally discussed in training or on operational units in the west?
Camlobe
The heat-seeking SAMs were still flying up the F4's jet pipes and then exploding...but the bit of jet pipe they had entered was an easily attached and sacrificial extension. SAM blows extension off, F4 returns to base...mostly. Believe there are pictures on the net somewhere.
