The Shar Decision - Questioning "Their Lordships"`
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I fear k-saucy is right. We can argue all we like and while we can see the pitfalls of policy decisions from our lowly positions, those above can only focus on budgets and the highly unsavoury management-style yukspeak phrase, 'risk management'. (Risk management is another word for 'cut the cost, never mind the performance, I won't have to make a career-threatening decision but will probably get promoted as long no-one catches on until after the end of my tour'!)
While we can see the flaws in their arguments -
what if Uncle Sam ain't there,
what if there is a credible air-threat,
what if there is a sub-surface threat,
what if there isn't any AD/SEAD/CAS/SH/AT etc.....
- the people who call the shots have been so far removed from the front-line for so long, their actual decisions are based on previous experience that is of little use. Or of course, they never had relevant experience in the first place, which is quite feasible in this day of 'right person for the job'!
Oh, and most likely, he/she will not have asked the front-line experts either!
The fact is we won't get any highly-paid Neddie to admit he's porked it and we will have to accept that any exped fleet from 2006 -201? will have to hope that the USN is on our side and close by with top cover. It doesn't make good reading, its very sad for the Sea Jet and the FAA as a whole but that's tough sh*t.
Oh, Av Plt........ go away, you sad boy.
While we can see the flaws in their arguments -
what if Uncle Sam ain't there,
what if there is a credible air-threat,
what if there is a sub-surface threat,
what if there isn't any AD/SEAD/CAS/SH/AT etc.....
- the people who call the shots have been so far removed from the front-line for so long, their actual decisions are based on previous experience that is of little use. Or of course, they never had relevant experience in the first place, which is quite feasible in this day of 'right person for the job'!
Oh, and most likely, he/she will not have asked the front-line experts either!
The fact is we won't get any highly-paid Neddie to admit he's porked it and we will have to accept that any exped fleet from 2006 -201? will have to hope that the USN is on our side and close by with top cover. It doesn't make good reading, its very sad for the Sea Jet and the FAA as a whole but that's tough sh*t.
Oh, Av Plt........ go away, you sad boy.
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Oh Jacko, almost forgot..... we need a blue-water fleet cos His Excellency for World Affairs and Grovelling, El Tone, tells us we are a 'farce for good and world stability'.
Our masterful and kind leader want's us to be 'world policemen' dontchaknow! (The images of Keystone Kops or Inspector Clouseau come to mind.....oh well!)
Our masterful and kind leader want's us to be 'world policemen' dontchaknow! (The images of Keystone Kops or Inspector Clouseau come to mind.....oh well!)
Jacko your last comments explain your hostility towards the Sea Harrier and the Royal Navy in general. Why do we need a blue water fleet you ask?
Didn't you do geography at school? Britain is a MARITIME nation. Throughout history our fortunes have been largely dependant on sea power and maritime trade. A capable blue water fleet is VITAL if the UK is to have any influence in the world.
We have interests around the world. Some strategic, some financial. We need the assets to protect these interests. More to the point, over 90% of UK trade goes by sea? Want to attack the Uk? Traditionally you do it by sea. Even today, a few submarines lurking in shipping lanes could serverely disrupt out economy. As for aircraft, what do you think they run on? Apple Juice? Oil, which has to be imported. These supply/trades routes need to be defended. Remember the attacks on oil shipping during the Iran/Iraq war? I seem to recall the deployment of naval forces by western nations.....
Of course, defence policy is the servant of foreign policy. This concept makes the loss of organic air defence even more disturbing. Should the UK be....
a) An extension of US foreign and defence policy, with every decision on deployment of British forces being made in Washington.
b) Part of an centralised Europe, with decisions being made in Brussels, regardless of British needs.
c) An strong ally of both Europe and the US, but a slave to neither, and with influence on both camps, and with the ability to act independently if required.
If you think c), then we need a capable blue water fleet, with the ability to operate in hosile areas. To do that, we need organic air defence. In other words, the Sea Harrier.
Didn't you do geography at school? Britain is a MARITIME nation. Throughout history our fortunes have been largely dependant on sea power and maritime trade. A capable blue water fleet is VITAL if the UK is to have any influence in the world.
We have interests around the world. Some strategic, some financial. We need the assets to protect these interests. More to the point, over 90% of UK trade goes by sea? Want to attack the Uk? Traditionally you do it by sea. Even today, a few submarines lurking in shipping lanes could serverely disrupt out economy. As for aircraft, what do you think they run on? Apple Juice? Oil, which has to be imported. These supply/trades routes need to be defended. Remember the attacks on oil shipping during the Iran/Iraq war? I seem to recall the deployment of naval forces by western nations.....
Of course, defence policy is the servant of foreign policy. This concept makes the loss of organic air defence even more disturbing. Should the UK be....
a) An extension of US foreign and defence policy, with every decision on deployment of British forces being made in Washington.
b) Part of an centralised Europe, with decisions being made in Brussels, regardless of British needs.
c) An strong ally of both Europe and the US, but a slave to neither, and with influence on both camps, and with the ability to act independently if required.
If you think c), then we need a capable blue water fleet, with the ability to operate in hosile areas. To do that, we need organic air defence. In other words, the Sea Harrier.
Webf,
Not hostile, just cynical. Besides which, I think you're living in the 1950s, before the withdrawal from Suez, and before the disappearance of a global threat. In Devon Sir Walter Raleigh and Sir Francis Drake may still seem like relevant role models, but the world they inhabited is not one I recognise today.
The sun has set on the glorious British Empire, old chap, and no-one is threatening these sea lanes upon which we supposedly depend so much more heavily than our neighbours and partners. (Nor, in my opinion, is today's RN remotely capable of keeping them safe on its own, it's simply too small). We could never afford the kind of Navy required for the role you outline, nor is that role the one outlined in SDR, 'Options or any other recent DWP. You must accept that the RN is incapable of autonomously performing the kind of global strategic role you outline and will always rely on co-operation with allied Navies. Why not rely on our Allies for Fleet Air Defence too, even if only for the brief time window before the arrival of JSF?
Moreover, there is no real global threat to the sea lanes, which is why the World's navies have shifted to an increasing emphasis on Littoral operations. The US Navy clearly believes that it no longer needs an AD aircraft with the range of the F-14, and is instead packing the decks of its carriers with more versatile and more useful F/A-18s.
Even if there was a threat, it's probably the case that land-based air power represents a more efficient and cost effective solution, with a land-based Nimrod able to cover massive areas of ocean in the ASW role, and with sea-skimming air-launched missiles (according to you) representing the worst case threat to surface warships.
And just for interests sake, our democratically elected government (not just this one but the last one too) have quite deliberately moved away from the belief that we need to be able to act autonomously. If we did need to do so, the first thing we should spend money on is decent SEAD so that all operations can be protected, not on a handful of SHars so that we can send a single carrier to sea with its own air defence, but with inadequate capacity to do anything else worthwhile.
This Government's policy (which I think is mistaken in this regard) does at least give the RN's carriers and JFH a role in expeditionary warfare, despite their lack of cost-effectiveness. You should perhaps welcome its commitment to the GR7/9 and the Harrier's shipborne role, and you should be overjoyed that they are even contemplating CVF and FCBA.
We're again guilty of delusions of grandeur and of emptily trying to punch above our weight, and cannot afford to maintain these relics of the Cold War and Corporate when there are other, more pressing priorities for the Defence budget. Yours is exactly the kind of attitude that has seen the RN consume a disproportionate amount of our limited defence budget for decades, and is as inappropriate and old fashioned as the 'Cavalry enthusiasts' who still think that we should maintain massed formations of heavy armour.
Not hostile, just cynical. Besides which, I think you're living in the 1950s, before the withdrawal from Suez, and before the disappearance of a global threat. In Devon Sir Walter Raleigh and Sir Francis Drake may still seem like relevant role models, but the world they inhabited is not one I recognise today.
The sun has set on the glorious British Empire, old chap, and no-one is threatening these sea lanes upon which we supposedly depend so much more heavily than our neighbours and partners. (Nor, in my opinion, is today's RN remotely capable of keeping them safe on its own, it's simply too small). We could never afford the kind of Navy required for the role you outline, nor is that role the one outlined in SDR, 'Options or any other recent DWP. You must accept that the RN is incapable of autonomously performing the kind of global strategic role you outline and will always rely on co-operation with allied Navies. Why not rely on our Allies for Fleet Air Defence too, even if only for the brief time window before the arrival of JSF?
Moreover, there is no real global threat to the sea lanes, which is why the World's navies have shifted to an increasing emphasis on Littoral operations. The US Navy clearly believes that it no longer needs an AD aircraft with the range of the F-14, and is instead packing the decks of its carriers with more versatile and more useful F/A-18s.
Even if there was a threat, it's probably the case that land-based air power represents a more efficient and cost effective solution, with a land-based Nimrod able to cover massive areas of ocean in the ASW role, and with sea-skimming air-launched missiles (according to you) representing the worst case threat to surface warships.
And just for interests sake, our democratically elected government (not just this one but the last one too) have quite deliberately moved away from the belief that we need to be able to act autonomously. If we did need to do so, the first thing we should spend money on is decent SEAD so that all operations can be protected, not on a handful of SHars so that we can send a single carrier to sea with its own air defence, but with inadequate capacity to do anything else worthwhile.
This Government's policy (which I think is mistaken in this regard) does at least give the RN's carriers and JFH a role in expeditionary warfare, despite their lack of cost-effectiveness. You should perhaps welcome its commitment to the GR7/9 and the Harrier's shipborne role, and you should be overjoyed that they are even contemplating CVF and FCBA.
We're again guilty of delusions of grandeur and of emptily trying to punch above our weight, and cannot afford to maintain these relics of the Cold War and Corporate when there are other, more pressing priorities for the Defence budget. Yours is exactly the kind of attitude that has seen the RN consume a disproportionate amount of our limited defence budget for decades, and is as inappropriate and old fashioned as the 'Cavalry enthusiasts' who still think that we should maintain massed formations of heavy armour.
Last edited by Jackonicko; 24th May 2002 at 00:36.
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Archimedes
Thanks for the correction – much appreciated!
Of course, we shouldn’t commit the FA2 to low-level suicide attack missions à la Falklands any more – but the interesting question is, “If the GR7/9 is to deliver from medium or high level, who is going to protect its six?”
We actually need both aircraft types for efficient air-to-ground operations – LGBs from the FA2 won’t work without “lazing” from the GR (or ground forces).
As a team, they have a fairly good offensive capability – separately, that capability is much diminished. And, at the risk of boring everyone, without the FA2 all Task Force Units become vulnerable to air attack.
Thanks for the correction – much appreciated!
Of course, we shouldn’t commit the FA2 to low-level suicide attack missions à la Falklands any more – but the interesting question is, “If the GR7/9 is to deliver from medium or high level, who is going to protect its six?”
We actually need both aircraft types for efficient air-to-ground operations – LGBs from the FA2 won’t work without “lazing” from the GR (or ground forces).
As a team, they have a fairly good offensive capability – separately, that capability is much diminished. And, at the risk of boring everyone, without the FA2 all Task Force Units become vulnerable to air attack.
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Jackonicko
I must say that you enjoy being provocative! No harm done!
The issue here is not a competition between FA2 and the GR7/9. Nor is anyone trying to do down Jaguar pilots or their steed.
What appears clear to me from your remarks is that you do not have the embarked/maritime experience to understand how very important it is to be able to defend yourself at sea – especially when you get caught with your pants down (i.e. no shore-based air assets nearby and the enemy approaching fast). The ability to “cope” in a situation like that depends on organic Fleet resources that are under the direct control of the Naval Task Force Commander.
Your comment, “whether it's worth retaining in the face of other, more versatile and more useful priorities.
And we do have allies who can provide this level of air cover .............. if we need carrier aviation at all.” – this represents a sad reflection of a somewhat frivolous attitude during a serious debate. (I don’t mind being corrected on facts, at all – different numbers for Eurofighter do get spread around – so I accede to your privileged information.)
Do read DP 2001, you may be surprised by its content. For example:
“Force and Capability Development
27. The validity of the Strategic Defence Review’s conclusions about the broad shape of our future capability requirements is confirmed by this reassessment both of the future strategic context and of our immediate operational priorities. The key characteristics are to be able to:
· respond to crises using forces at graduated states of readiness, rather than relying on prepositioning;
· deploy early to reduce the risk of a crisis escalating;
· successfully conduct large, high intensity combat operations against demanding opponents with advanced capabilities;
· prepare, deploy, operate, sustain and recover our forces within a NATO, EU, UN or ad hoc multinational framework;
· maintain a qualitative edge in key military capabilities.”
What could be more “versatile or useful” in the context of this than carrier-borne fixed wing air defence?
Please don’t continue to quote the F3 and the Jaguar as being versatile or useful in this context. Both aircraft types require “prepositioning”.
As for the F3 in particular, your stated knowledge of that aircraft’s weapon system is less than convincing. Look at what our Allies say about this “fighter” aircraft:-
Dear Friends,
I received further independent confirmation of our perceptions regarding the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Tornado F3 Radar in comparison to the Sea Harrier Blue Vixen and AMRAAM system. This completely independent evaluation is from a senior Air Force Fighter Weapons School graduate and a recently retired full Colonel from our Air Force who has flown in and evaluated the combat capabilities of these systems. He is brutally specific that the poor "mechanization" of the F3 Radar is less capable than our late model Phantom F-4E Radars from the late 70's and early 80's. He described the design as "tragically inadequate," and that the ergonomics and human factors in the system are quite poor. Most radar functions must be done manually by the backseater in the Tornado F3--he gave very specific examples. The radar is powerful and can see airborne targets at altitude at long range but has no auto gain control found in modern US systems. The F3 has a very incomplete pulse doppler capability and minimal over land look down capability (comparable to the early Blue Fox in the Sea Harrier FRS1). His conversations with their crews led him to believe that a good early F-16 radar (mid 80's capability) would be a real improvement for them. Their AMRAAM capability is specious, very likely not real AMRAAM missile compatibility (perhaps as little as 1/5 the functionality available in the US systems). This would not make it on to a fighter I designed and integrated, and I would have eaten the radar supplier for lunch in the simulator tests and again after his first delivery to the systems integration lab with the fixes in the system.
Note that an individual with operational experience only on the Tornado F3 system would be "stuck" in his cognitive understanding of the air intercept environment in the late 70's or very early 80's. I believe that matches Air Marshall Peter Squire's resume exactly. It explains to me why such a bad decision was possible.
The Sea Harrier Blue Vixen radar is a good "F-16 type system” and was very well thought out in the "mechanization" area" with many important functions, including auto gain, done by software, eliminating the need for the additional person required for the same human functionality in the Tornado F3. The Sea Harrier Blue Vixen "mechanization," human factors design, and ergonomics are thoughtfully done and has true AMRAAM capability equivalent to our own F-16C's or 18's.
Perhaps you should stop all Tornado F3 upgrades and spend the money on Sea Harriers and new jets. An interim capability could be retrofitted from the Sea Harrier pipeline to the Tornado F3, but would not solve its aircraft performance issues.
Very Respectfully Yours,
Charlie Weinert
USAF Academy Class of 1969
Vice President
Thresholds Unlimited, Inc.
Remember, my friend, we are all in this business to defend our nation and our interests abroad. Providing inaccurate and misleading comment in a debate such as this is against the national interest – and if your comments re the F3 are seen to be blatantly inaccurate, what can we believe about your comments on the Jaguar (especially if it doesn’t have a 10,000 ft runway to operate from).
I must say that you enjoy being provocative! No harm done!
The issue here is not a competition between FA2 and the GR7/9. Nor is anyone trying to do down Jaguar pilots or their steed.
What appears clear to me from your remarks is that you do not have the embarked/maritime experience to understand how very important it is to be able to defend yourself at sea – especially when you get caught with your pants down (i.e. no shore-based air assets nearby and the enemy approaching fast). The ability to “cope” in a situation like that depends on organic Fleet resources that are under the direct control of the Naval Task Force Commander.
Your comment, “whether it's worth retaining in the face of other, more versatile and more useful priorities.
And we do have allies who can provide this level of air cover .............. if we need carrier aviation at all.” – this represents a sad reflection of a somewhat frivolous attitude during a serious debate. (I don’t mind being corrected on facts, at all – different numbers for Eurofighter do get spread around – so I accede to your privileged information.)
Do read DP 2001, you may be surprised by its content. For example:
“Force and Capability Development
27. The validity of the Strategic Defence Review’s conclusions about the broad shape of our future capability requirements is confirmed by this reassessment both of the future strategic context and of our immediate operational priorities. The key characteristics are to be able to:
· respond to crises using forces at graduated states of readiness, rather than relying on prepositioning;
· deploy early to reduce the risk of a crisis escalating;
· successfully conduct large, high intensity combat operations against demanding opponents with advanced capabilities;
· prepare, deploy, operate, sustain and recover our forces within a NATO, EU, UN or ad hoc multinational framework;
· maintain a qualitative edge in key military capabilities.”
What could be more “versatile or useful” in the context of this than carrier-borne fixed wing air defence?
Please don’t continue to quote the F3 and the Jaguar as being versatile or useful in this context. Both aircraft types require “prepositioning”.
As for the F3 in particular, your stated knowledge of that aircraft’s weapon system is less than convincing. Look at what our Allies say about this “fighter” aircraft:-
Dear Friends,
I received further independent confirmation of our perceptions regarding the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Tornado F3 Radar in comparison to the Sea Harrier Blue Vixen and AMRAAM system. This completely independent evaluation is from a senior Air Force Fighter Weapons School graduate and a recently retired full Colonel from our Air Force who has flown in and evaluated the combat capabilities of these systems. He is brutally specific that the poor "mechanization" of the F3 Radar is less capable than our late model Phantom F-4E Radars from the late 70's and early 80's. He described the design as "tragically inadequate," and that the ergonomics and human factors in the system are quite poor. Most radar functions must be done manually by the backseater in the Tornado F3--he gave very specific examples. The radar is powerful and can see airborne targets at altitude at long range but has no auto gain control found in modern US systems. The F3 has a very incomplete pulse doppler capability and minimal over land look down capability (comparable to the early Blue Fox in the Sea Harrier FRS1). His conversations with their crews led him to believe that a good early F-16 radar (mid 80's capability) would be a real improvement for them. Their AMRAAM capability is specious, very likely not real AMRAAM missile compatibility (perhaps as little as 1/5 the functionality available in the US systems). This would not make it on to a fighter I designed and integrated, and I would have eaten the radar supplier for lunch in the simulator tests and again after his first delivery to the systems integration lab with the fixes in the system.
Note that an individual with operational experience only on the Tornado F3 system would be "stuck" in his cognitive understanding of the air intercept environment in the late 70's or very early 80's. I believe that matches Air Marshall Peter Squire's resume exactly. It explains to me why such a bad decision was possible.
The Sea Harrier Blue Vixen radar is a good "F-16 type system” and was very well thought out in the "mechanization" area" with many important functions, including auto gain, done by software, eliminating the need for the additional person required for the same human functionality in the Tornado F3. The Sea Harrier Blue Vixen "mechanization," human factors design, and ergonomics are thoughtfully done and has true AMRAAM capability equivalent to our own F-16C's or 18's.
Perhaps you should stop all Tornado F3 upgrades and spend the money on Sea Harriers and new jets. An interim capability could be retrofitted from the Sea Harrier pipeline to the Tornado F3, but would not solve its aircraft performance issues.
Very Respectfully Yours,
Charlie Weinert
USAF Academy Class of 1969
Vice President
Thresholds Unlimited, Inc.
Remember, my friend, we are all in this business to defend our nation and our interests abroad. Providing inaccurate and misleading comment in a debate such as this is against the national interest – and if your comments re the F3 are seen to be blatantly inaccurate, what can we believe about your comments on the Jaguar (especially if it doesn’t have a 10,000 ft runway to operate from).
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bystanderish,
You mention, “making statements about other forces that are not only derogatory but inaccurate. However(!) following your lead”
Sadly, it is arguable that you have been hung by your own petard! FA2 is at least as accurate as any RAF aircraft in the free fall bombing mode (see last year’s Inter-service Bombing competition). Of course free fall can’t hold a flag to LGB (which the FA2 can drop if a lazing unit is ashore)! So don’t compare oranges (free fall from FA2) with lemons (LGB from GR7) and pretend to be giving an authoritative statement!
You are right to question the following even though you have quoted it out of context:
“If only the FA2 had not been described as the only ac with a 'credible, expeditionary, offensive capability'”
I should have said, “the only available a/c with a 'credible, expeditionary, offensive capability' that meets the air defence needs of a JTF and that also contribute to the Air-to-Ground Attack tasks.”
I stand corrected! Do come out of the shadows again soon!
You mention, “making statements about other forces that are not only derogatory but inaccurate. However(!) following your lead”
Sadly, it is arguable that you have been hung by your own petard! FA2 is at least as accurate as any RAF aircraft in the free fall bombing mode (see last year’s Inter-service Bombing competition). Of course free fall can’t hold a flag to LGB (which the FA2 can drop if a lazing unit is ashore)! So don’t compare oranges (free fall from FA2) with lemons (LGB from GR7) and pretend to be giving an authoritative statement!
You are right to question the following even though you have quoted it out of context:
“If only the FA2 had not been described as the only ac with a 'credible, expeditionary, offensive capability'”
I should have said, “the only available a/c with a 'credible, expeditionary, offensive capability' that meets the air defence needs of a JTF and that also contribute to the Air-to-Ground Attack tasks.”
I stand corrected! Do come out of the shadows again soon!
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Re: Defending the Nimrod
MOA,
Thanks for your input! It is very clear that the Nimrod has an important role to play in SAR (and perhaps, local fisheries protection). But £2.8 billion for an upgrade? We could do the same task for less than half the price by buying and using new civil aircraft.
Deployment? A nineteen hour day, I believe – but who needs 3 hours preparation for a standard operating task? And 5 hours on task – forgive me but waiting to see if you arrive is not good enough against a submarine threat – we already have an ASW helo screening procedure that works well (60 nm is not so far!).
My mention of Nimrod as a possible candidate for cost saving would indeed mean replacing it with a cheaper alternative for tasks such as SAR. But we never see you guys around the Fleet when we are deployed – en route to or at a trouble spot – so much for the ease of deployability (which in any case is not within the spirit or the word of DP 2001).
My basic criticism comes from an occasion in the mid-eighties. Let me quote from a particular paper (notal):
“NIMROD MARITIME RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT (MRA) TO REPLACE
ROYAL NAVY ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW) FRIGATES AND HELICOPTERS
An Air Staff claim was being put forward in the late Seventies and early Eighties that the Nimrod MRA could and should replace the Fleet’s Anti Submarine Warfare frigates and helicopters in defending the Fleet from submarine attack. It was claimed that the Nimrod was at least as effective as the organic Fleet Units (ASW warships & helicopters) in detecting, prosecuting and destroying submarines.
The Air Staff was again conveniently ignoring the laws of physics and aerodynamics. Although the small UK Nimrod force could indeed fly in the sky above Fleet Units when they were close to the UK and maintain a reasonable presence, longer support distances were not possible.
When the Task Force sailed South to the Falklands in 1982, the Nimrod MRA was conspicuous by its absence in spite of the very real submarine threat. Even at Ascension Island, there were no Nimrods available to sanitize the sea areas until well after the Task Force had proceeded South. When they did arrive, they carried out missions around Ascension but on only two occasions did they venture up to 600 nms South of the Island. That was well short of the 4,000 nms to the Falklands Exclusion Zone.
Post the Falklands, some fictitious reports were circulated under the auspices of MOD(UK)Air claiming that the Nimrod MRA had regularly patrolled the coast of Argentina within 60 nms of the shore looking for enemy submarines. How strange that the RAF wouldn’t allow Vulcans to fly close to the outer limits of the Falkland Islands without Sea Harrier protection and without a Task Force “Weapons Tight” policy but it would send off Nimrods without any protection into the jaws of the Argentine Air Force.
The true facts concerning the Nimrod MRA’s ability to find and destroy submarines became clear in the early eighties. Statistics showed that when patrolling over the Fleet during Exercises and when submarines were definitely present as a threat to that Fleet, the Nimrod had autonomously achieved only one “possible submarine contact” for every 5,000 hours flown – and it had never carried out a successful autonomous prosecution and kill of a submarine on exercise. Discussions between a UK Naval Staff Desk Officer and Nimrod crews attending an Exercise debrief at Rosyth revealed further alarming facts:
a. Nimrod Crews were sworn to secrecy by their Administrative Authority concerning the track record of the Nimrod in its primary ASW role (because the record was so bad);
b. During exercises against a known submarine threat, the Nimrod would inevitably be unable to autonomously locate or detect the “orange” submarine. So it would signal to the submarine to launch a green grenade – the smoke from which would then be visible on the surface above the submarine. Using this smoke beacon as a datum, the Nimrod crew would carry out set procedures for locating and prosecuting the submarine. Even with this help from the target, the Nimrod was invariably unable to detect, much less prosecute the submarine. Nonetheless, the Nimrod crew would then file a post exercise report detailing the patterns flown over and the sono buoys dropped in the target area. It would go down on the exercise report as a successful prosecution.
c. This falsely reported prosecution would then go to the UK Ministry of Defence for use by the Air Staff in proclaiming the operational effectiveness of the Nimrod to Ministers.
By hiding the true lack of effectiveness of the Nimrod ASW and promoting it as a viable ASW defence for the Fleet at Sea, the Air Staff were:
a. At best, concerned with empire building;
b. At worst, showing complete disregard for the defence of the Fleet and the lives of the sailors onboard Fleet units.
The saddest thing about it all is that this major UK Air Staff subterfuge continues. Central Committees and Ministers obviously remain ignorant of the true merit of Nimrod as an ASW vehicle. Why else would they have agreed a $3 billion upgrade programme for the Nimrod in 1996?
The UK Ministry line seems to be, “Tornado doesn’t work! Upgrade it at any cost! The Nimrod doesn’t work! Upgrade it at any cost!”"
Can we afford to wait and check if this upgrade works? And if it does, does the perceived threat balanced by the inherent lack of deployability of the Nimrod make it worth the huge investment?
I don't think so!
Thanks for your input! It is very clear that the Nimrod has an important role to play in SAR (and perhaps, local fisheries protection). But £2.8 billion for an upgrade? We could do the same task for less than half the price by buying and using new civil aircraft.
Deployment? A nineteen hour day, I believe – but who needs 3 hours preparation for a standard operating task? And 5 hours on task – forgive me but waiting to see if you arrive is not good enough against a submarine threat – we already have an ASW helo screening procedure that works well (60 nm is not so far!).
My mention of Nimrod as a possible candidate for cost saving would indeed mean replacing it with a cheaper alternative for tasks such as SAR. But we never see you guys around the Fleet when we are deployed – en route to or at a trouble spot – so much for the ease of deployability (which in any case is not within the spirit or the word of DP 2001).
My basic criticism comes from an occasion in the mid-eighties. Let me quote from a particular paper (notal):
“NIMROD MARITIME RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT (MRA) TO REPLACE
ROYAL NAVY ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW) FRIGATES AND HELICOPTERS
An Air Staff claim was being put forward in the late Seventies and early Eighties that the Nimrod MRA could and should replace the Fleet’s Anti Submarine Warfare frigates and helicopters in defending the Fleet from submarine attack. It was claimed that the Nimrod was at least as effective as the organic Fleet Units (ASW warships & helicopters) in detecting, prosecuting and destroying submarines.
The Air Staff was again conveniently ignoring the laws of physics and aerodynamics. Although the small UK Nimrod force could indeed fly in the sky above Fleet Units when they were close to the UK and maintain a reasonable presence, longer support distances were not possible.
When the Task Force sailed South to the Falklands in 1982, the Nimrod MRA was conspicuous by its absence in spite of the very real submarine threat. Even at Ascension Island, there were no Nimrods available to sanitize the sea areas until well after the Task Force had proceeded South. When they did arrive, they carried out missions around Ascension but on only two occasions did they venture up to 600 nms South of the Island. That was well short of the 4,000 nms to the Falklands Exclusion Zone.
Post the Falklands, some fictitious reports were circulated under the auspices of MOD(UK)Air claiming that the Nimrod MRA had regularly patrolled the coast of Argentina within 60 nms of the shore looking for enemy submarines. How strange that the RAF wouldn’t allow Vulcans to fly close to the outer limits of the Falkland Islands without Sea Harrier protection and without a Task Force “Weapons Tight” policy but it would send off Nimrods without any protection into the jaws of the Argentine Air Force.
The true facts concerning the Nimrod MRA’s ability to find and destroy submarines became clear in the early eighties. Statistics showed that when patrolling over the Fleet during Exercises and when submarines were definitely present as a threat to that Fleet, the Nimrod had autonomously achieved only one “possible submarine contact” for every 5,000 hours flown – and it had never carried out a successful autonomous prosecution and kill of a submarine on exercise. Discussions between a UK Naval Staff Desk Officer and Nimrod crews attending an Exercise debrief at Rosyth revealed further alarming facts:
a. Nimrod Crews were sworn to secrecy by their Administrative Authority concerning the track record of the Nimrod in its primary ASW role (because the record was so bad);
b. During exercises against a known submarine threat, the Nimrod would inevitably be unable to autonomously locate or detect the “orange” submarine. So it would signal to the submarine to launch a green grenade – the smoke from which would then be visible on the surface above the submarine. Using this smoke beacon as a datum, the Nimrod crew would carry out set procedures for locating and prosecuting the submarine. Even with this help from the target, the Nimrod was invariably unable to detect, much less prosecute the submarine. Nonetheless, the Nimrod crew would then file a post exercise report detailing the patterns flown over and the sono buoys dropped in the target area. It would go down on the exercise report as a successful prosecution.
c. This falsely reported prosecution would then go to the UK Ministry of Defence for use by the Air Staff in proclaiming the operational effectiveness of the Nimrod to Ministers.
By hiding the true lack of effectiveness of the Nimrod ASW and promoting it as a viable ASW defence for the Fleet at Sea, the Air Staff were:
a. At best, concerned with empire building;
b. At worst, showing complete disregard for the defence of the Fleet and the lives of the sailors onboard Fleet units.
The saddest thing about it all is that this major UK Air Staff subterfuge continues. Central Committees and Ministers obviously remain ignorant of the true merit of Nimrod as an ASW vehicle. Why else would they have agreed a $3 billion upgrade programme for the Nimrod in 1996?
The UK Ministry line seems to be, “Tornado doesn’t work! Upgrade it at any cost! The Nimrod doesn’t work! Upgrade it at any cost!”"
Can we afford to wait and check if this upgrade works? And if it does, does the perceived threat balanced by the inherent lack of deployability of the Nimrod make it worth the huge investment?
I don't think so!
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alphaleaderuk
Re: Defending the Nimrod
Who are you, some sort of journo or MOD Police trying to get some poor sod to break the official secrets act!! Your threads seem to imply some sort of RN background, but it would appear you have no concept of ASW. What are you hoping to hear, some poor sap telling you in great detail his experiences of finding/tracking submarines in a Nimrod to refute your lies!!
I HAVE NEVER EVER, EVER, SEEN SUCH A PATHETIC COLLECTION OF BLATANT LIES WRITTEN IN PRINT.
I am not claiming that the Nimrod is the greatest thing since sliced bread in terms of ASW, but your claims that is so ineffective are pathetic, untrue and a great insult to anyone who has been in the Nimrod fleet in the last 30 years. You seem to imply there has been some sort of systematic cover up over the years of the Nimrods lack of ASW capability, from junior ranks up to Flag Officers. Don't you think over time this might have leaked out, both to the rest of the RAF and the RN, from a dsigruntled source. How about the fact that the Nimrod is as capable an ASW platform as any other nations MPA, P-3, Aurora, Atlantique, etc, as is regularly proved in international competitions and Exercises (e.g Fincastle). So why do other nations have MPA (with an ASW role), and are replacing them. Oh, I was forgetting, this is obviuosly a global conspiracy by the entire MPA community!!! (I guess you must be a grassy knoll man!!!) Most other countries operate MPA as part of their naval forces, manned by navy personnel who also serve tours on ASW frigates etc. So, according to you, other nations NAVYs are wasting money and perpetuating useless assets out of THEIR OWN BUDGETS are they!!! I think not.
Submarines are VERY quiet, VERY elusive targets, more so in the last 10-15 years, and finding them is very difficult. That is one reason why many third world nations are buying them. If you have/are serving in the navy you will know that ASW is a team game, most effective when a variety of assets are employed. These include helos, MPA, submarines, frigates etc. Each has a part to play. I am not claiming the Nimrod is the answer to ASW, but it is far more capable than you imply. The MRA4 will be more capable than the Merlin in the ASW role, and I haven't even discussed other roles for MRA4, are you advocating the RN scrap their Merlin fleet. Talking of spending too much money on an asset, what is the current price tag for a Merlin??
I have a very slow fuse as a rule, but reading the utter drivel you have written has so incensed me I bear no responsibility for spelling or punctuation. I hope a lot of already very unhappy (pay and conditions) AEOps never find out where you live. I would duck, you can expect LOTS more incoming!! (You are not Admin Guru are you?)
Re: Defending the Nimrod
Who are you, some sort of journo or MOD Police trying to get some poor sod to break the official secrets act!! Your threads seem to imply some sort of RN background, but it would appear you have no concept of ASW. What are you hoping to hear, some poor sap telling you in great detail his experiences of finding/tracking submarines in a Nimrod to refute your lies!!
I HAVE NEVER EVER, EVER, SEEN SUCH A PATHETIC COLLECTION OF BLATANT LIES WRITTEN IN PRINT.
I am not claiming that the Nimrod is the greatest thing since sliced bread in terms of ASW, but your claims that is so ineffective are pathetic, untrue and a great insult to anyone who has been in the Nimrod fleet in the last 30 years. You seem to imply there has been some sort of systematic cover up over the years of the Nimrods lack of ASW capability, from junior ranks up to Flag Officers. Don't you think over time this might have leaked out, both to the rest of the RAF and the RN, from a dsigruntled source. How about the fact that the Nimrod is as capable an ASW platform as any other nations MPA, P-3, Aurora, Atlantique, etc, as is regularly proved in international competitions and Exercises (e.g Fincastle). So why do other nations have MPA (with an ASW role), and are replacing them. Oh, I was forgetting, this is obviuosly a global conspiracy by the entire MPA community!!! (I guess you must be a grassy knoll man!!!) Most other countries operate MPA as part of their naval forces, manned by navy personnel who also serve tours on ASW frigates etc. So, according to you, other nations NAVYs are wasting money and perpetuating useless assets out of THEIR OWN BUDGETS are they!!! I think not.
Submarines are VERY quiet, VERY elusive targets, more so in the last 10-15 years, and finding them is very difficult. That is one reason why many third world nations are buying them. If you have/are serving in the navy you will know that ASW is a team game, most effective when a variety of assets are employed. These include helos, MPA, submarines, frigates etc. Each has a part to play. I am not claiming the Nimrod is the answer to ASW, but it is far more capable than you imply. The MRA4 will be more capable than the Merlin in the ASW role, and I haven't even discussed other roles for MRA4, are you advocating the RN scrap their Merlin fleet. Talking of spending too much money on an asset, what is the current price tag for a Merlin??
I have a very slow fuse as a rule, but reading the utter drivel you have written has so incensed me I bear no responsibility for spelling or punctuation. I hope a lot of already very unhappy (pay and conditions) AEOps never find out where you live. I would duck, you can expect LOTS more incoming!! (You are not Admin Guru are you?)
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Great Topic,
But...Please stop writing "Service Papers", my monitor is too small, and most of it is Baullaux anyhow. If it's worth a point, make it short. (ISS "Brevity is the key to Comunication")
Thanks,
Rota
But...Please stop writing "Service Papers", my monitor is too small, and most of it is Baullaux anyhow. If it's worth a point, make it short. (ISS "Brevity is the key to Comunication")
Thanks,
Rota
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I can't take it any longer. I try to just laugh at it but I'm afraid I just can't contain myself.
alphaleaderuk:
You and that american obviously have absolutely no concept of the F3. It is tempting to let all this sort of disinformation get spread around thus making it even easier for us when the opposition get all arrogant. All I'll say is if you don't know what you're talking about (and "my mate who once fought an F3 said..." doesn't count) then keep quiet.
Just for the record on one small and relatively minor point: the F3 with weapons can out turn all other UK fast jets with weapons on. Only the hawk with no weapons (and what use is that?) is a bit of a "challenge".
Thanks
ps anyone had a go against our ASRAAMs yet???He He
Alpha
My comments on the F3 seem to be validated by one of its users here, and by most of the aircrew I've spoken to about it during the last few weeks. Yours, however, are outdated and unbalanced.
The Jaguar's record speaks for itself.
You talk about the need to pre-position these assets. I'd point out that it has always been quicker, cheaper and easier to deploy a FJ squadron than it is to deploy a carrier and its various support ships. Remember that in Sierra Leone a Jag squadron could have been there (operating from Dakar in Senegal) long before the carrier, had a political decision not been taken to send the carrier (principally to underline El Tone's CVF decision in SDR, I suspsect).
Moreover, once in theatre the Jags would have had 30-mm cannon, CRV7, 1,000-lbers, PII, PIII and RBL755 and CBU87 to choose from, whereas because 1,000-lbers were held to be unacceptable in the circumstances the only weapon available to the carrierbased GR7s was said to be "Noise!"
The carrier's USP is not rapid deployability, it is independence of host nation support (though for a carrier to operate close enough to the target for the SHar and GR7 to be useful an absence of outright opposition is handy). In this day and age however, if it's impossible to get basing in a neighbouring nation the operation you are trying to undertake probably isn't politically viable anyway.
Using a carrier just ensures that its economic viability is pants, too.
Even I know that your Nimrod bull refers and relates to the MR1 (and is biased, partial and in key areas factually incorrect even here), and that the in-service MR2 is the dog's whatsit. The 4 promises to be even more useful, if only they'll expand their thinking and stick Storm Shadow on it as well!
Nosey,
You say (on the other thread) that I should be Jagonicko - it's just that Jag mates have bought me more beer and bent my ear more than you and your lot!
My comments on the F3 seem to be validated by one of its users here, and by most of the aircrew I've spoken to about it during the last few weeks. Yours, however, are outdated and unbalanced.
The Jaguar's record speaks for itself.
You talk about the need to pre-position these assets. I'd point out that it has always been quicker, cheaper and easier to deploy a FJ squadron than it is to deploy a carrier and its various support ships. Remember that in Sierra Leone a Jag squadron could have been there (operating from Dakar in Senegal) long before the carrier, had a political decision not been taken to send the carrier (principally to underline El Tone's CVF decision in SDR, I suspsect).
Moreover, once in theatre the Jags would have had 30-mm cannon, CRV7, 1,000-lbers, PII, PIII and RBL755 and CBU87 to choose from, whereas because 1,000-lbers were held to be unacceptable in the circumstances the only weapon available to the carrierbased GR7s was said to be "Noise!"
The carrier's USP is not rapid deployability, it is independence of host nation support (though for a carrier to operate close enough to the target for the SHar and GR7 to be useful an absence of outright opposition is handy). In this day and age however, if it's impossible to get basing in a neighbouring nation the operation you are trying to undertake probably isn't politically viable anyway.
Using a carrier just ensures that its economic viability is pants, too.
Even I know that your Nimrod bull refers and relates to the MR1 (and is biased, partial and in key areas factually incorrect even here), and that the in-service MR2 is the dog's whatsit. The 4 promises to be even more useful, if only they'll expand their thinking and stick Storm Shadow on it as well!
Nosey,
You say (on the other thread) that I should be Jagonicko - it's just that Jag mates have bought me more beer and bent my ear more than you and your lot!
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Alpha,
I agree with you. Keep the SHAR, upgrade it using the money destined for the F3 force, and retire the F3 from service early.
Then, please inform the RAF when the SHAR force is ready to take over ops in Southern Watch, the Falklands, QRA......
I agree with you. Keep the SHAR, upgrade it using the money destined for the F3 force, and retire the F3 from service early.
Then, please inform the RAF when the SHAR force is ready to take over ops in Southern Watch, the Falklands, QRA......
WEBF,
The RN may or may not have “consumed as much of the defence budget as the Army or the RAF”. That’s not what I said. I just pointed out that it had consumed a “disproportionate amount of our limited defence budget for decades” and that much of that expenditure has been on big ticket, grandiose and inappropriate systems (like Trident, Polaris and Chevaline).
You assume that proportionate means one third of the budget available, whereas I'd see a small Navy consuming a relatively small fraction of available funding. We need a small Euro-Navy (like the Dutch or the Germans) yet we persist in maintaining a global Empire-protecting and cash-quzzling monster.
And yes, I have read your letter on the other thread, and noticed a raft of lies and mistakes.
The Sea Harrier’s serviceability is not ‘good’
Sea Harrier cannot carry ALARM (never cleared or integrated)
Sea Harrier can no longer carry Sea Eagle (not in RN service)
Sea Harrier has no autonomous laser designation capability
Sea Harrier has no recce capability beyond a single oblique F95
Which CBUs and rockets are currently cleared for service use on the FA2, by the way?
Your claim that the Sea Harrier FA2 is the most versatile aircraft in Britain's inventory is a blatant lie. It’s capable enough in the air to air role, but apart from that it’s probably the least versatile fast jet aircraft in the inventory.
Sea Harrier may have had acceptable bringback in the Adriatic (though not according to some of those I’ve spoken to), but it is certainly inadequate in the Gulf.
£100 million was the figure given for the saving due to the cost of the upgrade (though this is a major under-estimate), and represents a tiny fraction of the total cost savings gained by early retirement of the SHar.
The RN may or may not have “consumed as much of the defence budget as the Army or the RAF”. That’s not what I said. I just pointed out that it had consumed a “disproportionate amount of our limited defence budget for decades” and that much of that expenditure has been on big ticket, grandiose and inappropriate systems (like Trident, Polaris and Chevaline).
You assume that proportionate means one third of the budget available, whereas I'd see a small Navy consuming a relatively small fraction of available funding. We need a small Euro-Navy (like the Dutch or the Germans) yet we persist in maintaining a global Empire-protecting and cash-quzzling monster.
And yes, I have read your letter on the other thread, and noticed a raft of lies and mistakes.
The Sea Harrier’s serviceability is not ‘good’
Sea Harrier cannot carry ALARM (never cleared or integrated)
Sea Harrier can no longer carry Sea Eagle (not in RN service)
Sea Harrier has no autonomous laser designation capability
Sea Harrier has no recce capability beyond a single oblique F95
Which CBUs and rockets are currently cleared for service use on the FA2, by the way?
Your claim that the Sea Harrier FA2 is the most versatile aircraft in Britain's inventory is a blatant lie. It’s capable enough in the air to air role, but apart from that it’s probably the least versatile fast jet aircraft in the inventory.
Sea Harrier may have had acceptable bringback in the Adriatic (though not according to some of those I’ve spoken to), but it is certainly inadequate in the Gulf.
£100 million was the figure given for the saving due to the cost of the upgrade (though this is a major under-estimate), and represents a tiny fraction of the total cost savings gained by early retirement of the SHar.
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alpha
What a load of horses #rse! I dont know where you have got your info from, but its totally off mark.
You obviously have no idea of the way that Nimrods operate or indeed what they actually do. If you did you would not be trying to tempt a response to the drivel that you have written.
I get the impression you are one of the 2 Shar pilots actually left in the Navy, and are just a little bit bitter that 3 billion is being spent on an aircraft other than yours.
Edited to remove correct spelling at sauce
What a load of horses #rse! I dont know where you have got your info from, but its totally off mark.
You obviously have no idea of the way that Nimrods operate or indeed what they actually do. If you did you would not be trying to tempt a response to the drivel that you have written.
I get the impression you are one of the 2 Shar pilots actually left in the Navy, and are just a little bit bitter that 3 billion is being spent on an aircraft other than yours.
Edited to remove correct spelling at sauce
Jacko
You are starting to show yourself up. Polaris was a NATIONAL system, not a naval asset. Polaris was cheaper than Skybolt or similar being carried by RAF Nimrods. Chevaline was an upgrade to Polaris. As for Trident, the same arguments applied. the Navy never really wanted it, and the Naval vote got clobbered for paying for it. Does the 1981 Defence White Paper mean anything to you?
So, you want a "small Euro-Navy" do you? Why do you think it should be like the Dutch or the Germans? Why not the French? We have world wide involvements, and these simply cannot be achieved without naval forces. The whole modern idea of expeditionery warfare means we need more than a brown water Navy. Look at the UK contribution to Operation Sharp Guard, the NATO enforcement of the arms embargo on the warring parties during the conflict in Bosnia. We deployed (over the years) TWENTY frigates and destroyers AND five Fleet Submarines. This was entirely seperate to the deployment of a CVS and Sea Harriers etc.
Certainly your ideas would mean the ending of any amphibious capabilities. But hey, maybe your idea of a balanced fleet is a few RAF Regiment Gunners patrolling the waterways around Norfolk?
The idea that a maritime nation like ours can do without a reasonable fleet is ludicrous. You should consider what Churchill said to a similar statement in 1914: "Are you sure? It would be a pity to be wrong". During the Kosovo "war" people kept criticising the NATO leaders and pointing out the the only way to really effect events would be to use (or threaten to use) troops on the ground. The same is true at sea, the capbilities of airpower are limited. You need ships, and the means to protect these ships.
Now for your criticisms of my letter....
1. My letter was six pages (of A4) long. You have only found a few things to argue with. Hardly full of lies and misinformation, is it?
2. The Sea Harriers servicabilty. Interesting topic isn't it? "Good" and "not good" are not particularly helpful terms. Various people have told me the Sea Harrier's servicability is much the same as the other FJ aircraft the UK operates. Servicabilty is largely due to the ability to get spare quicky. With the current DLO fiasco, this is a impossibilty. Consider the problems the RAF Sea Kings are having due to lack of spares. Or the Tank regiments. Or ANYONE else.
3. Yes, Sea Eagle is no longer routinely carried aboard the carriers, but the capability still exists.
4. Air Forces Monthly (I assume that you don't write for them) was the source for much of the information I used, and it was confirmed by various people, including a friend who is involved the the world of defence journalism. This is where the ALARM info came from.
5. I never said the Sea Harrier had a Laser target designator, did I? Stop twisting my words.
6. Nor did I say it carried more than a F95 for reece.
7. Bringback is not such an issue with air defence weapon loads than with air to ground ones. As I said, the new engine would improve this. Anyway, why would you take off with a full bomb load unless you expected to drop them? So hence the ability to bring them back is less important. 8. I'm not going to get involved in a discussion about cost. But the savings gained by getting rid of the Sea Harrier will be more than wiped out if we lose several ships needlessly. Personally I care more about the lives at risk.
You are starting to show yourself up. Polaris was a NATIONAL system, not a naval asset. Polaris was cheaper than Skybolt or similar being carried by RAF Nimrods. Chevaline was an upgrade to Polaris. As for Trident, the same arguments applied. the Navy never really wanted it, and the Naval vote got clobbered for paying for it. Does the 1981 Defence White Paper mean anything to you?
So, you want a "small Euro-Navy" do you? Why do you think it should be like the Dutch or the Germans? Why not the French? We have world wide involvements, and these simply cannot be achieved without naval forces. The whole modern idea of expeditionery warfare means we need more than a brown water Navy. Look at the UK contribution to Operation Sharp Guard, the NATO enforcement of the arms embargo on the warring parties during the conflict in Bosnia. We deployed (over the years) TWENTY frigates and destroyers AND five Fleet Submarines. This was entirely seperate to the deployment of a CVS and Sea Harriers etc.
Certainly your ideas would mean the ending of any amphibious capabilities. But hey, maybe your idea of a balanced fleet is a few RAF Regiment Gunners patrolling the waterways around Norfolk?
The idea that a maritime nation like ours can do without a reasonable fleet is ludicrous. You should consider what Churchill said to a similar statement in 1914: "Are you sure? It would be a pity to be wrong". During the Kosovo "war" people kept criticising the NATO leaders and pointing out the the only way to really effect events would be to use (or threaten to use) troops on the ground. The same is true at sea, the capbilities of airpower are limited. You need ships, and the means to protect these ships.
Now for your criticisms of my letter....
1. My letter was six pages (of A4) long. You have only found a few things to argue with. Hardly full of lies and misinformation, is it?
2. The Sea Harriers servicabilty. Interesting topic isn't it? "Good" and "not good" are not particularly helpful terms. Various people have told me the Sea Harrier's servicability is much the same as the other FJ aircraft the UK operates. Servicabilty is largely due to the ability to get spare quicky. With the current DLO fiasco, this is a impossibilty. Consider the problems the RAF Sea Kings are having due to lack of spares. Or the Tank regiments. Or ANYONE else.
3. Yes, Sea Eagle is no longer routinely carried aboard the carriers, but the capability still exists.
4. Air Forces Monthly (I assume that you don't write for them) was the source for much of the information I used, and it was confirmed by various people, including a friend who is involved the the world of defence journalism. This is where the ALARM info came from.
5. I never said the Sea Harrier had a Laser target designator, did I? Stop twisting my words.
6. Nor did I say it carried more than a F95 for reece.
7. Bringback is not such an issue with air defence weapon loads than with air to ground ones. As I said, the new engine would improve this. Anyway, why would you take off with a full bomb load unless you expected to drop them? So hence the ability to bring them back is less important. 8. I'm not going to get involved in a discussion about cost. But the savings gained by getting rid of the Sea Harrier will be more than wiped out if we lose several ships needlessly. Personally I care more about the lives at risk.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 25th May 2002 at 14:11.
Who's showing themselves up?
Skybolt was cancelled by the US before we could buy it. It was cheaper than Polaris. The last strategic air launched nuke carried by RAF aircraft was Blue Steel. It wasn't carried by Nimrods, but by Vulcans and Victors.
Any weapons system could be seen as a national asset. The RN, however, took over the strategic deterrent role (with alacrity) and therefore took reponsibility for it. To describe the Admiralty as 'never really wanting it' is bonkers.
The cost effectiveness of Polaris is extremely controversial, but few would describe it as having represented value for money. Chevaline is widely reckoned to have been an almost complete waste of time and money.
If the aim is to provide a genuinely independent nuclear deterrent I'd argue that Trident is similarly weak.
Yes, a small Euro Navy. And like the Dutch or the Germans and not the French because they spend to much on sea power too, doubtless labouring under a similar legacy of Imperial and Colonial tradition. Why not? Especially if we could then spend money on more relevant and frequently used capabilities like SEAD, or could avoid FSTA being a half-arsed PPP or PFI, or could afford a couple of squadrons of C-17s, or a proper number of Longbow Apaches, etc.
Your bias against air power is beginning to show, especially in your comments about Allied Farce!
1) Couldn't be arsed to go through it in detail, just highlighted the real problems.
2) Exactly. By comparison with other FJs the SHar has a poor serviceability record (fair enough, it's an old jet and it operates in an unfavourable environment). You specifically said the opposite.
3) Sea Eagle is no longer in service. The capability no longer exists - except in India!
4) AFM, god love 'em, are wrong on ALARM. It's never been integrated on SHar, and I've never even heard of it being fit-checked or seriously feas.studded. I'm not going to tell you whether or not I write for them - you might realise that I am, in fact Oscar Wilde, and thereby destroy the anonymity of my PPRUNE handle.... (Oh Bu**er!)
5) You inferred that the SHar ("the most versatile aircraft in Britain's inventory") had a viable PGM capability. It doesn't except as a dumb, bomb truck.
6) You described the SHar ("the most versatile aircraft in Britain's inventory") the FJ with the poorest recce capability in the inventory as being the most versatile, and highlighted its recce capability. An F95 does not really count!
7) Bringback's an issue, especially if you're claiming that SHar is an all-singing, all-dancing, versatile multi-role aircraft. Andits relevant in the AA role, too, sometimes, especially since AMRAAM cannot be jettisoned by SHar, but (god forbid) has to be fired if the aircraft cannot get down to landing weight with them attached!
8) You don't want to talk about cost. What a surprise. Any cutbacks will result in some increase in risk, it's all about risk assessment and risk management. More lives would be saved by spending the SHar pot of money on (say) decent SEAD capability or better EW for other FJ types.
8)
Skybolt was cancelled by the US before we could buy it. It was cheaper than Polaris. The last strategic air launched nuke carried by RAF aircraft was Blue Steel. It wasn't carried by Nimrods, but by Vulcans and Victors.
Any weapons system could be seen as a national asset. The RN, however, took over the strategic deterrent role (with alacrity) and therefore took reponsibility for it. To describe the Admiralty as 'never really wanting it' is bonkers.
The cost effectiveness of Polaris is extremely controversial, but few would describe it as having represented value for money. Chevaline is widely reckoned to have been an almost complete waste of time and money.
If the aim is to provide a genuinely independent nuclear deterrent I'd argue that Trident is similarly weak.
Yes, a small Euro Navy. And like the Dutch or the Germans and not the French because they spend to much on sea power too, doubtless labouring under a similar legacy of Imperial and Colonial tradition. Why not? Especially if we could then spend money on more relevant and frequently used capabilities like SEAD, or could avoid FSTA being a half-arsed PPP or PFI, or could afford a couple of squadrons of C-17s, or a proper number of Longbow Apaches, etc.
Your bias against air power is beginning to show, especially in your comments about Allied Farce!
1) Couldn't be arsed to go through it in detail, just highlighted the real problems.
2) Exactly. By comparison with other FJs the SHar has a poor serviceability record (fair enough, it's an old jet and it operates in an unfavourable environment). You specifically said the opposite.
3) Sea Eagle is no longer in service. The capability no longer exists - except in India!
4) AFM, god love 'em, are wrong on ALARM. It's never been integrated on SHar, and I've never even heard of it being fit-checked or seriously feas.studded. I'm not going to tell you whether or not I write for them - you might realise that I am, in fact Oscar Wilde, and thereby destroy the anonymity of my PPRUNE handle.... (Oh Bu**er!)
5) You inferred that the SHar ("the most versatile aircraft in Britain's inventory") had a viable PGM capability. It doesn't except as a dumb, bomb truck.
6) You described the SHar ("the most versatile aircraft in Britain's inventory") the FJ with the poorest recce capability in the inventory as being the most versatile, and highlighted its recce capability. An F95 does not really count!
7) Bringback's an issue, especially if you're claiming that SHar is an all-singing, all-dancing, versatile multi-role aircraft. Andits relevant in the AA role, too, sometimes, especially since AMRAAM cannot be jettisoned by SHar, but (god forbid) has to be fired if the aircraft cannot get down to landing weight with them attached!
8) You don't want to talk about cost. What a surprise. Any cutbacks will result in some increase in risk, it's all about risk assessment and risk management. More lives would be saved by spending the SHar pot of money on (say) decent SEAD capability or better EW for other FJ types.
8)
I have no bias against air power, Jacko. But your implied claim that naval forces are never used or deployed is a complete load of rubbish. Lets say we need to support an operation far away, with lots of heavy armour involved. How do you move Tanks etc?
By either RFAs or STUFT. How would you defend them from enemy submarines (which, according to you, are the main maritime threat now)? By frigates and destroyers of course. Don't start about the Nimrod, we all know that the Nimrod is more suited to offensive ASW operations (as are our own submarines).
Same applies for enemy surface vessels. Also aircraft cannot implement an embargo, unless they just sink everything. If stop and search is what you want, send for the Navy!!
In short naval forces allow you to dominate the sea space, aircraft on their own cannot do that.
As for cost effectiveness, in 1981 Keith Speed MP got sacked for point out that the Royal Navy and maritime elements of the RAF provided 70% of NATO forces in the Eastern Atlantic for approx 23% of the defence budget, but BAOR and RAF Germany provided 10% of NATO forces in central Europe for 40% of the defence budget.
A naval contribution by the UK to a multinational operation will be more significant (particularly vis-a-vis the US) then sending a few more aircraft instead.
By either RFAs or STUFT. How would you defend them from enemy submarines (which, according to you, are the main maritime threat now)? By frigates and destroyers of course. Don't start about the Nimrod, we all know that the Nimrod is more suited to offensive ASW operations (as are our own submarines).
Same applies for enemy surface vessels. Also aircraft cannot implement an embargo, unless they just sink everything. If stop and search is what you want, send for the Navy!!
In short naval forces allow you to dominate the sea space, aircraft on their own cannot do that.
As for cost effectiveness, in 1981 Keith Speed MP got sacked for point out that the Royal Navy and maritime elements of the RAF provided 70% of NATO forces in the Eastern Atlantic for approx 23% of the defence budget, but BAOR and RAF Germany provided 10% of NATO forces in central Europe for 40% of the defence budget.
A naval contribution by the UK to a multinational operation will be more significant (particularly vis-a-vis the US) then sending a few more aircraft instead.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 25th May 2002 at 14:45.
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Here's where things start to get interesting.
New timetable for Eurofighter entry into RAF service
24 May 2002
The UK's MOD has announced a revised timetable for the introduction of Eurofighter into service with the Royal Air Force. The current slippage is thought to be about six months.
In a statement the MOD said that as early as February it believed the June 2002 In Service Date (ISD) was under threat, "...delays in bringing the detailed design to full maturity in some areas prevented the flight test programme from starting on time
Defence Procurement Minister Lord Bach said, "Following a thorough review of the programme involving the partner nations, the NATO agency responsible for undertaking the procurement, and industry, we have jointly concluded that acceptance of the first aircraft into service should be delayed, to take place by the end of this year, and we shall plan on that basis."
The MOD said it would work with industry to recover lost time and to achieve the planned Operational Employment Date in the second half of the decade, in order to avoid any gap in front-line capability or extra costs to the Ministry of Defence.
The Eurofighter partners are Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain who have ordered a total of 620 aircraft, with the first production tranche of 148 jets running through to 2005. The second tranche begins in 2005 and the third in 2010.
REF XQQEE XQQAR
[email protected]
Copyright(c) 1996 - 2002 Defence Data Ltd. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part in any form or medium is prohibited except as provided in the Conditions of Use. The Defence Data logo is the trademark of Defence Data Ltd. Defence Systems Daily, and DSD, are the trademarks of Defence Data Ltd. By using this Web Site, you agree to all of the Conditions of Use.
http://www.defence-data.com/current/page14612.htm
New timetable for Eurofighter entry into RAF service
24 May 2002
The UK's MOD has announced a revised timetable for the introduction of Eurofighter into service with the Royal Air Force. The current slippage is thought to be about six months.
In a statement the MOD said that as early as February it believed the June 2002 In Service Date (ISD) was under threat, "...delays in bringing the detailed design to full maturity in some areas prevented the flight test programme from starting on time
Defence Procurement Minister Lord Bach said, "Following a thorough review of the programme involving the partner nations, the NATO agency responsible for undertaking the procurement, and industry, we have jointly concluded that acceptance of the first aircraft into service should be delayed, to take place by the end of this year, and we shall plan on that basis."
The MOD said it would work with industry to recover lost time and to achieve the planned Operational Employment Date in the second half of the decade, in order to avoid any gap in front-line capability or extra costs to the Ministry of Defence.
The Eurofighter partners are Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain who have ordered a total of 620 aircraft, with the first production tranche of 148 jets running through to 2005. The second tranche begins in 2005 and the third in 2010.
REF XQQEE XQQAR
[email protected]
Copyright(c) 1996 - 2002 Defence Data Ltd. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part in any form or medium is prohibited except as provided in the Conditions of Use. The Defence Data logo is the trademark of Defence Data Ltd. Defence Systems Daily, and DSD, are the trademarks of Defence Data Ltd. By using this Web Site, you agree to all of the Conditions of Use.
http://www.defence-data.com/current/page14612.htm