The deluded Dark Blue

[skua]

A think tank encrusted in barnacles has come up with this:
Air Power - The Metonymy of the RAF - The Phoenix ThinkTank - Naval & Maritime Think Tank


It has occasioned some suitably caustic khaki comments on Arrse.


Feel free to join in!

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

I'm not even sure the piece deserves comment. They conveniently forget the Gulf War, Operation Deliberate Force and anything else which shows that air power works. I realise the Andrew contributed little more that a couple of SLCM launchers and a pedalo to the Gulf War, but that's no reason to ignore it in an article about air power. They also conveniently ignore the political controls on air power in Vietnam which, by the US's own subsequent admissions, rendered it much less capable.

Was this written on April 1st? It seems like a joke.

[Lonewolf_50]

In pursuit of strategic independence and the need to retain control of their own resources (ie aircraft) AP3000 dismisses organic air power, as practiced at sea, in a few short words:

[quote] “The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has its own organic air power, providing a very high assurance of support from airmen with a comprehensive understanding of ground combat operations. However, this did not prove to be a particularly effective model for the application of air power in the 2003 Iraq War; flexing high-value USMC assets to service higher priority tasks elsewhere in theatre was very difficult, and the perception that organic capabilities were always available to the Marines sometimes inhibited a reciprocal flow of air support when it was urgently required.” (p.63) [/quote]
The coordination with the JFACC of organic assets in a MAGTF has been an ongoing doctrinal issue between USMC, USN, USAF, and USA for about the last 20 years ... just after the infamous Roles and Missions debates after Gulf War I. The subjective assessment of "not particularly effective" reflects a myopia not unique to the RAF. USAF has the same problem of having tunnel vision. What I found worked when I was working air ops in that theater was communication to fit the mission, not some idiot proof, fire and forget doctrinal statement that would fix all air power concerns.

USMC organic air is just that, a task force's organic asset. "Excess sorties" were a useful tool in terms of providing the JFC and JFACC additional assets with the Joint Force Commander's main effort needed more air.

Yes, it's complicated. Real life can be that way. Some of these pie in the sky doctrinal and positional debates gloss over how real people adapt and sort out problems during execution.

This is a pet peeve of mine.

When you read stuff like John Warden's Five Cock Rings of Air Power, or McPeak's assertions that sea power is a subset of air power, you wonder if the thin air at altitude has an impact on the cerebreal content of air power advocates. :P The AP3000 looks to be cut of the same cloth.

All that carping aside, I think that strategic air power, in terms of advocacy, remains a valid concern and is best advocated for by an Air Force. It is an element of the Air Force function that it takes an air minded person to get right.

My two cents.

EDIT
Fox3: "that shows that air power works."

Works at doing what?
Supporting the Joint Fight, or winning the war by itself?

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

Regrettably, there are no Paragraph identifiers but;

This massive investment in an independent strategic bombing force had diverted considerable resources from tactical air support of maritime and land forces. As a result Coastal Command – a true “Cinderella Service” – was unable to provide adequate air cover in the mid-Atlantic to counter the U-Boat threat, which had the potential to strangle the UK into defeat and remove the one secure base from which to retake mainland Europe.

Is that the same Coastal Command that grabbed pilots, navigators and air bombers that Bert Harris had made a massive investment into converting to operationally ready aircrew?

Anyway, I'm sure that the tirade by 2 former Warfairies could be countered by someone in light blue casting a critical view over BR 1806 http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/jscsc/...md/prelims.pdf

The Land component would love that, though.

[MAINJAFAD]

This massive investment in an independent strategic bombing force had diverted considerable resources from tactical air support of maritime and land forces. As a result Coastal Command – a true “Cinderella Service” – was unable to provide adequate air cover in the mid-Atlantic to counter the U-Boat threat, which had the potential to strangle the UK into defeat and remove the one secure base from which to retake mainland Europe.

I wish the fishheads would face the fact that the only aircraft capable of doing that mission (Long Range B-24) and more importantly the radar equipment (10cm ASV), weapons and operational tactics didn't exist until early 1943, and when they did all come together, it kicked the U-boats out of the North Atlantic in the space of a few weeks!!! Plus the Royal Navy didn't put the major effort into ASW pre war either (they though ASDIC would beat the U-Boat by itself!!!).

[Cows getting bigger]

You know, what really gets me about all this doctrine and single service staff college (despite being in the same building) nonsense is that when the push comes to the shove a bunch of green, dark blue and light blue get together and just make it work. I'm reminded of navy medics being awarded military crosses on the battlefield in Afghanistan, chinooks self-ferrying to Sierra Leone to sit on a ship playing gunboat diplomacy, soldiers crewing Nimrods etc etc.

All this desk bound, commander-who-recently-retired-but-joined-the-service-before-I-was-born nonsense is the most out of date and divisive rubbish that can be loosely attributed to the armed forces. People who put their name to such nonsense do not deserve to hold/retain the Queen's Commission; they have failed in their duty.

[4mastacker]

....The RAF won’t have a fully operational MRCA until at least 2021 .....

What's Tornado been doing for the past 30-odd years?

[TheWizard]

These air forces and the other resources of the Royal Navy and British Army, which between them will deploy by 2020 about 24 F35B and 240 helicopters of various types, are excluded.

Optimism
adjective= hopeful, positive, confident, encouraged, can-do (informal), bright, assured, cheerful, rosy, buoyant, idealistic, Utopian, sanguine, expectant, looking on the bright side, buoyed up, disposed to take a favourable view, seen through rose-coloured spectacles •

[MaroonMan4]

Come on guys, are we really doing this!?

Even on PPRUNE does this warrant any kind of discussion, it will never gain traction.

The well known fact that the the RN has probably suffered most in the recent TELIC/HERRICK environment and associated SDSR is acknowledged (although not always in public ) by all 3 Services and MoD mandarins.

But, it is equally acknowledged that unless there is a stupendous political gamble and shift in policy that the purpose, roles and function of the RAF is just as relevant today as they were 50 years ago.

Quite simply it is only the current economic situation and deluded perception of 'peace dividends' that results in the politicians taking the risk with the nation's defence and capabilities (whether that is long range SAR, coastal defence/maritime patrol or the number of Sqns).

We are in a demographic environment where many do not remember or understand wars of national survival or the proven real peace dividends of a genuinely capable HM Forces that could project and sustain a Cold War style stance.

We are a democracy and if Mr & Mrs Joe Soap aren't interested, and the politicians happy to ignore Service Chief advice for more resources, then let's not allow ourselves to be degraded by slagging each other off. Deep down we all know that when required we all have our roles to play in whatever operational environment and spectrum of conflict.

I personally agree with previous posters (especially Cgb) and would also say that regardless of Service we just get on with it, and whichever is the majority environment of operations is the expert and calls the shots. That expertise is developed, experienced, practiced and therefore required across all components.

Drop it, let it go and move on-we all know that in the future the majority of us will be sharing the same sh!t hole together somewhere in the world (admittedly maybe not the FJ mates in their super (US) bases, hotels and spanking new carriers!).

[Evalu8ter]

Wise words MM4...nice to see the RN apologists airbrushing the 1Sqn Harriers, Chinook and MPA/MRR out of Corporate and perpetuating the Al Fawr Myth of an amphibious assault by RN Sea Kings.....

[Courtney Mil]

Well, at least Sharky has a mate now. Someone with equally rabid, flawed arguments. I could spend hours writing responses to all the points, but I really can't be arsed. In any case, this will make no difference to anything, so I say, "crack on and keep knocking yourselves out"!

[FODPlod]

Originally Posted by Evalu8ter

Wise words MM4...nice to see the RN apologists airbrushing the 1Sqn Harriers, Chinook and MPA/MRR out of Corporate and perpetuating the Al Fawr Myth of an amphibious assault by RN Sea Kings.....

That's your idea of what MM4's "wise words" about "dropping it" meant, is it?

I suspect members of the PTT are raising their glasses to skua tonight for bringing them such prominence on an RAF-dominated forum and in the wider world. They've certainly succeeded in twisting some tails.

[oxenos]

" (they though ASDIC would beat the U-Boat by itself!!!)."


In the 1930's the RN were convinced that the submarine threat was completely neutralised by their ASDIC.

There was, however, something worrying them.

During the First War, the Wicked Hun had sent ships to bombard East Coast ports. Their cunning plan was that the RN would send some cruisers down from Rosyth to investigate, and just out of sight they would have a force of heavy cruisers waiting to spring the trap

The RN, intent on fighting the previous war all over again, wanted the RAF to ensure that this could not happen.

The RAF therefore spent a lot of their pocket money on Ansons, which, while a lovely little aeroplane, was not suitable for anti-submarine work. It was, however just the thing for patrolling the seaward approaches to West Hartlepoole They even called this force Coastal Command.

When the penny dropped, there was a mad scramble to get more suitable aircraft. Interestingly, on the Purchasing Commision sent to the States to find an Anson replacement was a chap called Harris.

It was still called Coastal Command until 1969.

Digressing some what, I have to agree with cows getting bigger about working together. While the Senior Officers argue about budgets and tried to screw each other, those of us at Sqn / Ship level got on with making things work.

[Hangarshuffle]

Kicking.

Oh dear, another after hours sesh for some of the boot boys trying to deliver a kicking to the RN (on planet prune).
I'm afraid I'm with some of the others on here, I was all for making it work for the side I was on, regardless of the colour of the uniform.
* Most of the senior officers I read about, or articles they publish, regardless of service... well I just glaze over at them. It all seems utterly irrelevant when you've been a civvy for a bit - you sort of see how inconsequential it really all was, and truthfully still is..


** I take a bit of an offense to the thread title (that everyone in the dark blue is deluded). Never was deluded, don't think most of the Navy is at all-too much history to be so.
I think uncomfortable would have been a better word.

[Melchett01]

I know and fully expect each of the single Services to blow their own trumpets and put forward the case as to why they are the best thing since sliced bread, but this really is plumbing the depths of amateurish 6th form debating. It's full of inconsistencies and muddled if not down right contradictory thinking that does little to further their case, and in some cases, they are just plain incorrect.

For a start Iraqi ops in 2003 did not start with a naval cruise missile strike. They are conveniently forgetting the two B-2 decapitation raids that the USAF launched when supposedly hot time sensitive intelligence was received that Saddam was hiding out in the Mansour district in Baghdad. Those 2 raids occurred before what the press love to call the 'shock and awe' campaign. And if my memory serves, the radar picture I was watching at the time had an awful lot of fixed wing assets on it along with quite a few rotary assets that were tasked to destroy Iraqi IADS sites down towards the Saudi border thereby creating a corridor.

ISTAR, a concept with which they infer intimate knowledge and understanding as "a glamorous acronym of an old concept, one that is as old as warfare itself." does not actually stand for "Intelligence, Surveillance, Tracking, Attack and Reconnaissance". As they profess to have read AP3000, I'm sure there is no need for me to tell them what the actual definition is here, they'll be familiar enough with it to correct it themselves. Furthermore, their claim that ISTAR "is an integrated facet of maritime and land operations and some of that capability is supported by each services’ airborne vehicles." is a little disingenuous when viewed through the lens of the Falklands campaign when the Navy had to retrofit a Nimrod radar to Sea Kings in a rather hurried fashion.

They also seem to think that following the cancellation of Nimrod that they have the whole maritime surveillance and ISTAR piece sewn up with Scan Eagle and Merlin. Just what is the range, endurance and coverage of these platforms? Last time I checked, Scan Eagle had a comms range of about 100km and carried EO/IR optics. Now, airframe issues aside, what exactly did the RAF's maritime surveillance capability bring to the party?

Their use of operations in Sierra Leone as an example of strategic lift being done best by the Navy is equally incoherent. Apparently, Ocean's task group with its 18 helicopters was a classic example of maritime / littoral expeditionary capability and was crucial to the success of the op. But what about the RAF's ability to move 600 troops into Freetown in under 36 hours that you mentioned in the previous paragraph? How long would it have taken the RN to move 600 troops from the UK to Freetown? Or is that just another inconvenient truth to be swept under the carpet?

And finally, for now, their assertion that the loss of the nuclear deterrent spelled the for the RAF as an independent strategic force is a schoolboy error in terms of understanding exactly what is meant by the concept of strategic. Air power in its strategic sense is about achieving effect; it is the result of an action that is strategic not the actions of the platform. So, whereas we might have once considered a 1,000 bomber raid or the ability to transport x-tons of freight over x-thousand of miles as being strategic, that is very much old school thinking. How many C-130s did we deploy to Ethiopia to help in famine relief? Not many. On the one public level, we were there on humanitarian grounds; dig a little deeper and an the desire by HMG to prevent the Soviets from gaining influence and a foothold in the region by dominating the humanitarian effort was also key to the decision to deploy.

Had the B-2 decapitation strikes at the start of OIF been successful, then much of the arguments about airpower no longer having a strategic role would be null and void. What the authors of this paper singularly fail to grasp is that airpower managed to put a bomber over the top of Baghdad, whilst the IADS was still up and running, literally hours after receiving a tip-off, and then hit the designated targets. There was nothing wrong with airpower on that occasion, it was dodgy HUMINT that led the B-2 to drop on the wrong locations. But still, lets not let truth get in the way of a good story eh chaps?

I could go on pulling this apart, but frankly, it isn't sporting and I have an early start. I do have one question that maybe somebody can answer though - just how do you command a patrol boat IN Northern Ireland? Was he lost or was it a toy boat in his bath tub?

[kintyred]

I'm afraid I don't see this irrational diatribe as a purely RN phenomenon. I would hold this up as an example of the woolly-mindedness of much of the military senior officer cadre. It has long been the case that military planners have twisted the facts to fit their particular agenda. If I had to deal with the three services to make sensible decisions for the future of our armed forces I would be at my wits end trying to work out what was fact and what was distortion and spin.

[Basil]

Well, just read a little of the paper and I'm not a staff officer or specialist polly but:

In addition to the RAF, I'm ex Army (TA) and Mercantile marine and would tend to welcome reasoned discussion of most effective use of assets without defending a particular service totem pole.

Nor did operations against primitive tribesmen require the sophisticated equipment that (was) needed for use against a modern industrial power

Yes, reminded of
"Two thousand pounds of education
Drops to a ten-rupee jezail. "

Bit like the WW2 Russian tank offensive and I mean no disrespect to the Russians

From 1942 to 1945, Bomber Command and the 8th AF Bomber Force dropped over two million tons of ordnance on Axis targets in Europe. Although this offensive killed nearly 600,000 civilians of various nations and reduced German cities to rubble, their will to resist remained unbroken.

It did however, keep anti aircraft artillery and Luftwaffe Staffeln out of the Eastern front (no doubt much to the relief of the Wermacht and Luftwaffe personnel so engaged)

Sir Trenchard (sic) felt able to write after the second World War; . . . The days of the big ship are past. They can no longer operate in the face of Air Power. Carriers were a passing phase and could only be used when one power ruled the air and was predominant over its enemy.”

Can't say I agree with that. Weapons and their deployment are, like politics and diplomacy, dynamic considerations and I'm sure Viscount Trenchard was aware of that.

In the Falklands War, even heavy Argentine aerial attacks caused minimal losses to British amphibious forces,[6] and failed to change the course of the conflict.

How different would that have been had not the British forces had fighter aircraft as one of their assets?
I was safely in civil aviation by then
(Big 'Thank you' to those who supplied extremely effective AAM and to those who denied theirs as opponents supplies ran out)

Whether you are in business or military you must deploy your assets most effectively at the time.

p.s. part of tonight's pub discussion was British errors in support of aircraft design in the fifties - tootle pip!

[Union Jack]

Feel free to join in! - Skua

I will, by breaking into French, namely " plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose".

If in any doubt, have a look at:

http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...ing-crabs.html

A few of the current "usual suspects" shoved their oar in then, and I particularly liked the Blessed BEagle's "Never trust anyone with face-fungus. Particularly when it's irritated by crabs?" and, later on, "Actually, I'm sure that most of us lateral perambulatory crustaceans have a high regard for Pusser's finest!"

I certainly wouldn't too excited by a paper produced by two officers who retired with three stripes - and no wings....

Jack

PS And I never previously appreciated that WEBF was actually RNR

[Vie sans frontieres]

Maybe I've missed something, maybe I visit the wrong websites or read the wrong articles but what is it with these retired RN officers spouting off all the time? Why do I never see retired RAF officers with their own websites or writing to the broadsheets complaining about the RN? What is the source of this anti-RAF resentment and why does it stay with them for so long after retirement? They really need to grow up - they're like kids stamping their feet because their birthday presents weren't as good as those given to the kids next door.

[Party Animal]

what is it with these retired RN officers spouting off all the time?

Inferiority complex! Should have worked harder at school etc...