Flt. Lt. Sean Cunningham inquest
Joined: Dec 2000
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From: UK
Many roads will lead to the AES IPT. It would be up to them to fend off criticism and deflect blame.
But for starters, if you want to chase documentary failures, the RTI is a place to start.
A UTI/RTI/STI will have a standard format and will incriminate the author.
We already know (I think) that it said "refit shackle" or similar, and that will be derived from the author referring to the seat AP. If neither say "replace" stiff nut with new item - you have a starting point.
Later in the document it will have a few formatted details
Manhours :- XXXX
Spares Required:- ....if it says "NIL" then this compounds the first mistake.
In fact, it more than compounds the first mistake. It means that the author can't blame the tradesman for not following best practise.
(Chug, our posts crossed)
But for starters, if you want to chase documentary failures, the RTI is a place to start.
A UTI/RTI/STI will have a standard format and will incriminate the author.
We already know (I think) that it said "refit shackle" or similar, and that will be derived from the author referring to the seat AP. If neither say "replace" stiff nut with new item - you have a starting point.
Later in the document it will have a few formatted details
Manhours :- XXXX
Spares Required:- ....if it says "NIL" then this compounds the first mistake.
In fact, it more than compounds the first mistake. It means that the author can't blame the tradesman for not following best practise.
(Chug, our posts crossed)
Joined: Aug 2006
Posts: 4,914
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From: West Sussex
SPHLC, I should have thought that many more roads lead to the UK Military Airworthiness Authority. It is a typical of the many systemic failures that litter the UK Military Aviation scene that it never flagged up the absence of a Safety Case for a system, and a critical Escape System at that, that had been in service since the 70s.
The fact that authority is now vested in the recently formed Military Aviation Authority, as against its parent MOD in which it was vested previously, is immaterial. It failed to ensure the airworthiness of this system, hence the airworthiness of this aircraft, which was a major contributor to this accident. Yet its DG congratulates the panel for an SI that failed to mention that. Something is rotten here in the State of Denmark, and it's not rotting Giraffe!
The fact that authority is now vested in the recently formed Military Aviation Authority, as against its parent MOD in which it was vested previously, is immaterial. It failed to ensure the airworthiness of this system, hence the airworthiness of this aircraft, which was a major contributor to this accident. Yet its DG congratulates the panel for an SI that failed to mention that. Something is rotten here in the State of Denmark, and it's not rotting Giraffe!
Joined: Dec 2004
Posts: 632
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From: UK
It is interesting that when working on the periphery of the AES IPT previously, their TL took the Safety Manager as saving, and after a significant gap was advised to bring in a contractor..........so I heard
In the 'Teams' defence they were savaged by cuts and federated out to other PTs, the transition from the S&AD IPT to the AES PT ensured it lost the strength when dealing with FLCs, platforms and industry. The PT became very dysfunctional in the way it did business. Many of the guys who were left worked tirelessly to ensure an output, some most definitely did not!! And this was further undermined by some of the worst leadership I have ever encountered in 24 years in the military!
In the 'Teams' defence they were savaged by cuts and federated out to other PTs, the transition from the S&AD IPT to the AES PT ensured it lost the strength when dealing with FLCs, platforms and industry. The PT became very dysfunctional in the way it did business. Many of the guys who were left worked tirelessly to ensure an output, some most definitely did not!! And this was further undermined by some of the worst leadership I have ever encountered in 24 years in the military!
Joined: Dec 2004
Posts: 632
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From: UK
JTO,
If this is the case then they are truly F$%^'ed!!
I can only assume that this is not a performance related posting, but more of a location choice! However, if it is second tier management (C1), then they will get a good guy! If it's the B2 then.................
If this is the case then they are truly F$%^'ed!!
I can only assume that this is not a performance related posting, but more of a location choice! However, if it is second tier management (C1), then they will get a good guy! If it's the B2 then.................
Joined: Feb 2003
Posts: 3,311
Likes: 365
From: uk
Could I just throw a couple of points in the pot.
If the seat Safety Case was invalid, or even non-existent, then the Whole Aircraft Safety Case, for a number of user platforms, is compromised. On Hawk, that implicates the Aircraft PT, the Release to Service Authority and Aircraft Design Authority.
I am not entirely convinced a RTI (Routine Technical Instruction) was suitable here. It may only be used if "Design Organisation (i.e. Martin Baker and BAeS) input is NOT required".
Does anyone think MB or BAeS should not be involved in any way whatsoever when there is a perceived need to (a) crack detect and (b) disturb a safety critical system, including replacing a component whose correct fitment is critical to correct operation, and is known to be so?
If the seat Safety Case was invalid, or even non-existent, then the Whole Aircraft Safety Case, for a number of user platforms, is compromised. On Hawk, that implicates the Aircraft PT, the Release to Service Authority and Aircraft Design Authority.
I am not entirely convinced a RTI (Routine Technical Instruction) was suitable here. It may only be used if "Design Organisation (i.e. Martin Baker and BAeS) input is NOT required".
Does anyone think MB or BAeS should not be involved in any way whatsoever when there is a perceived need to (a) crack detect and (b) disturb a safety critical system, including replacing a component whose correct fitment is critical to correct operation, and is known to be so?
Joined: Nov 2012
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From: UK East Anglia
Could be the last - Words fail me. Thanks for corroborating the fact about the Safety Manger. I am with you all the way regarding the worst leadership. Certainly went right down hill when the Gp Capt left.
Joined: Aug 2006
Posts: 4,914
Likes: 657
From: West Sussex
Thank you tuc as ever for the knowledge and expertise that sadly seems so lacking within the UK Military Airworthiness Authority itself these days. So, having identified one more tree in one more wood as infected with the unairworthiness virus, we must now turn to its neighbouring trees and find them infected also. Not only trees within this wood either, but in neighbouring woods, and no doubt in other woods too, as we trace this deadly canker throughout the whole forest of UK Military Aviation.
Words cannot fail us, dragartist, on the contrary we must speak out and testify to other shortcomings and actions that have suborned mandated process instead of implementing it. The MOD has always pigeon holed these tragedies as one offs, with one off remedies, be it to incorporate new systems such as ESF or to ground whole fleets such as the Nimrod Mk2. What they never do is to admit to widespread systemic failure of UK Military Airworthiness Provision, the extent and cause of which evaded the Haddon-Cave Report.
In short we have to do what Haddon-Cave failed to do and show that extent of failure and its historic causes. The latter have been well documented and discussed within this forum, they only need admitting to by the RAF High Command, for it is within that body that they can be mainly found. The former is where we go next, following tuc's post, and that would appear initially to be the AES IPT, the Hawk PT, the RTSA, and the Design Authority.
As to the RAFCAM HF experts, might I suggest they start looking at the actions of certain VSO's as from 1987 wrt financial shortfalls following disastrous policy changes, and the agreed remedial action to correct that by making 28% year on year cuts to Air Safety provision? Their knowledge of Groupthink would be invaluable in analysing blatantly illegal orders, deliberate obfuscation and deceit, the unjust laying of blame on juniors, even upon deceased JOs, and the ensuing denial and cover up by their successors to this day. Their testimony could then be handed to the RAF Provost Marshal, who might just be minded to view it as new evidence. You never know your luck!
Words cannot fail us, dragartist, on the contrary we must speak out and testify to other shortcomings and actions that have suborned mandated process instead of implementing it. The MOD has always pigeon holed these tragedies as one offs, with one off remedies, be it to incorporate new systems such as ESF or to ground whole fleets such as the Nimrod Mk2. What they never do is to admit to widespread systemic failure of UK Military Airworthiness Provision, the extent and cause of which evaded the Haddon-Cave Report.
In short we have to do what Haddon-Cave failed to do and show that extent of failure and its historic causes. The latter have been well documented and discussed within this forum, they only need admitting to by the RAF High Command, for it is within that body that they can be mainly found. The former is where we go next, following tuc's post, and that would appear initially to be the AES IPT, the Hawk PT, the RTSA, and the Design Authority.
As to the RAFCAM HF experts, might I suggest they start looking at the actions of certain VSO's as from 1987 wrt financial shortfalls following disastrous policy changes, and the agreed remedial action to correct that by making 28% year on year cuts to Air Safety provision? Their knowledge of Groupthink would be invaluable in analysing blatantly illegal orders, deliberate obfuscation and deceit, the unjust laying of blame on juniors, even upon deceased JOs, and the ensuing denial and cover up by their successors to this day. Their testimony could then be handed to the RAF Provost Marshal, who might just be minded to view it as new evidence. You never know your luck!
Joined: Mar 2007
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From: Bristol Temple Meads
The followning accidents all stem from cost cutting in the 1990s;
(a) Chinook
(b) Hercules
(c) Nimrod
(d) Tornado/Patriot
(e) Hawk
(f) Tornado CWS.
This, according to H-C was the "golden age". Did he realy believe what he wrote, or was he encouraged to protect the guilty.
DV
(a) Chinook
(b) Hercules
(c) Nimrod
(d) Tornado/Patriot
(e) Hawk
(f) Tornado CWS.
This, according to H-C was the "golden age". Did he realy believe what he wrote, or was he encouraged to protect the guilty.
DV
Joined: Aug 2006
Posts: 4,914
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From: West Sussex
F3WMB:-
Absolutely agree Fox3. Experience and currency commensurate with aircraft configuration and sortie type is as essential a component of airworthiness as any hardware.
https://www.gov.uk/government/public...nado-f3-ze-982
I would add the Tornado F3 crash at Glen Kinglas to that list
https://www.gov.uk/government/public...nado-f3-ze-982
Joined: Mar 2008
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From: Outside the Fence
The fact that they were low flying in that terrain in L Fit with fuel in the tanks shows a grave lack of awareness throughout thesupervisory chain. Whenever an F3 squadron fitted L Fit there should have been clear instructions on what could, and COULD NOT, be done with the aircraft. It was possible to do a lot with the ac in that configuration but it did not provide “Carefree Handling”, particularly at heavy weights.
The OEU operated in L Fit quite often due to Flight Trials being undertaken. When conducting tactical sorties in L Fit we would not consider any tactical or aggressive manoeuvring until the tanks were dry. Although one would not wish to over regulate, (write yet another ASO Beano) it is imperative that Sqn Auths and Supervisors do their job properly. It is all too easy to become “Comfortable” and thus complacent.
Deliverance, I would just like to add that it is only worth being a wingman if you have good leaders. If the dilution rate is too high the RAF has a problem. Certainly, some of those Execs should be in the air leading and not pushing paperwork.
The OEU operated in L Fit quite often due to Flight Trials being undertaken. When conducting tactical sorties in L Fit we would not consider any tactical or aggressive manoeuvring until the tanks were dry. Although one would not wish to over regulate, (write yet another ASO Beano) it is imperative that Sqn Auths and Supervisors do their job properly. It is all too easy to become “Comfortable” and thus complacent.
Deliverance, I would just like to add that it is only worth being a wingman if you have good leaders. If the dilution rate is too high the RAF has a problem. Certainly, some of those Execs should be in the air leading and not pushing paperwork.
Last edited by Dominator2; 18th February 2014 at 12:36.
Joined: Mar 2007
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From: Bristol Temple Meads
Chugalug posted the Accident Inquiry three posts ago. It says it all.
DV
