Two Generals now looking for employment.
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Thanks for that, the situation seems to have been pretty much unchanged from my time (though the Jordanians etc weren't present then). If I may, I would just offer the following:
1. There was a Major Incident Plan in place in 2010 (I wrote the Aircraft Accident Annex). Certainly my Annex was a joint document and we table topped various scenarios with the USMC. I even had a Marine Capt liaison officer working for me in Air Ops.
2. Contractor security and vetting was always a problem and one which nobody really wanted to grip. It reached farcical proportions when an attempt was made to get Air Traffic Control to vet them and issue an Air Side permit, on the principle they had to drive around the airfield to get to the construction site. ATC was promptly inundated by thousands of applications, most of whom could not speak English. We eventually got this turned off but it was not satisfactorily resolved during my stint.
3. The Jan 11 MOU essentially formalised the status quo. Leatherneck and Shorabak were essentially separate, self contained, autonomous camps. I suspect that the greatest level of cooperation was on the ATC / Airfield Ops side (which worked very well).
As always, my comments are caveated that I am a mere Ops Wallah and not a FP guru.
1. There was a Major Incident Plan in place in 2010 (I wrote the Aircraft Accident Annex). Certainly my Annex was a joint document and we table topped various scenarios with the USMC. I even had a Marine Capt liaison officer working for me in Air Ops.
2. Contractor security and vetting was always a problem and one which nobody really wanted to grip. It reached farcical proportions when an attempt was made to get Air Traffic Control to vet them and issue an Air Side permit, on the principle they had to drive around the airfield to get to the construction site. ATC was promptly inundated by thousands of applications, most of whom could not speak English. We eventually got this turned off but it was not satisfactorily resolved during my stint.
3. The Jan 11 MOU essentially formalised the status quo. Leatherneck and Shorabak were essentially separate, self contained, autonomous camps. I suspect that the greatest level of cooperation was on the ATC / Airfield Ops side (which worked very well).
As always, my comments are caveated that I am a mere Ops Wallah and not a FP guru.
SAS
My comment was about your (and I may have misunderstood) implication that the Tongans had deliberately left a point unguarded to allow Taliban entry. I apologise if I misinterpreted your statement.
As for aggressive patrolling of the perimeters. Do you honestly believe that the USMC, RAF, British Army, Jordanian Army etc didn't do that? FFS only someone who has been there can understand the scale of the tri-base area. As others have pointed out, you could had a division on the ground around the base and they still might have got through!! I'm afraid you could have provided the best protection, the best kit, the best aircraft, armoured vehicles etc and people will still die. That may be harsh, but it is a combat zone.
My comment was about your (and I may have misunderstood) implication that the Tongans had deliberately left a point unguarded to allow Taliban entry. I apologise if I misinterpreted your statement.
As for aggressive patrolling of the perimeters. Do you honestly believe that the USMC, RAF, British Army, Jordanian Army etc didn't do that? FFS only someone who has been there can understand the scale of the tri-base area. As others have pointed out, you could had a division on the ground around the base and they still might have got through!! I'm afraid you could have provided the best protection, the best kit, the best aircraft, armoured vehicles etc and people will still die. That may be harsh, but it is a combat zone.
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And when it happens, it needs to be thoroughly investigated to determine the facts.People need to be held accountable. As a former US Marine I am heartened to see the Commandant moving forward with this. You should similarly expect accountability (if a proper investigation reveals there is blame) of the British leadership rather than chalking it up to it's a big base and and **** happens mentality.
Last edited by West Coast; 7th Oct 2013 at 18:47.
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West Coast,
I'm quite happy that people should be held to account. The C2 arrangement, amongst other things, was a cluster but it had been for YEARS. It should have been gripped much earlier but a mired by a combination of:
1. US interservice rivalry. The USMC were desperate to maintain their autonomy and keep the USAF out of Bastion. The USAF, who after all had just spent hundreds of millions of dollars on the place, were desperate to get in and take over as Airfield Operating Authority. We were the lesser of 2 evils, in that we kept the USAF out with minimal impact on the USMC manpower cap.
2. Nation pride. We'd damn well built the place in we were bally well going to keep in charge of it for as long as possible. All whilst putting the minimum amount of resources, in terms of people and mony in, to do the job.
By all means let's hold people accountable, and it is a refreshing change that does credit to the USMC that they have started at the top, but let's make sure we get them all.
Again these are just my own views as an Ops Wallah based on my working relationship with the USMC, dealings with the USAF (both at Bastion and further afield) and having done this far too many times not to be a touch synical.
I'm quite happy that people should be held to account. The C2 arrangement, amongst other things, was a cluster but it had been for YEARS. It should have been gripped much earlier but a mired by a combination of:
1. US interservice rivalry. The USMC were desperate to maintain their autonomy and keep the USAF out of Bastion. The USAF, who after all had just spent hundreds of millions of dollars on the place, were desperate to get in and take over as Airfield Operating Authority. We were the lesser of 2 evils, in that we kept the USAF out with minimal impact on the USMC manpower cap.
2. Nation pride. We'd damn well built the place in we were bally well going to keep in charge of it for as long as possible. All whilst putting the minimum amount of resources, in terms of people and mony in, to do the job.
By all means let's hold people accountable, and it is a refreshing change that does credit to the USMC that they have started at the top, but let's make sure we get them all.
Again these are just my own views as an Ops Wallah based on my working relationship with the USMC, dealings with the USAF (both at Bastion and further afield) and having done this far too many times not to be a touch synical.
Last edited by Wallah; 7th Oct 2013 at 15:21.
Thread Starter
Appreciate the insight. The USMC/USAF dust up doesn't come as a surprise. It however doesn't explain how the attack was so spectacularly successful.
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They probably read some history books.
The VC raid on the MACV-SOG compound in Vietnam
being one example. It's not brain surgery with good planning.
I was reading a book about the Iraq war and it said that the US
used history of fights in Vietnam as examples of what to expect,
how to fight. Hue being one.
No reason the enemy can't do the same.
The VC raid on the MACV-SOG compound in Vietnam
being one example. It's not brain surgery with good planning.
I was reading a book about the Iraq war and it said that the US
used history of fights in Vietnam as examples of what to expect,
how to fight. Hue being one.
No reason the enemy can't do the same.
I was reading a book about the Iraq war and it said that the US
used history of fights in Vietnam as examples of what to expect,
how to fight. Hue being one
used history of fights in Vietnam as examples of what to expect,
how to fight. Hue being one
His rationale was that as we had just arrived and had precious little experience of our own at the time and as the higher level J2 organisations couldn't provide material at the level of tactical detail required, historical books on tactical Russian and Mujahideen ops were as good a starting point as any as most of the people on the ground probably had links to the people in the books.
As you rightly say, doesn't take the brains of an archbishop to at least try to fill gaps in knowledge and understanding through a quick trip to Amazon / your local variant of.
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In case anyone is interested, the book I was reading was
Running the War in Iraq by Maj Gen Jim Molan.
Yes, an Australian General got to be Deputy Chief of Operations
for the whole Iraq war, mostly under General Casey but also others.
Running the War in Iraq by Maj Gen Jim Molan.
Yes, an Australian General got to be Deputy Chief of Operations
for the whole Iraq war, mostly under General Casey but also others.
I heard some scuttlebutt at the office today that these two generals were the sixth and seventh starred officers to be relieved of their commands by Gen Amos during his tenure as USMC Commandant. If true, and if he was responsible for approving the appointments of these men, does this not raise questions over Gen Amos' judgement? Perhaps he should find himself accountable... like this? 
Seriously, though, I'm all for sackings when negligence is there in black-and-white, which is usually the case only when written rules and regulations have been transgressed. As soon as you start talking about generals and their ilk, very little is in black and white, and everything is in nuanced shades of grey. It's funny that someone brought up Nimrod and airworthiness a few posts back, because the parallels are more stark than you might imagine at first. With Nimrod, the rot started when the money that supported airworthiness was taken away, but the rot took so long to take effect that those held accountable after the crash were the ones wrestling manfully with the hospital pass they'd received from their predecessors. In this (Bastion) case, I'm led to understand that the Maj Gens were severely constrained by a large reduction in theatre manpower that had been in the pipeline for some time, but that was not accompanied in any way by a reduction in immediate ambition. Keep delivering more with less... What were they to do except spread what they had, thinly, in a vain attempt to achieve everything asked of them? They were forced into taking a risk, and it got called. True accountability stops at the person who ordered the manpower reduction, yet failed to change the corresponding task. Not these two generals.
Seriously, though, I'm all for sackings when negligence is there in black-and-white, which is usually the case only when written rules and regulations have been transgressed. As soon as you start talking about generals and their ilk, very little is in black and white, and everything is in nuanced shades of grey. It's funny that someone brought up Nimrod and airworthiness a few posts back, because the parallels are more stark than you might imagine at first. With Nimrod, the rot started when the money that supported airworthiness was taken away, but the rot took so long to take effect that those held accountable after the crash were the ones wrestling manfully with the hospital pass they'd received from their predecessors. In this (Bastion) case, I'm led to understand that the Maj Gens were severely constrained by a large reduction in theatre manpower that had been in the pipeline for some time, but that was not accompanied in any way by a reduction in immediate ambition. Keep delivering more with less... What were they to do except spread what they had, thinly, in a vain attempt to achieve everything asked of them? They were forced into taking a risk, and it got called. True accountability stops at the person who ordered the manpower reduction, yet failed to change the corresponding task. Not these two generals.
Last edited by Easy Street; 8th Oct 2013 at 20:54.
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I thought this quote was an interesting one from Maj Gen Jim Molan
in his book Running the War in Iraq.
He wrote this as he was summing up at the end of the book and applies to the insurgents. His time in Iraq spanned 2004/2005.
"I suggested that none of us should be surprised if the enemy surprises us. Our enemy doesn't have perfect knowledge and the worst does not always happen, but often the insurgents in Iraq seemed to know intimately what our options were and they worked to our weaknesses."
As has been said, the enemy only need to be lucky once.
A few other choice quotes in the book as well plus it gives a very good understanding of the detail that needs to be gone through before a strike is authorised. Detail that includes scrutiny and analysis by legal teams before and after.
in his book Running the War in Iraq.
He wrote this as he was summing up at the end of the book and applies to the insurgents. His time in Iraq spanned 2004/2005.
"I suggested that none of us should be surprised if the enemy surprises us. Our enemy doesn't have perfect knowledge and the worst does not always happen, but often the insurgents in Iraq seemed to know intimately what our options were and they worked to our weaknesses."
As has been said, the enemy only need to be lucky once.
A few other choice quotes in the book as well plus it gives a very good understanding of the detail that needs to be gone through before a strike is authorised. Detail that includes scrutiny and analysis by legal teams before and after.
Easy,
Sometimes one has to grow a pair of balls and stand up and say what is not wanted to be heard.....the TRUTH!
Perhaps some of the GenGen's should have scaled back Operations and then defended their decisions to those demanding excessive pie in the sky expectations from the forces who was plainly not in a position to carry them out.
The Bad Guys are not the ones that fight against us....they are the guys who are on our side who set us up for failure....and they need to be sought out and be dealt with just as aggressively as the other enemy.
Every Commander has a responsibility to ensure no unnecessary risks are taken in the execution of their mission. That certainly has been a central point failure of our Senior Military leadership starting with Iraq and working forward to today. Too many have put their fingers to their forehead and backed off to cary out Orders they know were wrongheaded.
Sometimes one has to grow a pair of balls and stand up and say what is not wanted to be heard.....the TRUTH!
Perhaps some of the GenGen's should have scaled back Operations and then defended their decisions to those demanding excessive pie in the sky expectations from the forces who was plainly not in a position to carry them out.
The Bad Guys are not the ones that fight against us....they are the guys who are on our side who set us up for failure....and they need to be sought out and be dealt with just as aggressively as the other enemy.
Every Commander has a responsibility to ensure no unnecessary risks are taken in the execution of their mission. That certainly has been a central point failure of our Senior Military leadership starting with Iraq and working forward to today. Too many have put their fingers to their forehead and backed off to cary out Orders they know were wrongheaded.
You should similarly expect accountability (if a proper investigation reveals there is blame) of the British leadership rather than chalking it up to it's a big base and and **** happens mentality.
Of course, no politician will ever be accountable for any decision ever made. It will always be blamed on the previous government. All very simple really
