Economist book review - The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945

[Squirrel 41]

Originally Posted by ColinB

As it consists of almost 900 pages I doubt if many people have read this book unless they had a review copy.
I think the topic has been widely covered and some of us probably still have the HMSO and SBS tomes (now worth a few quid). So I wouldn't normally want to spend £20 on it except I thought his excellent book Interrogations gave new insights into Nuiremburg and was well written and Xmas is on the horizon. So.....

Colin - 642 pages, and I'm on page 406 which is beginning to deal with USSBS and BBSU. Thus far, the over-riding analytical points to me have been:

(i) prior to late 1942 Bomber Command wasn't able to achieve sufficient accuracy to even make the area-bombing plan work;

(ii) the Bomber Offensive in the first half of the war was one of the few things we could do, so we did it;

(iii) Harris was an iconoclast who wouldn't consider other approaches (ie, he opposed CHASTISE, the oil plan, the transport plan, and resented supporting land forces in the summer and early autumn of 1944;

(iv) Germany and Germans behaved exactly the same way under bombing as Brits did in 1940-41 - and this shouldn't have been a surprise. As a result, morale never cracked;

(v) the RAF never seriously considered a counter-force strategy, and so the USAAC largely defeated the Luftwaffe. This provided the local air supremacy - and later air superiority - that sharply reduced bomber losses after late 1944;

(vi) the target analysis that was done was not done as systematically as the USAAC. Consequently when the USAAC (correctly) picked on transport and oil/synthetic oil, the results were good;

(vii) The crews were young, brave, scared and did it anyway. Not a bad word to be said about the operational end of the RAF - the scorn is for Harris and his team.

(viii) Fortunately, the Luftwaffe was led by Goring and Hitler, who believed their own propaganda and trusted their own worldview, which meant that the Luftwaffe was much less effective than it should've been.

It's an excellent book, and I highly recommend it. Very detailed, a mastery of the material on both UK and German sides, and beautifully written: highly recommended for Christmas lists - along with a decent bottle of something.

S41

[ShotOne]

It's hard to prove the case that our bombing prevented Germany developing a strategic bombing force since they had a free hand to do so before our offensive gOt into gear and didn't do so, prioritising short range tactical aircraft.

As to " Battle of Britain a waste of time..." Of course it wasn't, although even if we'd lost, they would still have had to get past our fleet to mount an invasion. We lost more aircrew in one night over Nuremberg than in the entire. BoB!

[Pontius Navigator]

Overy’s shift of ground, . . . from fulfilling a role as principal academic standard-bearer for Bomber Command, he has become today an adviser to Hamburg’s new museum on its experience of wartime victimhood at the hands of the RAF.

So, no cause for bias then.

The Germans themselves were amazed by the complete failure to target their power stations;

As Squirrel said (before I read that far) We should remember that Harris was opposed to panacea targets such as oil, ball bearings, dams, etc and not enthused on diversion of his force to transport targets. To that end he reverted to the primary aim of strategic bombing whenever he could,

never mind all the German civilians - were lost pursuing a flawed strategy. Think of how much harm would have been done to Germany's military power had the British bombers joined the American ones in focusing on military/industrial targets.

We should remember that the innocent German civilians wholly approved of the Nazi offensive and the righting of wrongs wrought by their politician at Versaille.

IIRC the Hamburg attack was a combined effort with successive raids by Bomber Command and USAFE over 3 days. It was not Bomber Command going it alone.

Harris did not target civilians per se; had he wished to attack civilian targets then there were many small towns in German that would have been soft, undefended targets. In a study of target lists we should remember that industry at the time was manpower intensive and workers generally occupied housing close to their point of work - commuting was never a factor then. As we know, Bomber Command did not have the bombing aids for precision bombing until accurate target marking by the Pathfinder Force, even then DMPI were often marked up to 400 yards away. As the work force was essential to the factor so civilian casualties were acceptable collateral damage - see below as well.

acceptable when it was needed and soon as war over then judged by peacetime standards.

Yet we immediately began work on Atomic weapons that would have devastated western Russia in hours and not years.

It's hard to prove the case that our bombing prevented Germany developing a strategic bombing force since they had a free hand to do so before our offensive gOt into gear and didn't do so, prioritising short range tactical aircraft.

But until they had seen the effects of our heavy bomber programmes they had not seen any advantages in developing one. In fact looking at a map would also show that they did not need a long range heavy bomber force. Their targets were closer to their bases that ours to theirs.

[Pontius Navigator]

Such Revisionism 70 years after the event leads one to suppose that new thinking could reveal the WW1 strategy was wholly wrong too.

Instead of pouring all our money in to artillery and ammunition and Chinese digging ever more trenches, we should have employed manoeuvre warfare. We should have fallen back, drawn the enemy out of his prepared positions, and then swept in with tanks, armoured cars and light bombers and . . .

You get the idea?

[Pontius Navigator]

Originally Posted by Heathrow Harry

the Germans never had a serious N weapons programme

Actually just today that statement has been brought in to question by the Daily Wail.

"Austrian authorities have ordered a search of secret tunnels beneath a concentration camp . . . eyewitness accounts . . . Mauthausen-Gusen near Linz. Tests show high levels of uranium. A secret section may have been missed post-war.

[racedo]

It's hard to prove the case that our bombing prevented Germany developing a strategic bombing force since they had a free hand to do so before our offensive gOt into gear and didn't do so, prioritising short range tactical aircraft.

Germany were never into developing a Heavy bomber force as majority of operations were used to support Blitzkreig.

It was an error of the Nazis because as their logistics chain became stretched they lacked the resources to resupply as well as adequately bomb their opponents.

As to " Battle of Britain a waste of time..." Of course it wasn't, although even if we'd lost, they would still have had to get past our fleet to mount an invasion. We lost more aircrew in one night over Nuremberg than in the entire. BoB!

BoB loss would have been a catastrophe. I mentioned earlier about confidence and losing this so soon after Dunkirk would have sapped confidence.

The idea of fleet stopping an invasion while great has an inherent weakness in that it relies on being able to attack and defend oneself without losing anything in return.

Prince of Wales and Repulse losses showed how easy it was to overcome the strength of battleships and figure Germany would have easily sacrificed couple of hundred aircraft for similar. Add this to mines then even a succesful defence would potentially have cost half the home fleet.

Even a failed German invasion that cost half of home fleet would have been a German success.

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

I'm reminded how costly the Navy found retaking Crete without credible air cover.

[ColinB]

It's an excellent book, and I highly recommend it. Very detailed, a mastery of the material on both UK and German sides, and beautifully written: highly recommended for Christmas lists - along with a decent bottle of something.

I did put it on my Xmas list, but they have refused to buy me any more books.

I'll be going to the well-known riverine purveyor of books

Is that the one in Germany?

[Onceapilot]

Direct research, rather than quotations from books written by other people, will allow a realistic understanding of the Allied bomber offensive in WW2.
Some may be interested to know that Germany tried hard to develop long-range heavy bombers. Fortunately for us, they were over ambitious in the design of the He177 (with DB610 engines). The political/military drive for this heavy bomber is shown by the production of over 1500 DB610 double-engine units (the equivalent of over 3000 DB605 engines) before the end of 1942. By the time that Germany gave-up on the He177, over 7000 DB610 engine units had been made for it.
Atomic bombs. German research had effectively validated the theory. They were certainly on the path to building a weapon.

OAP

[Pontius Navigator]

Originally Posted by Squirrel 41

(v) the RAF never seriously considered a counter-force strategy, and so the USAAC largely defeated the Luftwaffe. This provided the local air supremacy - and later air superiority - that sharply reduced bomber losses after late 1944;

Britain had already suffered a counter-force strategy and given the inevitable advantage of a short range fighter and rapid turn round had been able to hold off the Luftwaffe.

The Luftwaffe then switched to a counter-logistics strategy with some success but ultimately that too failed. The RAF would appear to have learnt both lessons and opted to improve on the second using massive force.

To then suggest the RAF did not try a counter-force strategy is wrong as night fighter intruders used to mix with the German fighter stacks and attack airfields as fighters recovered. A full-blown counter-air campaign would have been both unnecessary and wasteful early on as the Luftwaffe offensive air was already limited.

After D-day you are talking a target rich environment and to suggest counter-air was the sole prerogative of the USAAC is wrong.

[Whenurhappy]

I didn't even bother to ask for this book for my stocking as Mrs WP has had enough of the 'dull, dusty, boring war books' that clutter the Study, the sitting room, the bedside table. As it happens I've just finished reading the Saward Biography of Harris and he is painted in a much more positive light (but he would be, it was 'authorised').

What is undeniable is that the CBO (and let's remember it was a combined offensive) drew enormous resources of the Reich into purely defensive roles. Although one can argue about the magnitude of the impact, what is undeniable is the oft-ignored fact that there was no other means of war that the Western Allies could have prosecuted that could have begun to touch the level of damage and dislocation that the CBO achieved. Both Goering and Speer made this point during their interrogations at Nuernburg.


What would be interesting would be to Blue Team and Red team the options Harris (and Portal) had in 1942 and 43 - poor performing platforms, sub-optimal weapons, abysmal accuracy of delivery, surprisingly limited intelligence (apart from PI) and a competing resource base. Without Harris's involvement as DD Plans in the mid 1930s, the RAF would have had no Strategic Bomber force!

I'm not defending Harris, but what other realistic and effective options did he have?

[ColinB]

Atomic bombs. German research had effectively validated the theory. They were certainly on the path to building a weapon.

Germany did not have the industrial capacity to build A Bombs before 1945. Neither had it the knowledge to produce weapons grade uranium 235 or plutonium.
The only country with the industrial capacity and sufficient engineers and scientists was the USA with a little help from our Germans.
To discover how little the Germans knew read the Hall Farm Tapes where all of the German scientists were confined in the immediate post-war years and recorded

[awblain]

Spot on ColinB

Farm Hall indeed settles the matter about why the remaining aryan physicists' pooch was walking tentatively around Germany in mid-1945.

Some tunnels under Mauthausen with Uranium in them (anyone think to check the geology?) does not a combination of the Oak Ridge, Argonne, Los Alamos and Hanford sites make.

The USSR was already deeply engaged in nuclear weapons development, despite wartime stringency; but then, just the knowledge that a simple reactor-based plutonium programme was underway makes the road to executing one rather easier in the face of a demanding and despotic leader.

[Onceapilot]

You are correct in part Colin, but for the wrong reasons. AFAIK from evidence in public, the German fission weapon research had not quite progressed to the point where a large yield weapon could be designed. This was partly because the heavy bombing of Germany had completely disrupted the research process.
If Germany lacked the industrial capacity to build such weapons, as you claim, that was partly due to the efforts of heavy bombing.
Atomic bombs. German research had effectively validated the theory. They were certainly on the path to building a weapon.

OAP

[polecat2]

There was a very good account of the German attempt to produce an atomic bomb written in the 1960s by the now discredited historian David Irving. Titled 'The Virus House', it was written long before he went native after interviewing so many old Nazis. It was highly recommended at the time and I remember it supported the theory that the work was severely disrupted by the bombing campaign.

Polecat

[ColinB]

You can download it here Free Download: David Irving, The Virus House (The German Atomic Bomb)

It is dated but valuable. I try not confuse David Irving's alleged personal beliefs with his excellent scholarship.

[ColinB]

You are correct in part Colin, but for the wrong reasons. AFAIK from evidence in public, the German fission weapon research had not quite progressed to the point where a large yield weapon could be designed. This was partly because the heavy bombing of Germany had completely disrupted the research process.
If Germany lacked the industrial capacity to build such weapons, as you claim, that was partly due to the efforts of heavy bombing.
Atomic bombs. German research had effectively validated the theory. They were certainly on the path to building a weapon.

I am afraid there is no credible evidence for your theory, the reality is that only the USA had the capability to build such a device in the timescale. It was a matter of cost, scientists, engineers and industrial capacity. It cost a conservative $2 billion in an era when a Spitfire fully fitted cost £10K.
The Frisch-Peierls Report convinced us that we could not afford to invest such a large commitment on a device which may not be used in the current war.

[Onceapilot]

Sorry Colin, what theory? You are wrong to dismiss the threat that German atomic research posed in WW2. We disagree on this.

Getting back to the first post:
"Some interesting statistics in this article.
The article misses a point mentioned in one of the comments: "Not bombing German cities during WWII would have provided a gift worth many 10's of millions of man hours of industrial production and scientific research & development"."
IMO, the Allied bombing campaign was central to the defeat of Germany by 1945 and, it prevented the successful development of many high-tech weapons. It may have been something of a "club" but, it became a powerful weapon that beat the monster to death before it could kill us all.

OAP

[Pontius Navigator]

It cost a conservative $2 billion in an era when a Spitfire fully fitted cost £10K.

Putting currency values against goods works only in functioning capitalist democracies - goods needing to be bought and workers paid.

In a totalitarian dictatorship the economic value, as OAP said, is

man hours of industrial production and scientific research & development

A shortage of manpower or factory facilities - Peenemunde - is far more significant than mere shortage of money.

[racedo]

IMO, the Allied bombing campaign was central to the defeat of Germany by 1945 and, it prevented the successful development of many high-tech weapons. It may have been something of a "club" but, it became a powerful weapon that beat the monster to death before it could kill us all.

Bombing the cities didn't end the war, nor was it ever likely to. It was done to make people aware of the cost of war.

Men away from home fighting in a foreign land gets forgotten about very quickly and that is now even with 24 hr media.

Having bombers go overhead and attack nearest city is a reminder.

In todays world the Bombing campaign was wrong BUT as said earlier in thread we were not in todays world in WW2. The bombing was needed and required and those who led it would have known that once peace broke out their role would be questioned and diminished.

A war fighting leader who takes it to the enemy should never be allowed gain political office, their personality alone precludes them as lacking the compromise and deceit that is required in politics. That is fine as long as everybody recignise that we need dogs to fight dogs.
Eisenhower was as much a politician as a general, Patton was a general, MacArthur also a general................real difference here.