Forces' productivity
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Wrathmonk,
Perhaps I can help here. The way JFH was attempting to go about things went roughly as follows:
1. When in Rome, do as the Romans do - so, the 'rules' to be obeyed for day to day flying activity were those applying on the base of operations. On an RAF station - RAF rules, RN ship, RN rules.
2. Own uniform rules - JFH personnel retained their own services' terms of service and engagement rules, as well as pay regs. This included harmony rules. Of course, this was before JPA and the rest.
3. Converge and improve - JFH were charged with developing a blend of the two services' regimes that delivered better effectiveness at lower costs. The basic idea was not to 'average out' but to select the best of each and weld them into a better system to operate the mixed fighter/strike force that had been set up under Strike Command. And that included looking at a better set of 'harmony' rules that allowed embarkations to ships, and deployments to land bases, to be carried out in the best possible way.
All great ideas, but the basic problem was that to do this JFH should have been answering to a Joint Command. Whatever else Strike was at that time, 'joint' wasn't a description that easily applied. So, from day one, there was fierce institutional resistance to any changes away from RAF rules. (The RN hierarchy were really not bothered, having passed the baton to Strike). Of course, once the SHARs were binned, any need for 'convergence' was removed, and the process became once of 'conversion' to form NSW in an all RAF mould.
For what it's worth, those of us who were involved found that, at the working level (by which I mean SO1 and below) there was a huge appetite for trying new ways of doing things and showing the rest of Strike what could be achieved in a 'joint' environment. Friendships were forged across the 'divide' that have lasted for many years, and we were ready to move forward when the rug was pulled. For my part, I think it was a real shame that those who signed up to the idea were so ready to ditch their promises when the single service chips were down. We can only hope that all the lessons from JFH are being reviewed and learned as the UK gets ready to try the 'joint aircraft at sea' idea again.
As ever, very best regards to all those of whatever cloth doing the real business out there today
Engines
Perhaps I can help here. The way JFH was attempting to go about things went roughly as follows:
1. When in Rome, do as the Romans do - so, the 'rules' to be obeyed for day to day flying activity were those applying on the base of operations. On an RAF station - RAF rules, RN ship, RN rules.
2. Own uniform rules - JFH personnel retained their own services' terms of service and engagement rules, as well as pay regs. This included harmony rules. Of course, this was before JPA and the rest.
3. Converge and improve - JFH were charged with developing a blend of the two services' regimes that delivered better effectiveness at lower costs. The basic idea was not to 'average out' but to select the best of each and weld them into a better system to operate the mixed fighter/strike force that had been set up under Strike Command. And that included looking at a better set of 'harmony' rules that allowed embarkations to ships, and deployments to land bases, to be carried out in the best possible way.
All great ideas, but the basic problem was that to do this JFH should have been answering to a Joint Command. Whatever else Strike was at that time, 'joint' wasn't a description that easily applied. So, from day one, there was fierce institutional resistance to any changes away from RAF rules. (The RN hierarchy were really not bothered, having passed the baton to Strike). Of course, once the SHARs were binned, any need for 'convergence' was removed, and the process became once of 'conversion' to form NSW in an all RAF mould.
For what it's worth, those of us who were involved found that, at the working level (by which I mean SO1 and below) there was a huge appetite for trying new ways of doing things and showing the rest of Strike what could be achieved in a 'joint' environment. Friendships were forged across the 'divide' that have lasted for many years, and we were ready to move forward when the rug was pulled. For my part, I think it was a real shame that those who signed up to the idea were so ready to ditch their promises when the single service chips were down. We can only hope that all the lessons from JFH are being reviewed and learned as the UK gets ready to try the 'joint aircraft at sea' idea again.
As ever, very best regards to all those of whatever cloth doing the real business out there today
Engines
Thanks Engines - as I thought, those at the coalface made it work (using huge doses of common sense) whilst those at the top of the command chain squabbled amongst each other! Hopefully, with potentially 4 years + before F35 becomes a reality on the front line the "rules and regs" will have been squared away. After all the SO1s and SO2s of yesteryear should be the 2* and above of today - some of them may even be in Joint Command!
Thank you to all who re-educated me about the tactical WE-177 QRA role of the Vulcan and its successors. In the wee hours of the morning, I'd forgotten that this ordnance remained part of the RAF's arsenal beyond the strategic nuclear deterrent carried by our SSBN force. Please forgive my oversight.
I'm no doubt teaching granny in some cases but in the RN, variants of this device were carried for delivery by Fleet Air Arm Sea Vixens, Buccaneers and SHAR in the nuclear strike role. Unlike the Vulcans, it seems, these versatile aircraft and their crews regularly exercised and often employed their capability to perform conventional bombing, air-to-air refuelling and air defence to one degree or another, too.
Even the FAA's Wasp and Wessex helicopters were in on the act, being tasked with the delivery of the WE-177 '600 lb' nuclear depth bomb in an anti-submarine role if the situation required. However, they also exercised and often employed their capability to drop Mk 11 conventional depth charges or anti-submarine torpedoes and fire AS-12 air-to-surface missiles in addition to their reconnaissance, surveillance and humble utility tasking (someone had to fetch the mail
).
I'm no doubt teaching granny in some cases but in the RN, variants of this device were carried for delivery by Fleet Air Arm Sea Vixens, Buccaneers and SHAR in the nuclear strike role. Unlike the Vulcans, it seems, these versatile aircraft and their crews regularly exercised and often employed their capability to perform conventional bombing, air-to-air refuelling and air defence to one degree or another, too.
Even the FAA's Wasp and Wessex helicopters were in on the act, being tasked with the delivery of the WE-177 '600 lb' nuclear depth bomb in an anti-submarine role if the situation required. However, they also exercised and often employed their capability to drop Mk 11 conventional depth charges or anti-submarine torpedoes and fire AS-12 air-to-surface missiles in addition to their reconnaissance, surveillance and humble utility tasking (someone had to fetch the mail
).
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Tribal Warfare
My heart sinks when I see these sorts of threads, because the only winner is he who wishes to marginalise HMF further: be it the press and public opinion, be it the treasury in order to pay for votes for the next GE.
I recall an academic (not the same one as per this thread) who warned repeatedly that though rats have highly developed social patterns, if several were to be confined in a space which because prgressively smaller then there comes a point when the rats turn on one another.
My metaphor of HMF as rats and the Treasury/Govt as the enclosure may not be to everyone's taste, but it suffices to illustrate the pressures that people/Services believe themselves to be under. The winner is not going to be any one of the Services: we now have reduction to one 4* per Service and forcible eviction from MoD HO, as a direct result of VSO delinquent behaviour during the past decade. Who's the winner there?
Look back at history, several hundreds of years, and you will see a common theme: UK governments have ALWAYS resented paying the insurance premiums that HMF represent. Cuts are nothing new.
HMF would be better served by (re)gaining public opinion and utilising that to influence govt. and subsequent force levels and funding prioritisation against the plethera of other (worthy) causes that vie for govt money.
Personally - I would be content to see a reduced HMF international/expeditionary capability if the quid quo pro were to be improved safety/security on British streets (implied task includes education in civic responsibility and policing - 2 other Govt depts) and improved social secuity (implied task includes healthcare & social safetynet - 3 OGDs). May views will not be welcomed by Benny in FI, but I assess the risk to FI to be medium and non-military ie Dipl.
Weapons free against my opinion, as you wish, but do try to stop the "war of the capbadges" from spilling into every thread.
I recall an academic (not the same one as per this thread) who warned repeatedly that though rats have highly developed social patterns, if several were to be confined in a space which because prgressively smaller then there comes a point when the rats turn on one another.
My metaphor of HMF as rats and the Treasury/Govt as the enclosure may not be to everyone's taste, but it suffices to illustrate the pressures that people/Services believe themselves to be under. The winner is not going to be any one of the Services: we now have reduction to one 4* per Service and forcible eviction from MoD HO, as a direct result of VSO delinquent behaviour during the past decade. Who's the winner there?
Look back at history, several hundreds of years, and you will see a common theme: UK governments have ALWAYS resented paying the insurance premiums that HMF represent. Cuts are nothing new.
HMF would be better served by (re)gaining public opinion and utilising that to influence govt. and subsequent force levels and funding prioritisation against the plethera of other (worthy) causes that vie for govt money.
Personally - I would be content to see a reduced HMF international/expeditionary capability if the quid quo pro were to be improved safety/security on British streets (implied task includes education in civic responsibility and policing - 2 other Govt depts) and improved social secuity (implied task includes healthcare & social safetynet - 3 OGDs). May views will not be welcomed by Benny in FI, but I assess the risk to FI to be medium and non-military ie Dipl.
Weapons free against my opinion, as you wish, but do try to stop the "war of the capbadges" from spilling into every thread.
Originally Posted by Nimbus20
.....but do try to stop the "war of the capbadges" from spilling into every thread.
My own take on productivity was/is that it means very little within the context of a watch keeping role and it cant be directly translated to a deskbound role even within the same service. How that can them be measured at a service granularity is beyond me.
Anecdote time.
I worked double days at a day only flying station. earlies started 1 hr before ATC which in turn started 1 hr before flying. Normally then 6am, but we finished at 12am a short day...which compensated us for the following... Afters started at 12 until cease flying which could be 8 in the summer, additionally the afters shift covered out of hours stuff and the following weekends display work.
Days did 8-5.
On change of boss, the decision was made that we (shift workers) weren't working enough basic hours compared to days, so mornings were extended till 3pm and afters finished at 8pm even during no flying periods or later as flying dictated. Given that the out of hours stuff was watch keeping, but the staff using the equipment had gone home, there was actually no work to do..
I don't mind working, but I don't like being shafted simply because somebody further up the food chain cant equate fair and reasonable. Whacked in my environmental and was posted within 3 months.
Anecdote time.
I worked double days at a day only flying station. earlies started 1 hr before ATC which in turn started 1 hr before flying. Normally then 6am, but we finished at 12am a short day...which compensated us for the following... Afters started at 12 until cease flying which could be 8 in the summer, additionally the afters shift covered out of hours stuff and the following weekends display work.
Days did 8-5.
On change of boss, the decision was made that we (shift workers) weren't working enough basic hours compared to days, so mornings were extended till 3pm and afters finished at 8pm even during no flying periods or later as flying dictated. Given that the out of hours stuff was watch keeping, but the staff using the equipment had gone home, there was actually no work to do..
I don't mind working, but I don't like being shafted simply because somebody further up the food chain cant equate fair and reasonable. Whacked in my environmental and was posted within 3 months.
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There are lies, damn lies, and statistics
Personnel ‘at sea’ or on ‘overseas operations’ typically work longer hours than their UK based colleagues. The Survey of Continuous Working Patterns showed the Royal Navy averaged 57.9 hours per week when at sea, while the Army and RAF averaged 72.8 hours and 67.4 hours respectively when on overseas operations. These figures are all over an hour less than those for 2010–11.
Do Navy personnel count as on operations when they set sail out of port? Or os it when they come within territorial waters or something?
As for the hours worked.....I'm not sure we'd like the pilots that ferry our troops or the those that drop ordnance near our guys on the ground being at work as long as those same troops, would we?
This is a really stupid, ignorant thread.
As for the hours worked.....I'm not sure we'd like the pilots that ferry our troops or the those that drop ordnance near our guys on the ground being at work as long as those same troops, would we?
This is a really stupid, ignorant thread.
So hanging around outside the harbour counts?
Oh, I am soooo surprised.
No wonder this thread was started by someone 'navy' and 'somerset'......no agenda there then.
Oh, I am soooo surprised.
No wonder this thread was started by someone 'navy' and 'somerset'......no agenda there then.
If this is all too simplistic, then being totally transparent and Joint in this current fiscal environment what is the method of measuring Operational Capability, Efficiency, and Value for Money?
Of course when they detect and deter intruders who intend to destroy half a dozen aircraft, whirly birds, radar on a destroyer or 20 battle tanks by sugar in the tank, radio equipment etc etc they worth every penny.
If you wish to measure value for money then Nuclear deterrent is a waste of money as has not been used and has been replaced a number of times so it has zero productivity and not delivered (pun intended) anything and long may that continue.
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Hi Climbear
Clearly the AFPRB must have failed to take into account the Submarine service who mostly work a minimum 84hrs per week at sea before action stations or emergency stations are taken into account and I recall being subjected to a time and motion study during a docking period circa 1995 (harmony time) of 64hrs average over a 42day maintenance cycle.
Whole heartedly agree with your closing statement
, obviously even within a single service different subsets 
have differing practices.
Deepsixteen
Quote:
There are lies, damn lies, and statistics
Perhaps when measuring productivity, the number of days deployed could be assessed against how hard each Service apparently works when deployed as shown in the latest AFPRB Report.
Quote:
Personnel ‘at sea’ or on ‘overseas operations’ typically work longer hours than their UK based colleagues. The Survey of Continuous Working Patterns showed the Royal Navy averaged 57.9 hours per week when at sea, while the Army and RAF averaged 72.8 hours and 67.4 hours respectively when on overseas operations. These figures are all over an hour less than those for 2010–11.
Then again, perhaps we should just stop sniping, accept that different environments have different practices (not wrong just different), and stand together against the common foe (HM Treasury).
There are lies, damn lies, and statistics
Perhaps when measuring productivity, the number of days deployed could be assessed against how hard each Service apparently works when deployed as shown in the latest AFPRB Report.
Quote:
Personnel ‘at sea’ or on ‘overseas operations’ typically work longer hours than their UK based colleagues. The Survey of Continuous Working Patterns showed the Royal Navy averaged 57.9 hours per week when at sea, while the Army and RAF averaged 72.8 hours and 67.4 hours respectively when on overseas operations. These figures are all over an hour less than those for 2010–11.
Then again, perhaps we should just stop sniping, accept that different environments have different practices (not wrong just different), and stand together against the common foe (HM Treasury).
Whole heartedly agree with your closing statement
, obviously even within a single service different subsets have differing practices.Deepsixteen
