ABC (Australia) '4 Corners' programme 18 Feb - F35 expose
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Would this be the same F-16 that was full of problems and a push to cancel?
http://archive.gao.gov/f0902c/105793.pdf
UNCERTAINTIES IN F-16 PROGRAM
In reviewing the F-16 program, GAO identified a number of uncertainties. The following are the most important, but there are others.
-- Critical development and operational flight testing remains.
-- Issues of the F-16's ability to survive and remlain invulnerable in battle remain unresolved. Proposals to incorportate modifications to increase the F-16's survivability remain undecided.
--The rate of loss for the F-16 due to engine malfunction is currently estimated by the Air Force to be three times higher than that called for by Air Force specifications.
http://archive.gao.gov/f0902c/105793.pdf
UNCERTAINTIES IN F-16 PROGRAM
In reviewing the F-16 program, GAO identified a number of uncertainties. The following are the most important, but there are others.
-- Critical development and operational flight testing remains.
-- Issues of the F-16's ability to survive and remlain invulnerable in battle remain unresolved. Proposals to incorportate modifications to increase the F-16's survivability remain undecided.
--The rate of loss for the F-16 due to engine malfunction is currently estimated by the Air Force to be three times higher than that called for by Air Force specifications.
Last edited by JSFfan; 21st Feb 2013 at 12:22.
Mk 1 - It bears on the appropriateness of making such comments as yours about those who have had such an impact.
Also, it's overkill in the extreme to argue that the F-16A was radically different from the YF-16. 20 square feet of wing area and a few inches on the antenna size do not equal a redesign.
Whatever you think of Sprey's views now, trying to dismiss his role in the F-16 in hindsight is a losing proposition.
Also, it's overkill in the extreme to argue that the F-16A was radically different from the YF-16. 20 square feet of wing area and a few inches on the antenna size do not equal a redesign.
Whatever you think of Sprey's views now, trying to dismiss his role in the F-16 in hindsight is a losing proposition.
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Interesting to hear that the brookings institute has suggested 'modest' savings of $200 billion over a decade today...the end result was a halving of the US F35 order. It's not unreasonable to expect deeper defense cuts, like obama's suggestion of $300 billion. Will be interesting to see if this is a possible beginning of the fabled 'death spiral', not because of its capabilities, but because of finances...
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I'm sure if you read through the other think tanks, you'll still find ones that think it should be cancelled in its entirety.
But in any case, it's still very bad news for a programme that's verging on unaffordability for a large number of its partner nations.
But in any case, it's still very bad news for a programme that's verging on unaffordability for a large number of its partner nations.
Last edited by Bastardeux; 21st Feb 2013 at 16:38.
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Would these be the same doom and gloom think tanks that wanted the f-16 cancelled because of the problems?
It seems it was put into production of 650 units with a 'we'll fix it later' attachment.
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense require acomplete program review before making any commitments for USAF F-16 purchases beyond the first 650 aircraft.
This review should include an updated military, need assessment and comparison of F-16 performance under realistic operational conditions.
The multinational F-16 single-engine fighter aircraft has been approved for full production; the first-production F-16 is scheduled fordelivery in August 1978.
A number of uncertainties about the F-16 remain:
critical development and operational flight Testing remains,issues of the F-16s ability to survive and remain invulnerable in battle remain unresolved, the F-100 enqine problems are serious because it has only one engine,and the rate of loss due to engine malfunction is currently estimated t o be three times higher than called for by Air Force Specifications. The basic delivery schedule requirements have caused some degree of concurrency between full-scale development, production, and deployment end, this has created an element of risk for the production program that could complicate correction of subsystem design problems
It seems it was put into production of 650 units with a 'we'll fix it later' attachment.
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense require acomplete program review before making any commitments for USAF F-16 purchases beyond the first 650 aircraft.
This review should include an updated military, need assessment and comparison of F-16 performance under realistic operational conditions.
The multinational F-16 single-engine fighter aircraft has been approved for full production; the first-production F-16 is scheduled fordelivery in August 1978.
A number of uncertainties about the F-16 remain:
critical development and operational flight Testing remains,issues of the F-16s ability to survive and remain invulnerable in battle remain unresolved, the F-100 enqine problems are serious because it has only one engine,and the rate of loss due to engine malfunction is currently estimated t o be three times higher than called for by Air Force Specifications. The basic delivery schedule requirements have caused some degree of concurrency between full-scale development, production, and deployment end, this has created an element of risk for the production program that could complicate correction of subsystem design problems
Last edited by JSFfan; 21st Feb 2013 at 17:30.
JSFfan. You're clutching at straws, Mate. You're sounding like a politico trying to "big-up" any scrap of good news, even every piece of news that is just neutral. The F-16 programme (and many others in those times) went on in a very different economic climate AND during the Cold War when defence spending had a much higher profile. It was also far less expensive "in real terms" and, being MUCH less complicated, far easier to make work properly. It also had significant growth potential.
As we now know, it also did its job very well. Oh, and the F100 engine turned out to be a real winner in its day. I flew some 500 hours of F100 without a single hiccough - despite my best endeavours.
Gosh. That completely exonerates you. Everything you've been telling us is clearly true.
And that, as I've told you before, is exactly what JSF needs to see if it still meets our requiremtns since the available g has been reduced and the accel time increased.
As we now know, it also did its job very well. Oh, and the F100 engine turned out to be a real winner in its day. I flew some 500 hours of F100 without a single hiccough - despite my best endeavours.
Good to see them coming around. A couple of years ago it was a total failure and should be cancelled, now it's just cut back a bit.Well done think tank.
Originally Posted by JSFfan
This review should include an updated military, need assessment and comparison of F-16 performance under realistic operational conditions.
Last edited by Courtney Mil; 21st Feb 2013 at 17:39.
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Would these be the same doom and gloom think tanks that wanted the f-16 cancelled because of the problems?
It seems it was put into production of 650 units with a 'we'll fix it later' attachment.
It seems it was put into production of 650 units with a 'we'll fix it later' attachment.
And cutting your aircraft numbers in half, particularly on the scale the Americans' initially planned on purchasing, constitutes much more than "cut back a bit"
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got a link to where the total buy has been cut in half of initial plan, or is this like your USN statement?
or do you mean it's a think tank idea and counts for nothing?
or do you mean it's a think tank idea and counts for nothing?
Last edited by JSFfan; 21st Feb 2013 at 17:57.
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Well seeing as it's not official policy, no. Just like you would never have found a link explaining that the RAF actually planned to only buy 180 Typhoons for years and years, but officially was going to buy 230.
Furthermore, I never said it had been cut, I simply stated a think tank's predictions in comparatively modest budget cut scenario.
The US needs to make cuts in its federal budget. Which is a fact. The defense budget makes up half of US federal discretionary spending. Which is fact. All but a very small minority of congressmen are accepting that defense cuts will be part of a budget deal. Which is fact. The F35 is the biggest single expense on the DoD's books, again, a fact. If you think the F35 is magically going to be completely immune, you are very, very naive.
Furthermore, I never said it had been cut, I simply stated a think tank's predictions in comparatively modest budget cut scenario.
The US needs to make cuts in its federal budget. Which is a fact. The defense budget makes up half of US federal discretionary spending. Which is fact. All but a very small minority of congressmen are accepting that defense cuts will be part of a budget deal. Which is fact. The F35 is the biggest single expense on the DoD's books, again, a fact. If you think the F35 is magically going to be completely immune, you are very, very naive.
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And that, as I've told you before, is exactly what JSF needs to see if it still meets our requiremtns since the available g has been reduced and the accel time increased.
Not sure what JSFfan is talking about since he's on my filter, but in fact I know of no DC think tank (at least to the right of POGO) that called for the pruning (let alone felling) of the project before 2010 at the earliest.
Originally Posted by cuefay
Not a representative sample
During my three years flying the F-15, at Tyndall, I was not aware of a single engine failure in any of the three squadrons flying there. No, I don't know how many hours that was, but flying four waves a day, plus deployed flying and a lot of aircraft, I would imagine that would constitute a representitive sample.Just This Once. Good point, well made. In fact, come to think of it, double the above mentioned sample size.
Last edited by Courtney Mil; 21st Feb 2013 at 20:13.
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It's been a while since I read the Boyd book, so if I've got this wrong, I'm sure someone will quickly correct me, but as I recall it, Boyd led a small group of young civilian performance engineers - including Sprey, who fought tooth and nail against the USAF hierarchy of the day to: -
(a) keep the F16 (the USAF top brass and the manufacturers wanted very long range, multi-purpose platforms like the F111 and a much heavier F15 than the F15 turned out to be [thanks in no small part to Boyd and his team]) and
(b) keep the F16 small and agile so it could be primarily what Boyd saw it needed to be - an air superiority fighter that could defeat anything in the Soviet inventory. He didn't quite succeed in this, and the F16 ended up a bit heavier than the model he pushed for.
If I recall correctly, the USAF brass were never even mildly enthusiastic about the F16 and would have been quite happy to see it shelved at any stage of its development in favour of the big and heavy 'fighters' that they and the manufacturers wanted. It was only when Boyd presented his slide show around Washington clearly demonstrating that every aircraft in the US inventory (even the F4) was inferior to the Russian aircraft of the day that he began to gain some traction. (But not without continued resistance to the end. He later faced a court-martial for 'stealing' a million dollars of computer time to come up with this presentation.)
This slide show effectively killed the F111 as a first line fighter bomber when Boyd showed it to be grossly inferior to the Russian fighters in every parameter measured. (Incidentally, a couple of F105 pilots thanked Boyd after surviving encounters with Mig19s and MiG21s using his model that showed a Thud pilot the options to use that would best serve them against a superior aircraft.)
The A10 featured heavily at this same time. The USAF brass really didn't want it, and went to extraordinary lengths to kill the project. It survived, thanks only to politics and what amounted to sleight of hand, but was relegated to ANG units almost immediately, and until the Iraq war(s), it was seen as a dead end aircraft unworthy of the 'real' USAF.
Anyone who thinks he knows anything about the way the Pentagon (and Canberra?) works would do well to read the Boyd book and see just how corrupt the system was (and, I suspect, still is).
(Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, by Robert Coram.)
(a) keep the F16 (the USAF top brass and the manufacturers wanted very long range, multi-purpose platforms like the F111 and a much heavier F15 than the F15 turned out to be [thanks in no small part to Boyd and his team]) and
(b) keep the F16 small and agile so it could be primarily what Boyd saw it needed to be - an air superiority fighter that could defeat anything in the Soviet inventory. He didn't quite succeed in this, and the F16 ended up a bit heavier than the model he pushed for.
If I recall correctly, the USAF brass were never even mildly enthusiastic about the F16 and would have been quite happy to see it shelved at any stage of its development in favour of the big and heavy 'fighters' that they and the manufacturers wanted. It was only when Boyd presented his slide show around Washington clearly demonstrating that every aircraft in the US inventory (even the F4) was inferior to the Russian aircraft of the day that he began to gain some traction. (But not without continued resistance to the end. He later faced a court-martial for 'stealing' a million dollars of computer time to come up with this presentation.)
This slide show effectively killed the F111 as a first line fighter bomber when Boyd showed it to be grossly inferior to the Russian fighters in every parameter measured. (Incidentally, a couple of F105 pilots thanked Boyd after surviving encounters with Mig19s and MiG21s using his model that showed a Thud pilot the options to use that would best serve them against a superior aircraft.)
The A10 featured heavily at this same time. The USAF brass really didn't want it, and went to extraordinary lengths to kill the project. It survived, thanks only to politics and what amounted to sleight of hand, but was relegated to ANG units almost immediately, and until the Iraq war(s), it was seen as a dead end aircraft unworthy of the 'real' USAF.
Anyone who thinks he knows anything about the way the Pentagon (and Canberra?) works would do well to read the Boyd book and see just how corrupt the system was (and, I suspect, still is).
(Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, by Robert Coram.)
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The ugly duckling proved its self a swan and has been the back bone of many western air forces. Those looking through the prision of their past experience at the time, couldn't see the future.