RAF Rivet Joint
R280
I was very careful just to state facts, as I know nothing of the 135 variants. I wanted to point out the flawed argument used by MoD over many years, especially very recently on Nimrod, was being repeated. I wouldn't like to see other history repeating itself. I'd like to think the MAA will ensure it isn't, but given their proven inability to learn lessons, and lack of original thinking, one can never be sure.
PS By my reckoning, the MRA4 genesis period was well over 20 years! The tendering was under way in 1993, so there would have been substantial effort well before that. I attended a Design Review for the radar upgrade on the day Maggie left #10!
I was very careful just to state facts, as I know nothing of the 135 variants. I wanted to point out the flawed argument used by MoD over many years, especially very recently on Nimrod, was being repeated. I wouldn't like to see other history repeating itself. I'd like to think the MAA will ensure it isn't, but given their proven inability to learn lessons, and lack of original thinking, one can never be sure.
PS By my reckoning, the MRA4 genesis period was well over 20 years! The tendering was under way in 1993, so there would have been substantial effort well before that. I attended a Design Review for the radar upgrade on the day Maggie left #10!
Last edited by tucumseh; 17th May 2013 at 17:02.
NoVANav:-
That would be as determined by the Air Accident Investigation Authority, which is the same as the Airworthiness Authority, which is the same as the Owner/Operator? Yeah, right...
All of the accidents to any model have been from pilot error, not the airframe.
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I think the RAF Rivet Joint will get some sort of RTS when it is delivered by the USAF. HOWEVER, I think it will be because the embarrassment of not clearing it for RAF use will out weigh the risk. I hope the Duty Holders stand in front of the new aircraft and crews and have their picture taken so we all know who made the decision.
I think the RAF Rivet Joint will get some sort of RTS
Last edited by Chugalug2; 18th May 2013 at 15:11.
NoVanNav said "...can really be considered new airframes..."
ermmm....NO!
I don't know how many times you've bought a 50,000-mile car and considered it "new", but I've never.
These are OLD airframes that have been repaired and reworked - not rebuilt and renovated - and also heavily modified from their original design structural and electrical loadings and other parameters. Technically they may not be much safer, structurally, from many over-modified ex-Nimrods.
The very best of designers can cock things up - look at any new aircraft design you like to see my point. The only difference here is that we hope that someone will sign something to state that they are fit for purpose and possibly airworthy too. And possibly the MAA may wait til after the designers say so?
Rant off.
Added bit:
"It is unlike anything that is done in the commercial aviation community. "
Ever wondered why?
ermmm....NO!
I don't know how many times you've bought a 50,000-mile car and considered it "new", but I've never.
These are OLD airframes that have been repaired and reworked - not rebuilt and renovated - and also heavily modified from their original design structural and electrical loadings and other parameters. Technically they may not be much safer, structurally, from many over-modified ex-Nimrods.
The very best of designers can cock things up - look at any new aircraft design you like to see my point. The only difference here is that we hope that someone will sign something to state that they are fit for purpose and possibly airworthy too. And possibly the MAA may wait til after the designers say so?
Rant off.
Added bit:
"It is unlike anything that is done in the commercial aviation community. "
Ever wondered why?
Last edited by Rigga; 18th May 2013 at 21:19.
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RC-135 Accidents
Since most posters do not know the airframe history I will assume cannot comment on my comments are only general in nature and not specifically directed at the RC-135 jets.
There have been no RC-135 accidents that were not attributable to anything other than pilot error, with one exception. The RC-135E, Rivet Amber, disappeared in a flight between Shemya and Eielson AFBs without a cause every being identified. This was a one-off specially modified program, lost many years ago, and no relation to today's Rivet Joints.
RC airframes are not only re-worked but, in many areas, are new over the years. All -135 wing skins were replaced in the '80s-'90s; the engine pylons were replaced when the F108s were hung, along with landing gear upgrades. RC-135 fuselage skins are replaced where necessary and the addition of external antennas, cheeks, extended nose, internal equipment results in many components being replaced to accommodate the heavier equipment and airframe changes.
You cannot compare this mod to the Nimrod upgrade to the MRA4. From my sources at RAF and the company the MRA4 conversion was costing a huge amount of money as each airframe upgrade was actually an individual custom-fitted kit, as the original airframes were not to a standard build. The Airseeker original airframes were near the last of 820 -135s built and are pretty standardized. There are now 20 conversions to Rivet Joint standard and others to the various RC-135S, U, and X models. Quite a bit more experience than four attempted MRA4s.
I'm am not familiar with the official certification hoops within MoD but the contracts would not have been signed if there were a problem.
And, back to the original question: there is still no correlation between the latest KC-135R accident in the AOR and the airworthiness of the RC-135.
There have been no RC-135 accidents that were not attributable to anything other than pilot error, with one exception. The RC-135E, Rivet Amber, disappeared in a flight between Shemya and Eielson AFBs without a cause every being identified. This was a one-off specially modified program, lost many years ago, and no relation to today's Rivet Joints.
RC airframes are not only re-worked but, in many areas, are new over the years. All -135 wing skins were replaced in the '80s-'90s; the engine pylons were replaced when the F108s were hung, along with landing gear upgrades. RC-135 fuselage skins are replaced where necessary and the addition of external antennas, cheeks, extended nose, internal equipment results in many components being replaced to accommodate the heavier equipment and airframe changes.
You cannot compare this mod to the Nimrod upgrade to the MRA4. From my sources at RAF and the company the MRA4 conversion was costing a huge amount of money as each airframe upgrade was actually an individual custom-fitted kit, as the original airframes were not to a standard build. The Airseeker original airframes were near the last of 820 -135s built and are pretty standardized. There are now 20 conversions to Rivet Joint standard and others to the various RC-135S, U, and X models. Quite a bit more experience than four attempted MRA4s.
I'm am not familiar with the official certification hoops within MoD but the contracts would not have been signed if there were a problem.
And, back to the original question: there is still no correlation between the latest KC-135R accident in the AOR and the airworthiness of the RC-135.
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You're assuming the ground is wet because of rain but considering the age of the airframe it could be a fuel leak. 
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NoVANav,
Your statement,
I'm am not familiar with the official certification hoops within MoD but the contracts would not have been signed if there were a problem.
Unfortunately, contracts are signed by the MoD, when significant issues have not been resolved. The lack of information, resistances to share information and legal constraints can make RTS extremely difficult.
There have been many near misses with the RJ over the years from which the USAF has learnt valuable lessons. Will we benefit from these lessons or have to relearn them?
Your statement,
I'm am not familiar with the official certification hoops within MoD but the contracts would not have been signed if there were a problem.
Unfortunately, contracts are signed by the MoD, when significant issues have not been resolved. The lack of information, resistances to share information and legal constraints can make RTS extremely difficult.
There have been many near misses with the RJ over the years from which the USAF has learnt valuable lessons. Will we benefit from these lessons or have to relearn them?
I'm am not familiar with the official certification hoops within MoD but the contracts would not have been signed if there were a problem.
Examples familiar to most here:
Nimrod AEW
Nimrod 2000/RMPA/MRA4 (in fact, any Nimrod contract!)
Chinook HC Mk2
Chinook HC Mk3 (in fact, any Chinook contract!)
and so on, and on.....
In each case, an upgrade contract was signed knowing the aircraft to be upgraded was not airworthy. It follows that delays were inevitable, and predicted, because without that stable baseline any programme is built on sand.
I'm not claiming the 135s satisfy this MoD policy
but I have no confidence whatsoever that anyone in the MoD has had the balls to ignore this policy, which the MAA has consistently stated itself to be content with. Conversely, successful MoD aircraft and equipment upgrade programmes share one common denominator - the Build Standard, Safety Case and Airworthiness certification have been stabilised and verified, as the #1 Risk Reduction activity.
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for the record:-
Rivet Amber was a special, somewhat experimental and very costly ($35 million in 1960's dollars) RC-135E, highly modified with a large section of the metal fuselage having been replaced with fiberglass to house a large, state-of-the-art and very unique phased array airborne radar built by Hughes Aircraft that was capable of transmitting seven megawatts
Rivet Amber was a special, somewhat experimental and very costly ($35 million in 1960's dollars) RC-135E, highly modified with a large section of the metal fuselage having been replaced with fiberglass to house a large, state-of-the-art and very unique phased array airborne radar built by Hughes Aircraft that was capable of transmitting seven megawatts
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NoVANav:-
Well so you keep saying, but attributed by who? You? The USAF? Boeing? With all due respect none of those are proven impartial accident investigators. Indeed they seem to have as much partiality as the RAF and the MOD, who have a track record of finding by default the first people on the scene of an accident to be responsible for it. Pilot error saves a whole lot of trouble; to aircraft manufacturers, operators, and in particular to airworthiness authorities. Given the present military aircraft arrangements I wouldn't buy a used car, let alone an aircraft, from any of them on either side of the pond.
The most impartial review of 135 accidents easily available is Wikki (and doesn't that say a whole lot about where we're at?) With engine and tail separations alone a noted feature, you seem to demand a lot of your pilots and little of their superiors.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation It Kills!
There have been no RC-135 accidents that were not attributable to anything other than pilot error
The most impartial review of 135 accidents easily available is Wikki (and doesn't that say a whole lot about where we're at?) With engine and tail separations alone a noted feature, you seem to demand a lot of your pilots and little of their superiors.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation It Kills!
Last edited by Chugalug2; 19th May 2013 at 10:08.
Designing airframes, engines, avionic and electrical circuitry and their subsequent modifications is one of the worlds best guessing games based mainly on lessons learned from previous accidents and incidents where resulting investigations could reliably form positive root causes.
The mere fact that these particular frames have undergone bridging checks in order to transfer ownership as well as (properly approved) heavy modifications does not make them perfect. They can only be considered less imperfect than they were before the Mods / Checks.
The fact that the 707/135 series has (as stated on this thread) undergone so many severe structural changes during their normal development life is..."a concern" to me.
But then, what do I know? I won't be flying in them or responsible for them in any way. I have enough other "used" aircraft to care about.
The mere fact that these particular frames have undergone bridging checks in order to transfer ownership as well as (properly approved) heavy modifications does not make them perfect. They can only be considered less imperfect than they were before the Mods / Checks.
The fact that the 707/135 series has (as stated on this thread) undergone so many severe structural changes during their normal development life is..."a concern" to me.
But then, what do I know? I won't be flying in them or responsible for them in any way. I have enough other "used" aircraft to care about.
Last edited by Rigga; 19th May 2013 at 19:56.
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however many committees and studies we have you can't guarantee safety
You have to take a balanced view - is the additional capability worth the risk?
You get different answers in war-time - just remember how fast various systems were designed & issued in the Falklands War, and Gulf War 1 & 2
You have to take a balanced view - is the additional capability worth the risk?
You get different answers in war-time - just remember how fast various systems were designed & issued in the Falklands War, and Gulf War 1 & 2
HH, it isn't per se the additional capacity that brings risk, it is whoever assesses that risk. If they be objective professionals, free of all pressure to bend to the will of others, whether manufacturers or operators, then that risk can be reduced to a minimum. If they be one and the same as the operator, who also investigates its own accidents and risk assessments, then it can't.
Unless and until the regulatory and investigation authorities are separate from, and independent of, the operators (as they are in civil aviation) risks will be unnecessarily high, leading to more and more avoidable accidents and fatalities.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation it Kills!
Unless and until the regulatory and investigation authorities are separate from, and independent of, the operators (as they are in civil aviation) risks will be unnecessarily high, leading to more and more avoidable accidents and fatalities.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation it Kills!
What concerns me is the number of BoI reports that present causal factors as revelations, despite them having been identified early on, formally notified and staff instructed to ignore the risk when there was an opportunity to mitigate it long before the aircraft entered service. Nimrod, Hercules XV179, Tornado ZG710, Sea King ASaCs are some of the well known ones.
If permitted to get on with the job and implement regulations, risks are generally reduced to ALARP. The prevailing ethos I describe is what must change.
Yes, some UORs are delivered quicker but the safety obligation is not allowed to be ignored. It is the foreshortening of the approvals process that makes it seem quicker. If a Project Manager ignores instructions from above and simply follows the mandated regulations, he is just as likely to meet the UOR timescales we see.
And senior staffs don't like the concept of "standing risks" but the sensible PM knows what they are. Typically, Build Standards, and hence Safety Cases, will not have been maintained (for example, all the above cases). Some because it has never been contracted in the first place; others (e.g. ASaC) where it was contracted but then cancelled by a non-engineer who deemed it unnecessary. It is the very first question a PM asks of the Design Authority. His answer determines your workload and risk mitigation for the entire Concept, Assessment and Development Phases; and to a great extent helps establish an accurate cost. The problem is MoD has too few who know how to do this, even if they were allowed to, which is why so many projects are "over budget" but do not exceed a fair and reasonable cost.
If permitted to get on with the job and implement regulations, risks are generally reduced to ALARP. The prevailing ethos I describe is what must change.
Yes, some UORs are delivered quicker but the safety obligation is not allowed to be ignored. It is the foreshortening of the approvals process that makes it seem quicker. If a Project Manager ignores instructions from above and simply follows the mandated regulations, he is just as likely to meet the UOR timescales we see.
And senior staffs don't like the concept of "standing risks" but the sensible PM knows what they are. Typically, Build Standards, and hence Safety Cases, will not have been maintained (for example, all the above cases). Some because it has never been contracted in the first place; others (e.g. ASaC) where it was contracted but then cancelled by a non-engineer who deemed it unnecessary. It is the very first question a PM asks of the Design Authority. His answer determines your workload and risk mitigation for the entire Concept, Assessment and Development Phases; and to a great extent helps establish an accurate cost. The problem is MoD has too few who know how to do this, even if they were allowed to, which is why so many projects are "over budget" but do not exceed a fair and reasonable cost.
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Why RJ is Not Commercial Maintained?
Your comment shows a misunderstanding of commercial vs. military use. Commercial aircraft are used at high intensity levels with, usually, a multiple flight cycles each day. Maintenance is a profit costing item and only those required inspections are accomplished.
Commercial aircraft do not undergo major upgrades every few years where most of the interior is removed, equipment and structure inspected and upgraded.
RJs are on a modification cycle that requires upgrades to current Block standards. This is a continuing cycle and the entire RJ fleet is NEVER the same Block version. For example, RAF RJs will be Block 11, I believe. USAF RJs delivered last year were Block 10s. Those in 2014 will probably be Block 14s.
This is NOT a commercial-type program.
If everyone is so concerned with using the -135 airframe, I am sure L-3 would modify any new, comparable airframe to a SIGINT platform. Of course, 40 years of working RFI and other mission-related issues would need to be worked from scratch. How many other RAF units, of the diminished number remaining, is MoD willing to cut to pay the enormous bill this would require.
One question I have with modern aircraft, especially those designed only for airliners, is how robust the basic structure is when you cut and add all the different bits to make an RJ-like aircraft? The -135 was very overbuilt and has had many, many mods involving holes, cheeks, noses, antennas, blisters, probes and other things added and removed all over the airframe. Will the composite aircraft of the future be able to take all this needed work without a complete (costly) redesign?
Commercial aircraft do not undergo major upgrades every few years where most of the interior is removed, equipment and structure inspected and upgraded.
RJs are on a modification cycle that requires upgrades to current Block standards. This is a continuing cycle and the entire RJ fleet is NEVER the same Block version. For example, RAF RJs will be Block 11, I believe. USAF RJs delivered last year were Block 10s. Those in 2014 will probably be Block 14s.
This is NOT a commercial-type program.
If everyone is so concerned with using the -135 airframe, I am sure L-3 would modify any new, comparable airframe to a SIGINT platform. Of course, 40 years of working RFI and other mission-related issues would need to be worked from scratch. How many other RAF units, of the diminished number remaining, is MoD willing to cut to pay the enormous bill this would require.
One question I have with modern aircraft, especially those designed only for airliners, is how robust the basic structure is when you cut and add all the different bits to make an RJ-like aircraft? The -135 was very overbuilt and has had many, many mods involving holes, cheeks, noses, antennas, blisters, probes and other things added and removed all over the airframe. Will the composite aircraft of the future be able to take all this needed work without a complete (costly) redesign?
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Previous quote: "The most impartial review of 135 accidents easily available is Wikki (and doesn't that say a whole lot about where we're at?) With engine and tail separations alone a noted feature, you seem to demand a lot of your pilots and little of their superiors. Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation It Kills!'
I mentioned only RCs, where I am familiar with all accidents. Only the Rivet Amber could possibly be attributed to not implementing a required upgrade.
I know of no situation where the USAF does not take responsibility. The comment about "Self regulation" is confusing. Who would take responsibility for a military aviation incident? In the US NTSB is not involved in military accidents.
I mentioned only RCs, where I am familiar with all accidents. Only the Rivet Amber could possibly be attributed to not implementing a required upgrade.
I know of no situation where the USAF does not take responsibility. The comment about "Self regulation" is confusing. Who would take responsibility for a military aviation incident? In the US NTSB is not involved in military accidents.
Last edited by NoVANav; 20th May 2013 at 15:08. Reason: adding previous quote
NVN:-
The UK AAIB (Air Accident Investigation Board) is not responsible for investigating UK Military Air Accidents, but may be involved if invited. The MAAIB is the responsible body which, together with its stable-mate the MAA, is part of the MOD. Thus a similar set up exists in the UK and the USA, whereby Military Airworthiness Regulation and Air Accident Investigation are subsidiary functions of the owner/operators, ie the DOD/MOD and their dependent Services. That is why UK Military Airworthiness and Air Accident Investigation are both in a state of crisis.
You ask who would take responsibility for investigating Military Air Accidents. I would suggest that whoever it might be, they must be separate from, and independent of, the DOD/MOD and the Airworthiness Authority, which must be separate and independent also. Easy to say and very difficult to do, I admit, but the last 30 years has shown that the clash of interests that the present incestuous system allows for has cost much blood and treasure.
In short, in the UK the MAA and MAAIB must become separate and independent of the MOD and of each other. Only then can we expect Airworthiness Provision and Air Accident Investigation that can be relied upon. I would respectfully suggest that a similar course might benefit US Military Aviation Safety also.
Who would take responsibility for a military aviation incident? In the US NTSB is not involved in military accidents.
You ask who would take responsibility for investigating Military Air Accidents. I would suggest that whoever it might be, they must be separate from, and independent of, the DOD/MOD and the Airworthiness Authority, which must be separate and independent also. Easy to say and very difficult to do, I admit, but the last 30 years has shown that the clash of interests that the present incestuous system allows for has cost much blood and treasure.
In short, in the UK the MAA and MAAIB must become separate and independent of the MOD and of each other. Only then can we expect Airworthiness Provision and Air Accident Investigation that can be relied upon. I would respectfully suggest that a similar course might benefit US Military Aviation Safety also.
"Commercial aircraft do not undergo major upgrades every few years where most of the interior is removed, equipment and structure inspected and upgraded"
Yes, they do. Boeings commonly have C & D checks at which seating positions are often changed. This type of modification, as you should know, means Primary Structural changes to the whole airframe to protect the passengers new positions.
And because civil aircraft of the same type do so many different flight profiles the inspection severity and periodicity is adapted to suit each particular airframe and/or operation. This could mean that civil aero-maintenance companies would reduce the inspections of (as Nova Nav implies) low-use airframes because over-maintenance is also a waste of time and money. The military "norm" (from my past experience) is to continue with whatever (single) maintenance policy is published/available whatever the use of any airframe within any fleet - a really big mistake in my humble opinion.
Another major principle of PRACTICE states that, if you keep messing with structural loadings you will eventually weaken some part of it in a way you did not intend...
By the way; I have no doubt that all of the employees at Boeing, L3 and all those others trying to ensure the best outcome of these events are doing their utmost, honest and best work. I am just trying to put across the notion that even the best of intentions sometimes has unexpected outcomes and old aeroplanes are old aeroplanes whatever the work conducted on them.
Yes, they do. Boeings commonly have C & D checks at which seating positions are often changed. This type of modification, as you should know, means Primary Structural changes to the whole airframe to protect the passengers new positions.
And because civil aircraft of the same type do so many different flight profiles the inspection severity and periodicity is adapted to suit each particular airframe and/or operation. This could mean that civil aero-maintenance companies would reduce the inspections of (as Nova Nav implies) low-use airframes because over-maintenance is also a waste of time and money. The military "norm" (from my past experience) is to continue with whatever (single) maintenance policy is published/available whatever the use of any airframe within any fleet - a really big mistake in my humble opinion.
Another major principle of PRACTICE states that, if you keep messing with structural loadings you will eventually weaken some part of it in a way you did not intend...
By the way; I have no doubt that all of the employees at Boeing, L3 and all those others trying to ensure the best outcome of these events are doing their utmost, honest and best work. I am just trying to put across the notion that even the best of intentions sometimes has unexpected outcomes and old aeroplanes are old aeroplanes whatever the work conducted on them.