Astute - Slow, leaky, rusty

[Shannon volmet]

Astute - Slow, leaky, rusty
Apologies, not aviation related (except they are supposed to defend the new aircraft carriers), but of interest.

Grauniad: Slow, leaky, rusty: Britain's £10bn submarine beset by design flaws

Exclusive: Royal Navy's HMS Astute 'has a V8 engine with a Morris Minor gearbox'

Britain's nuclear hunter-killer submarines were doomed from the start

The flawed thinking and design behind the fleet at the heart of Britain's navy is now coming to the fore

Sorry, but found this on another forum, liked it so much I just had to share it!

S.V.

f******g MOD procurement.

If it was their turn to buy a round of drinks at the bar it'd be pot luck whether they returned with a round of trebble sambukas nobody wanted, came back empty handed demanding more money off everyone because they'd knocked several tables drinks over on the way, or got everyone chucked out because they'd been across to the offie and come back in with a crate of special brew on their shoulder, or simply disappeared with the cash only to show up again several days later proffering the dregs of a couple of cans with tab ends in them muttering something about cost over runs before putting several bottles of champagne on your tab.

[Wensleydale]

Think whichever country you're from that military projects always go over
budget, and never work as they were planned to.





Quote:




I might be wrong
but the French don't carry on like this
(IMHO)


Think the last aircraft carrier they built has spent more time in dock than
at sea.

To say nothing of the Maginot Line...

[orca]

You are of course correct old chap. All MoD procurement should be measured against the Maginot Line as a baseline to determine whether or not it provided value for money, on time.

[kbrockman]

The CDG did have indeed more than its fair share of problems between 2000 and 2007 but it has to be said that they did a wonderfull job in 2007 and 2008 refitting, refueling and repairing her.

I seem to recall that ever since it is by far the most intensively used carrier currently in use with state of the art Satrap stabilization system, comm systems and very effective high level of automation ,all of the new big French vessels are operated with less personnel than their US or UK counterparts (eg Mistral, their newHorizon class and in the future the Baracudda boats).

[JFZ90]

i should clarify that i'm not knocking french procurement - my first hand experience is they do somethings very well, others I think DE&S is actually better.

The point is you don't see the continual assault in the press in France like you do in the UK - if they are similar, what is the difference? Culture, IMO. The UK just love saying the MoD is sh*t - like engineering in general, it is treated with more respect in France.

I would support a scheme whereby those who love to criticise large procurement programmes from their armchairs - who don't have a fig about what risk or development means - are actually banned from access to modern technology. They may then think twice before they tell all what they 'reckon'

[hval]

tucumseh,

Good lord sir! Yes! I had totally forgotten BOWMAN. Probably since most the time it hides in stores unused and unwanted. What a heap of sh1t that is.

JFZ90,

Other countries errors do not excuse our extremely poor showing on programme management. It is totally inexcusable to waste so many billions; totally. I do not see the French, Japanese nor others cancelling projects after billions have been spent on them (USA excepted with Comanche).

I agree that there are a number of projects that do reach completion acceptably; there are others which reach completion only after the goalposts have been shifted to allow completion to be achieved, and those projects I have listed, plus many more, which do not achieve a successful completion.

[Heathrow Harry]

The USA has cancelled dozens of programs over the years

Skybolt
Navajo
B-70
A-12 Avenger
B-1

come to mind instantly

and god knows how many helicopter programmes

and then there are those which had very restricted numbers bought compared to the original plans

B-58
F-111
B-2
F-117
F-22

[hval]

Heathrow Harry,

You are correct. My poor writing. What I meant to type was e.g. Comanche.

This still does not excuse our cock ups.

[JFZ90]

I think the A-12 Avenger was nearly $2bn down the toilet and didn't even get near a prototype.

Cancelled in the early nineties they are still arguing about getting some money back....

The MBT-70 and Crusader also also notable, as are the Cheyenne and Commanche - these would be regarded as cock ups & mismanagement if done in the UK.

I have a feeling that hval will only see bad in UK with no mitigation; this kind of proves my point that UK procurement gets knocked irrespective of the facts.

The well known NAO example of QEII being delayed and costing more has nothing to do with poor programme management - seemingly a request was made to save short term money and the outcome was increased cost and delay. Such a decision was made in the full knowledge of the impacts - it should not be implied otherwise - hence programme change control (hence pm) was operating correctly. You can question who approved such a decision & why (lack of money trumps all other considerations), but it won't have been in DE&S. The same principle applies to MRA4 cancellation - its suits some to imply it was technically a total goat, but in reality the decision was driven to save future support money. DE&S can't deliver programmes if the money is withdrawn.

Avenger was heading towards being a $60bn programme, and really out of technical / reqt control on a totally different scale to anything in the uk. Its EVM system did spot the issue and precipitate its cancellation however.

Bottom line is, if you benchmark uk vs others - it is no where near as bad as it is perceived and portrayed, though I'd agree that recent financial cuts have had a big & very visible impact on the equipment programme.

That said, the UK maybe about to embark upon the biggest procurement cock-up in history, ironically with the intention of doing the opposite. What do you think will happen (and how) when you try and make changes to project funding/reqts with the DE&S GOCO!? Who will control that & how (effectively?).

[hval]

JFZ90,

I have a feeling that hval will only see bad in UK with no mitigation

Not at all, not at all. This discussion has been UK centric, as were your comments re UK project failures. I was keeping my comments focussed on the UK as we were discussing the UK. I see all project failures, on such a large scale, as being unacceptable, irrespective of nation.

My basic comment should be "No nation can afford procurement mistakes. The mistakes always come at the cost of a loss in defence of the nation".

As for political interference I consider that as potentially being part of any project, and definitely part of all large, expensive projects.

[hval]

I believe the loss of Crusader for the USA to be a dreadful mistake. Here is a link to a report on the cancellation of Crusader written in 2003.

The Cancellation of Crusader: A Study in the Dynamics of Decision-Making

Part of the conclusion says: -

Post 9-11 finds the Army at a crossroad of changing and new times. The old ways of doing business no longer applies. Things are moving quickly and transformation is occurring not only in the way we expect to fight but also in how we are doing business in DoD. The lesson from the Crusader cancellation debacle is that the Army needs to revisit its justification for the entire family of “new programs” and seriously question the utility of future FCS (Future Combat Systems). Those programs at risk may need to be re- validated lest the shifting sands of the new geo-strategic era bring them down as they did Crusader.

In retrospect, regardless of how clumsily the decision was made, Secretary Rumsfeld was completely within his authority to deviate from the systems his subordinates were using to arrive at decisions and to do so at the slightest whim. It was for Congress to discipline him and the Bush administration, should it have appeared to them that Secretary Rumsfeld was wrong in his decision. That Congress chose to abide by the decision removes from the overall debate any criticism on how the decision was arrived at.

It will be interesting to observe the DoD decision-making process in the coming months and years to see if these process continues on its present course or a more congenial tone will emerge on the Hill and within the DoD infrastructure.

Look what happened to FCS - The DoD released a memorandum on 23 June 2009 that cancelled the Future Combat Systems program and replaced it with separate programmes.

[dervish]

I would support a scheme whereby those who love to criticise large procurement programmes from their armchairs - who don't have a fig about what risk or development means - are actually banned from access to modern technology. They may then think twice before they tell all what they 'reckon'

Precisely. There's a lot of ill informed comment about procurement here but I doubt if 5% of posters have the faintest idea how it works. I wish MoD would publish a project diary. The Nimrod MRA4 one would be sensational.

[SASless]

Sometimes one wonders if those doing the procurement know anything about the process as well!

It ain't like the MOD have exactly excelled over the past many years.

[tucumseh]

Sometimes one wonders if those doing the procurement know anything about the process as well!

One of the points I often make is that very many DE&S staffs don't actually serve at the 5 grades below the DE&S project manager basic grade; so cannot possibly know very much at all about the process, or the practical application of the procedures. In simple terms, if you haven't served in the lower grades, you can't recognise the mistakes for what they are - primarily those in Materiel and Financial Provisioning, which is something you should learn before being promoted into DE&S. Therefore, it could be reasonably said that it is not MoD policy to have knowledgeable project managers, and those who are are an increasingly rare breed.

It ain't like the MOD have exactly excelled over the past many years.

But I also make a point of noting very many projects are delivered to time, cost and performance. The problem is that senior staffs in MoD regard those who do this as trouble makers, as it raises the bar for the rest. Such staffs are "encouraged" to move on to jobs where they require a long, steep learning curve, so allowing their old department to dumb down to it's natural level. A great advocate of this management strategy was, for example, the Nimrod MRA4 2 Star.

I wish MoD would publish a project diary.

What an excellent idea! But you'd have to be careful that MoD produced the original diary (or closely related Risk Register) because some years ago various senior staffs, including the above 2 Star, ruled it acceptable that 2nd and even 3rd sanitised versions be created which did not record risks or events that were in any way embarrassing. These were the versions that would be produced to justify claims that "events" didn't happen.

On one programme of mine I discovered this when a 3 Star General came visiting and asked if I had recorded airworthiness/safety as a risk. I said "Yes", but up piped a consultant employed by my boss who, at the same time, said "No". We all looked puzzled until the consultant declared he'd been employed to create a 2nd Risk Register, but omitting certain risks (as the boss had decided to save money by cancelling airworthiness contracts). This was not conveyed to a later BoI, when it criticised (using different words) the mismanagement of those risks. The risks HAD been identified and managed properly, but then that work was cancelled. One Risk Register recorded all these events; two others didn't.

THAT is practical project (mis)management in action. The rules and procedures were perfectly fine, and 99% of staff implemented them well. The culture that allowed the 1% to prevail, and then be protected, is what was wrong.

[Burnt Fishtrousers]

So I guess the MOD compromise will be to fit Morris Minor gearboxes to our carrier fleet (that have no aircraft) so their submarine escorts can keep up -

Presumably those at the MOD will be wise enough to make sure that when they have sorted the Astute class speed issue, they will make sure the torpedos used are fast enough not to be caught up by the vessel that fired them in the first place?

Monty Python couldnt do it better

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

Whilst it's a popular jolly jape to take the p**s out of Director Ships, who considers the INVINCIBLE Class Carriers/Through Deck Cruisers a procurement disaster? I recall very well the significant gearbox failures suffered by INVINCIBLE before she saved our bacon (or mutton) down South. Indeed, ILLUSTRIOUS suffered a spectacular gearbox failure as late as '86.

First of Class usually have problems. It's usually called the road to progress, without which we'd still be building CHURCHILL Class boats. That said, much of what tucumseh has written may well have migrated sideways.

[t43562]

Possibly relevant in the sense that one might view industrial, engineering and scientific preparedness for war as being as necessary as the purely military:
Britain's aerospace capability needs safeguarding | Opinion | The Engineer

[GreenKnight121]

Or the infamous collapsing lifts in the Invincible class?

A very nice (or not-nice) long article with drawings and photos on the subject:
World Naval Ships Forums - View Single Post - RN Aircraft Carriers (Engineering)
You will need to join the website, but that's a reward all its own.

© Crown Copyright/MoD (1987).
CVS AIRCRAFT LIFTS
BY LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER D. STRAWFORD, R.N.
(H.M.S. Ark Royal, formerly staff of C-in-C Fleet)

Introduction

Traditionally aircraft lifts in R.N. aircraft carriers have been of counterbalanced
design carried by multiple chains on two or more sides of the lift
platform, and driven by electric motors.

The advent of the INVINCIBLE Class into service, however, introduced a radical
change in lift design that utilizes a non-counterbalanced platform driven by an
electro-hydraulic system designed and manufactured by Mactaggart Scott & CO Ltd.

As with most new design equipments, initial teething problems were to be
expected. Since its introduction into service the CVS aircraft lift has been
beset by problems. Most of these have been of a minor nature, but early
operating experience revealed a more serious shortcoming in design that on
several occasions resulted in near catastrophic failure of the lift machinery
with serious operational implications. Poor material and documentary support
exacerbates the situation and adds to the frustrations of the equipment
maintainers.

This article seeks to clarify the issues surrounding the aircraft lift design
and outlines the measures that have been and are being taken to overcome
the known shortcomings in design and support.

.....

MAJOR LIFT FAILURES Since introduction into service there have been several serious and near catastrophic aircraft lift failures due to uncontrolled tilting of the lift platform (FIG. 14). In each case ships have had to withdraw from operational commitments and expensive and manpower-intensive base support has been required to return the lifts to normal operation. In the majority of failures the prime cause of loss of control of the platform has been centred around the synchronizing system.
.....

Right way (fig 2):


Wrong Way (fig 14):

[tucumseh]

GBZ

My experience of Ships, apart from managing aircraft related electronics, is that MoD managed the vessel itself very well with limited resources (which could be said of much of MoD’s routine work). Of course, plentiful resources don’t guarantee success – see Nimrod.



From an aircraft perspective, what was very wrong was the integration of the aircraft and the ship. I recall Director General Aircraft (Navy) used to have a “Ships and Bases” section, which was our first port of call (note, lingo) for such matters, but they largely disappeared after about 1988 (formation of ASE). The next time I was modifying a CVS-borne aircraft, meaning ships’ procedures had to change, the reply was “Wait to see if there’s a problem, then we’ll see if we can fix it”. In other words, keep on using old procedures which the new aircraft perhaps renders unsafe.



In more general terms, this policy of not mitigating risks until they were proven to exist in-service became formal MoD policy in the mid-90s. Hence, on occasions the first manifestation resulted in unnecessary and avoidable deaths; and the BoI reports simply (and unwittingly) regurgitated a decade-old risk register which had been marked “waste of time, no further action” by a bean counter.



I fully agree First of Class (of anything) usually have problems, but the project manager's job is to avoid the avoidable and manage the unavoidable. In design terms, the way of doing this is meeting the mandated Configuration Milestones, which includes Design Reviews. In 1999 DGAS2 (Nimrod) and CDP ruled that a Critical Design Review can be waived if it means saving money. Very often, BoIs note failures which should have been addressed at CDR or before. But because they lack the necessary experience, they don't recognise the failure for what it is, and certainly don't criticise VSOs for knowingly allowing the failure. So, the system disintegrates at a late stage, having been managed perfectly well for 95% of the time.




On a lighter note, a good example was the Lynx upgrade of the 80s, resulting in her sitting higher on her undercarriage. HMS Endurance wasn’t modified, so the top of the rotor head caught the hangar door runners. This was quickly transformed into a savings measure by announcing Endurance would retain the old variant, which meant the aircraft conversion programme cost less. But what this did was hide a serious failure to fill in the MF714 box “Affected Contractors” properly (and then manage what was affected), which is the primary means of initiating system integration and functional safety. By 1992, this too was formal policy, whereas the Lynx error was a rarity.