Account of Sheffield attack by Radar Operator in Invincible

[Navaleye]

The engagement mentioned would have the interception of three Canberras by 801 CAP. One kill, sadly crew not recovered.

[glojo]

Originally Posted by Tourist

Remember guys this is just one persons account.

I have no knowledge if this is true or not, but to start arguing over whether somebody else should be court martialled because one person has told their side of a story is a little unjust.

Without evidence, it is just hearsay.

Totally agree, plus it might be wrote by someone who is possibly unfairly but understandably trying to blame someone, anyone for a tragic incident that was beyond their control..

IF ONLY

If only I did this

If only did that

If only I had said

[alfred_the_great]

Would people like some redders for their chips?

What happened happened; while this RP may've been right in this instance I doubt he was right every time. The AAWO has the responsibility for the picture, and frankly he was doing his job. The BOI sat, made recommendations and we've moved on. Rehashing this now achieves nothing.

[Two's in]

Roadster asks the most pertinent question;

I would be interested to know though, how does one draw a distinction between dereliction of duty and making a decision later proved to be in error?

And whatever the events were that unfolded, the narrative tries to set the scene of the poor old honest-to-goodness enlisted guy being screwed over by the chippy Rodney. Great piece of drama, but if you have to embellish that angle, what else has been embellished to make it a good read? There were no shortage of mistakes made during the conflict, many of them great tragedies. Trying to personalise it into an "us versus them'' account does nobody any credit.

[NutLoose]

I would have thought the offer of a sweetie by the AAWO wasn't trying to curry any favour with anyone, simply showing he was human too....he too would be feeling like poo and knew his judgement call had just gone tragically wrong... End of the day someone has to make a decision and stick with it.... If the ratings felt bad about it, spare a thought for the guy making the call..... It's war, and in war everything does not run to the book.... I feel for them all, but while the ratings still feel guilt, think how the other guy feels who had the burden on his shoulders of taking the decision.

[glojo]

It went on like this for the first few days and we worked out that the Argentinean fighter pilots could not night fly as they would attack only when it was light and mainly at dawn and dusk. This was to our advantage as a pattern was set and it gave us time to rest and recuperate at night."

What an odd statement...

Odd because it makes NO SENSE.

I was not there but I do KNOW that when not at action stations, ships were working defence watch systems and the ship would be closed up accordingly. My experience has been a six hours on, six hours off routine for the whole period of a conflict. No one, but no one 'assumes' the enemy will definitely only attack at a set time of day, that makes NO sense.

Who would be naive enough to make that assumption? How would anyone know that night attacks were not being held back?

How can that sailor just a few days into this conflict have known that? This statement is made by someone with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight

after the first few days

We....... Does this mean the task group commander decided

The Argentinian fighter pilots could not night fly

Ignoring that claim there was a continuing ASW threat and closing up at action stations was a regular event. Did the capital ships all relax at night?? I think not as we KNOW that a few of the Task Group pilots were flying night operations.

Woodward was very, very protective of the carriers and I just cannot imagine everyone getting a good nights sleep and only fighting the defensive war during daylight hours, it makes NO SENSE?

Just been reading the BOI regarding the sinking of Coventry and she was engaged in multiple day time incidents, NOT at just dawn or dusk. I am not saying that whole statement by the alleged young sailor did not happen but it does ask questions regarding factual content.

[Navaleye]

The threat reduction process said that theiy could not manage night flights with the possible exemption on their Naval Air Arm. They never tried it, so we have to assume this was a reasonable assumption.

[glojo]

The threat reduction process said that theiy could not manage night flights with the possible exemption on their Naval Air Arm. They never tried it, so we have to assume this was a reasonable assumption.

Note how you are highlighting the fact that there was a possible exemption... and we are of course talking purely air threat. We should not close our eyes to both surface and under surface threats. Argentinian ships\patrol boats were both detected and sunk during the hours of darkness and whilst our capital ships would not take an active role in this, the rest of the battle group would.

To suggest that nights were for periods of rest is plain wrong... Ships would sneak inshore under the cover of darkness to carry out Naval Gunfire Support or ASW patrols and this was always high risk with the threat of return fire ever present, including attacks from shore based anti-ship missiles.

I have just read the BOI regarding Coventry and the opening observations although slightly off topic are so, so relevant to my remarks regarding training..

Have things changed?? I VERY much doubt it.

Originally Posted by Official de-classified BOI

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS

Q1. Was Coventry properly trained to cope with the situation at 251820Z May?

A. No She had inadequate training for inshore AAW and massive damage situations

Q2 was Coventry uniquely under-trained?

A. No On the contrary in many areas she was better trained than most

[MAINJAFAD]

Navaleye

Pretty much spot on. The only aircraft that they had which were anything close to all weather capable were the SuE's and navy recce aircraft (Neptune and Tracker) which did track the CVBG at night time, though the Sheffield attack was pretty much the Neptune's swansong.

[Pontius Navigator]

I thought the RAF could guarantee air cover anywhere in the World and there would be no need for the Royal Navy to have its own air power.

Originally Posted by ORAC

That was the proposal up to 1965. However, contrary to popular belief it was the RAF "Island Hopping" strategy that was rejected and the Navy carrier/amphibious strategy which was accepted - hence the cancellation of the TSR2 and all RAF strategic reach.

It was the subsequent Defence White Paper of 1966 which reduced the UK to a strategy of having no force projection capability East of Suez and the cancellation of CVA01.

This was possibly the situation in the 60s but it changed again in the '70s. The RAF undertook air defence of the fleet and tried to prove this during Exercise Highwood in Nov/Dec 1971. I was on a NEAF crew and not directly involved but we met Highwood crews during a week in UK. We met the same 543 Victor crew at Waddington and later at St Mawgan. The weather was so bad that they were unable to return to Wyton and were operating from diversions the whole time. The tanker force was also helping to provide fighter cover.

Given the lack of land-based AEW and the winter weather I think the Navy won the arguement but still lost its carriers.

[anotherthing]

Tourist,

It is not hearsay if it is a first person account. If it was someone giving 'evidence' of what a third party had told them, then that would be hearsay.

However your point about it being one side of the story is valid