"British MoD acquisition/procurement and support organization may be privatised"...
Well let's keep it to the supposed superiority of Military Staff over CS Staff that permeates the thread, s-d. Tuc spells out his credentials and I spell out the actions of VSOs. Both of us ignored, other than for me to be accused of thread drift.
There is a tendency for self delusion here that does not bode well for the future of the MOD whether it be acquiring, procuring, regulating or investigating. It can't do any of those things and should most certainly not be doing the latter two.
The MOD is the problem and always will be, both for the Nation's Defence and for the Armed Forces. I don't know what can be done about that, but something needs to. I do know what should be done about UK Military Airworthiness and Air Accident Investigation. That is why it is my "one and only topic" as you so charmingly put it.
There is a tendency for self delusion here that does not bode well for the future of the MOD whether it be acquiring, procuring, regulating or investigating. It can't do any of those things and should most certainly not be doing the latter two.
The MOD is the problem and always will be, both for the Nation's Defence and for the Armed Forces. I don't know what can be done about that, but something needs to. I do know what should be done about UK Military Airworthiness and Air Accident Investigation. That is why it is my "one and only topic" as you so charmingly put it.
It is not exactly clear what benefit (other than being able to sack people) having a contractor running the show will make. Will they novate contracts such as FSTA over to them? What will they do - 'improve' the contract, or manage it in the same way as now? What exactly will change? Will the management be 'better'? What does that mean? Will they discover magic efficiencies the current team are unaware of due to their "business acumen"? Its nonsense isn't it? No doubt many will recall tales of 'consultants' coming in to help projects and see that more often than not provide little or no insight that isn't obvious to the CS/Mil already employed - or infact they merely regurgitate ideas they pick from the team. The real issues are usually with the control of funding, reqt mgt & change and the interface with MB.
I do wonder how on earth the interface between MoD and a GOCO would work in practice - how many requirements would e.g. MoD control over the GOCO on a typical aircraft programme? A few KURs or a proper technical spec including intelligent application of reglations? Who is going to administer that properly with the GOCO? What is the scale of effort to be retained in MoD? Will it be much smaller than todays PT? Won't the GOCO need a PT around the same size as the DE&S PT (adding duplication) - plus they will be being paid more? Noting the "hardwired to zero" types that we've all met - surely there isn't a consensus that PTs are 'overmanned'?!?!?
It all seems to add up to less and less money available for the end user, and more and more lining the pockets of middle men.
I do wonder how on earth the interface between MoD and a GOCO would work in practice - how many requirements would e.g. MoD control over the GOCO on a typical aircraft programme? A few KURs or a proper technical spec including intelligent application of reglations? Who is going to administer that properly with the GOCO? What is the scale of effort to be retained in MoD? Will it be much smaller than todays PT? Won't the GOCO need a PT around the same size as the DE&S PT (adding duplication) - plus they will be being paid more? Noting the "hardwired to zero" types that we've all met - surely there isn't a consensus that PTs are 'overmanned'?!?!?
It all seems to add up to less and less money available for the end user, and more and more lining the pockets of middle men.
I'm not sure the problem is with "Who" does it rather than "what" is done.
The main issue is that, over the last few years, almost everything in MOD has been dismantled with no thought towards cause and effect. It's all about price and not about value.
Its very easy in hindsight to say that there was no plan to begin with, but - however its wrapped - there is no coherent plan now!
The main issue is that, over the last few years, almost everything in MOD has been dismantled with no thought towards cause and effect. It's all about price and not about value.
Its very easy in hindsight to say that there was no plan to begin with, but - however its wrapped - there is no coherent plan now!
Can I ask one question?
What happens to the CS/mil/private company guy who will be responsible for any future debacles?
And the guy/committee who appointed him/her?
On previous/current experience, nothing. I think that's the real problem.
May I suggest that whoever is responsible in future has a better carrot/stick arrangement than we have at present. This will need to be better than the current grade of "targets met = bonus"
What happens to the CS/mil/private company guy who will be responsible for any future debacles?
And the guy/committee who appointed him/her?
On previous/current experience, nothing. I think that's the real problem.
May I suggest that whoever is responsible in future has a better carrot/stick arrangement than we have at present. This will need to be better than the current grade of "targets met = bonus"
F3WMB:
Subject to a very minor modification to your post, it seems that we are in violent agreement now.
What happens to the VSO/CS/mil/private company guy who will be responsible for any future debacles?...On previous/current experience, nothing. I think that's the real problem.
Chug is quite right to raise the independent MAA issue. It is not thre4ad drift on a thread essentially discussing funding and how it is (mis)spent.
The gross and deliberate waste of money, which led to the "black hole" and hence the problems being discussed here, is also what caused the airworthiness failings. All these issues are inextricably linked. Not to appreciate that is to be as badly stove-piped as MoD.
Nor do most here appreciate the simple fact that both "sides" are actually complaining about the actions of the same few VSOs. Chug does.
The gross and deliberate waste of money, which led to the "black hole" and hence the problems being discussed here, is also what caused the airworthiness failings. All these issues are inextricably linked. Not to appreciate that is to be as badly stove-piped as MoD.
Nor do most here appreciate the simple fact that both "sides" are actually complaining about the actions of the same few VSOs. Chug does.
I know we bang on about the appalling behaviour of VSOs and senior CSs on these threads, but I’m not blind to the fact they were once juniors; and some were even competent.
At what point does a hitherto sensible, competent and honest man decide to needlessly sacrifice men and money? It has got to be the “system” that produces them that bears much of the blame.
My own view has always been that once you reach 2 Star level you are a protected species. Also, said 2 Stars identify their successors at an early stage and they, too, become protected. These people are not only protected by being able (and encouraged) to blame those below them, but also from above. Sometimes rising stars are singled out because they are genuinely excellent. Too often it is because they share a club membership with the 2 Star. Almost always they are rejected if they demonstrate competence. In MoD(PE)/DPA/DLO/DE&S it is has always been well known that if you deliver to Time, Cost and Performance, the attitude of VSOs is that you are raising the bar to an unwelcome level and drawing attention to the fact T/C/P can be achieved (with the correct training and background). That is not just my opinion, but was routinely annotated in “Career Guidance Panels”. You were instructed to be less competent, and in the aircraft world that meant sacrificing safety.
One of the most basic rules of procurement (and acquisition) is that of independent scrutiny. It is the mandated means by which you avoid, as far as possible, waste. Suffice to say, it has been an offence in MoD for 20 years to implement these mandated rules. (December 1992, Director General Support Management – an RAF AVM immediately under the RAF Chief Engineer – ruled it a sacking offence. 5 successive Mins(AF) have now upheld it as a disciplinary offence, although they stopped short of sacking). Why? It is a bullying management tactic to hide their own failings. If you conduct scrutiny properly, it highlights the deliberate waste. My first suggestion is there should be robust implementation of these scrutiny regulations. (A recommendation made to PUS in June 1996 by MoD’s own Director Internal Audit, and rejected. Implementing recommendation #13 in that report would have nipped all airworthiness failings in the bud).
But the rules don’t require independent oversight at a level close enough to the decision making. As I described above, the oversight comes from people who have a vested interest in meeting Time and Cost targets, and it is stated policy to sacrifice performance to meet these. However, and this is close to my heart because I worked in the system and lost friends in accidents, “performance” includes safety and the decision of, especially, the RAF Chief Engineer in the early/mid 90s and his 2/4 Star opposites in PE to cross that line and knowingly sacrifice safety so their books balanced was reprehensible and criminal. It was a double whammy, because it only served to conceal the underlying failures until, conveniently, they had retired. Once there was no more airworthiness funding to slash, the basic problem could no longer be concealed – their polices continued to waste money and there was nowhere left to hide. If you don’t like me saying “airworthiness”, substitute “procurement”. Amounts to the same.
My second suggestion is that Gray uses this forthcoming restructuring to introduce robust independent scrutiny. He should employ people who no longer have a vested interest, either in monetary or career terms. Despite my ramblings about certain VSOs and SCSs, most are supremely competent. I’d employ them to police the system. Beware the man who has nothing left to lose.
At what point does a hitherto sensible, competent and honest man decide to needlessly sacrifice men and money? It has got to be the “system” that produces them that bears much of the blame.
My own view has always been that once you reach 2 Star level you are a protected species. Also, said 2 Stars identify their successors at an early stage and they, too, become protected. These people are not only protected by being able (and encouraged) to blame those below them, but also from above. Sometimes rising stars are singled out because they are genuinely excellent. Too often it is because they share a club membership with the 2 Star. Almost always they are rejected if they demonstrate competence. In MoD(PE)/DPA/DLO/DE&S it is has always been well known that if you deliver to Time, Cost and Performance, the attitude of VSOs is that you are raising the bar to an unwelcome level and drawing attention to the fact T/C/P can be achieved (with the correct training and background). That is not just my opinion, but was routinely annotated in “Career Guidance Panels”. You were instructed to be less competent, and in the aircraft world that meant sacrificing safety.
One of the most basic rules of procurement (and acquisition) is that of independent scrutiny. It is the mandated means by which you avoid, as far as possible, waste. Suffice to say, it has been an offence in MoD for 20 years to implement these mandated rules. (December 1992, Director General Support Management – an RAF AVM immediately under the RAF Chief Engineer – ruled it a sacking offence. 5 successive Mins(AF) have now upheld it as a disciplinary offence, although they stopped short of sacking). Why? It is a bullying management tactic to hide their own failings. If you conduct scrutiny properly, it highlights the deliberate waste. My first suggestion is there should be robust implementation of these scrutiny regulations. (A recommendation made to PUS in June 1996 by MoD’s own Director Internal Audit, and rejected. Implementing recommendation #13 in that report would have nipped all airworthiness failings in the bud).
But the rules don’t require independent oversight at a level close enough to the decision making. As I described above, the oversight comes from people who have a vested interest in meeting Time and Cost targets, and it is stated policy to sacrifice performance to meet these. However, and this is close to my heart because I worked in the system and lost friends in accidents, “performance” includes safety and the decision of, especially, the RAF Chief Engineer in the early/mid 90s and his 2/4 Star opposites in PE to cross that line and knowingly sacrifice safety so their books balanced was reprehensible and criminal. It was a double whammy, because it only served to conceal the underlying failures until, conveniently, they had retired. Once there was no more airworthiness funding to slash, the basic problem could no longer be concealed – their polices continued to waste money and there was nowhere left to hide. If you don’t like me saying “airworthiness”, substitute “procurement”. Amounts to the same.
My second suggestion is that Gray uses this forthcoming restructuring to introduce robust independent scrutiny. He should employ people who no longer have a vested interest, either in monetary or career terms. Despite my ramblings about certain VSOs and SCSs, most are supremely competent. I’d employ them to police the system. Beware the man who has nothing left to lose.
For the last 15 years I have worked in QA and Continued Airworthiness starting in the RAF and then in a variety of quite different aircraft maintenance and management "organisations" (some are not organised).
In ALL these organisations the same rule for QA/CA applies:
The same principle applies to the MAA, and probably to the MAAIB too. There will be very little incriminating evidence from internal investigations and any possible incrimination will not be published in public records.
That is not to say that there will never be a case brought to some form of Trial - in all deep MOD rule-changes there has always been one show-case to show that the rules work and that there is no sham, but none afterwards...
If this principle is applied to the procurement system I can't imagine the potential for smoke, mirrors, missappropriation and abuse.
In ALL these organisations the same rule for QA/CA applies:
Nobody believes the internal company report is worth doing anything about - or that the QA guy's worries are just nit-picking pedantism.
If QA want some movement in a particular issue they will probably tell the next external audit team (and sometimes a regulatory authority) - for them to find the issue in their reports. If an external audit (or regulatory authority) finds the issue - something MAY get done.The same principle applies to the MAA, and probably to the MAAIB too. There will be very little incriminating evidence from internal investigations and any possible incrimination will not be published in public records.
That is not to say that there will never be a case brought to some form of Trial - in all deep MOD rule-changes there has always been one show-case to show that the rules work and that there is no sham, but none afterwards...
If this principle is applied to the procurement system I can't imagine the potential for smoke, mirrors, missappropriation and abuse.
A humble Amen to all that you say, tucumseh. What you describe is a corrupt and criminal system.
Just as you say, it is the system that is corrupt and there are always those who are so weak as to be corrupted by it. You also say, and I agree wholeheartedly, that there are many, indeed the vast majority, who fight against the corruption and do the best that they can for the Nation's Security, for the Armed Forces, and for their own Moral Values. Many are VSOs and again I fully concur. But, and here's the rub, the corruption goes unacknowledged, here as well as elsewhere. Those morally weak and incompetent VSOs that have cost us so much in blood and treasure, as denounced by you tuc, go uninvestigated, unchallenged, and unpunished. Indeed, the trinkets and titles of the "honours" system are heaped upon them instead. Others lower down the food chain, outside of the 2*+ firmament that you so rightly describe, are offered as sacrificial goats in their place. That is no way to run a Town Council let alone a major Department of State!
It seems the default choice is to knowingly let such a scandalous system continue, all for the want of challenging it. Why? Because a VSO was once a good egg at running a Squadron, a Station, even a Group? Absolute power corrupts absolutely. Being above the law, protected by others, and choosing your own successor is absolutely corrupt in my view, never mind the additional cost of your own incompetence, Sir!
The other eternal truth is;
There is a lot of nothing going on, I think.
Just as you say, it is the system that is corrupt and there are always those who are so weak as to be corrupted by it. You also say, and I agree wholeheartedly, that there are many, indeed the vast majority, who fight against the corruption and do the best that they can for the Nation's Security, for the Armed Forces, and for their own Moral Values. Many are VSOs and again I fully concur. But, and here's the rub, the corruption goes unacknowledged, here as well as elsewhere. Those morally weak and incompetent VSOs that have cost us so much in blood and treasure, as denounced by you tuc, go uninvestigated, unchallenged, and unpunished. Indeed, the trinkets and titles of the "honours" system are heaped upon them instead. Others lower down the food chain, outside of the 2*+ firmament that you so rightly describe, are offered as sacrificial goats in their place. That is no way to run a Town Council let alone a major Department of State!
It seems the default choice is to knowingly let such a scandalous system continue, all for the want of challenging it. Why? Because a VSO was once a good egg at running a Squadron, a Station, even a Group? Absolute power corrupts absolutely. Being above the law, protected by others, and choosing your own successor is absolutely corrupt in my view, never mind the additional cost of your own incompetence, Sir!
The other eternal truth is;
All that is necessary for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing
