New Helos for the RAN
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: australia
Posts: 3
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If the UK newspapers are to be believed,wait a few weeks and get some RN Merlins second-hand to replace Sea King. Try haggling and you could pick up another Bay-Class thrown in!
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Australia - South of where I'd like to be !
Age: 59
Posts: 4,261
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Flying blind
Re "I think some have gotten a bit carried away with the whole anti MRH-90 thread, yes, it has quite a few problems that require $$$$ to be spent, when has a new aircraft and it's systems not?
But, it's at the start of it's life cycle and (with the aformentioned $$$) should be a good workhorse in due time."
It shouldn't be up to us to spend $$$ working problems out. We as a country and our armed forces are not big enough to warrant it as well as we shouldn't have to do it and we don't have the excess money to spend fixing problems.
OK, if it was a proven system and VASTLY better than anything the US made, then buy it, otherwise we should buy off the shelf, already proven and US made gear that already has a support system in place world wide and that's not / without counting the big plus of interoperability factors with the US with has to account for $$$$$.
"should be a good workhorse in due time."
Leave the due time to NATO, while we get on with what we should be doing, training and operations.
Look at the big picture - we buy 24 helo's. That is a piss ant amount in the scheme of what the US operates so why be different. Then look at how many Tigers we bought ? It's a bit of a joke.
It almost seems to me that some people DON'T want us to buy US just to be different.
Just my HO.
.
Re "I think some have gotten a bit carried away with the whole anti MRH-90 thread, yes, it has quite a few problems that require $$$$ to be spent, when has a new aircraft and it's systems not?
But, it's at the start of it's life cycle and (with the aformentioned $$$) should be a good workhorse in due time."
It shouldn't be up to us to spend $$$ working problems out. We as a country and our armed forces are not big enough to warrant it as well as we shouldn't have to do it and we don't have the excess money to spend fixing problems.
OK, if it was a proven system and VASTLY better than anything the US made, then buy it, otherwise we should buy off the shelf, already proven and US made gear that already has a support system in place world wide and that's not / without counting the big plus of interoperability factors with the US with has to account for $$$$$.
"should be a good workhorse in due time."
Leave the due time to NATO, while we get on with what we should be doing, training and operations.
Look at the big picture - we buy 24 helo's. That is a piss ant amount in the scheme of what the US operates so why be different. Then look at how many Tigers we bought ? It's a bit of a joke.
It almost seems to me that some people DON'T want us to buy US just to be different.
Just my HO.
.
Join Date: Nov 2009
Location: Down West
Posts: 156
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Flying Blind,
The Canadian replacement for the Seaking is the "Cyclone" (S92 derivative), that ain't exactly going as planned if you read the "Rotorheads" forum.
Cheers now
The Canadian replacement for the Seaking is the "Cyclone" (S92 derivative), that ain't exactly going as planned if you read the "Rotorheads" forum.
Cheers now
500N
You're right about buying Euro. The Tiger/MRH90 buy will go down in history as quick as the dud subs [also from Euroland]..
Our small numbers need to be bought from the guys who build the biggest fleets in our AOO...Uncle Sam.
The Seasprite debacle was more to do with DMO/Navy specking something that was not off the shelf. An experiment really... We had the full R&D over 11 frames. The same R&D in the USA would be over hundreds of frames. Simple economics really..
You're right about buying Euro. The Tiger/MRH90 buy will go down in history as quick as the dud subs [also from Euroland]..
Our small numbers need to be bought from the guys who build the biggest fleets in our AOO...Uncle Sam.
The Seasprite debacle was more to do with DMO/Navy specking something that was not off the shelf. An experiment really... We had the full R&D over 11 frames. The same R&D in the USA would be over hundreds of frames. Simple economics really..
According to a 2010 Bild report [...]
Bundeswehr NATO-Hubschrauber NH90: Modernster Helikopter der Welt hat viele Mängel - Politik - Bild.de
The bird has for sure teething problems, and more than just what is in that article, but having seen it, I'm sure the ground clearance is much more that just 16 cm. In fact it's 40 cm. The size of the tyres on the main landing gear is 615 if I recall.
Who had the smart idea of putting those blade antennas just behind the front gear on a military helicopter, that's another story.
The most reliable of sources.
The ANZAC frigates have RAST compatible with Seahawk and I guess the Romeo; but the AWDs will apparently be fitted with ASIST so will that be an issue?
Arrakis
Join Date: Jan 2009
Location: North Arm Cove, NSW, Australia
Age: 86
Posts: 229
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
MH-60R is the wrong aircraft and a bad deal
Consider these time-honoured Principles of War: Economy of Effort, Flexibility, Versatility; also the following extracts from Defence White Paper 2009:
Operational Flexibility
Chapter 8.61 - Australia cannot afford to maintain a large number of narrowly applicable capabilities. The future development of the ADF is to emphasise, wherever possible, operational flexibility and multi-role employment in the ADF's systems, platforms and organisations. This might involve, for example, achieving greater platform flexibility by way of inter-changeable modular design and construction techniques.
Interoperable Capability
Chapter 8.65 - Interoperability is principally concerned with the ability of personnel and systems of different nations and agencies to work effectively together, safely and securely. Where it makes sense to do so, and it is cost-effective and in keeping with the policy settings in this White Paper, capabilities and systems should be designed to be interoperable from conception, not as an afterthought in the capability development process.
Cost-Effective Capability
Chapter 8.66 - Defence will continue to drive down the costs of ownership of military capability...
See these links concerning configuration options for the Romeo and Sierra versions (view Missions): MH-60R____, MH-60S____
Relating the configuration options to fore-mentioned DWP2009 criteria begs the question: Why was the Romeo selected instead of the Sierra?
The versatile Sierra performs the broadest roles, including fleet replenishment, within the US Navy. A whole range of certified modular systems and weapon kits are easily adaptable to the Sierra, so it would have made much more sense to acquire 8 new Sierra and upgrade the remaining 16 Seahawk S-70B-2 to Sierra standard. This would have enabled much broader application of the Seahawk fleet, whereas the Romeo has too narrowly applicable capabilities and is quite unsuited for boarding party and general fleet replenishment roles. Fitment of modular weapon systems to the Sierra on an as required basis would comply with the 'Operational Flexibility' guidelines in Chapter 8.61 of DWP2009, whereas the MH-60R will contravene these principles.
Regarding dipping sonar capability; this was removed from the RAN Sea Kings some years back, presumably to make that aircraft more usable in utility and fleet replenishment roles. But the Seahawk without dipping sonar was inadequate for ASW training and no effort seems to have been made over time to equip either aircraft with a modular type-certified dipping sonar system, like the L3 Ocean Systems AQS-18V-3 (see: L3 Communications - Ocean Systems, Products - Airborn Systems/Seaborn Systems). Justifying the Romeo in part on this basis is not a credible argument and the selection of this model aircraft virtually scorns foregoing DWP2009 criteria.
Interoperability is much vaunted in DoD hardware acquisition media releases, somewhat inferring that Australia should operate the same equipment assets as allied forces. As implied in the foregoing Chapter 8.65 of Defence Policy; interoperability is more about compatible doctrine, communications, weaponry, ammunition and meshing of supply sources than commonality of platforms. The US especially may have differing equipment fits to hardware compared with export versions that they make available to other nations (see this link: http://elpdefensenews.********.com/2...lth-issue.html).
So why is $3.2billion project cost for 24 x Romeo a bad deal?
One billion dollars is a vast amount of money. Converting dollars to seconds; $1million = 11.57 days, whereas $1billion = 31.71 YEARS. The collective cost of the Seasprite fiasco and Tiger, MRH90, MH-60R acquisitions will approximate $8billion.
The ongoing ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan (HSMP) or Project Air 9000, now grandly bureaucratically re-termed the Aerospace Capability Implementation Roadmap – Rotary Wing (ACIR-RW), is driving this hugely wasteful strategy which is materially degrading ADF military capacity. Kiowa, Iroquois, Blackhawk, Seahawk, Chinook; which all have relatively low airframe hours compared with similar types operated by other nations, could have all been cost-effectively progressively optimised through ongoing manufacturer upgrade programs, which would have saved billions of taxpayer dollars. Instead, the essential battlefield utility helicopter role - hitherto performed by Iroquois, Blackhawk, Sea King and partially by Seahawk - is being progressively shed and cannot be adequately replaced by the medium lift MRH90, which can only be viewed as a reckless failure of defence planning.
Apparently, as part of the MH-60R deal, Lockheed Martin/Sikorsky will refurbish 50 ADF Blackhawks and Seahawks for prospective sale to third parties and split the proceeds of sale with the Australian government (Team Romeo | MH-60R). So; LM/S will make a huge killing on the MH-60R and also benefit from prospective sale of potentially very adequate helicopter assets! How can the Australian DoD justify shedding about 75 helicopters that are cost-effectively upgradable (Iroquois, Blackhawk, Seahawk) and spend $3.2billion on just 24 complex new aircraft that will have narrowly applicable capabilities?
Operational Flexibility
Chapter 8.61 - Australia cannot afford to maintain a large number of narrowly applicable capabilities. The future development of the ADF is to emphasise, wherever possible, operational flexibility and multi-role employment in the ADF's systems, platforms and organisations. This might involve, for example, achieving greater platform flexibility by way of inter-changeable modular design and construction techniques.
Interoperable Capability
Chapter 8.65 - Interoperability is principally concerned with the ability of personnel and systems of different nations and agencies to work effectively together, safely and securely. Where it makes sense to do so, and it is cost-effective and in keeping with the policy settings in this White Paper, capabilities and systems should be designed to be interoperable from conception, not as an afterthought in the capability development process.
Cost-Effective Capability
Chapter 8.66 - Defence will continue to drive down the costs of ownership of military capability...
See these links concerning configuration options for the Romeo and Sierra versions (view Missions): MH-60R____, MH-60S____
Relating the configuration options to fore-mentioned DWP2009 criteria begs the question: Why was the Romeo selected instead of the Sierra?
The versatile Sierra performs the broadest roles, including fleet replenishment, within the US Navy. A whole range of certified modular systems and weapon kits are easily adaptable to the Sierra, so it would have made much more sense to acquire 8 new Sierra and upgrade the remaining 16 Seahawk S-70B-2 to Sierra standard. This would have enabled much broader application of the Seahawk fleet, whereas the Romeo has too narrowly applicable capabilities and is quite unsuited for boarding party and general fleet replenishment roles. Fitment of modular weapon systems to the Sierra on an as required basis would comply with the 'Operational Flexibility' guidelines in Chapter 8.61 of DWP2009, whereas the MH-60R will contravene these principles.
Regarding dipping sonar capability; this was removed from the RAN Sea Kings some years back, presumably to make that aircraft more usable in utility and fleet replenishment roles. But the Seahawk without dipping sonar was inadequate for ASW training and no effort seems to have been made over time to equip either aircraft with a modular type-certified dipping sonar system, like the L3 Ocean Systems AQS-18V-3 (see: L3 Communications - Ocean Systems, Products - Airborn Systems/Seaborn Systems). Justifying the Romeo in part on this basis is not a credible argument and the selection of this model aircraft virtually scorns foregoing DWP2009 criteria.
Interoperability is much vaunted in DoD hardware acquisition media releases, somewhat inferring that Australia should operate the same equipment assets as allied forces. As implied in the foregoing Chapter 8.65 of Defence Policy; interoperability is more about compatible doctrine, communications, weaponry, ammunition and meshing of supply sources than commonality of platforms. The US especially may have differing equipment fits to hardware compared with export versions that they make available to other nations (see this link: http://elpdefensenews.********.com/2...lth-issue.html).
So why is $3.2billion project cost for 24 x Romeo a bad deal?
One billion dollars is a vast amount of money. Converting dollars to seconds; $1million = 11.57 days, whereas $1billion = 31.71 YEARS. The collective cost of the Seasprite fiasco and Tiger, MRH90, MH-60R acquisitions will approximate $8billion.
The ongoing ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan (HSMP) or Project Air 9000, now grandly bureaucratically re-termed the Aerospace Capability Implementation Roadmap – Rotary Wing (ACIR-RW), is driving this hugely wasteful strategy which is materially degrading ADF military capacity. Kiowa, Iroquois, Blackhawk, Seahawk, Chinook; which all have relatively low airframe hours compared with similar types operated by other nations, could have all been cost-effectively progressively optimised through ongoing manufacturer upgrade programs, which would have saved billions of taxpayer dollars. Instead, the essential battlefield utility helicopter role - hitherto performed by Iroquois, Blackhawk, Sea King and partially by Seahawk - is being progressively shed and cannot be adequately replaced by the medium lift MRH90, which can only be viewed as a reckless failure of defence planning.
Apparently, as part of the MH-60R deal, Lockheed Martin/Sikorsky will refurbish 50 ADF Blackhawks and Seahawks for prospective sale to third parties and split the proceeds of sale with the Australian government (Team Romeo | MH-60R). So; LM/S will make a huge killing on the MH-60R and also benefit from prospective sale of potentially very adequate helicopter assets! How can the Australian DoD justify shedding about 75 helicopters that are cost-effectively upgradable (Iroquois, Blackhawk, Seahawk) and spend $3.2billion on just 24 complex new aircraft that will have narrowly applicable capabilities?
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 29th Jun 2011 at 23:44.
Join Date: Jan 2009
Location: North Arm Cove, NSW, Australia
Age: 86
Posts: 229
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Shipborne helo securing systems
Hi Arrakis.
A Navy EngO recently alerted me to differences between RAST and ASIST systems at a Garden Island wake for an aviator colleague. Somebody on another forum also provided this reference document: INDAL Technologies: Product Technical Papers - Sample technical documents on product and services for your convenience
It does seem that RAST equipped MH-60R will not be fully compatible with ASIST configured AWDs, nor Romeos modified for ASIST able to fully utilise RAST on the ANZAC frigates without modification..
I hope we are not going down the track of 2 separate versions of the Romeo!
A Navy EngO recently alerted me to differences between RAST and ASIST systems at a Garden Island wake for an aviator colleague. Somebody on another forum also provided this reference document: INDAL Technologies: Product Technical Papers - Sample technical documents on product and services for your convenience
It does seem that RAST equipped MH-60R will not be fully compatible with ASIST configured AWDs, nor Romeos modified for ASIST able to fully utilise RAST on the ANZAC frigates without modification..
I hope we are not going down the track of 2 separate versions of the Romeo!
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: Sydney
Posts: 3
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Why 60R is the right choice
There is no requirement for separate ASIST and RAST versions of the MH-60R.
The differences between RAST and ASIST from an aircraft side are:
1. RAST uses a messenger cable (lowered through the centre of the Main RAST probe) to winch the hauldown cable up to the aircraft for conducting Recovery Assist (RA) landings. ASIST doesn't use a hauldown cable and hence no messenger cable. However the probe themselves are virtually identical. An ASIST aircraft, without the messenger cable, is fully cable of conducting Freedeck, landing into the RAST RSD without hauldown, and Cleardeck, direct to filght deck with no RSD on deck. With the messenger cable winch fitted to the probe an ASIST aircraft would be fully RAST capable. Straightening of the aircraft is conducted by connecting cables to the aft tie down fittings once the aircraft is shutdown.
2. ASIST has IR beacons fitted to the aircraft to enable the ASIST system to track the aircraft above the flight deck. RAST doesn't track the aircraft so this is a non issue. Straightening of the aircraft to stow it in the hangar is done via the ASIST RSD.
Thus with two relatively straightforward additions (messenger cable and tailwheel probe) an ASIST aircraft is fully compatible with RAST and ASIST.
MH-60S is not a good option for the RAN as it would require longer flight decks (60S tailwheel is in the same location as Blackhawk) and whilst you can still fit the 60S on to the AWD, FFG and FFH flightdecks, in order to ensure that the tailwheel will be on the deck you would need to land further forward and more accurately as you would be reducing the clearance forward from the hangar door. The main way to achieve this safely is to reduce deck motion limits (and thus capability). Also 60S is not fitted with RAST or ASIST (the 60S is primarily operated from CVN not FF/DD). Fitting the RAST probe to a 60S would be a significant modification to primary structure. The Maritime Utility role is to be filled by MRH90 operated by 808 Sqn, from SUCCESS and LHDs, thus this a secondary role for the 60R.
The $3.2 Billion is not just purchase of aircraft and spares it also includes simulators, infrastructure work at both ALBATROSS and STIRLING and mods to FFH and FFG.
As for converting S-70B-2 to MH-60R standard, that could make the Sea Sprite project look simple.
The differences between RAST and ASIST from an aircraft side are:
1. RAST uses a messenger cable (lowered through the centre of the Main RAST probe) to winch the hauldown cable up to the aircraft for conducting Recovery Assist (RA) landings. ASIST doesn't use a hauldown cable and hence no messenger cable. However the probe themselves are virtually identical. An ASIST aircraft, without the messenger cable, is fully cable of conducting Freedeck, landing into the RAST RSD without hauldown, and Cleardeck, direct to filght deck with no RSD on deck. With the messenger cable winch fitted to the probe an ASIST aircraft would be fully RAST capable. Straightening of the aircraft is conducted by connecting cables to the aft tie down fittings once the aircraft is shutdown.
2. ASIST has IR beacons fitted to the aircraft to enable the ASIST system to track the aircraft above the flight deck. RAST doesn't track the aircraft so this is a non issue. Straightening of the aircraft to stow it in the hangar is done via the ASIST RSD.
Thus with two relatively straightforward additions (messenger cable and tailwheel probe) an ASIST aircraft is fully compatible with RAST and ASIST.
MH-60S is not a good option for the RAN as it would require longer flight decks (60S tailwheel is in the same location as Blackhawk) and whilst you can still fit the 60S on to the AWD, FFG and FFH flightdecks, in order to ensure that the tailwheel will be on the deck you would need to land further forward and more accurately as you would be reducing the clearance forward from the hangar door. The main way to achieve this safely is to reduce deck motion limits (and thus capability). Also 60S is not fitted with RAST or ASIST (the 60S is primarily operated from CVN not FF/DD). Fitting the RAST probe to a 60S would be a significant modification to primary structure. The Maritime Utility role is to be filled by MRH90 operated by 808 Sqn, from SUCCESS and LHDs, thus this a secondary role for the 60R.
The $3.2 Billion is not just purchase of aircraft and spares it also includes simulators, infrastructure work at both ALBATROSS and STIRLING and mods to FFH and FFG.
As for converting S-70B-2 to MH-60R standard, that could make the Sea Sprite project look simple.
Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: Oz
Posts: 644
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sikorsky's proposal to remanufacture and sell Army Black Hawks and Navy Seahawks was a side issues to the Romeo bid and was not something which carried much weight in the decision. The proposal was to reman them to a near common config for parapublic roles i.e. Coast Guard etc, or as second tier maritime/transport capabilities to approved nations.
Sikorsky has done similar work on old S-61/H-3 platfirms in transforming them to S-61T standard, and I'm sure they'll be interested in the four Sea Kings we'll have on offer early next year!
Any such deal for the Black Hawks and Seahawks (and Seakings) is a direct commercial agreement between Sikorsky and the Commonwealth and is subject to US State Dept approval, and will be negotiated entirely separately to the Romeo buy contract.
In other words, don't hold your breath!
Sikorsky has done similar work on old S-61/H-3 platfirms in transforming them to S-61T standard, and I'm sure they'll be interested in the four Sea Kings we'll have on offer early next year!
Any such deal for the Black Hawks and Seahawks (and Seakings) is a direct commercial agreement between Sikorsky and the Commonwealth and is subject to US State Dept approval, and will be negotiated entirely separately to the Romeo buy contract.
In other words, don't hold your breath!
Join Date: Jan 2009
Location: North Arm Cove, NSW, Australia
Age: 86
Posts: 229
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hi Tiger 73; see the Operational Flexibility guidelines from DWP2009, Chapter 8.61 (my post #48). Also consider the variety of warships that the RAN found it necessary to deploy to the Middle East over the past few years to maintain commitments.
Embarking a single highly complex helo with narrowly applicable capabilities on both ANZAC Frigates and the AWDs will greatly inhibit Navy flexibility for multiple roles, whereas MH-60S would have enabled broader use of warship platforms.
As for the maritime utility role being performed by MRH90; they are medium lift helicopters and the version being acquired is unsuited for shipboard roles. Your reasoning would mean always deploying platforms other than FFH and FFG for adequate performance of boarding party and replenishment roles.
Australia has only a small navy compared with the USN so some compromises on capabilities are necessary to acquire best value for the defence dollar. In reality, that means some affordable adequate second tier capabilities because the nation simply cannot afford to keep splurging on very up-market hardware. I did not suggest the S70B fleet be upgraded to Romeo, but reasonably close to more versatile Sierra standard as the airframes are sufficiently similar.
If the Romeo project includes a whole bunch of peripheral costs including ship modifications, then those aspects should be made clear to the taxpayer. The DMO website (Top 30 Acquisition Projects: Defence Materiel Organisation) of course includes very little detail of project parameters and costs, so hardware acquisitions listed thereon are naturally viewed by most as somewhat murky.
Embarking a single highly complex helo with narrowly applicable capabilities on both ANZAC Frigates and the AWDs will greatly inhibit Navy flexibility for multiple roles, whereas MH-60S would have enabled broader use of warship platforms.
As for the maritime utility role being performed by MRH90; they are medium lift helicopters and the version being acquired is unsuited for shipboard roles. Your reasoning would mean always deploying platforms other than FFH and FFG for adequate performance of boarding party and replenishment roles.
Australia has only a small navy compared with the USN so some compromises on capabilities are necessary to acquire best value for the defence dollar. In reality, that means some affordable adequate second tier capabilities because the nation simply cannot afford to keep splurging on very up-market hardware. I did not suggest the S70B fleet be upgraded to Romeo, but reasonably close to more versatile Sierra standard as the airframes are sufficiently similar.
If the Romeo project includes a whole bunch of peripheral costs including ship modifications, then those aspects should be made clear to the taxpayer. The DMO website (Top 30 Acquisition Projects: Defence Materiel Organisation) of course includes very little detail of project parameters and costs, so hardware acquisitions listed thereon are naturally viewed by most as somewhat murky.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Australia - South of where I'd like to be !
Age: 59
Posts: 4,261
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Seems Smith is putting a nice spin on it.
AUSTRALIA'S highest paid public servant, the head of the beleaguered Defence Materiel Organisation Dr Steve Gumley, has resigned. The DMO is responsible for purchasing everything the Australian Defence Force needs, from toothbrushes to tanks, jet fighters and warships.
Defence Minister Stephen Smith has been highly critical of the organisation's performance, in particular over the maintenance of naval supply ships and problems with major projects including the building of three air warfare destroyers.
It is understood the government wants to bring the DMO more directly under the control of the Department of Defence and defence force commanders.
Dr Gumley will be replaced by one of two associate secretaries - effectively super deputies - who will report directly to Defence Secretary Ian Watt.
Full article here.
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/defence-materiel-organisation-chied-steve-gumley-quits/story-e6frg8yo-1226089635356
It will be interesting to see if they manage to "bring the DMO more directly under the control of the Department of Defence and defence force commanders."
AUSTRALIA'S highest paid public servant, the head of the beleaguered Defence Materiel Organisation Dr Steve Gumley, has resigned. The DMO is responsible for purchasing everything the Australian Defence Force needs, from toothbrushes to tanks, jet fighters and warships.
Defence Minister Stephen Smith has been highly critical of the organisation's performance, in particular over the maintenance of naval supply ships and problems with major projects including the building of three air warfare destroyers.
It is understood the government wants to bring the DMO more directly under the control of the Department of Defence and defence force commanders.
Dr Gumley will be replaced by one of two associate secretaries - effectively super deputies - who will report directly to Defence Secretary Ian Watt.
Full article here.
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/defence-materiel-organisation-chied-steve-gumley-quits/story-e6frg8yo-1226089635356
It will be interesting to see if they manage to "bring the DMO more directly under the control of the Department of Defence and defence force commanders."
Evertonian
Not a big fan of this Government, but if they can strike that balance between DoD restrictions & the defence forces requirements, then credit to them.
Join Date: Aug 2000
Posts: 665
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
He might have fumbled the ADFA Skype bonk rather badly, but Stephen Smith is about the only man (or woman) on the Labor front bench who gives me any hope in Labor. He seems refreshingly free of spin.
Some would say he doesn't have enough experience yet, but I'd say Smith as leader is the only hope for Labor. If he can sort out DMO - unlikely, I think - he'd really have achieved a major victory, both for common sense and for the poor grunt in the field.
Some would say he doesn't have enough experience yet, but I'd say Smith as leader is the only hope for Labor. If he can sort out DMO - unlikely, I think - he'd really have achieved a major victory, both for common sense and for the poor grunt in the field.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Australia - South of where I'd like to be !
Age: 59
Posts: 4,261
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Andu
Agree, although a few other up and comers MIGHT have the goods but to be seen.
Even if Smith can't sort out DMO, if his only legacy is "bring the DMO more directly under the control of the Department of Defence and defence force commanders.", then that is a good thing.
BUT, the defence force commanders had better focus on it if it is their lap as the ball will then end up with them if things don't improve, they won't be able to duck and blame DMO.
Anyone's thoughts on this ?
Agree, although a few other up and comers MIGHT have the goods but to be seen.
Even if Smith can't sort out DMO, if his only legacy is "bring the DMO more directly under the control of the Department of Defence and defence force commanders.", then that is a good thing.
BUT, the defence force commanders had better focus on it if it is their lap as the ball will then end up with them if things don't improve, they won't be able to duck and blame DMO.
Anyone's thoughts on this ?
Join Date: Aug 2000
Posts: 665
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hopefully the new CDF won't be as keen to have the pollies love him as the recently departed one appeared to be. They need to be told the painful truth about the dreadful state the ADF is in thanks in large part to DMO screwups, although a few who wear - or wore - uniforms should share in the blame as well.