Military madness; Why?
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Wha...
so, when Mr Lee ignores the procurement process iot bargain down the price of some generation-before-last jet aircraft, he's a genius, and when John Howard buys inolvement in a project which will see Australia at the forefront of fighter technology for decades, he is an evil despot?
Similarly, when Brendan Nelson ignores the normal processes to buy F-18E he is a criminal moron because F-111 can still cut it...oh wait, no, he's also a genius just like Mr Lee, but ....
wait, aren't you just talking bollocks, TBM?
If it was easy, or intuitive, then ex-FLTLTs would be hired back on contract to make these decisions and win the day. It isn't easy, and there are a bunch of competing priorities on every project, so it often goes wrong.
Buying FMS, (which is different to COTS and MOTS) is the only option for limiting technical risk - except when the US is already up to it's neck in technical risk (JSF). In any case, it just transfers our risk to the US military.
The only thing you can safely say is that buying old, last-generation military equipment is less risky than buying new equipment. Whether or not that equipment meets the requirement is another question entirely.
Similarly, when Brendan Nelson ignores the normal processes to buy F-18E he is a criminal moron because F-111 can still cut it...oh wait, no, he's also a genius just like Mr Lee, but ....
wait, aren't you just talking bollocks, TBM?
If it was easy, or intuitive, then ex-FLTLTs would be hired back on contract to make these decisions and win the day. It isn't easy, and there are a bunch of competing priorities on every project, so it often goes wrong.
Buying FMS, (which is different to COTS and MOTS) is the only option for limiting technical risk - except when the US is already up to it's neck in technical risk (JSF). In any case, it just transfers our risk to the US military.
The only thing you can safely say is that buying old, last-generation military equipment is less risky than buying new equipment. Whether or not that equipment meets the requirement is another question entirely.
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Rigga
The point is that we use military standards to show that the equipment will survive the environment they will be operated in. The boxes need to be vibrated and still operate to show that when they are fitted to an aircraft they will continue to function, there is no point fitting a box that's going to shake itself to bits by the time you get off the ground!
Which standards are needed? Well some of it depends on the customer, but if you rock up to fit your new box onto an aircraft and it doesn't comply with the standards then it won't be allowed on!
The point is that we use military standards to show that the equipment will survive the environment they will be operated in. The boxes need to be vibrated and still operate to show that when they are fitted to an aircraft they will continue to function, there is no point fitting a box that's going to shake itself to bits by the time you get off the ground!
Which standards are needed? Well some of it depends on the customer, but if you rock up to fit your new box onto an aircraft and it doesn't comply with the standards then it won't be allowed on!
Thread Starter
EMERGOV:
If you read what I wrote I said the Super Hornet and C-17 projects set an example as GOOD buying for the ADF. Howard and Nelson can take a bow on those.
Many other projects are flops.....trying to second guess on new rather than mature technology is risky business when one considers the small numbers of things we buy.
The F-35 will probably be another F-111. Bad start, good result. More Super Hornets and buy F-35's later in the cycle perhaps!
Wedgetail will never fully meet the capability sought I'm told. What would have been wrong with a lesser number of B767 AWACS ala Japan??
If you read what I wrote I said the Super Hornet and C-17 projects set an example as GOOD buying for the ADF. Howard and Nelson can take a bow on those.
Many other projects are flops.....trying to second guess on new rather than mature technology is risky business when one considers the small numbers of things we buy.
The F-35 will probably be another F-111. Bad start, good result. More Super Hornets and buy F-35's later in the cycle perhaps!
Wedgetail will never fully meet the capability sought I'm told. What would have been wrong with a lesser number of B767 AWACS ala Japan??
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I think we agree here.
The competing priorities part cannot be overstated in my book. The AS government has a long-held policy of ensuring a level of local industry involvement. This creates jobs, and ensures a market for some very specific and difficult to maintain qualifications. No-one is a fan of QANTAS sending its maintenance off shore, but plenty of people question why the govt will reward defence contracts that retain aerospace and marine engineering jobs in Australia.
FMS is the way to go for rapid acquisition of proven equipment, but then we find ourselves locked into an upgrade and sustainment plan not of our choosing. When a specific operational requirement comes up, due to a local threat, or local conditions, or introduction of some legislation like crash worthiness, we have to think long and hard about venturing away from the terms of the FMS contract.
In the mean time, we have DSTO, ARDU, and other agencies specifically to ensure we can do these mods, but when we do, everyone cries foul about 'Australianising' the equipment.
Govt wants value for money, but also wants top-end equipment. Govt distrusts defence because of bad projects, but are utterly reliant on defence opinion when choosing those contracts. Defence wants proven kit, govt wants assurances that the kit will last for years and years and still be relevant.
It's not like buying a car at all, really. It's more like buying a power plant in a national park with someone else's money when no-one knows if Australia First or the Greens will set policy next year.
The competing priorities part cannot be overstated in my book. The AS government has a long-held policy of ensuring a level of local industry involvement. This creates jobs, and ensures a market for some very specific and difficult to maintain qualifications. No-one is a fan of QANTAS sending its maintenance off shore, but plenty of people question why the govt will reward defence contracts that retain aerospace and marine engineering jobs in Australia.
FMS is the way to go for rapid acquisition of proven equipment, but then we find ourselves locked into an upgrade and sustainment plan not of our choosing. When a specific operational requirement comes up, due to a local threat, or local conditions, or introduction of some legislation like crash worthiness, we have to think long and hard about venturing away from the terms of the FMS contract.
In the mean time, we have DSTO, ARDU, and other agencies specifically to ensure we can do these mods, but when we do, everyone cries foul about 'Australianising' the equipment.
Govt wants value for money, but also wants top-end equipment. Govt distrusts defence because of bad projects, but are utterly reliant on defence opinion when choosing those contracts. Defence wants proven kit, govt wants assurances that the kit will last for years and years and still be relevant.
It's not like buying a car at all, really. It's more like buying a power plant in a national park with someone else's money when no-one knows if Australia First or the Greens will set policy next year.
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Why Australia's military capacity has declined.
Hello all.
Pre-Tange Re-organization of Australian defence in 1974, hardware acquisition planning was managed pretty efficiently within the relatively armed forces departments with small public service components embedded and the military were properly under political control with individual service ministerial representation. Now, the military is subjected to public service domination and hardware acquisition is managed under a separate ministry. DMO and DSTO have undue political clout and their relationship with large multinational arms conglomerates seems pretty murky.
The main thrust of defence policy is support of low productivity largely foreign-parented defence industries which are siphoning money out of the country. Both major political parties are supporting long-range unrealistic and unaffordable increases in defence spending to benefit such industry which is really uneconomic job creation. It does not seem to matter that unproven costly acquisitions, with multiple associated capability gaps, are actually diminishing defence preparedness and there seems a continual shrugging of shoulders at all levels re acquisition and operating costs. We are only now seeing the tip of a very big iceberg regarding flawed costly equipment acquisitions aiming toward a mythical Force 2030 structure and there may have to be a big reality check sometime soon.
Australia has often been suckered into becoming a launch customer for unproven hardware lured by offset orders for industry. The nation would be much better prepared militarily if it were a lagging customer after upgrade programs for new hardware have become established evolving from operating experience worldwide. Similarly, it seems smarter to put some existing hardware through approved factory upgrade programs overseas, even if they might be lacking in some capabilities considered essential by our defence dreamers. There are a plethora of modular upgrade systems created these days certified for adaptation to a wide array of military hardware so low risk enhancements (minimal R&D) are achievable either locally or offshore.
Australian political and military leaders are being neglectful of their responsibilities to maintain continuous adequate and credible military preparedness and unless there is radical change in defence organisation and culture, the present unjustifiable and unaffordable waste of much taxpayer funding will just continue.
Pre-Tange Re-organization of Australian defence in 1974, hardware acquisition planning was managed pretty efficiently within the relatively armed forces departments with small public service components embedded and the military were properly under political control with individual service ministerial representation. Now, the military is subjected to public service domination and hardware acquisition is managed under a separate ministry. DMO and DSTO have undue political clout and their relationship with large multinational arms conglomerates seems pretty murky.
The main thrust of defence policy is support of low productivity largely foreign-parented defence industries which are siphoning money out of the country. Both major political parties are supporting long-range unrealistic and unaffordable increases in defence spending to benefit such industry which is really uneconomic job creation. It does not seem to matter that unproven costly acquisitions, with multiple associated capability gaps, are actually diminishing defence preparedness and there seems a continual shrugging of shoulders at all levels re acquisition and operating costs. We are only now seeing the tip of a very big iceberg regarding flawed costly equipment acquisitions aiming toward a mythical Force 2030 structure and there may have to be a big reality check sometime soon.
Australia has often been suckered into becoming a launch customer for unproven hardware lured by offset orders for industry. The nation would be much better prepared militarily if it were a lagging customer after upgrade programs for new hardware have become established evolving from operating experience worldwide. Similarly, it seems smarter to put some existing hardware through approved factory upgrade programs overseas, even if they might be lacking in some capabilities considered essential by our defence dreamers. There are a plethora of modular upgrade systems created these days certified for adaptation to a wide array of military hardware so low risk enhancements (minimal R&D) are achievable either locally or offshore.
Australian political and military leaders are being neglectful of their responsibilities to maintain continuous adequate and credible military preparedness and unless there is radical change in defence organisation and culture, the present unjustifiable and unaffordable waste of much taxpayer funding will just continue.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 6th Feb 2011 at 23:01.
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From my viewpoint as a lowly engineer working on military projects (aviation and naval, UK and Aus) there are several problems.
The personnel problem on the customer side is plain (2 year tours, not much experience etc), though a lot of my current customer PO is permanent civil servants.
Also, there is much wrong with the major contractors. To win the bid, you have to put in the most believable lie you can. You have to say you will be cheaper and quicker than the competition, without being caught bullsh.tting.
Even many projects that say they are "on time and on budget" are only in that position due to the latest adjustments/agreements with the customer. Schedules are almost meaningless.
I am asked how long it will take to do a task, I say, for instance, 2 weeks (10 days). The manager then tries to give me 7 days, and looks pissed off when I say "no, 10 days". There is a major lack of understanding on the part of project managers, schedule is king and leads to the god of money. If you don't meet the schedule, you get extra 'help' and have to waste time explaining things to them, and generating more metrics/recovery plans/schedules to satisfy them.
The idea of a major contract is to do absolute minimum possible to meet the requirements, doesn't matter how suitable to product is. (e.g. controls for a video recorder on one screen of an MFK, yet tape counter on a completely different page
)
The major contractors are also getting snowed under in process and standards (reporting, metrics, reviews). You have to have all these things to show you are a competent organisation, and individually each makes sense. However, you end up with so many of them that they take so much time that nobody gets the core work done. My current project has more people faffing around on contracts and commercial stuff than we have engineers doing the core job.
I think for Aus the whole Australianisation thing sometimes costs more money than it generates (well, a lot of the time to be honest). I'm all for keeping cash in the country (and me employed), but the cost and time blowouts to come up with a unique version of something scary. I don't think we have the economy to support the buying habit of Australianisation. I reckon let the better off countries buy the 'A' model, then when the bugs are ironed out, we'll get some, probably still quicker than waiting for it to be Australianised.
Even fixed price contracts are not the cure people had hoped. If the customer stuck rigidly to them the penalty payments and liquidated damages etc would drive the company under, and you wouldn't get any product. Maybe that needs to be the new attitude, pick a couple of smallish projects and ruthlessly implement the contract, no leeway. The government wastes some money in the short term, a couple of companies go under / get swallowed by competitors, Other companies get the message and suddenly become more realistic in pricing an schedule. Not a great vote winner though, politicians may have to find a new job.
I am often stopped from doing a job to the best of my abilities because all we want is the minimum effort for the cheapest cost.
Basically, I'm looking to get out of engineering and do something completely different. The dissatisfaction with how these military projects go is not just on the customer side. Sorry for the war-and-peace rant.
Anybody in Aus looking to employ an ex-engineer?
(probably not after that rant, thank god for internet anonymity)
The personnel problem on the customer side is plain (2 year tours, not much experience etc), though a lot of my current customer PO is permanent civil servants.
Also, there is much wrong with the major contractors. To win the bid, you have to put in the most believable lie you can. You have to say you will be cheaper and quicker than the competition, without being caught bullsh.tting.
Even many projects that say they are "on time and on budget" are only in that position due to the latest adjustments/agreements with the customer. Schedules are almost meaningless.
I am asked how long it will take to do a task, I say, for instance, 2 weeks (10 days). The manager then tries to give me 7 days, and looks pissed off when I say "no, 10 days". There is a major lack of understanding on the part of project managers, schedule is king and leads to the god of money. If you don't meet the schedule, you get extra 'help' and have to waste time explaining things to them, and generating more metrics/recovery plans/schedules to satisfy them.
The idea of a major contract is to do absolute minimum possible to meet the requirements, doesn't matter how suitable to product is. (e.g. controls for a video recorder on one screen of an MFK, yet tape counter on a completely different page
)The major contractors are also getting snowed under in process and standards (reporting, metrics, reviews). You have to have all these things to show you are a competent organisation, and individually each makes sense. However, you end up with so many of them that they take so much time that nobody gets the core work done. My current project has more people faffing around on contracts and commercial stuff than we have engineers doing the core job.
I think for Aus the whole Australianisation thing sometimes costs more money than it generates (well, a lot of the time to be honest). I'm all for keeping cash in the country (and me employed), but the cost and time blowouts to come up with a unique version of something scary. I don't think we have the economy to support the buying habit of Australianisation. I reckon let the better off countries buy the 'A' model, then when the bugs are ironed out, we'll get some, probably still quicker than waiting for it to be Australianised.
Even fixed price contracts are not the cure people had hoped. If the customer stuck rigidly to them the penalty payments and liquidated damages etc would drive the company under, and you wouldn't get any product. Maybe that needs to be the new attitude, pick a couple of smallish projects and ruthlessly implement the contract, no leeway. The government wastes some money in the short term, a couple of companies go under / get swallowed by competitors, Other companies get the message and suddenly become more realistic in pricing an schedule. Not a great vote winner though, politicians may have to find a new job.
I am often stopped from doing a job to the best of my abilities because all we want is the minimum effort for the cheapest cost.
Basically, I'm looking to get out of engineering and do something completely different. The dissatisfaction with how these military projects go is not just on the customer side. Sorry for the war-and-peace rant.
Anybody in Aus looking to employ an ex-engineer?
(probably not after that rant, thank god for internet anonymity)
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Originally Posted by Straight Up Again
The personnel problem on the customer side is plain (2 year tours, not much experience etc), though a lot of my current customer PO is permanent civil servants.
Not saying we post talented SQN LDRs / MAJs etc to DMO or various projects from project inception to Sqn service (no matter how long); nor saying we ought to build our own ICBMs
(OK I'm being silly); but there may be scope in this regard to minimise the posting cycle sh1t fight for projects of vital importance.What would it take? Would would the costs be for both the service & the member concerned? What precautions would be needed to avoid 'customer capture'? What incentives would be needed to attract talented SMEs to 'opt out' of the posting cycle for 6-10 years?
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Hello Scran.
I erred; there are now 3 separate ministers governing the Defence organisation, Minister for Defence, Minister for Defence Material, Minister for Defence Science & Personnel plus a Parliamentary Secretary for Defence. Appreciable shuffling of politicians through defence related appointments since 2007.
Both DMO and DSTO now have their own separate ministerial clout whereas the military is subordinate to the Secretary of Defence/CDF diarchy under the Minister for Defence. Once upon a time, each of the armed forces had their own ministerial representation with public service elements embedded in the respective military departments and that worked well.
In theory, DMO ought to be just a project co-ordination agency but it certainly wields more power. If I recall correctly, former Ministers for Defence Fitzgibbon and Faulkner both expressed frustration at being unable to exercise adequate control over processes in DMO.
My point is nothing works effectively unless appropriately organised and the whole defence structure is really a fragmented dysfunctional mess; but I doubt that the politicians (of either major political party) have the fortitude to restructure back towards a semblance of the system that once worked pretty efficiently. Things may get a whole lot worse if DMO gets spun off into a separate corporate entity, which has been proposed.
I erred; there are now 3 separate ministers governing the Defence organisation, Minister for Defence, Minister for Defence Material, Minister for Defence Science & Personnel plus a Parliamentary Secretary for Defence. Appreciable shuffling of politicians through defence related appointments since 2007.
Both DMO and DSTO now have their own separate ministerial clout whereas the military is subordinate to the Secretary of Defence/CDF diarchy under the Minister for Defence. Once upon a time, each of the armed forces had their own ministerial representation with public service elements embedded in the respective military departments and that worked well.
In theory, DMO ought to be just a project co-ordination agency but it certainly wields more power. If I recall correctly, former Ministers for Defence Fitzgibbon and Faulkner both expressed frustration at being unable to exercise adequate control over processes in DMO.
My point is nothing works effectively unless appropriately organised and the whole defence structure is really a fragmented dysfunctional mess; but I doubt that the politicians (of either major political party) have the fortitude to restructure back towards a semblance of the system that once worked pretty efficiently. Things may get a whole lot worse if DMO gets spun off into a separate corporate entity, which has been proposed.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 7th Feb 2011 at 17:20.
Thread Starter
The so-called "corporatisation" of Defence is creating massive inefficiencies and cost to the military. All aspects are over managed with fewer people at the coalface.
In reality we run a small military and if you look at budgets vs. numbers compared to other countries we must be blowing alot of loot on 'hot air'....
In reality we run a small military and if you look at budgets vs. numbers compared to other countries we must be blowing alot of loot on 'hot air'....
Music Quizmeister
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Bushranger,
Thanks.
I wonder, however, if we went back to a Minister for each Service, would we be any better off - or would we have Minister's fighting each other, whereas now, supposedly, the senior Minister (i.e. Defence) is the descision maker.
I do agree that the two "junior" Minister's and Parlimentary Secretary don't seem to do any value-adding to the entire process...............
(edited for spelling.....)
Thanks.
I wonder, however, if we went back to a Minister for each Service, would we be any better off - or would we have Minister's fighting each other, whereas now, supposedly, the senior Minister (i.e. Defence) is the descision maker.
I do agree that the two "junior" Minister's and Parlimentary Secretary don't seem to do any value-adding to the entire process...............
(edited for spelling.....)
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compressorstall
When you said :
'When you buy a car, you go to the showroom, see what closest matches your requirements and what you can afford, and then you haggle a bit to save money and then pay up and drive off. In the military a bunch of people of 2 year tours come up with the requirement and industry seeks to match it, then after 2 years, another bunch of staff officers tinker with the requirement and industry reacts to the requested changes, then after 2 years come more staff officers'
You missed out one other vital thing....... the people that went to the car showroom in the first place, couldn't even drive a car!!!! Now that's where the main problem lies!
Winco
When you said :
'When you buy a car, you go to the showroom, see what closest matches your requirements and what you can afford, and then you haggle a bit to save money and then pay up and drive off. In the military a bunch of people of 2 year tours come up with the requirement and industry seeks to match it, then after 2 years, another bunch of staff officers tinker with the requirement and industry reacts to the requested changes, then after 2 years come more staff officers'
You missed out one other vital thing....... the people that went to the car showroom in the first place, couldn't even drive a car!!!! Now that's where the main problem lies!
Winco
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Hi again Scran.
There is ongoing unfettered Australian Public Service recruiting for highly paid positions in DoD and DMO so civilian domination of the defence realm is growing prodigiously. If the organisational structure was streamlined along the following lines, huge efficiencies would be achievable:
a. abolish both of the Material and Science & Personnel ministries,
b. downsize DMO and DSTO making them agencies subordinate to MinDef,
c. establish cells of DMO within DoD and the respective armed forces headquarters,
c. vest personnel management within the Secretary of Defence/CDF diarchy, where it belongs,
d. create parliamentary secretaries for each of the armed forces subordinate to MinDef; and
e. vest authority for all defence expenditure in MinDef.
These measures would dilute the public service domination of the defence realm and reinstate more traditional political control of the military; also generate big savings in manpower costs enabling labour to be diverted for other national needs.
Dare I say that defence budgetting could also be pruned to an affordable and adequate 7.5 percent of federal government revenue, not the near 10 percent as now and projected to unrealistically increase out to 2030. That would really cause some soul-searching regarding wasteful spending. Tying projected defence expenditure to GDP is just deceitful smoke and mirrors stuff. Former MinDef Fitzgibbon was on the right track pulling back defence outlay projections to the 4 year budget estimates process but then Parliamentary Secretary Combet reverted that to a 10 year horizon due to lobbying from largely foreign-owned defence industry.
Are such reforms realistic? Sadly, the political will probably does not exist within either of the major political parties; but pretty bold action is essential if the existing shambolic scenario is to be remedied. Perhaps the biggest obstacle is that so many former politicians, senior public servants and military chiefs have been or are now riding the Defence 'gravy train'. Just check who were/are directly employed in influential appointments by the multi-national arms conglomerates and/or as lobbyists on mind-blowing financial packages.
There is ongoing unfettered Australian Public Service recruiting for highly paid positions in DoD and DMO so civilian domination of the defence realm is growing prodigiously. If the organisational structure was streamlined along the following lines, huge efficiencies would be achievable:
a. abolish both of the Material and Science & Personnel ministries,
b. downsize DMO and DSTO making them agencies subordinate to MinDef,
c. establish cells of DMO within DoD and the respective armed forces headquarters,
c. vest personnel management within the Secretary of Defence/CDF diarchy, where it belongs,
d. create parliamentary secretaries for each of the armed forces subordinate to MinDef; and
e. vest authority for all defence expenditure in MinDef.
These measures would dilute the public service domination of the defence realm and reinstate more traditional political control of the military; also generate big savings in manpower costs enabling labour to be diverted for other national needs.
Dare I say that defence budgetting could also be pruned to an affordable and adequate 7.5 percent of federal government revenue, not the near 10 percent as now and projected to unrealistically increase out to 2030. That would really cause some soul-searching regarding wasteful spending. Tying projected defence expenditure to GDP is just deceitful smoke and mirrors stuff. Former MinDef Fitzgibbon was on the right track pulling back defence outlay projections to the 4 year budget estimates process but then Parliamentary Secretary Combet reverted that to a 10 year horizon due to lobbying from largely foreign-owned defence industry.
Are such reforms realistic? Sadly, the political will probably does not exist within either of the major political parties; but pretty bold action is essential if the existing shambolic scenario is to be remedied. Perhaps the biggest obstacle is that so many former politicians, senior public servants and military chiefs have been or are now riding the Defence 'gravy train'. Just check who were/are directly employed in influential appointments by the multi-national arms conglomerates and/or as lobbyists on mind-blowing financial packages.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 8th Feb 2011 at 10:01.
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Not saying we post talented SQN LDRs / MAJs etc to DMO or various projects from project inception to Sqn service (no matter how long); nor saying we ought to build our own ICBMs (OK I'm being silly); but there may be scope in this regard to minimise the posting cycle sh1t fight for projects of vital importance.
What would it take? Would would the costs be for both the service & the member concerned? What precautions would be needed to avoid 'customer capture'? What incentives would be needed to attract talented SMEs to 'opt out' of the posting cycle for 6-10 years?
What would it take? Would would the costs be for both the service & the member concerned? What precautions would be needed to avoid 'customer capture'? What incentives would be needed to attract talented SMEs to 'opt out' of the posting cycle for 6-10 years?
How much does their military effectiveness dissapear over that time? i.e. if you have an Army SME from an armoured vehicle background, will he lose some of his effectiveness as he gest further away from operational, and indeed operational concepts and other kit (not from his project) change? (genuine question, I don't have a military background, but know that test pilots do limited tours usually before going back to a squadron)
I still think you would need some short term people on the project to keep an input from the end user perspective, but maybe less of them and in less important positions, or else you may end with on time, on budget, meets the requirements kit that is actually bugger all use.
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Hi Straight Up Again.
I have seen a few gripes from DMO sources regarding military representative posting turbulence but ponder whether this might just be deflecting criticism regarding some of the ill-managed projects.
I cannot recall changeover of particular project officers being much of a problem when the armed forces managed their own projects. Pretty easy to arrange say a couple of months overlap where there are no subordinate continuation staff.
Methinks there would be a simple solution if the military resumed responsibility for project management with DMO cells embedded in the respective service headquarters. Simply invite military retirees to involve in projects as there are thousands just annoying their wives and itching to do something constructive. I drink beer with many in their late 80s who are still sharp as a tack and this invaluable national resource should not be wasted.
An outside the square solution I know, but it seems to me the problem is easily solved with some flexible thinking.
I have seen a few gripes from DMO sources regarding military representative posting turbulence but ponder whether this might just be deflecting criticism regarding some of the ill-managed projects.
I cannot recall changeover of particular project officers being much of a problem when the armed forces managed their own projects. Pretty easy to arrange say a couple of months overlap where there are no subordinate continuation staff.
Methinks there would be a simple solution if the military resumed responsibility for project management with DMO cells embedded in the respective service headquarters. Simply invite military retirees to involve in projects as there are thousands just annoying their wives and itching to do something constructive. I drink beer with many in their late 80s who are still sharp as a tack and this invaluable national resource should not be wasted.
An outside the square solution I know, but it seems to me the problem is easily solved with some flexible thinking.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 8th Feb 2011 at 08:51.
Thread Starter
A bit of common-sense , experience in the field plus some business smarts are required.
My friend's son was up until recently in the Army [infantry] and served in Timor and ME theatres. His unit was involved in combat boot trials not long ago. Each man was issued with three different makes/styles of combat boot. This required them to field trial them and report through a convoluted paperwork process on the suitability etc etc of each type and to rate them 1 to 3.
The boot that was rated 3 by the majority was the one selected by DMO for production. Afterwards an order came out that soldiers were not allowed to wear privately sourced boots as "they had selected the 'new' combat boot"!!!! A joke I'd say...
This is typical of the bull**** in procurement. He also said he and his friends used US boots where possible as they were easily available in fractional fittings vs. the "new" boot that was limited in available sizes and numbers.
Apart from a weapon, boots are an infanteers' major asset...
My friend's son was up until recently in the Army [infantry] and served in Timor and ME theatres. His unit was involved in combat boot trials not long ago. Each man was issued with three different makes/styles of combat boot. This required them to field trial them and report through a convoluted paperwork process on the suitability etc etc of each type and to rate them 1 to 3.
The boot that was rated 3 by the majority was the one selected by DMO for production. Afterwards an order came out that soldiers were not allowed to wear privately sourced boots as "they had selected the 'new' combat boot"!!!! A joke I'd say...
This is typical of the bull**** in procurement. He also said he and his friends used US boots where possible as they were easily available in fractional fittings vs. the "new" boot that was limited in available sizes and numbers.
Apart from a weapon, boots are an infanteers' major asset...
