Iroquois camouflage
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Iroquois camouflage
Bushranger may know the answer to this.
How did the camo scheme come about for the Australian Raaf/Army Hueys?
It's slightly different to other Australian Army choppers as it's two-tone (tan/green) with no black. It's my favourite of the Oz schemes and always wondered how it came to be.
Cheers
Chris
How did the camo scheme come about for the Australian Raaf/Army Hueys?
It's slightly different to other Australian Army choppers as it's two-tone (tan/green) with no black. It's my favourite of the Oz schemes and always wondered how it came to be.
Cheers
Chris
BR71 will be able to put some more detail on this. But basically 9 SQN came back to Amberley from Vietnam at the end of 1971. The UH-1H at this stage was still in overall olive green. Over the next few years - I guess about 1973-1975 - some schemes were trialled, and this was the one that eventually won out. This was also the final scheme when aircraft were handed over to the Army about 1989, and some gifted to PNG.
Interesting to note that in this mid-70s period, the "RAAF" marked on the fuselage sides was changed to "AIR FORCE" (remember BD?), because the media always reported "Army" choppers carrying out rescues and flood relief, etc !!
Nothing changes. The media also reported today that Army aircraft were evacuting people from Cairns to Brisbane - evacuations of course have been by C-17 and C-130. Gotta laugh, but the media do not know the difference between the ADF, RAAF and Army.
Interesting to note that in this mid-70s period, the "RAAF" marked on the fuselage sides was changed to "AIR FORCE" (remember BD?), because the media always reported "Army" choppers carrying out rescues and flood relief, etc !!
Nothing changes. The media also reported today that Army aircraft were evacuting people from Cairns to Brisbane - evacuations of course have been by C-17 and C-130. Gotta laugh, but the media do not know the difference between the ADF, RAAF and Army.
Vietnam scheme - Yes I believe so, and that is appropriate.
The original scheme was silver, believe it or not!
The first UH-1B (or 204B) A2-384 was delivered in the first batch of 8 for SAR. But concurrently (1962) the role was changing to battlefield support and then our involvement in Malaya and Vietnam for these early aircraft. So all subsequent machines (and the first) had a scheme of an attractive gloss olive green with white roof, yellow and white detailing. But gloss had tactical drawbacks.
Eventually in Vietnam the aircraft were matt olive green overall, with toned-down black detailing.
A very proud record by 9SQN in SVN, which BR71 is always attesting to.
The original scheme was silver, believe it or not!
The first UH-1B (or 204B) A2-384 was delivered in the first batch of 8 for SAR. But concurrently (1962) the role was changing to battlefield support and then our involvement in Malaya and Vietnam for these early aircraft. So all subsequent machines (and the first) had a scheme of an attractive gloss olive green with white roof, yellow and white detailing. But gloss had tactical drawbacks.
Eventually in Vietnam the aircraft were matt olive green overall, with toned-down black detailing.
A very proud record by 9SQN in SVN, which BR71 is always attesting to.
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RAAF Iroquois camouflage scheme
Hello all. Many accounts of military happenings drift toward myths over time.
The RAAF Iroquois camouflage scheme was initiated for a particular purpose post-Vietnam War; development trials for fighter versus helicopter tactics. There were no alternative schemes considered and that introduced was designed by my kids in 1976. Full story with imagery to appear shortly, which most should find quite interesting. Meanwhile, this article may also appeal.
January 27, 2011 - Knight Ridder/Tribune - YAKIMA, Washington.
An icon of the Vietnam War, a faithful conveyer of American troops across the globe and saviour to countless lost or injured civilians, the Huey helicopter's long Army service is ending. For the medevac detachment at the Army's Yakima Training Center, that distinguished career concluded Wednesday. More than 50 years after the first models lifted off, the Army is retiring the few single-bladed UH-1 variants still sitting on the flightline.
Wednesday's retirement ceremony at the training center was a bitter-sweet moment for the pilots, crewmen and passengers who came to know the Huey as a reliable machine for both combat missions and stateside duties, most notably civilian search and rescue. Chief Warrant Officer Joseph Long, part of the Training Center's Air Ambulance Detachment, is probably one of the last Vietnam-era Huey pilots serving today. He was recalled to active duty in 2002 because the Army didn't have enough Huey-trained pilots. Long had the honor of piloting the last formal Huey mission at the training center as part of the flyaway retirement ceremony on the parade ground. Sitting on his left was retired Lt. Col. Bruce Crandall, who received the Medal of Honor for flying 70 wounded troops out of Vietnam's Ia Drang Valley in 1965.
Long said newer helicopters have been threatening to push the Huey out of service for 30 years. "It just never happened," Long said. "It was always pulling a mission."The Huey is considered the most widely known modern helicopter, thanks to numerous Hollywood depictions and the characteristic "whoop-whoop-whoop" sound made by the spinning main rotor. "It's an iconic aircraft. It's an amazing thing to be able to fly something that everybody knows," said Maj. George Johnson, commanding officer of the training center's medevac detachment.
The Huey was well known in its role as a medevac chopper and its pilots earned a reputation as the "cowboys of aviation" for their willingness to fly whenever, wherever, however if somebody needed help under fire. The bird was nicknamed "Dustoff" for the cloud of dirt kicked up on takeoff, a name still given to medevac crews. But the Huey also served as a troop transport and air assault platform, part of the military's decision to broaden the Army's aviation aspect for the "helicopter war" in Vietnam. Seven thousand flew in Vietnam; more than 16,000 were made.
The Huey differed from its predecessors by use of a turbo-shaft engine that took up less space. "There's no doubt that without this aircraft, we couldn't have done what we did there in Vietnam," said retired Col. Phillip Courts, commander of the Army's Ninth Aviation Brigade in Vietnam and a guest speaker at Wednesday's ceremony. Courts told how he once led a group of 35 Hueys from Fort Lewis to Portland before heading east along the Columbia River on their way to the training center. Hoping to find a path through bad weather, he punched ahead of the rest of the choppers but ended up having to land. The crew spent the night grounded and then flew toward Union Gap, where a shortage of fuel forced him to land short of his destination."I had to live with that for several years, but the story ended well," Courts said.
Many who boarded the Huey could tell the same story. Even when the Huey crashed, it often held together well enough to spare the occupants from major injury. Don Morris, a retired Army command sergeant major from Ellensburg, on Wednesday recalled surviving crashes in the jungle and a rice paddy. "They could take the abuse and keep on going," Morris said.Other helicopters carry more technology and are better outfitted for today's military. But fans of the original Huey know that their favorite helicopter could stay in the air for another 20 years.
The seven Hueys in the training center fleet will be turned over to the Air Force to serve as training aircraft. At least will two remain in service at Fort Rucker, Ala., the epicenter of the Army's aviation program, an Army spokeswoman said. Even though Wednesday's retirement flight was limited by fog, Crandall said he still enjoyed the chance to go up one more time in an active-duty Huey. "That's the best helicopter ever built up to now," he said
Perhaps some journalistic distortion regarding the acronym DUSTOFF which according to legend meant 'Dedicated Untiring Support To Our Fighting Forces'.
The RAAF Iroquois camouflage scheme was initiated for a particular purpose post-Vietnam War; development trials for fighter versus helicopter tactics. There were no alternative schemes considered and that introduced was designed by my kids in 1976. Full story with imagery to appear shortly, which most should find quite interesting. Meanwhile, this article may also appeal.
January 27, 2011 - Knight Ridder/Tribune - YAKIMA, Washington.
An icon of the Vietnam War, a faithful conveyer of American troops across the globe and saviour to countless lost or injured civilians, the Huey helicopter's long Army service is ending. For the medevac detachment at the Army's Yakima Training Center, that distinguished career concluded Wednesday. More than 50 years after the first models lifted off, the Army is retiring the few single-bladed UH-1 variants still sitting on the flightline.
Wednesday's retirement ceremony at the training center was a bitter-sweet moment for the pilots, crewmen and passengers who came to know the Huey as a reliable machine for both combat missions and stateside duties, most notably civilian search and rescue. Chief Warrant Officer Joseph Long, part of the Training Center's Air Ambulance Detachment, is probably one of the last Vietnam-era Huey pilots serving today. He was recalled to active duty in 2002 because the Army didn't have enough Huey-trained pilots. Long had the honor of piloting the last formal Huey mission at the training center as part of the flyaway retirement ceremony on the parade ground. Sitting on his left was retired Lt. Col. Bruce Crandall, who received the Medal of Honor for flying 70 wounded troops out of Vietnam's Ia Drang Valley in 1965.
Long said newer helicopters have been threatening to push the Huey out of service for 30 years. "It just never happened," Long said. "It was always pulling a mission."The Huey is considered the most widely known modern helicopter, thanks to numerous Hollywood depictions and the characteristic "whoop-whoop-whoop" sound made by the spinning main rotor. "It's an iconic aircraft. It's an amazing thing to be able to fly something that everybody knows," said Maj. George Johnson, commanding officer of the training center's medevac detachment.
The Huey was well known in its role as a medevac chopper and its pilots earned a reputation as the "cowboys of aviation" for their willingness to fly whenever, wherever, however if somebody needed help under fire. The bird was nicknamed "Dustoff" for the cloud of dirt kicked up on takeoff, a name still given to medevac crews. But the Huey also served as a troop transport and air assault platform, part of the military's decision to broaden the Army's aviation aspect for the "helicopter war" in Vietnam. Seven thousand flew in Vietnam; more than 16,000 were made.
The Huey differed from its predecessors by use of a turbo-shaft engine that took up less space. "There's no doubt that without this aircraft, we couldn't have done what we did there in Vietnam," said retired Col. Phillip Courts, commander of the Army's Ninth Aviation Brigade in Vietnam and a guest speaker at Wednesday's ceremony. Courts told how he once led a group of 35 Hueys from Fort Lewis to Portland before heading east along the Columbia River on their way to the training center. Hoping to find a path through bad weather, he punched ahead of the rest of the choppers but ended up having to land. The crew spent the night grounded and then flew toward Union Gap, where a shortage of fuel forced him to land short of his destination."I had to live with that for several years, but the story ended well," Courts said.
Many who boarded the Huey could tell the same story. Even when the Huey crashed, it often held together well enough to spare the occupants from major injury. Don Morris, a retired Army command sergeant major from Ellensburg, on Wednesday recalled surviving crashes in the jungle and a rice paddy. "They could take the abuse and keep on going," Morris said.Other helicopters carry more technology and are better outfitted for today's military. But fans of the original Huey know that their favorite helicopter could stay in the air for another 20 years.
The seven Hueys in the training center fleet will be turned over to the Air Force to serve as training aircraft. At least will two remain in service at Fort Rucker, Ala., the epicenter of the Army's aviation program, an Army spokeswoman said. Even though Wednesday's retirement flight was limited by fog, Crandall said he still enjoyed the chance to go up one more time in an active-duty Huey. "That's the best helicopter ever built up to now," he said
Perhaps some journalistic distortion regarding the acronym DUSTOFF which according to legend meant 'Dedicated Untiring Support To Our Fighting Forces'.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 5th Feb 2011 at 19:18.
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How the RAAF Iroquois camouflage scheme originated
The development of the RAAF Iroquois camouflage devolved indirectly from the Vietnam War so please tolerate a background ramble before we get to the substance of how a camouflaged fleet emerged.
In January 1969, then Group Captain 'Bay' Adams, DFC, AFC was Task Force Air Commander for 1 Australian Task Force in Vietnam - he gets mentions in Pierre Klosterman's great book 'The Big Show' regarding WW2 happenings. We often discussed supposed helicopter vulnerability/survivability way after bar closure and one particular incident in PK's book understandably influenced his thinking. Have mislaid my copy of the book but they were both in a flight of 8 Typhoons attacking a Luftwaffe airfield. The German flak tower gunners were on the ball and only Pierre and Bay survived the attack.
Digressing a bit more; big Bay was flying with me one day (me then Squadron Leader) and we were leading the second of 2 flights of 4 Iroquois to extract a company of infantry from a fairly tight clearing in jungle. We landed sort of in pretty compressed finger four formation (so-called heavy left) squeezed up on the first flight.
The Group Captain was flying and I told him to just hold the aircraft lightly on the skids when we touched down because the condition of dry grass covered ground beneath was uncertain. He was a big man and did not yet have a sensitive feel for chopper ops so somewhat dumped the collective whereupon we began to roll backwards experiencing some slight juddering from mast bumping by the rotorhead. I grabbed control and eased forward as much as we dared before handing over and advising him to just keep a bit more power on so we were light on the skids. But he seemed not to grasp what I meant and again lowered the collective too far whereupon the ground collapsed beneath us or we perhaps teetered on an old artillery shell crater hidden in the longish dry grass. Mast bumping was then quite severe and I decided we had to shut down to inspect for damage.
We had managed to shift a little to firmer ground before shutdown and I then noticed the forward edge of the LZ on fire – an infanteer had previously thrown a smoke grenade and rotorwash from the forward aircraft blew the white hot canister on to dry grass. I climbed up onto the cabin and the mast did not seem dented. The green men were very jumpy having had multiple contacts with the opposition and I recall looking down into a seeming myriad of wide open eyes with them all doubtless thinking: 'Oh no; what the hell is he doing up there?' I am pretty sure I decided to fly it out but my mind is now blank re that aspect, although I do recall big Bay saying when I was back in the cockpit something like: 'That was a brave thing to do' and I responded: 'No; the bloody pad is on fire.' He seemingly had not noticed that being more concerned with what might have happened to the aircraft.
Forward to post-Vietnam in 1972 after I had established the helicopter operations cell at RAAF Headquarters Operational Command and become the inaugural HOPS. I felt it very important that any lessons from Vietnam War operations should be recognised and that the Air Force should also seek to improve and further develop techniques for helicopter operations in less permissive air environments, night operations and field deployment mobility.
The seeds were sown on files and 5SQN subsequently conducted some very thorough trialling of early generation night vision goggles revealing the need for safe procedures concerning their usage. Sadly, this awareness seemingly later got lost when battlefield helos were transferred from Air Force to Army Aviation in 1989. The evidence given by the former CO 5SQN to the Army Court of Inquiry concerning the Blackhawk mid-air collision at Townsville in 1996 was apparently not adequately reflected in proceedings.
I was appointed CO 9SQN early January 1976. Sometime soon thereafter, we received a direction from HQOC to begin some development work on fighter versus helicopter tactics. A few of us at the squadron had previously flown fighters and saw this as inspirational.
We decided a matt finish Iroquois camouflage scheme would probably be beneficial and discovered there were only 2 suitable paints in the supply system although pretty appropriate colours. As with the gunship development project, it was wiser to stick with materials already in the inventory than trying to fight for funding of something different. So, I selected a few sample camouflage schemes from magazines and told the junior aircrew to come up with some draft ideas utilising the 2 available paint colours.
A couple of weeks went by with nil progress and seeming low interest so I got a bit exasperated, gathered up all of the material and took it home to our kids, explaining to them why a camouflage scheme was required. We had 5 daughters and the eldest 3 sat down with pads, crayons, etcetera. After about 3 days of the usual tribal squabbling, number 3 daughter came to me and said: 'Here's your new colour scheme Dad.' So, we took it across to the 3 Aircraft Depot Paint Shop where the guys made just a couple of minor adjustments and said: 'That's workable.'
We fired the proposed colour scheme off to HQ Operational Command and HQ Support Command, the latter being the Air Force engineering and equipment authority. Eventually, HQSC authorised painting of only 4 aircraft which was not going to be practicable. The squadron had 8 aircraft deployed in 3 separate detachments in PNG and Indonesia for virtually the whole year to support Army Survey Corps operations, had to provide ongoing Army support training in Australia and New Zealand, cope with whatever other national commitment tasking emerged and provide resources for the fighter versus helicopter tactics development activities. Just guessing now, but we probably had around 30 x C-130s in and out over the year shuffling Iroquois wherever.
In those circumstances, it was absolutely imperative to maintain the traditional maintenance stagger to ensure optimum on-line availability of aircraft. It would have been impossible to do this if the 4 aircraft to be camouflaged had to be more or less reserved for the tactics development trials so we protested to HQSC who came back and said we could paint 5. That was also unworkable and after about 20 seconds of thought, the solution became obvious.
We decided to trickle 5 through the 3AD Paint Shop to satisfy the official approval and quietly establish our own painting facility in the least conspicuous corner of the crowded hangar which we shared with 12SQN who operated Chinooks. As aircraft progressively emerged from 250 hour 'D' servicings, we would either slot them to 3AD for painting or do them in-squadron, rotating aircraft through the detachments as necessary by C-130 and always giving the appearance back at Amberley that we only had a few painted in the new camouflage scheme.
Come the end of the year, all of the birds came home to roost and one day near Christmas, the Group Captain CO 482 Maintenance Squadron, who was the pseudo HQSC representative on the base, was snooping around and came across this fleet of camouflaged Iroquois. He barged into my office protesting: 'What's the meaning of this; you were only authorised to paint 5 aircraft?' I responded: 'We had heavy operational commitments and some of your blunt mates at HQSC wanted to make it impossible for us to maintain the maintenance stagger, so we made an operational decision and painted the bloody lot.' He stomped out of the office and very soon after, the camouflage scheme was adopted for the entire Air Force Hotel model Iroquois fleet.
The moral in this story is never underestimate the creative potential of children.
We participated in the fighter versus helo tactics development trials and had great fun playing with Mirages and Macchis - 5SQN was also further involved downstream. But ultimately, the invaluable reservoir of 26 years of wide-ranging helo operations - including extensive combat experience for which there is no substitute - and the operating capabilities development work conducted post-Vietnam was sacrificed by the foolish politico/military decision to transfer Air Force battlefield helicopter assets to Army Aviation. Australia's military expertise and capacity has undoubtedly suffered.
Air Vice Marshal Bay Adams, CBE, DFC, AFC had served as Director Joint Operations & Plans in Canberra post-Vietnam, became Chief of Air Force Operations and AOC Operational Command preceding retirement in 1979. He was strongly supportive of the capabilities improvements initiatives for the RAAF helicopter force. We occasionally bumped while still serving and he would inevitably say: 'Remember that day when we were flying together in Vietnam?' and my answer was always: 'I remember!' Very sadly, he succumbed to illness in 1990. A fine man, great leader and a true warrior.
Some more thoughts on camouflage considerations in a later post.
In January 1969, then Group Captain 'Bay' Adams, DFC, AFC was Task Force Air Commander for 1 Australian Task Force in Vietnam - he gets mentions in Pierre Klosterman's great book 'The Big Show' regarding WW2 happenings. We often discussed supposed helicopter vulnerability/survivability way after bar closure and one particular incident in PK's book understandably influenced his thinking. Have mislaid my copy of the book but they were both in a flight of 8 Typhoons attacking a Luftwaffe airfield. The German flak tower gunners were on the ball and only Pierre and Bay survived the attack.
Digressing a bit more; big Bay was flying with me one day (me then Squadron Leader) and we were leading the second of 2 flights of 4 Iroquois to extract a company of infantry from a fairly tight clearing in jungle. We landed sort of in pretty compressed finger four formation (so-called heavy left) squeezed up on the first flight.
The Group Captain was flying and I told him to just hold the aircraft lightly on the skids when we touched down because the condition of dry grass covered ground beneath was uncertain. He was a big man and did not yet have a sensitive feel for chopper ops so somewhat dumped the collective whereupon we began to roll backwards experiencing some slight juddering from mast bumping by the rotorhead. I grabbed control and eased forward as much as we dared before handing over and advising him to just keep a bit more power on so we were light on the skids. But he seemed not to grasp what I meant and again lowered the collective too far whereupon the ground collapsed beneath us or we perhaps teetered on an old artillery shell crater hidden in the longish dry grass. Mast bumping was then quite severe and I decided we had to shut down to inspect for damage.
We had managed to shift a little to firmer ground before shutdown and I then noticed the forward edge of the LZ on fire – an infanteer had previously thrown a smoke grenade and rotorwash from the forward aircraft blew the white hot canister on to dry grass. I climbed up onto the cabin and the mast did not seem dented. The green men were very jumpy having had multiple contacts with the opposition and I recall looking down into a seeming myriad of wide open eyes with them all doubtless thinking: 'Oh no; what the hell is he doing up there?' I am pretty sure I decided to fly it out but my mind is now blank re that aspect, although I do recall big Bay saying when I was back in the cockpit something like: 'That was a brave thing to do' and I responded: 'No; the bloody pad is on fire.' He seemingly had not noticed that being more concerned with what might have happened to the aircraft.
Forward to post-Vietnam in 1972 after I had established the helicopter operations cell at RAAF Headquarters Operational Command and become the inaugural HOPS. I felt it very important that any lessons from Vietnam War operations should be recognised and that the Air Force should also seek to improve and further develop techniques for helicopter operations in less permissive air environments, night operations and field deployment mobility.
The seeds were sown on files and 5SQN subsequently conducted some very thorough trialling of early generation night vision goggles revealing the need for safe procedures concerning their usage. Sadly, this awareness seemingly later got lost when battlefield helos were transferred from Air Force to Army Aviation in 1989. The evidence given by the former CO 5SQN to the Army Court of Inquiry concerning the Blackhawk mid-air collision at Townsville in 1996 was apparently not adequately reflected in proceedings.
I was appointed CO 9SQN early January 1976. Sometime soon thereafter, we received a direction from HQOC to begin some development work on fighter versus helicopter tactics. A few of us at the squadron had previously flown fighters and saw this as inspirational.
We decided a matt finish Iroquois camouflage scheme would probably be beneficial and discovered there were only 2 suitable paints in the supply system although pretty appropriate colours. As with the gunship development project, it was wiser to stick with materials already in the inventory than trying to fight for funding of something different. So, I selected a few sample camouflage schemes from magazines and told the junior aircrew to come up with some draft ideas utilising the 2 available paint colours.
A couple of weeks went by with nil progress and seeming low interest so I got a bit exasperated, gathered up all of the material and took it home to our kids, explaining to them why a camouflage scheme was required. We had 5 daughters and the eldest 3 sat down with pads, crayons, etcetera. After about 3 days of the usual tribal squabbling, number 3 daughter came to me and said: 'Here's your new colour scheme Dad.' So, we took it across to the 3 Aircraft Depot Paint Shop where the guys made just a couple of minor adjustments and said: 'That's workable.'
We fired the proposed colour scheme off to HQ Operational Command and HQ Support Command, the latter being the Air Force engineering and equipment authority. Eventually, HQSC authorised painting of only 4 aircraft which was not going to be practicable. The squadron had 8 aircraft deployed in 3 separate detachments in PNG and Indonesia for virtually the whole year to support Army Survey Corps operations, had to provide ongoing Army support training in Australia and New Zealand, cope with whatever other national commitment tasking emerged and provide resources for the fighter versus helicopter tactics development activities. Just guessing now, but we probably had around 30 x C-130s in and out over the year shuffling Iroquois wherever.
In those circumstances, it was absolutely imperative to maintain the traditional maintenance stagger to ensure optimum on-line availability of aircraft. It would have been impossible to do this if the 4 aircraft to be camouflaged had to be more or less reserved for the tactics development trials so we protested to HQSC who came back and said we could paint 5. That was also unworkable and after about 20 seconds of thought, the solution became obvious.
We decided to trickle 5 through the 3AD Paint Shop to satisfy the official approval and quietly establish our own painting facility in the least conspicuous corner of the crowded hangar which we shared with 12SQN who operated Chinooks. As aircraft progressively emerged from 250 hour 'D' servicings, we would either slot them to 3AD for painting or do them in-squadron, rotating aircraft through the detachments as necessary by C-130 and always giving the appearance back at Amberley that we only had a few painted in the new camouflage scheme.
Come the end of the year, all of the birds came home to roost and one day near Christmas, the Group Captain CO 482 Maintenance Squadron, who was the pseudo HQSC representative on the base, was snooping around and came across this fleet of camouflaged Iroquois. He barged into my office protesting: 'What's the meaning of this; you were only authorised to paint 5 aircraft?' I responded: 'We had heavy operational commitments and some of your blunt mates at HQSC wanted to make it impossible for us to maintain the maintenance stagger, so we made an operational decision and painted the bloody lot.' He stomped out of the office and very soon after, the camouflage scheme was adopted for the entire Air Force Hotel model Iroquois fleet.
The moral in this story is never underestimate the creative potential of children.
SPOT THE HUEYS
We participated in the fighter versus helo tactics development trials and had great fun playing with Mirages and Macchis - 5SQN was also further involved downstream. But ultimately, the invaluable reservoir of 26 years of wide-ranging helo operations - including extensive combat experience for which there is no substitute - and the operating capabilities development work conducted post-Vietnam was sacrificed by the foolish politico/military decision to transfer Air Force battlefield helicopter assets to Army Aviation. Australia's military expertise and capacity has undoubtedly suffered.
Air Vice Marshal Bay Adams, CBE, DFC, AFC had served as Director Joint Operations & Plans in Canberra post-Vietnam, became Chief of Air Force Operations and AOC Operational Command preceding retirement in 1979. He was strongly supportive of the capabilities improvements initiatives for the RAAF helicopter force. We occasionally bumped while still serving and he would inevitably say: 'Remember that day when we were flying together in Vietnam?' and my answer was always: 'I remember!' Very sadly, he succumbed to illness in 1990. A fine man, great leader and a true warrior.
Some more thoughts on camouflage considerations in a later post.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 6th Feb 2011 at 18:39.
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There were a number of RNZAF pilots attached to 9Sqn RAAF in Vietnam one of whom was Flt Lt Doug 'Punch" Paterson who was awarded a DFC. "Punch" Pattison was a bit of a character before he went to Vietnam. He got his DFC for refusing to abandon his ground-fire damaged Iroquois because, as he put it, "it was too far to walk home", so he brought the aircraft back with him!
There were 30 or so RNZAF pilots flew with the USAF on the Bronco, and with the Aussies on the Iroquois.
There were 30 or so RNZAF pilots flew with the USAF on the Bronco, and with the Aussies on the Iroquois.
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Huey Camouflage
Greetings!
I just read your post about the creation of the RAAF Huey camouflage. MOST interesting! Do you have any other good info/sources for Australian ARMY aircraft camo?
I'm an ex-US Army Aviator, dual rated. While I agree with your statement that valuable experience was lost when the RAAF battlefield helicopters were transfered to the Army, the loss could have been avoided if: 1) RAAF helicopter pilots transfered to the Army at the same time; or
2) Battlefield helicopters had been flown by Army pilots in the first
place, without Air Force prior usage.
My experience with US military interservice rivalry/competition/warfare has convinced me that ORGANIC tactical aviation (helicopters) should be properly operated by the ground forces supported. The Air Force folks simply did not have Army support as a top priority.
I hope we can "agree to disagree" on this subject
John Hyde ([email protected])
I just read your post about the creation of the RAAF Huey camouflage. MOST interesting! Do you have any other good info/sources for Australian ARMY aircraft camo?
I'm an ex-US Army Aviator, dual rated. While I agree with your statement that valuable experience was lost when the RAAF battlefield helicopters were transfered to the Army, the loss could have been avoided if: 1) RAAF helicopter pilots transfered to the Army at the same time; or
2) Battlefield helicopters had been flown by Army pilots in the first
place, without Air Force prior usage.
My experience with US military interservice rivalry/competition/warfare has convinced me that ORGANIC tactical aviation (helicopters) should be properly operated by the ground forces supported. The Air Force folks simply did not have Army support as a top priority.
I hope we can "agree to disagree" on this subject
John Hyde ([email protected])
'agree to disagree' indeed - the Rhodesians (and South Africans) seemed to manage just fine without descending into inter-service handbag-fights. Flew in Oman with a fella who - as an Air Lieutenant (Flying Officer/ 2-pip Lieutenant in UK money) K-Car captain used to run Fireforce Ops. Very successfully, according to accounts by others who'd been there.
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While I agree with your statement that valuable experience was lost when the RAAF battlefield helicopters were transfered to the Army, the loss could have been avoided if: 1) RAAF helicopter pilots transfered to the Army at the same time;
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Ii didn't know that any RAAF pilots transfered to the Army with the helicopters. However, their reception does not surprise me. Unsolicited advise is rarely appreciated, especially from members, former or not, of the OTHER service! But if the Army DIDN'T ask,....
What can I say?
Bikinimao
What can I say?
Bikinimao
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I may be missing something here, but some slight clarification re post #13..
The single-engine Huey II is an upgrade of the UH-1H. The twin-engine UH-1Y Venom, also known as the 'Super Huey', is a new-build stretched and enhanced version of the UH-1N.
Re some earlier posts concerning Iroquois historical efforts at Amberley.
A2-771 was among the 16 x UH-1H first acquired by the RAAF in Vietnam in 1968 and survived that campaign intact. It was never utilised as a gunship during Vietnam operations, but was modified at Amberley after return to Australia in 1971 for adaptation to the Bushranger configuration when required.
Unit history would be accurately portrayed if A2-771 is exhibited in the olive drab colour scheme that applied to 9SQN aircraft in Vietnam, but not if the aircraft is configured as a gunship. If exhibited in Bushranger configuration, the aircraft livery should be the 2 tone Air Force camouflage scheme which was introduced in 1976.
Consider me pedantic if you wish, but I am not supportive of distorting military history.
The single-engine Huey II is an upgrade of the UH-1H. The twin-engine UH-1Y Venom, also known as the 'Super Huey', is a new-build stretched and enhanced version of the UH-1N.
Re some earlier posts concerning Iroquois historical efforts at Amberley.
A2-771 was among the 16 x UH-1H first acquired by the RAAF in Vietnam in 1968 and survived that campaign intact. It was never utilised as a gunship during Vietnam operations, but was modified at Amberley after return to Australia in 1971 for adaptation to the Bushranger configuration when required.
Unit history would be accurately portrayed if A2-771 is exhibited in the olive drab colour scheme that applied to 9SQN aircraft in Vietnam, but not if the aircraft is configured as a gunship. If exhibited in Bushranger configuration, the aircraft livery should be the 2 tone Air Force camouflage scheme which was introduced in 1976.
Consider me pedantic if you wish, but I am not supportive of distorting military history.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 27th Mar 2011 at 20:45.
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"Many who boarded the Huey could tell the same story. Even when the Huey crashed, it often held together well enough to spare the occupants from major injury. Don Morris, a retired Army command sergeant major from Ellensburg, on Wednesday recalled surviving crashes in the jungle and a rice paddy".
Not to mention three wrecks could just about be turned into a 'new' helicopter.
If my memory serves me right the Australian colour camo looks much like we had in Oman in 1973, not counting the Saudi donated helis that were shades of brown.
Not to mention three wrecks could just about be turned into a 'new' helicopter.
If my memory serves me right the Australian colour camo looks much like we had in Oman in 1973, not counting the Saudi donated helis that were shades of brown.
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My wife has nudged me regarding a minor discrepancy in post #7.
It seems there was a rough sketch of a camouflage pattern that had been generated by a junior pilot among the material that I passed to our kids, who then played around with colour combinations resulting in the 2 tone scheme depicted.
Women remember everything forever, especially if you have screwed up!
It seems there was a rough sketch of a camouflage pattern that had been generated by a junior pilot among the material that I passed to our kids, who then played around with colour combinations resulting in the 2 tone scheme depicted.
Women remember everything forever, especially if you have screwed up!
