Decision to axe Harrier is "bonkers".
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Engines,
The CAS definition has not been rewritten so that it can be claimed by differing aircraft types, that's a bit of a cynical claim and being economic with the truth. CAS is being done and redefined by the conflict we find ourselves in. Equally, from what I have heard, the Tornado is on a par where the Harrier left off in terms of capability and, importantly, the effect being delivered wherever and whenever required.
The CAS definition has not been rewritten so that it can be claimed by differing aircraft types, that's a bit of a cynical claim and being economic with the truth. CAS is being done and redefined by the conflict we find ourselves in. Equally, from what I have heard, the Tornado is on a par where the Harrier left off in terms of capability and, importantly, the effect being delivered wherever and whenever required.
Personally I am not interested in nitpicking over the exact meaning of CAS, but one thing only Harrier could do was maritime strike (by which I mean maritime based strike).
FB11
I hear what you're saying. However, I still think Harrier embarkations aboard Illustrious and Queen Elizabeth will be useful - good job that the US, Italy, and Spain still have them.
It does seem a bit incomplete that we have Chockheads training to work with jets at Culdrose, and a Naval Flying Standards Flight (Fixed Wing) at Yeovilton (who recently appeared in the BBC South West news programme Spotlight - in a feature about an artist) but no jets! There must be limits to the number of personnel who can be sent on exchange, and helicopter operations will need flight deck crews.
Also, It still leaves the problem of lacking maritime strike (ie seaborne strike) capabilities though - particularly as SSN numbers dwindle and fall below the SDSR level later on this decade.
jamesdevice
There certainly does appear to have been a serious anti Harrier/anti FAA campaign within parts of the MOD. Some pages back I asked why things like the RNR/Harrier idea came to nothing - probably because: a) HMG wanted to sell all the aircraft, b) It would have appeared to look like a U turn, and c) It was only the RN that wanted it, and the First Sea Lord would be unlikely to be supported by the other Chiefs of Staff.
Ii is a truism that you only appreciate something after you have lost it - and then need it.
Since we seem to have taken a lot of trouble to give the US a good deal I wonder what, if anything, we are getting in return. Something to reduce the shortfall in maritime force projection capability? As the Telegraph article says:
A Ministry of Defence spokesman said: “We are currently negotiating the sale of Harrier assets to the US Government. It would therefore be inappropriate to comment on the future of the Harrier fleet at this time.”
Anyway - ignoring the last minute changes to SDSR the weekend before the announcement to Parliament, which led to the Harrier axe, the decision to go without carrier strike was based on assumptions made in October 2010 about what would happen this decade. Subsequent events have proved those assumptions wrong - within a year. This is going to be a dangerous decade, with a serious capability gap, even if we do try to put a brave face on post SDSR.
“Launching attack helicopter strike operations from Ocean proved the ability of the task group to conduct maritime strike operations – both from submarines and now helicopter carriers.”
Hence my use of the term maritime strike.
FB11
I hear what you're saying. However, I still think Harrier embarkations aboard Illustrious and Queen Elizabeth will be useful - good job that the US, Italy, and Spain still have them.
It does seem a bit incomplete that we have Chockheads training to work with jets at Culdrose, and a Naval Flying Standards Flight (Fixed Wing) at Yeovilton (who recently appeared in the BBC South West news programme Spotlight - in a feature about an artist) but no jets! There must be limits to the number of personnel who can be sent on exchange, and helicopter operations will need flight deck crews.
Also, It still leaves the problem of lacking maritime strike (ie seaborne strike) capabilities though - particularly as SSN numbers dwindle and fall below the SDSR level later on this decade.
jamesdevice
There certainly does appear to have been a serious anti Harrier/anti FAA campaign within parts of the MOD. Some pages back I asked why things like the RNR/Harrier idea came to nothing - probably because: a) HMG wanted to sell all the aircraft, b) It would have appeared to look like a U turn, and c) It was only the RN that wanted it, and the First Sea Lord would be unlikely to be supported by the other Chiefs of Staff.
Ii is a truism that you only appreciate something after you have lost it - and then need it.
Since we seem to have taken a lot of trouble to give the US a good deal I wonder what, if anything, we are getting in return. Something to reduce the shortfall in maritime force projection capability? As the Telegraph article says:
A Ministry of Defence spokesman said: “We are currently negotiating the sale of Harrier assets to the US Government. It would therefore be inappropriate to comment on the future of the Harrier fleet at this time.”
Anyway - ignoring the last minute changes to SDSR the weekend before the announcement to Parliament, which led to the Harrier axe, the decision to go without carrier strike was based on assumptions made in October 2010 about what would happen this decade. Subsequent events have proved those assumptions wrong - within a year. This is going to be a dangerous decade, with a serious capability gap, even if we do try to put a brave face on post SDSR.
“Launching attack helicopter strike operations from Ocean proved the ability of the task group to conduct maritime strike operations – both from submarines and now helicopter carriers.”
Hence my use of the term maritime strike.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 21st Nov 2011 at 17:02.
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I'm confused. It rather appears that the phrase "martime strike" has different meanings to different people. I was under the firm impression that the RN lost that ability when the Sea Harriers (and their Sea Eagles) were scrapped: the Harriers never carried anti-ship missiles and were never optimised for maritime bombing
Of course the RAF had 617 fitted with Sea Eagles after the Buccs (and thier Martels) were scrapped, but that didn't last very long. Another example of the RAF elite not caring a toss about naval threats or interests.
Of course if we'd wired the Sea Kings to carry weapons (like we did for the Indian and Egyptian ones) then we could have used the remaining ones to carry Sea Eagles. Its a crazy thought that the Wessex could probably have carried them, but the later design couldn't - because we couldn't be bothered to fit the wiring at the initial construction
As for an RNR Harrier reserve - it would never have happened simply because you need a full time fleet to keep the fitters and maintainers current. You need an element of full time staff just to keep the airframes flying.
Same impasse I believe was found back in the 1980's when an RAF reserve squadron was (nearly) raised in the midlands flying ex-RN Wessex 5's. Too much of a full time commitment was needed from an engineering team
Of course the RAF had 617 fitted with Sea Eagles after the Buccs (and thier Martels) were scrapped, but that didn't last very long. Another example of the RAF elite not caring a toss about naval threats or interests.
Of course if we'd wired the Sea Kings to carry weapons (like we did for the Indian and Egyptian ones) then we could have used the remaining ones to carry Sea Eagles. Its a crazy thought that the Wessex could probably have carried them, but the later design couldn't - because we couldn't be bothered to fit the wiring at the initial construction
As for an RNR Harrier reserve - it would never have happened simply because you need a full time fleet to keep the fitters and maintainers current. You need an element of full time staff just to keep the airframes flying.
Same impasse I believe was found back in the 1980's when an RAF reserve squadron was (nearly) raised in the midlands flying ex-RN Wessex 5's. Too much of a full time commitment was needed from an engineering team
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High spirits asked
"why would a rationally sane person in charge WANT to reduce his FJ fleet"
1) Who is to say the upper tiers of the RAF or MOD ARE rational? It would go against the grain of experience in most large companies to suggest that upper managers are rational.. On the contrary, most promoted to the upper echelons tend to have greater traits of psycopathy.
2) On a rational basis, it would benefit the RAF on a long term basis if, in the knowledge that long term overall fast jet numbers were going to decline, to create a situation where ALL fast jet seats were under their control.. A proportion were going to go, but the way its panned out a proportion of those leaving are RN not RAF. Its been a long game: creation of, and then undermining of. Joint Force Harrier. First get the navy jets onto an RAF base, then get them under RAF control, then scrap the Navy jets and replace them with unwanted RAF ones, then run down the RN personnel to a point where they were ineffective, then scrap the aircraft and get rid of the remaining Navy crew
You're going to see the same happen with the CHF. It won't be long before CHF and RAF SH will be firmly joined in "Joint Force Merlin" - and three years or so later the CHF will be dead
.
"why would a rationally sane person in charge WANT to reduce his FJ fleet"
1) Who is to say the upper tiers of the RAF or MOD ARE rational? It would go against the grain of experience in most large companies to suggest that upper managers are rational.. On the contrary, most promoted to the upper echelons tend to have greater traits of psycopathy.
2) On a rational basis, it would benefit the RAF on a long term basis if, in the knowledge that long term overall fast jet numbers were going to decline, to create a situation where ALL fast jet seats were under their control.. A proportion were going to go, but the way its panned out a proportion of those leaving are RN not RAF. Its been a long game: creation of, and then undermining of. Joint Force Harrier. First get the navy jets onto an RAF base, then get them under RAF control, then scrap the Navy jets and replace them with unwanted RAF ones, then run down the RN personnel to a point where they were ineffective, then scrap the aircraft and get rid of the remaining Navy crew
You're going to see the same happen with the CHF. It won't be long before CHF and RAF SH will be firmly joined in "Joint Force Merlin" - and three years or so later the CHF will be dead
.
CAS = Air action against targets in close proximity to friendly forces and requiring detailed integration with those forces. That is all the definition says, nothing about operating base location, weapon loads, endurance, etc etc. Effective CAS in today's world is more dependent on the targeting pod and the equipment available to the JTAC than it is on the view out of the cockpit window.
Lets assume Joint Force Harrier had never been created. Realistically where would RN FW aviation be now if there had been no sharing of the Harrier capability? My guess is that the SHAR would have folded anyway (maybe a year or two later at best) due to the RN non-aviators having bigger and more expensive priorities elsewhere (carrier, subs, T45 etc) and FW FAA flying would have ceased. This would have either forced the creation of JFH anyway or led to the RN having limited 'exchange' slots on the three RAF Harrier squadrons (plus whatever they could afford with the USN). Or worse, for the RN, it could have signalled the end of FW FAA flying for ever. In some ways, IMHO, the creation of JFH has been the saviour of FAA FW flying rather than its nemesis.
But what would I know - I'm not a never-served armchair general/air marshal/admiral
But what would I know - I'm not a never-served armchair general/air marshal/admiral
"Of course the RAF had 617 fitted with Sea Eagles after the Buccs (and thier Martels) were scrapped, but that didn't last very long. Another example of the RAF elite not caring a toss about naval threats or interests."
Oh for gods sake, you could make some interesting points, but its hidden behind a sharkey ward type diatribe about how the big bad nasty RAF loathes anything dark blue.
The loss of Sea Eagle was a fairly sensible decision - it was a missile designed to take on heavy vessels (e.g. Soviet warships during the cold war). By 1998, the missile was very old in technical terms, I believe the entire missile stock required major work to sustain it as a technically capable and current missile, and there was no money in the pot to support this.
The SDSR saw the loss of the maritime strike role for Sea Eagle (and the GR4) for two fairly good reasons - 1 - the threat had completely dissapeared and 2 - its main weapon was utterly obsolete and required major work to keep it going.
Given this, the need to sustain 2 specialist squadrons of aircraft doing a maritime strike role was thrown into question.Therefore the 'delete Sea Eagle' must have been one of the easiest options taken in the 1998 SDSR.
Its also worth noting that the German Navy has taken similar decisions with regards to its own Tornado anti shipping fleet.
Oh for gods sake, you could make some interesting points, but its hidden behind a sharkey ward type diatribe about how the big bad nasty RAF loathes anything dark blue.
The loss of Sea Eagle was a fairly sensible decision - it was a missile designed to take on heavy vessels (e.g. Soviet warships during the cold war). By 1998, the missile was very old in technical terms, I believe the entire missile stock required major work to sustain it as a technically capable and current missile, and there was no money in the pot to support this.
The SDSR saw the loss of the maritime strike role for Sea Eagle (and the GR4) for two fairly good reasons - 1 - the threat had completely dissapeared and 2 - its main weapon was utterly obsolete and required major work to keep it going.
Given this, the need to sustain 2 specialist squadrons of aircraft doing a maritime strike role was thrown into question.Therefore the 'delete Sea Eagle' must have been one of the easiest options taken in the 1998 SDSR.
Its also worth noting that the German Navy has taken similar decisions with regards to its own Tornado anti shipping fleet.
Originally Posted by Jimlad1
"Of course the RAF had 617 fitted with Sea Eagles after the Buccs (and thier Martels) were scrapped, but that didn't last very long. Another example of the RAF elite not caring a toss about naval threats or interests."
Oh for gods sake, you could make some interesting points, but its hidden behind a sharkey ward type diatribe about how the big bad nasty RAF loathes anything dark blue.
The loss of Sea Eagle was a fairly sensible decision - it was a missile designed to take on heavy vessels (e.g. Soviet warships during the cold war). By 1998, the missile was very old in technical terms, I believe the entire missile stock required major work to sustain it as a technically capable and current missile, and there was no money in the pot to support this.
The SDSR saw the loss of the maritime strike role for Sea Eagle (and the GR4) for two fairly good reasons - 1 - the threat had completely dissapeared and 2 - its main weapon was utterly obsolete and required major work to keep it going.
Given this, the need to sustain 2 specialist squadrons of aircraft doing a maritime strike role was thrown into question.Therefore the 'delete Sea Eagle' must have been one of the easiest options taken in the 1998 SDSR.
Its also worth noting that the German Navy has taken similar decisions with regards to its own Tornado anti shipping fleet.
Oh for gods sake, you could make some interesting points, but its hidden behind a sharkey ward type diatribe about how the big bad nasty RAF loathes anything dark blue.
The loss of Sea Eagle was a fairly sensible decision - it was a missile designed to take on heavy vessels (e.g. Soviet warships during the cold war). By 1998, the missile was very old in technical terms, I believe the entire missile stock required major work to sustain it as a technically capable and current missile, and there was no money in the pot to support this.
The SDSR saw the loss of the maritime strike role for Sea Eagle (and the GR4) for two fairly good reasons - 1 - the threat had completely dissapeared and 2 - its main weapon was utterly obsolete and required major work to keep it going.
Given this, the need to sustain 2 specialist squadrons of aircraft doing a maritime strike role was thrown into question.Therefore the 'delete Sea Eagle' must have been one of the easiest options taken in the 1998 SDSR.
Its also worth noting that the German Navy has taken similar decisions with regards to its own Tornado anti shipping fleet.
Lets assume Joint Force Harrier had never been created. Realistically where would RN FW aviation be now if there had been no sharing of the Harrier capability?
The SHAR was canned, JFH was formed and the funding transferred to produce the GR7A amongst other items. From a UK perspective, this was probably the right idea as the GR variant was highly capable in Afghanistan, whereas the SHAR was unlikely to have been deployed anywhere in an operational environment in that same timescale except perhaps with limited CAS utility in Libya (It is worth noting that the SHAR also had a good CAS capability, not to the same degree as using Sniper/Litening etc, but was regularly practiced. Indeed in Operation Deny Flight it was regularly fragged for CAS/Recce sorties as part of the NATO effort. Many RN crews built up significant CAS experience both with the SHAR and latterly in the sandpit, the downside being the point where we are now at!
I blame Stumpy Henderson myself!!
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Widger and others,
Interesting take on JFH - and only in the interests of accuracy, I'm posting this piece here. Starting point - Harrier is gone, we'll get over it, as long as the RAF are committed to generating fixed wing aviation at sea. But history isn't pointing the right way.
JFH was formed with SHAR and GR7. (SHAR was only canned well after its formation) The whole idea was to blend the best of RAF and RN Harrier tactics and capabilities to operate in a truly 'Joint' fashion. The crucial word was 'convergence', with SHAR and GR7 providing full spectrum capability on land and sea.
Immediately after JFH formed, it became clear that the GR7A/9 programme was hopelessly underfunded. Fact. The race then began to find the cash, and the directive (from Strike) was 'JFH have to sort this out themselves - no help from outside' so the decision was taken to can the SHAR, which was predominantly an AD asset (but a very decent bomber - actually beat the GR7s in its last month in service) and put all the money into the GR7/7A/9/9A 'pot'. The RN agreed, on the basis that three front line units and an OCU were somehow to be made into four front line units (2 RAF and 2 RN) and an OCU - I was never very clear how that was going to happen.
The rest is history - second RN squadron formation was blocked by naked politicking at Strike, 3 Group was disbanded about as soon as it could be, the RN 2 star aviation post promised by the RAF was abolished, and no RN representation above Gp Capt was allowed on 1 Group. By the time the SDSR came along the RAF were, I think, perfectly justified (from their viewpoint) to can the Harrier and go for a Tornado/Typhoon FJ fleet.
But the problem with that viewpoint is that before the formation of JFH, the RAF had made serious commitments to maintain maritime aviation. I got them personally, along with many other RN personnel, from light blue 'on high'. The problem was (and still is) that the RAF has no cultural commitment to maritime aviation.
It's a logical position, though. If you look at the history of air power doctrine, most air forces have justified their existence on their ability to deliver military effect without the encumbrances of land bases and sea platforms. Why would the RAF make a sacrifice to keep a capability that, at its heart, it sees as a challenge to its own rationale for existence.
The decision was 'bonkers' if you took the RAF's commitments to maritime aviation at face value. Like many in both services, I did, and worked hard to follow them through. Unfortunately, there was no such commitment, and when the SDSR came along, sacrificing maritime aviation was, in the RAF's view, a small price to pay to avoid cuts to their core fleets. Actually, it was no price at all (for them).
Now, the nation is going to trust the RAF to deliver a maritime aviation capability, but this time with an aircraft that needs far more training and commitment to go to sea, and which would pose an even bigger challenge to land based air power.
Now that's 'bonkers'.
Best Regards as ever to all those of all colour uniforms doing the job,
Engines
Interesting take on JFH - and only in the interests of accuracy, I'm posting this piece here. Starting point - Harrier is gone, we'll get over it, as long as the RAF are committed to generating fixed wing aviation at sea. But history isn't pointing the right way.
JFH was formed with SHAR and GR7. (SHAR was only canned well after its formation) The whole idea was to blend the best of RAF and RN Harrier tactics and capabilities to operate in a truly 'Joint' fashion. The crucial word was 'convergence', with SHAR and GR7 providing full spectrum capability on land and sea.
Immediately after JFH formed, it became clear that the GR7A/9 programme was hopelessly underfunded. Fact. The race then began to find the cash, and the directive (from Strike) was 'JFH have to sort this out themselves - no help from outside' so the decision was taken to can the SHAR, which was predominantly an AD asset (but a very decent bomber - actually beat the GR7s in its last month in service) and put all the money into the GR7/7A/9/9A 'pot'. The RN agreed, on the basis that three front line units and an OCU were somehow to be made into four front line units (2 RAF and 2 RN) and an OCU - I was never very clear how that was going to happen.
The rest is history - second RN squadron formation was blocked by naked politicking at Strike, 3 Group was disbanded about as soon as it could be, the RN 2 star aviation post promised by the RAF was abolished, and no RN representation above Gp Capt was allowed on 1 Group. By the time the SDSR came along the RAF were, I think, perfectly justified (from their viewpoint) to can the Harrier and go for a Tornado/Typhoon FJ fleet.
But the problem with that viewpoint is that before the formation of JFH, the RAF had made serious commitments to maintain maritime aviation. I got them personally, along with many other RN personnel, from light blue 'on high'. The problem was (and still is) that the RAF has no cultural commitment to maritime aviation.
It's a logical position, though. If you look at the history of air power doctrine, most air forces have justified their existence on their ability to deliver military effect without the encumbrances of land bases and sea platforms. Why would the RAF make a sacrifice to keep a capability that, at its heart, it sees as a challenge to its own rationale for existence.
The decision was 'bonkers' if you took the RAF's commitments to maritime aviation at face value. Like many in both services, I did, and worked hard to follow them through. Unfortunately, there was no such commitment, and when the SDSR came along, sacrificing maritime aviation was, in the RAF's view, a small price to pay to avoid cuts to their core fleets. Actually, it was no price at all (for them).
Now, the nation is going to trust the RAF to deliver a maritime aviation capability, but this time with an aircraft that needs far more training and commitment to go to sea, and which would pose an even bigger challenge to land based air power.
Now that's 'bonkers'.
Best Regards as ever to all those of all colour uniforms doing the job,
Engines
Engines...slightly off-topic but re: the bombing comp you mentioned...what bombs were dropped from what profiles? I'm intruiged as to what attack capability the SHAR had.
edit: disregard!
edit: disregard!
Last edited by just another jocky; 18th Nov 2011 at 18:20.
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Now I've heard it all - the SHar was a better bomber than the GR7.
I've tried not to reply to this thread as so many seem to be living in a delusional fantasy land - paranoid is a word that springs to mind.
CEPP is a great capability and one that I believe that the UK should have, but it is not a must have so we have to live with a "capability holiday". The armed forces, including the RAF had salami sliced for so long that the feeling before SDSR was that it couldn't happen any longer - savings become pretty minimal. A whole fleet had to go and given the choice of Harrier and Tornado, from an Air power perspective (NOT an RAF perspective or RN perspective) it was a no brainer. I know many Harrier guys that didn't like the "more capable aircraft" comment in SDSR but that's the way it is. Remember before SDSR Harrier was the RAF's favourite child that could do no wrong and got pretty much everything it asked for. I would like to think that the RAF have had a cunning plan for more than a decade and correctly predicted the financial crisis etc but really I don't think so. Do you? Really?
The ensuing hysteria amongst some RN (although to be fair mostly ex-RN or armchair generals who have absolutely no experience of Air power) about the dastardly plot by the RAF to rid the world of the (fixed-wing) FAA is actually hilarious.
From a UK plc and a RN pov you should be far more upset about the loss (possibly a permanent loss) of an MPA capability - the world doesn't revolve around FJ, no matter how cool they seem to be.
The follow on debate of the make-up of the F35 force, and the evolution of maritime based Air power, is far more interesting. Obviously it should be all RAF.
I've tried not to reply to this thread as so many seem to be living in a delusional fantasy land - paranoid is a word that springs to mind.
CEPP is a great capability and one that I believe that the UK should have, but it is not a must have so we have to live with a "capability holiday". The armed forces, including the RAF had salami sliced for so long that the feeling before SDSR was that it couldn't happen any longer - savings become pretty minimal. A whole fleet had to go and given the choice of Harrier and Tornado, from an Air power perspective (NOT an RAF perspective or RN perspective) it was a no brainer. I know many Harrier guys that didn't like the "more capable aircraft" comment in SDSR but that's the way it is. Remember before SDSR Harrier was the RAF's favourite child that could do no wrong and got pretty much everything it asked for. I would like to think that the RAF have had a cunning plan for more than a decade and correctly predicted the financial crisis etc but really I don't think so. Do you? Really?
The ensuing hysteria amongst some RN (although to be fair mostly ex-RN or armchair generals who have absolutely no experience of Air power) about the dastardly plot by the RAF to rid the world of the (fixed-wing) FAA is actually hilarious.
From a UK plc and a RN pov you should be far more upset about the loss (possibly a permanent loss) of an MPA capability - the world doesn't revolve around FJ, no matter how cool they seem to be.
The follow on debate of the make-up of the F35 force, and the evolution of maritime based Air power, is far more interesting. Obviously it should be all RAF.
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just another jocky Engines...slightly off-topic but re: the bombing comp you mentioned...what bombs were dropped from what profiles? I'm intruiged as to what attack capability the SHAR had.
Was organised by RAF Cottesmore using Holbeach, Donna and Wainfleet as a competition between all four RAF squadrons and the SHAR squadrons.
The SHAR pitched up, followed all the rules and won the best overall pilot and best Squadron results.
The SHAR was a very accurate bomber but was limited in what it could carry. Having flown both Harriers the GR was obviously the more versatile bomber but to say more accurate would be incorrect.
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Engines,
You still haven't answered the questions regarding CAS, Harrier and Tornado. Am I sensing that you are dodging that topic now?
Did the Harrier bombing comp have any self des profiles or were they all dumb weapon attacks?
You still haven't answered the questions regarding CAS, Harrier and Tornado. Am I sensing that you are dodging that topic now?
Did the Harrier bombing comp have any self des profiles or were they all dumb weapon attacks?
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So which one was the most efficient?
Did the Harrier bombing comp have any self des profiles or were they all dumb weapon attacks?
The fact is that the SHAR was a very accurate pure bombing platform.
Yes the weapons competition was a dumb weapons competition but then self des attacks are a little bit like bombing for bosses arent they?
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What does bombing for bosses mean?
What's the point in quoting that SHAR won a bombing comp if the comp was largely irrelevant to current weapon release profiles? I am just confused as when people do quote it (as it has been in this thread) they expect it to mean something when, in fact, it doesn't mean all that much after being held up to scrutiny. There we go, I guess its just another example of making stats fit one's angle of a discussion.
What's the point in quoting that SHAR won a bombing comp if the comp was largely irrelevant to current weapon release profiles? I am just confused as when people do quote it (as it has been in this thread) they expect it to mean something when, in fact, it doesn't mean all that much after being held up to scrutiny. There we go, I guess its just another example of making stats fit one's angle of a discussion.
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What does bombing for bosses mean?
What's the point in quoting that SHAR won a bombing comp if the comp was largely irrelevant to current weapon release profiles? I am just confused as when people do quote it (as it has been in this thread) they expect it to mean something when, in fact, it doesn't mean all that much after being held up to scrutiny. There we go, I guess its just another example of making stats fit one's angle of a discussion.
What's the point in quoting that SHAR won a bombing comp if the comp was largely irrelevant to current weapon release profiles? I am just confused as when people do quote it (as it has been in this thread) they expect it to mean something when, in fact, it doesn't mean all that much after being held up to scrutiny. There we go, I guess its just another example of making stats fit one's angle of a discussion.
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OK, abstract question from the realms of alternative futures... but how well would the economics have worked out if instead of the GR9 upgrade, instead the money had been spent on retrofitting the SHAR fleet with the big / t(h)in wing from the original GR5 proposal? I seem to remember it was always intended to do this until the yanks blackmailed us over the Harrier II build contract.
At face value that would appear to have offered the most capable of the Harrier upgrade options: SHAR performance, with radar, with increased payload and nine hardpoints (not seven) - and a working gun.
And while on the subject I seem to remember the proposed GR3 tin wing conversion always being referred to as the GR5(K). Why "K" in that context? Obviously nothing to do with tanking...
At face value that would appear to have offered the most capable of the Harrier upgrade options: SHAR performance, with radar, with increased payload and nine hardpoints (not seven) - and a working gun.
And while on the subject I seem to remember the proposed GR3 tin wing conversion always being referred to as the GR5(K). Why "K" in that context? Obviously nothing to do with tanking...
Last edited by jamesdevice; 19th Nov 2011 at 09:13.