ADF Deployability of Armoured Elements
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jan 2009
Location: North Arm Cove, NSW, Australia
Age: 86
Posts: 229
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
ADF Deployability of Armoured Elements
Conceptually, the ADF may need to deploy company or battalion group sized elements regionally within the neighbouring wet tropics archipelago environs. Wherever deployed, such forces should have adequate integral mobile fire support expeditiously lodged as close as practicable to prospective scenes of action, which means air insertion and sustainment.
Existing and planned air resources employable for this purpose are 4 x C-17, 12 x C130J, 12 x C130H, 6 x CH-47D (to be replaced by 7 x CH-47F). Under the now outsourced system of aircraft maintenance, it is realistic to assume only 50 percent of these assets will be continuously on-line. Not all aircrew conversion training/currency requirements can be achieved in flight simulators and this need is fundamental to maintain adequate manning otherwise the system would grind to a halt; so some of the on-line availability must be dedicated to this purpose but perhaps intermittently. And; allowance must be made for support of military exercises and training for the same reason.
An optimistic assumption is that these air mobility assets would be continuously available to support operations: 2 x C-17, 6 x C130J, 6 x C-130H, 4 x CH-47F with the Chinooks providing only in theatre mobility.
For the small ADF, these principles of war should be paramount: flexibility, versatility, economy of effort so the nature of integral fire support must be tailored to what can be cost-effectively deployed and sustained. Deployment of towed artillery would also require towing vehicles whereas light armoured vehicles equipped with cannon and mortar ('poor man's artillery') would arguably be more flexible in the wet tropics.
Australian Army primary armour assets are Abrams tanks, ASLAV, enhanced stretched M113. For simplicity, let's assume empty weights approximate 67, 15 and 15 tonnes respectively. ASLAV has cannon and some M113 will have mortars, but neither as yet have dual fire support capabilities. Some physical characteristics for these vehicles are available via Wikipedia and see also this link: Australia’s M113 APC Family Upgrades
A C-17 can carry 1 x Abrams or 4 x ASLAV/M113 and a C-130 2 x ASLAV/M113. Characteristics for these heavy lifters are also found in Wikipedia.
While landing heavy C-17 and C-130 on unsealed airstrips is possible, there are limitations including bogging potential, foreign object damage to engines/propellors, manoeuvring constraints on small aprons. The C-130 would be less restricted than the C-17, but the Hercs could not necessarily go into all airfields in say PNG where Caribou once went. Nevertheless, some capability exists to deploy armour nearer to prospective scenes of action than an airhead.
If main battle tanks are employed anywhere, large transporter/recovery vehicles must also be deployed (see this link: Heavy Equipment Transport System - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia), but not mandatory for lighter armour which is more mobile and easier recovered. Strength of pavement, roads, bridges also constrain movement of heavy armour and whether large transporter/recovery vehicles would be able to function off roads in the wet tropics is very dubious.
Deployment of armour by sea is not a quick reaction option and presently constrained by availability and strength of wharves and cranes. The LPDs when (if?) they come into service may offset some present limitations, but then Abrams tanks would have to be ferried from a destination port to a scene of action if not close to a coastline, provided roads exist. The escort requirements for an LPD carrying substantial equipment and personnel assets is also another economy of effort consideration.
In theatre heavy lift would require Chinook deployment and it seems unlikely that more than 2 could be operationally deployed, even when the CH-47F comes into service; but one Chinook properly utilized can do a lot of work. Armour guzzles fuel that is generally externally loaded by Chinooks in big rubber 'donut' bladders, although M113 were often used to carry fuel for their own elements in Vietnam.
The whole Army concept of operations really comes into question as employment of main battle tanks seems a core principle. Present Air Force mobility resources would enable quick reaction deployment of light armoured vehicles closer to prospective scenes of action to provide integral mobile fire support. But are C-17, C-130, CH-47 resources adequate to cope with multiple ADF deployments and contingencies that might emerge at short notice?
Existing and planned air resources employable for this purpose are 4 x C-17, 12 x C130J, 12 x C130H, 6 x CH-47D (to be replaced by 7 x CH-47F). Under the now outsourced system of aircraft maintenance, it is realistic to assume only 50 percent of these assets will be continuously on-line. Not all aircrew conversion training/currency requirements can be achieved in flight simulators and this need is fundamental to maintain adequate manning otherwise the system would grind to a halt; so some of the on-line availability must be dedicated to this purpose but perhaps intermittently. And; allowance must be made for support of military exercises and training for the same reason.
An optimistic assumption is that these air mobility assets would be continuously available to support operations: 2 x C-17, 6 x C130J, 6 x C-130H, 4 x CH-47F with the Chinooks providing only in theatre mobility.
For the small ADF, these principles of war should be paramount: flexibility, versatility, economy of effort so the nature of integral fire support must be tailored to what can be cost-effectively deployed and sustained. Deployment of towed artillery would also require towing vehicles whereas light armoured vehicles equipped with cannon and mortar ('poor man's artillery') would arguably be more flexible in the wet tropics.
Australian Army primary armour assets are Abrams tanks, ASLAV, enhanced stretched M113. For simplicity, let's assume empty weights approximate 67, 15 and 15 tonnes respectively. ASLAV has cannon and some M113 will have mortars, but neither as yet have dual fire support capabilities. Some physical characteristics for these vehicles are available via Wikipedia and see also this link: Australia’s M113 APC Family Upgrades
A C-17 can carry 1 x Abrams or 4 x ASLAV/M113 and a C-130 2 x ASLAV/M113. Characteristics for these heavy lifters are also found in Wikipedia.
While landing heavy C-17 and C-130 on unsealed airstrips is possible, there are limitations including bogging potential, foreign object damage to engines/propellors, manoeuvring constraints on small aprons. The C-130 would be less restricted than the C-17, but the Hercs could not necessarily go into all airfields in say PNG where Caribou once went. Nevertheless, some capability exists to deploy armour nearer to prospective scenes of action than an airhead.
If main battle tanks are employed anywhere, large transporter/recovery vehicles must also be deployed (see this link: Heavy Equipment Transport System - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia), but not mandatory for lighter armour which is more mobile and easier recovered. Strength of pavement, roads, bridges also constrain movement of heavy armour and whether large transporter/recovery vehicles would be able to function off roads in the wet tropics is very dubious.
Deployment of armour by sea is not a quick reaction option and presently constrained by availability and strength of wharves and cranes. The LPDs when (if?) they come into service may offset some present limitations, but then Abrams tanks would have to be ferried from a destination port to a scene of action if not close to a coastline, provided roads exist. The escort requirements for an LPD carrying substantial equipment and personnel assets is also another economy of effort consideration.
In theatre heavy lift would require Chinook deployment and it seems unlikely that more than 2 could be operationally deployed, even when the CH-47F comes into service; but one Chinook properly utilized can do a lot of work. Armour guzzles fuel that is generally externally loaded by Chinooks in big rubber 'donut' bladders, although M113 were often used to carry fuel for their own elements in Vietnam.
The whole Army concept of operations really comes into question as employment of main battle tanks seems a core principle. Present Air Force mobility resources would enable quick reaction deployment of light armoured vehicles closer to prospective scenes of action to provide integral mobile fire support. But are C-17, C-130, CH-47 resources adequate to cope with multiple ADF deployments and contingencies that might emerge at short notice?
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: Great Southern Land
Age: 57
Posts: 434
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Present Air Force mobility resources would enable quick reaction deployment of light armoured vehicles closer to prospective scenes of action to provide integral mobile fire support. But are C-17, C-130, CH-47 resources adequate to cope with multiple ADF deployments and contingencies that might emerge at short notice?
The current ADF fleet of FW & RW transport / lift aircraft are insufficient to provide anything like the lift required to pick up a battlegroup that requires much armour (and remember that the CT or BG is not a fixed entity, but tailored to task). I think we're down to 8 'H-model' Hercs, and may be getting another 2 'J-models'. But even so, with all the other things that the ADF would be having to do with its lift fleet ..... not much scope for provision of dedicated lift to armoured vehicles.
They'll have to go by sea. No drama getting them to the SPOE, not from SPOD into the battle. The ASLAV can move itself, as can Bushies to and from SPOD or APOD. The Army has sufficient MAN HHTs to move a modest number of M1s & M88s; S Liners and Macks and heavy plant trailers to move M113s; TTFs and BLFTs to carry fuel; and other vehicles for the B Ech that drags itself along with the elements that would make up an 'armour-heavy' BG.
We're hamstrung to a degree by a number of factors: penny pinching by successive governments; lack of 'purple' awareness / inter-service distrust; historical over-reliance on powerful allies (and the assumption that they'll come to the rescue); and an Army that often seems to be run as an RAInf benefit scheme.
I'll stew in my bitterness for a while, have a grumble to the dog about the CA's idiotic beret ban, have a cup of tea and revisit this thread later.
Right on Like This - Do That. A very well informed post. I have very little to say that you have not already said. Bushranger, we shouldn't go into availablity of assets too much, but suffice to say that even your reduced figures for airlift availlability are optimistic. And remember, it's not just about the initial deployment of assets, but also the sustainment of assets; which over time can prove much more difficult. Why do you think there is no Hornet Squadron deployed? Supply chains for modern equipment are much longer and more complex than in the past.
Last edited by Trojan1981; 3rd Nov 2010 at 06:05.
Join Date: Feb 2005
Location: Antipodea
Posts: 22
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Availability is a touchy subject. To say the ALG crews and maintenance is stretched is an understatement.
You can see from the public road near Richmond that there are 4 mothballed C130H on the flightline. Deep storage if you want the official term however with no engines these frames won't be up and running any time soon.
Carriage of a single ASLAV by Herc is iffy. Not with external armour as it doesn't fit. The weight is an issue too as vehicle weighs more than the ramp hinge limit allows. We needed a waiver every time we lifted one.
You can see from the public road near Richmond that there are 4 mothballed C130H on the flightline. Deep storage if you want the official term however with no engines these frames won't be up and running any time soon.
Carriage of a single ASLAV by Herc is iffy. Not with external armour as it doesn't fit. The weight is an issue too as vehicle weighs more than the ramp hinge limit allows. We needed a waiver every time we lifted one.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jan 2009
Location: North Arm Cove, NSW, Australia
Age: 86
Posts: 229
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Why Australia's military capacity has declined.
Hi Trojan 1981; I was in the transport ops side of the Air Force for a time and live near Williamtown so get feedback pretty often over beers.
Post #2 by LT-DT leads us toward issues I hoped might emerge and I think it is worth reviewing what has generated the worsening decline in Australia's military capacity.
4 plus decades back, the separate armed forces were properly under political control and military hardware acquisition projects were pretty well-managed within the respective service departments and mainly well-proven 'off-the-shelf' gear was usually speedily introduced to operational service – C-130, Caribou, Iroquois to name just a few.
About that time, the RAAF and RAN both had more capacity to support the Army which was able to grow to 9 infantry battalions and supporting arms were expanded enabled by conscription to sustain the Vietnam War commitment
Forward to the 1980s and the Australian armed forces had become a thinly-veiled unified force subjected to public service domination with progressive centralisation of functions, like supply, impeding operational responsiveness. Technical capacity of the military was eventually deliberately de-skilled by shedding long-standing apprentice training schemes with ultimate elimination of Engineering and Equipment Branches within the Air Force. Outsourcing of aircraft maintenance and multiple other functions became widespread, predictably lowering on-line availability of expensive assets because contractors function to commercial requirements and not the military need to sometimes increase maintenance effort to cope with necessitous flying effort.
The military was downscaled in some respects post-Vietnam but the civilian component of Defence has since grown prodigiously, particularly the DMO/DSTO bit from the 1990s onwards with these agencies now having significant influence in capabilities planning and procurement and an intimate relationship with the major arms corporations that now largely parent defence industry in Australia. Support of defence industry has now become the central plank of defence policy, not maintaining continuous adequate and credible military preparedness through progressive optimization of in-service hardware (where cost-effective).
Both major political parties have endorsed compounding unaffordable defence expenditure toward a conceptual Force 2030 embracing an enlarged 'hardened and networked Army' – near 10 percent of federal government revenue will be outlayed on defence in 2010/11. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, which is patronised by Defence and some major arms manufacturers, largely drafted Defence White Paper 2009 around multiple dubious merit projects already in train and unrealistic military capabilities expansion.
Army cannot grow unless Navy and Air Force capabilities are commensurately expanded, particularly the airlift fleet, to enable timely deployments and sustainment of operations. If we have now got to the stage of mainly cannibalising ADF aircraft and other resources to sustain operations, then that can only lead to shrinking military capacities, particularly for quick reaction deployments. Manning of the military is also deficient and DWP2009 force growth expectations seem unachievable considering the apparent attitudes of Generation 'Y'.
'Defeat (of) armed attack upon Australia' is unrealistic as the continent is physically indefensible by military means. China has a strengthening economic stranglehold on Australia so invasion would be needless folly, apart from the mammoth military logistics issues involved. The best we might achieve (and afford) is deterrence of interference with our sea trade routes and modest scale (battalion or company group) military interventions where assistance is requested by other nations. So; do we really need a larger Army equipped with main battle tanks?
LT-DT; Chief of Army forsaking the Armoured Corps beret is just appalling as that head-dress reflects hugely important fine tradition and esprit-de-corps. I guess if public nudity became acceptable, the Army might still all be made to wear slouch hats! Both Navy and Air Force used to have working dress that was quite presentable in public; but many now move around in scruffy looking spotted pyjamas. 'No Saluting' areas are signposted around RAAF Base Williamtown so some once respected standards and traditions seem to have got trampled in a politically correct ADF.
Post #2 by LT-DT leads us toward issues I hoped might emerge and I think it is worth reviewing what has generated the worsening decline in Australia's military capacity.
4 plus decades back, the separate armed forces were properly under political control and military hardware acquisition projects were pretty well-managed within the respective service departments and mainly well-proven 'off-the-shelf' gear was usually speedily introduced to operational service – C-130, Caribou, Iroquois to name just a few.
About that time, the RAAF and RAN both had more capacity to support the Army which was able to grow to 9 infantry battalions and supporting arms were expanded enabled by conscription to sustain the Vietnam War commitment
Forward to the 1980s and the Australian armed forces had become a thinly-veiled unified force subjected to public service domination with progressive centralisation of functions, like supply, impeding operational responsiveness. Technical capacity of the military was eventually deliberately de-skilled by shedding long-standing apprentice training schemes with ultimate elimination of Engineering and Equipment Branches within the Air Force. Outsourcing of aircraft maintenance and multiple other functions became widespread, predictably lowering on-line availability of expensive assets because contractors function to commercial requirements and not the military need to sometimes increase maintenance effort to cope with necessitous flying effort.
The military was downscaled in some respects post-Vietnam but the civilian component of Defence has since grown prodigiously, particularly the DMO/DSTO bit from the 1990s onwards with these agencies now having significant influence in capabilities planning and procurement and an intimate relationship with the major arms corporations that now largely parent defence industry in Australia. Support of defence industry has now become the central plank of defence policy, not maintaining continuous adequate and credible military preparedness through progressive optimization of in-service hardware (where cost-effective).
Both major political parties have endorsed compounding unaffordable defence expenditure toward a conceptual Force 2030 embracing an enlarged 'hardened and networked Army' – near 10 percent of federal government revenue will be outlayed on defence in 2010/11. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, which is patronised by Defence and some major arms manufacturers, largely drafted Defence White Paper 2009 around multiple dubious merit projects already in train and unrealistic military capabilities expansion.
Army cannot grow unless Navy and Air Force capabilities are commensurately expanded, particularly the airlift fleet, to enable timely deployments and sustainment of operations. If we have now got to the stage of mainly cannibalising ADF aircraft and other resources to sustain operations, then that can only lead to shrinking military capacities, particularly for quick reaction deployments. Manning of the military is also deficient and DWP2009 force growth expectations seem unachievable considering the apparent attitudes of Generation 'Y'.
'Defeat (of) armed attack upon Australia' is unrealistic as the continent is physically indefensible by military means. China has a strengthening economic stranglehold on Australia so invasion would be needless folly, apart from the mammoth military logistics issues involved. The best we might achieve (and afford) is deterrence of interference with our sea trade routes and modest scale (battalion or company group) military interventions where assistance is requested by other nations. So; do we really need a larger Army equipped with main battle tanks?
...have a grumble to the dog about the CA's idiotic beret ban...
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 27th Oct 2010 at 04:35.
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Dark side of the moon.
Posts: 16
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
You've obviously put a lot of thought into this, unfortunately I don't think anyone here is in a position to really help. Have you considered writing to your local member or maybe the Minister for Defence.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jan 2009
Location: North Arm Cove, NSW, Australia
Age: 86
Posts: 229
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hi DA; my wife often grizzles about me relentlessly assailing politicians, mainly the Cabinet, Shadow Cabinet and any others whom I think might ask probing questions; but it is good occupational therapy for an old bugger, although minimal acknowledgements generally and replies are usually very scarce.
I got involved in the political realm for a while post-Air Force and learned that pollies seldom react positively to isolated complaints; but they all seem to have trigger levels where the weight of correspondence on particular issues obliges them to do something. I thus feel it super-important for all who are concerned about the parlous state of the military in this country to be putting our elected representatives under pressure, otherwise nothing will change.
Adding something to the thread debate; our defence planners seem to be focused on trundling brigade size formations around the globe and armies understandably like to think in terms of big formations so multiple specialized fighting elements can become involved.
Over about 50 years, Australia gained comprehensive military experience in the regional tropical archipelago embracing the ability to quickly deploy and extract suitably structured force elements which might futuristically ideally include mobile integral fire support elements like M113 with cannon and mortar capabilities. Such vehicles were initally designed for C-130 airlift but other hardware being introduced into service is diminishing this cost-effective capability.
I am a fan of armoured cavalry considering its flexibility and versatility and it fits very well with Australia's realistic force deployment capacity at about battalion and company group level, without the encumbrance of heavy armour back-up support. Maybe 'tankies' like LT-DT might add some other dimensions to discussion.
I got involved in the political realm for a while post-Air Force and learned that pollies seldom react positively to isolated complaints; but they all seem to have trigger levels where the weight of correspondence on particular issues obliges them to do something. I thus feel it super-important for all who are concerned about the parlous state of the military in this country to be putting our elected representatives under pressure, otherwise nothing will change.
Adding something to the thread debate; our defence planners seem to be focused on trundling brigade size formations around the globe and armies understandably like to think in terms of big formations so multiple specialized fighting elements can become involved.
Over about 50 years, Australia gained comprehensive military experience in the regional tropical archipelago embracing the ability to quickly deploy and extract suitably structured force elements which might futuristically ideally include mobile integral fire support elements like M113 with cannon and mortar capabilities. Such vehicles were initally designed for C-130 airlift but other hardware being introduced into service is diminishing this cost-effective capability.
I am a fan of armoured cavalry considering its flexibility and versatility and it fits very well with Australia's realistic force deployment capacity at about battalion and company group level, without the encumbrance of heavy armour back-up support. Maybe 'tankies' like LT-DT might add some other dimensions to discussion.
For Bushranger
I noticed that with your last post, your age and post count match, which is sorta like shooting one's age in golf. 
In re rapid deployment, I'd suggest that the last thing you want to put on that C-17 is the Abrams. You'll get a better fire support, and deployed package mix, by deploying the tracks with their fire support (and a variety of Command and Control and spares, I imagine) in a C-17 Sortie than a tank of that weight. The scenario you mention, which is island warfare in the Pacific, does not appear to be where the Abrams would be the best air payload. Suggest Abrams be follow on capability, seaborne. On the other hand, if the mission is an urban environment, Abrams might be a great idea, with one small problem: how many bridges in your expected Theater can withstand one? ( A non trivial problem for some US Army Op Plans when the MBT went from M-60 to M-1, and that was in Germany, where there are a lot of good bridges and bridge builders, and NATO common funds to build a few more). Does your deployment package include bridging assest (mobile bridging on tracked vehicles)? If not, on ground mobility of a variety of wheeled and tracked assets can be restricted in low infra operational missions.
Your concerns in re airstrips also ought to include MOG/Handling capacity, and refueling: do you bring bladders, or fly missions that keep "return fuel" on board to avoid exposure during the turn around?
Good post, though, on the problem of "rapid deployment" capability on a budget. Excellent food for thought.
In re rapid deployment, I'd suggest that the last thing you want to put on that C-17 is the Abrams. You'll get a better fire support, and deployed package mix, by deploying the tracks with their fire support (and a variety of Command and Control and spares, I imagine) in a C-17 Sortie than a tank of that weight. The scenario you mention, which is island warfare in the Pacific, does not appear to be where the Abrams would be the best air payload. Suggest Abrams be follow on capability, seaborne. On the other hand, if the mission is an urban environment, Abrams might be a great idea, with one small problem: how many bridges in your expected Theater can withstand one? ( A non trivial problem for some US Army Op Plans when the MBT went from M-60 to M-1, and that was in Germany, where there are a lot of good bridges and bridge builders, and NATO common funds to build a few more). Does your deployment package include bridging assest (mobile bridging on tracked vehicles)? If not, on ground mobility of a variety of wheeled and tracked assets can be restricted in low infra operational missions.
Your concerns in re airstrips also ought to include MOG/Handling capacity, and refueling: do you bring bladders, or fly missions that keep "return fuel" on board to avoid exposure during the turn around?
Good post, though, on the problem of "rapid deployment" capability on a budget. Excellent food for thought.
In A/Stan the Dutch had self propelled 155 guns, the Canadians have Leopard tanks, etc....
Armour will not meet all situations obviously but are force multipliers in many areas.
Inspite of what the Govt says a couple of my Army friends who have served tell me that our "armoured" vehicles are sub-standard compared to some of the UK and US force vehicles. Also the lack of close air support is a real problem. Heavy arty can be a big help as the guns can range out some 25-30km with guided projectiles if needed. A few units well placed offers cover for a big area. Also SP guns can relocate quickly as well as traverse to engage targets in a wide area without having a major move.
Armour will not meet all situations obviously but are force multipliers in many areas.
Inspite of what the Govt says a couple of my Army friends who have served tell me that our "armoured" vehicles are sub-standard compared to some of the UK and US force vehicles. Also the lack of close air support is a real problem. Heavy arty can be a big help as the guns can range out some 25-30km with guided projectiles if needed. A few units well placed offers cover for a big area. Also SP guns can relocate quickly as well as traverse to engage targets in a wide area without having a major move.
TBM: agreed on the utility of SP, however, depending on the operational theater, they run into as many mobility problems as tanks. Also, my ground pounding friends have often pointed out to me the different needs for direct versus indirect fires.
There was a military theorist some years back who opined that tanks would be overtaken by helicopters (darnit, can't recall his name, he's a 20th century sort, post WW II) as the mobile striking arm/cav. He also presumed that air assault, like the US 101st, would become the standard infantry formation. Needless to say, it hasn't quite panned out that way, but bits and pieces of his idea have, to include reliance on helicopter.
Which brings me to my actual question and point: in Aussie doctrine, do you consider helicopters a Close Air Support asset, or a different form of airborne fires? Even in our own armed forces, Army and Marines typically view CAS and Armed Helicopters as different sorts of things, even though both are in the broad sense "airborne fires" when seen from a ground commander's view.
This takes me back to that C-17. Rather than bringing a tank, bring a few attack helicopters and some kit/maintenance capability to keep them running during initial force insertion.
OK, I am biased, I are a (retired) helicopter pilot.
There was a military theorist some years back who opined that tanks would be overtaken by helicopters (darnit, can't recall his name, he's a 20th century sort, post WW II) as the mobile striking arm/cav. He also presumed that air assault, like the US 101st, would become the standard infantry formation. Needless to say, it hasn't quite panned out that way, but bits and pieces of his idea have, to include reliance on helicopter.
Which brings me to my actual question and point: in Aussie doctrine, do you consider helicopters a Close Air Support asset, or a different form of airborne fires? Even in our own armed forces, Army and Marines typically view CAS and Armed Helicopters as different sorts of things, even though both are in the broad sense "airborne fires" when seen from a ground commander's view.
This takes me back to that C-17. Rather than bringing a tank, bring a few attack helicopters and some kit/maintenance capability to keep them running during initial force insertion.
OK, I am biased, I are a (retired) helicopter pilot.
Join Date: Jul 2006
Location: Australia
Posts: 312
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Our Government needs to understand, based on the experiance of other Air Forces particularly the RAF, that four C17 long term will not be enough. We should be looking at least another two. These aircraft will fly more hours than planned and then we will be caught short.
There are I believe an average of only six H models and the J models are rapidly approaching centre section fatique problems.
Old and tired the Carabou may have been, but it was still doing a good job, Why we never re engined when first proposed in 1970's is beyonf many of us.
Two of our tankers were pinched by KRudd which affectively meant that we also lost yet more uplift capacity, and the jury is still out on whether we will retro fit the frieght floor.
Timor should have tausght us that we do not have enough air lift capacity.
Really to day we have no more affective capacity than in 66 when we have 24 C130's.
Yes I know one can play the sums and say a C17 equals 4 C130's and 1 C130 equals 4 Caribous but if you have four different tasks that equals does not work out.
The Government needs to put some real on the ground brian power in its ranks, because they make decisions not understanding the results of their decisions.
The RAAF has a proud history of uplift and support, but why do we have to work with one hand tied behind our back,
Regards
Col
There are I believe an average of only six H models and the J models are rapidly approaching centre section fatique problems.
Old and tired the Carabou may have been, but it was still doing a good job, Why we never re engined when first proposed in 1970's is beyonf many of us.
Two of our tankers were pinched by KRudd which affectively meant that we also lost yet more uplift capacity, and the jury is still out on whether we will retro fit the frieght floor.
Timor should have tausght us that we do not have enough air lift capacity.
Really to day we have no more affective capacity than in 66 when we have 24 C130's.
Yes I know one can play the sums and say a C17 equals 4 C130's and 1 C130 equals 4 Caribous but if you have four different tasks that equals does not work out.
The Government needs to put some real on the ground brian power in its ranks, because they make decisions not understanding the results of their decisions.
The RAAF has a proud history of uplift and support, but why do we have to work with one hand tied behind our back,
Regards
Col
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: Great Southern Land
Age: 57
Posts: 434
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
Which brings me to my actual question and point: in Aussie doctrine, do you consider helicopters a Close Air Support asset, or a different form of airborne fires? Even in our own armed forces, Army and Marines typically view CAS and Armed Helicopters as different sorts of things, even though both are in the broad sense "airborne fires" when seen from a ground commander's view.
You're pretty much on the money. The ARH is part of the combined arms team, and Army pilots now do the COAC (combat officers advanced course) alongside their Crunchie, Turret Head, Sapper and Gunner colleagues. The ARH brings effects to the battlespace in the Manoeuvre BOS. The Offensive Support BOS has CAS platforms providing the effects, and ARH isn't included in the doctrinal OS BOS - the CAS platforms in the pams are Hornet & Pig.
So the ARH is considered part of the collection of platforms and capabilities that deliver manoeuvre effects; having said that, I doubt one would be penalised for including ARH in the 'concept of OS' during a TEWT.
Our Government needs to understand, based on the experiance of other Air Forces particularly the RAF, that four C17 long term will not be enough. We should be looking at least another two. These aircraft will fly more hours than planned and then we will be caught short.
There are I believe an average of only six H models and the J models are rapidly approaching centre section fatique problems.
Old and tired the Carabou may have been, but it was still doing a good job, Why we never re engined when first proposed in 1970's is beyonf many of us.
Two of our tankers were pinched by KRudd which affectively meant that we also lost yet more uplift capacity, and the jury is still out on whether we will retro fit the frieght floor.
Timor should have tausght us that we do not have enough air lift capacity.
Really to day we have no more affective capacity than in 66 when we have 24 C130's.
Yes I know one can play the sums and say a C17 equals 4 C130's and 1 C130 equals 4 Caribous but if you have four different tasks that equals does not work out.
The Government needs to put some real on the ground brian power in its ranks, because they make decisions not understanding the results of their decisions.
The RAAF has a proud history of uplift and support, but why do we have to work with one hand tied behind our back,
Regards
Col
There are I believe an average of only six H models and the J models are rapidly approaching centre section fatique problems.
Old and tired the Carabou may have been, but it was still doing a good job, Why we never re engined when first proposed in 1970's is beyonf many of us.
Two of our tankers were pinched by KRudd which affectively meant that we also lost yet more uplift capacity, and the jury is still out on whether we will retro fit the frieght floor.
Timor should have tausght us that we do not have enough air lift capacity.
Really to day we have no more affective capacity than in 66 when we have 24 C130's.
Yes I know one can play the sums and say a C17 equals 4 C130's and 1 C130 equals 4 Caribous but if you have four different tasks that equals does not work out.
The Government needs to put some real on the ground brian power in its ranks, because they make decisions not understanding the results of their decisions.
The RAAF has a proud history of uplift and support, but why do we have to work with one hand tied behind our back,
Regards
Col
Head of nail, struck!
We now have next to no useful tactical airlift capability for places like Timor/PNG and our strategic airlift assets are overstretched and declining.
So the ARH is considered part of the collection of platforms and capabilities that deliver manoeuvre effects; having said that, I doubt one would be penalised for including ARH in the 'concept of OS' during a TEWT.
On paper everything looks good [haha]. In reality the show is broken. Lack of airlift for the tasks. The F-18 world can barely muster a 2 x 4 ship fly-by.
The Navy is a rusting relic of poor planning and decisions.
Army Avn is another 'paper' force. The news showed a couple of Tigers in Townsville flying around with 5-6 Blackhawks [which I'm told is about all that can be mustered on a regular basis.
and we laugh at Indonesia...!!!!
The Navy is a rusting relic of poor planning and decisions.
Army Avn is another 'paper' force. The news showed a couple of Tigers in Townsville flying around with 5-6 Blackhawks [which I'm told is about all that can be mustered on a regular basis.
and we laugh at Indonesia...!!!!
Join Date: Jun 2001
Posts: 1,451
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
and we laugh at Indonesia
From racedo:
As much as people dismiss the idea that somehow the Indonesians could buy these, maintain them and have a viable air force I would caution people that money talks.
Just because they did something stupid in the past doesn't mean they will do so in the future.
Acquiring the technology is easy but given the state of military salaries around the world it wouldn't be that hard to persuade young "retired" experienced personnel to move to a sunny place with mega nice salaries and perks.
It’s not as if members of NATO forces have not taken on assignments as "trainers" with Govt sanction with various militaries around the world often as an assistance to an arms deal.
Just because they did something stupid in the past doesn't mean they will do so in the future.
Acquiring the technology is easy but given the state of military salaries around the world it wouldn't be that hard to persuade young "retired" experienced personnel to move to a sunny place with mega nice salaries and perks.
It’s not as if members of NATO forces have not taken on assignments as "trainers" with Govt sanction with various militaries around the world often as an assistance to an arms deal.
Of course, looking at the parlous state of much of the ADF's current high tech inventory, the reverse argument (that just because we used to be able to do it right in the past, we'll not necessarily always be able to do it right in the future) holds true too.
Food for thought...
Food for thought...
Col/Herkman, you touch on one glaring current shortcoming, the absence of a light tactical fixed wing transport aircraft in the ADF inventory after the recent retirement of the Caribou, virtually putting many of the airfields in PNG and the islands to our north out of practical reach of the ADF, be it for military response or disaster/civil relief purposes.
The real problem (and one apparently totally lost on damn near everyone of star rank and certainly among the Defence civilian mandarins in Canberra), is the loss of aircrew skills in having our "light tactical transport squadron(!)" crews maintaining their currency in a motley collection of near superannuated Beechcraft King Airs.
I'd be willing to lay a substantial bet that there are people, both uniformed and non-uniformed, (some with an eye on a nice post retirement job with Bell or some other major defence contractor), who are entertaining fond hopes that we'll eventually replace the Caribou with Ospreys.
Gents, here's a fact that can't be ignored - we can't afford yet another overly complex, top shelf, incredibly expensive and therefore too small in numbers piece of equipment in the ADF.
And here's a prediction as certain as night follows day - if we go that route, it will go the way of every other project except the C17 in recent times. Delays, cost overruns, less than promised performance, expensive retrofixes... you’re all of you all too familiar with what amounts to a set in stone checklist.
The ADF needs something that:
- has already been proven to work (who was the wise man who said a long time ago now "Never buy the 'A' model of anything"?)
- cheap enough to buy and to operate that we can afford to buy it and operate it in meaningful (read 'effective') numbers so that enough crews can be trained and kept current on it to provide a surge capacity in times of crisis
- is common with equipment operated by our major ally so that we can have ready access to spares and extra airframes at short notice if required.
Like damn near everything we’ve bought over the last few years – (even the otherwise successful C17 suffers problem of too expensive and therefore too few) - the Osprey doesn't fit any of those criteria.
Join Date: Jul 2006
Location: Australia
Posts: 312
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Instead of taking the armies cast off aircraft and then to buy yet more completely throws me.
Stories that we need to have aircraft of 2010 era so staff can learn to work on more complex airframes, rather than that but how about looking at what task they can perform. Caribou it will never replace and I wonder how the leasing deal works on these airframes being used in combat roles. Once again the RAF found that out with the C17 and now if they have not already done so have bought their first ones.
We should have bought the C27, would have suited PNG areas well. has high interchange with the C130J and we would have had staff to service and repair them.
The problem is that Australian forces are controlled by the government, and some who tried to run the show the ADF way have been shown the door.
A question that no one from the government has answered is how do we remain operational when 40% of the tanker fleet is to have VIP fleet fitouts at a cost of $85M.
The ADF does not need to be told what their duties are, but many in Parliament need to look at their self focused desires which impact onto daily ADF operations.
Regards
Col
Stories that we need to have aircraft of 2010 era so staff can learn to work on more complex airframes, rather than that but how about looking at what task they can perform. Caribou it will never replace and I wonder how the leasing deal works on these airframes being used in combat roles. Once again the RAF found that out with the C17 and now if they have not already done so have bought their first ones.
We should have bought the C27, would have suited PNG areas well. has high interchange with the C130J and we would have had staff to service and repair them.
The problem is that Australian forces are controlled by the government, and some who tried to run the show the ADF way have been shown the door.
A question that no one from the government has answered is how do we remain operational when 40% of the tanker fleet is to have VIP fleet fitouts at a cost of $85M.
The ADF does not need to be told what their duties are, but many in Parliament need to look at their self focused desires which impact onto daily ADF operations.
Regards
Col
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Canberra
Posts: 382
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Whilst I agree that the ADF is facing a capability holiday in the delivery of Tactical airlift, and support calls for less silver bullet procurement.
I would also like to suggest the formation of a credible RAAF / Army Avn element that is able to support not supplant the full timers during weekends / stand down.
With Australia's population passing through 22 + Million and increasing at 300,000+ per year we will have the population to support these efforts. Ah but, these positions require very specific and a highly skilled workforce I hear you say? Well, set up a tent at any RAF / Navy / Army Base and I'm sure ADF recruiters would meet their yearly quoter in a fortnight.
It's all down to our political class's failure to realise that our region should rank much higher than current ops suggest. It would appear that various faceless persons are so concerned with the 'Big Picture' that they fail to understand our own growing importance (and their reliance to Aus) to our regional neighbors that face stark environmental realities in the not too distant future.
Enough already with the war in Afghanistan, focus on Australia's area of interest and develop capabilities to suit, the UK is now going through the pain of a political class unwilling / unable to understand that behind the promises to play alongside the big end of town to adequately fund and support that promise which comes at a very high price.
Pay up or change your tune.
I would also like to suggest the formation of a credible RAAF / Army Avn element that is able to support not supplant the full timers during weekends / stand down.
With Australia's population passing through 22 + Million and increasing at 300,000+ per year we will have the population to support these efforts. Ah but, these positions require very specific and a highly skilled workforce I hear you say? Well, set up a tent at any RAF / Navy / Army Base and I'm sure ADF recruiters would meet their yearly quoter in a fortnight.
It's all down to our political class's failure to realise that our region should rank much higher than current ops suggest. It would appear that various faceless persons are so concerned with the 'Big Picture' that they fail to understand our own growing importance (and their reliance to Aus) to our regional neighbors that face stark environmental realities in the not too distant future.
Enough already with the war in Afghanistan, focus on Australia's area of interest and develop capabilities to suit, the UK is now going through the pain of a political class unwilling / unable to understand that behind the promises to play alongside the big end of town to adequately fund and support that promise which comes at a very high price.
Pay up or change your tune.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jan 2009
Location: North Arm Cove, NSW, Australia
Age: 86
Posts: 229
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Australia's Flawed Defence Policy
Lonewolf 50 raises some interests points re fire support and I will make a separate post in that regard.
The fundamental reason why the ADF is in such decay is because the central plank of Australia's defence policy is support of defence industry which is now largely parented by foreign major arms corporations. Successive Australian governments have been pouring vast amounts of money into building and/or modifying military hardware in Australia which is really only job creation at forbidding cost because profits from such endeavours largely get siphoned offshore. It makes no sense to sustain low productivity industries in this land when we keep on importing people, supposedly to make up for labour shortfalls in the resources industry in particular. We should be sourcing only proven gear 'off-the-shelf' from the US (diesel submarines excepted) and cease slapping our great ally in the face by acquiring European origin military hardware.
Had we been continually progressively optimizing in-service US origin hardware to maintain adequate combat readiness, more credible military capabilities would now exist, particularly across the airlift and helicopter fleets. Enhancing the F-111, for around one third of the Super Hornet project cost, would have provided excellent long-range maritime strike deterrence of interference with our sea trade routes and we could have just leased some enhanced C-135 tankers from the USAF in lieu of involving in the MRTT. There are of course multiple other examples of inferior hardware decisions among all 3 services and the Service Chiefs are culpable to some extent although nobody has hitherto been held accountable.
Australia's defence policy is hugely flawed and this needs to be strongly emphasized to politicians of all species via correspondence so please generate some letters, in the national interest.
The fundamental reason why the ADF is in such decay is because the central plank of Australia's defence policy is support of defence industry which is now largely parented by foreign major arms corporations. Successive Australian governments have been pouring vast amounts of money into building and/or modifying military hardware in Australia which is really only job creation at forbidding cost because profits from such endeavours largely get siphoned offshore. It makes no sense to sustain low productivity industries in this land when we keep on importing people, supposedly to make up for labour shortfalls in the resources industry in particular. We should be sourcing only proven gear 'off-the-shelf' from the US (diesel submarines excepted) and cease slapping our great ally in the face by acquiring European origin military hardware.
Had we been continually progressively optimizing in-service US origin hardware to maintain adequate combat readiness, more credible military capabilities would now exist, particularly across the airlift and helicopter fleets. Enhancing the F-111, for around one third of the Super Hornet project cost, would have provided excellent long-range maritime strike deterrence of interference with our sea trade routes and we could have just leased some enhanced C-135 tankers from the USAF in lieu of involving in the MRTT. There are of course multiple other examples of inferior hardware decisions among all 3 services and the Service Chiefs are culpable to some extent although nobody has hitherto been held accountable.
Australia's defence policy is hugely flawed and this needs to be strongly emphasized to politicians of all species via correspondence so please generate some letters, in the national interest.
Join Date: Apr 2000
Posts: 291
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
we could have just leased some enhanced C-135 tankers from the USAF in lieu of involving in the MRTT
You gotta get those priorities right, Bushranger.