ADF Deployability of Armoured Elements
Join Date: Apr 2000
Posts: 291
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yeah, TBM-legend, they do - the difference being, the SAF actually uses their KC135s as tankers and not VIP transports that they snuck into the inventory under the guise of tankers.
Historians have expressed disbelief that the Nazis sidelined huge resources (rail rolling stock, manpower, materials, etc) to ship Jews and other 'undesirables' to the death camps almost right up the very end of WW2 when those resources were desperately needed for the failing war effort. It was a classic case of a twisted ideology overriding common sense.
What our politicians and the senior public servants in DMO have been doing with defence acquisition over these last few years is on a par with that.
Historians have expressed disbelief that the Nazis sidelined huge resources (rail rolling stock, manpower, materials, etc) to ship Jews and other 'undesirables' to the death camps almost right up the very end of WW2 when those resources were desperately needed for the failing war effort. It was a classic case of a twisted ideology overriding common sense.
What our politicians and the senior public servants in DMO have been doing with defence acquisition over these last few years is on a par with that.
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: Australia
Posts: 85
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
7x7, that's a champagne post.
You have just compared the DMO to Nazis, and made the assertion that our government is operating under the same twisted ideology as the Third Reich.
Don't listen to your family, I think you are a great Australian, and not a tool.
Now run away and find your marbles before Goebbels slips over on them.
You have just compared the DMO to Nazis, and made the assertion that our government is operating under the same twisted ideology as the Third Reich.
Don't listen to your family, I think you are a great Australian, and not a tool.
Now run away and find your marbles before Goebbels slips over on them.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jan 2009
Location: North Arm Cove, NSW, Australia
Age: 86
Posts: 229
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hi Lonewolf 50; you make some interesting points in your post #11.
Complaint from Australian infantry elements in Afghanistan re lack of mortars seems justified as they need that form of integral direct fire; but it should be mobile because those poor buggers are so over-burdened with all the gear they wear these days, it would be unrealistic to expect them to lug around heavy mortar hardware and ammunition. Ergo, the value of a light armoured cavalry vehicle with cannon and mortar, like a readily air transportable M113!
Some enhancements to armoured vehicles would affect air transportability, like adding necessitous external armour; but I ponder how stretching an M113 - as being done in Australia – affects carriage of multiple units in C-130 and C-17? Australia does not have an adequate fleet of C-17 so C-130 would foreseeably be the airlift asset most utilized for rapid response scenarios.
Airborne fire support by whichever armed forces can be broadly categorized as 'close air support' delivered as close as 10 metres from friendly forces with acceptable risk in necessitous circumstances or several hundred metres due to safety distance requirements of more powerful weapons. Although indirect fire support, helos if loitering out of earshot can react pretty swiftly; but response may not necessarily be timely if ferry to a scene of action is involved.
Intimately close fire is more safely delivered by pilot operated fixed forward-firing weaponry in my view which leads to thoughts about the characteristics of close air support platforms and the merits and otherwise of attack helicopters versus gunships, both rotary and fixed wing. Some desirable characteristics of good close air support platforms are strong hot and high performance, multiple gun and cannon redundancy, simple systems for reliability, lots of ammunition, optimum ability to see and hear ground-fire, quick turnaround and good field maintainability. If rotary wing, they should also be air transportable into remote areas. No problem in that regard for a conceptual Huey II Bushranger by C-130, but an MH-60L DAP Blackhawk (160th SOAR - MH-60L DAP - Special Ops Photos) for example might require C-17 airlift. Whether attack helicopters like the ADF Tiger are well suited for the intimate close air support role is debatable.
It seems to me that long-standing principles of war-fighting - flexibility, versatility, economy of effort – should be more pertinent than doctrine regarding concepts of operations when considering force structures and military hardware. It is just not cost-effective to deploy heavy armour and artillery if more flexible and versatile forms of fire support will suffice.
Going off forum for a week or so now to be with my dying friend.
Complaint from Australian infantry elements in Afghanistan re lack of mortars seems justified as they need that form of integral direct fire; but it should be mobile because those poor buggers are so over-burdened with all the gear they wear these days, it would be unrealistic to expect them to lug around heavy mortar hardware and ammunition. Ergo, the value of a light armoured cavalry vehicle with cannon and mortar, like a readily air transportable M113!
Some enhancements to armoured vehicles would affect air transportability, like adding necessitous external armour; but I ponder how stretching an M113 - as being done in Australia – affects carriage of multiple units in C-130 and C-17? Australia does not have an adequate fleet of C-17 so C-130 would foreseeably be the airlift asset most utilized for rapid response scenarios.
Airborne fire support by whichever armed forces can be broadly categorized as 'close air support' delivered as close as 10 metres from friendly forces with acceptable risk in necessitous circumstances or several hundred metres due to safety distance requirements of more powerful weapons. Although indirect fire support, helos if loitering out of earshot can react pretty swiftly; but response may not necessarily be timely if ferry to a scene of action is involved.
Intimately close fire is more safely delivered by pilot operated fixed forward-firing weaponry in my view which leads to thoughts about the characteristics of close air support platforms and the merits and otherwise of attack helicopters versus gunships, both rotary and fixed wing. Some desirable characteristics of good close air support platforms are strong hot and high performance, multiple gun and cannon redundancy, simple systems for reliability, lots of ammunition, optimum ability to see and hear ground-fire, quick turnaround and good field maintainability. If rotary wing, they should also be air transportable into remote areas. No problem in that regard for a conceptual Huey II Bushranger by C-130, but an MH-60L DAP Blackhawk (160th SOAR - MH-60L DAP - Special Ops Photos) for example might require C-17 airlift. Whether attack helicopters like the ADF Tiger are well suited for the intimate close air support role is debatable.
It seems to me that long-standing principles of war-fighting - flexibility, versatility, economy of effort – should be more pertinent than doctrine regarding concepts of operations when considering force structures and military hardware. It is just not cost-effective to deploy heavy armour and artillery if more flexible and versatile forms of fire support will suffice.
Going off forum for a week or so now to be with my dying friend.
Join Date: Apr 2000
Posts: 291
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Your ‘outraged’ reply to my last post might be great debating technique and go down well on the floor of Parliament, emergov, but that’s about all it is.
Put aside the mock outrage for one moment and look again at what I said. I compared the expensive mistakes the DMO has made in defence acquisition in recent years to the mistakes made by the Nazis in not using their limited resources more effectively in fighting a war against a far more numerous enemy.
“...using ... limited resources more effectively ... against a far more numerous enemy...”
Does that sound like the potential situation of any country you know?
Put aside the mock outrage for one moment and look again at what I said. I compared the expensive mistakes the DMO has made in defence acquisition in recent years to the mistakes made by the Nazis in not using their limited resources more effectively in fighting a war against a far more numerous enemy.
“...using ... limited resources more effectively ... against a far more numerous enemy...”
Does that sound like the potential situation of any country you know?
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: Australia
Posts: 85
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It wasn't 'outraged' it was a deliberately sarcastic response to a ridiculous point made by you.
Firstly, we are not spending billions of dollars on completely irrelevant and morally questionable goals like genocide. Being upset that the RAAF operates a VIP fleet is one thing, comparing it to the holocaust is just silly.
Secondly, the DMO is not operating on its own whims - it is buying stuff that the government told it to buy after the CDF advised them what is most appropriate.
Thirdly, there is no national emergency or crisis here, and we have no capability gap because we can't deploy a regiment of tanks in C-17.
Most importantly, the RAAF already has a VIP fleet, and your inference that the MRTT will primarily be used for VIP transport; that in fact it is being acquired for that purpose and not for MRTT, is incorrect and silly.
It would be lovely if the VIP fleet ceased to exist, but a quick global survey would prove that every country in the world shares similar Nazi leanings when it comes to transporting politicians and heads of state. Except maybe the Singaporeans?
Firstly, we are not spending billions of dollars on completely irrelevant and morally questionable goals like genocide. Being upset that the RAAF operates a VIP fleet is one thing, comparing it to the holocaust is just silly.
Secondly, the DMO is not operating on its own whims - it is buying stuff that the government told it to buy after the CDF advised them what is most appropriate.
Thirdly, there is no national emergency or crisis here, and we have no capability gap because we can't deploy a regiment of tanks in C-17.
Most importantly, the RAAF already has a VIP fleet, and your inference that the MRTT will primarily be used for VIP transport; that in fact it is being acquired for that purpose and not for MRTT, is incorrect and silly.
It would be lovely if the VIP fleet ceased to exist, but a quick global survey would prove that every country in the world shares similar Nazi leanings when it comes to transporting politicians and heads of state. Except maybe the Singaporeans?
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Australia - South of where I'd like to be !
Age: 59
Posts: 4,261
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Article in today's WA Newspaper.
Buying high-tech defence kit always risky Max Blenkin
November 1, 2010 - 11:59AM
AAP
Buying high-tech defence equipment is always risky, and attempts to eliminate that risk could result in Australian forces going to war with obsolete weapons, a new study says.
The study says despite many inquiries defence procurement projects continue to experience cost overruns, delays and shortfalls in performance, such as the plan to acquire Seasprite helicopters, which was dumped at vast cost.
In the paper, published in the latest edition of the Kokoda Foundation journal Security Challenges, former senior defence official Fred Bennett said there was always some risk, particularly in acquiring advanced high-tech equipment.
Advertisement: Story continues below
"Problematic as it is, experimental risk cannot be avoided," Mr Bennett said.
"Attempting to do so involves a greater risk - that of going into battle with obsolete weapons systems."
Australia's succession of high-profile defence headaches has included projects to acquire the Seasprites, Collins submarines and Wedgetail early warning aircraft.
To avoid problems, countries can buy proven equipment already in service with other nations, a practice known as military off-the-shelf (MOTS).
Mr Bennett said such strategies created only an illusion of lower risk.
"But by precluding innovation or changes to meet Australia's unique needs and circumstances, those strategies expose future military operations to higher risk," he said.
Australia's relatively small defence force depended on the highest quality of personnel and the best and most suitable equipment.
"But a MOTS-based procurement strategy risks sending our forces into battle with yesterday's weapons designed to meet the needs of a different defence force in a different theatre of operations and unsupported by in-country capability for repair or adaptation to changing operational conditions," he said.
Mr Bennett said the first step was to openly acknowledge that advanced, technologically complex defence equipment projects featured high levels of uncertainty.
It could then be accepted that the schedule and cost of such projects could not be forecast in any meaningful way in the early stages.
"Perhaps the key to successful defence project outcomes is higher quality, better educated and more experienced project managers," he said.
Buying high-tech defence kit always risky Max Blenkin
November 1, 2010 - 11:59AM
AAP
Buying high-tech defence equipment is always risky, and attempts to eliminate that risk could result in Australian forces going to war with obsolete weapons, a new study says.
The study says despite many inquiries defence procurement projects continue to experience cost overruns, delays and shortfalls in performance, such as the plan to acquire Seasprite helicopters, which was dumped at vast cost.
In the paper, published in the latest edition of the Kokoda Foundation journal Security Challenges, former senior defence official Fred Bennett said there was always some risk, particularly in acquiring advanced high-tech equipment.
Advertisement: Story continues below
"Problematic as it is, experimental risk cannot be avoided," Mr Bennett said.
"Attempting to do so involves a greater risk - that of going into battle with obsolete weapons systems."
Australia's succession of high-profile defence headaches has included projects to acquire the Seasprites, Collins submarines and Wedgetail early warning aircraft.
To avoid problems, countries can buy proven equipment already in service with other nations, a practice known as military off-the-shelf (MOTS).
Mr Bennett said such strategies created only an illusion of lower risk.
"But by precluding innovation or changes to meet Australia's unique needs and circumstances, those strategies expose future military operations to higher risk," he said.
Australia's relatively small defence force depended on the highest quality of personnel and the best and most suitable equipment.
"But a MOTS-based procurement strategy risks sending our forces into battle with yesterday's weapons designed to meet the needs of a different defence force in a different theatre of operations and unsupported by in-country capability for repair or adaptation to changing operational conditions," he said.
Mr Bennett said the first step was to openly acknowledge that advanced, technologically complex defence equipment projects featured high levels of uncertainty.
It could then be accepted that the schedule and cost of such projects could not be forecast in any meaningful way in the early stages.
"Perhaps the key to successful defence project outcomes is higher quality, better educated and more experienced project managers," he said.
Join Date: Jan 2000
Location: Australia
Posts: 543
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sounds awfully like defence industry spin to me. The argument would hold water if the 'cutting edge' kit 'engineered just for Australian conditions' actually worked.
Too much of the 'unique' equipment bought for the ADF over the last decade and more simply hasn't, or at least not for too many years after promised and after costing far more than it should have.
Too much of the 'unique' equipment bought for the ADF over the last decade and more simply hasn't, or at least not for too many years after promised and after costing far more than it should have.
Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: Oz
Posts: 644
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by herkman
A question that no one from the government has answered is how do we remain operational when 40% of the tanker fleet is to have VIP fleet fitouts at a cost of $85M.
Join Date: Jan 2000
Location: Australia
Posts: 543
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Another Oz 'A' model buy debacle in the making?
Mainstream US media report signals JSF implosion – Plane Talking
Does this put posts #22 and #23 into a slightly different perspective?
Mainstream US media report signals JSF implosion – Plane Talking
The question that one hopes Australia’s defence minister Stephen Smith will ask of his minders and masters in our defence establishment this morning is “when did you know this and why haven’t I been told”.
Join Date: Jan 2000
Location: Australia
Posts: 543
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A very interesting (and worrisome) comment under the Bloomberg article I referred to in my last post.
Go to news.google.com.au. As of this writing there is not a single mention of this in the Australian Media, as reported by Google. Next go to news.google.com and search the news for “F-35.” You will find many dozens of articles describing the problem from around the world, but only this blog post emanating from Australia.
If only the Australian media’s apathy was justified!!
If only the Australian media’s apathy was justified!!
Rule 1 - never be first to buy the 'A' model of anything.
Mature 'A' models can work [C-17/F/A-18/C-130A etc] but not others....
Aussie Tiger/SeaSprite/MRH90/Collins subs.....
Mature 'A' models can work [C-17/F/A-18/C-130A etc] but not others....
Aussie Tiger/SeaSprite/MRH90/Collins subs.....
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Australia - South of where I'd like to be !
Age: 59
Posts: 4,261
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I like this quote from the same article. It could be applied to all defence projects.
"The lack of critical analysis and demands for action by the US to resolve the JSF issues has damaged the national interest, and a completely new, more ruthless, more performance oriented defence establishment is urgently overdue. The concept of critically managing rather than just applauding major defence commitments remains an alien notion in Canberra."
Going back to my post of the WA Article, he says
"But by precluding innovation or changes to meet Australia's unique needs and circumstances, those strategies expose future military operations to higher risk,"
What "unique needs and circumstances" do we have that the US doesn't also operate in ?
I think we must sometimes "create a problem" to keep people employed finding a solution.
.
"The lack of critical analysis and demands for action by the US to resolve the JSF issues has damaged the national interest, and a completely new, more ruthless, more performance oriented defence establishment is urgently overdue. The concept of critically managing rather than just applauding major defence commitments remains an alien notion in Canberra."
Going back to my post of the WA Article, he says
"But by precluding innovation or changes to meet Australia's unique needs and circumstances, those strategies expose future military operations to higher risk,"
What "unique needs and circumstances" do we have that the US doesn't also operate in ?
I think we must sometimes "create a problem" to keep people employed finding a solution.
.
Join Date: Jul 2006
Location: Australia
Posts: 312
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
FA18 and the story of the stolen tankers
The proposal to convert two of the KC30's to VIP duties is outlined the Australian Defense Magazine . Auguswt 2008.
Also tabled was the conversion costs of $25M per airframe.
Google search will reveal more, including a official statement by Angus.
As the purchase of five allows for two deployments of two aircraft, I sure hope you not rostered to refuel from number four. Number Five was originally purchased as a back up for the four other frames.
As for the the VIP scrongers, put them into couple of C130's that should cull out many of the hangers on.
Regards
Col
Also tabled was the conversion costs of $25M per airframe.
Google search will reveal more, including a official statement by Angus.
As the purchase of five allows for two deployments of two aircraft, I sure hope you not rostered to refuel from number four. Number Five was originally purchased as a back up for the four other frames.
As for the the VIP scrongers, put them into couple of C130's that should cull out many of the hangers on.
Regards
Col
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: OZ
Posts: 56
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Those that believe the tanker will always be a tanker and never do vip duties are either naive or think that the seasprite was a really good buy.
Pssst - got some left handed screw drivers you might be interested in.
F
Pssst - got some left handed screw drivers you might be interested in.
F
Join Date: Jan 2000
Location: Australia
Posts: 543
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Frazzled, no one would have a problem with using the standard tanker on the occasional VIP trip. The vitally important word in that sentence is "standard". However, if the article I read some time ago is to be believed, (possibly the same one herkman refers to - can't recall), two of the aircraft won't have the refuelling gear installed "to save money" (and, if I recall correctly, neither will they have upper deck large cargo doors fitted, but I'm not sure on that point).
If that's a fact, two of the airframes will be, to all intents and purposes, near to standard A330 passenger airliners, (3 class of course, with that all-important First Class cabin installed) and next to useless for many of the military tasks they were bought as part of the defence budget to perform - and therefore, since they can't be used for such mundane military tasks, they'll be much more readily available for all those vitally important VIP flights
.
When you consider what two fewer airframes in an already very small tanker fleet will mean to capability, it's enough to make anyone who has even a fleeting knowledge of what's involved in keeping such complex airframes airborne cry.
If that's a fact, two of the airframes will be, to all intents and purposes, near to standard A330 passenger airliners, (3 class of course, with that all-important First Class cabin installed) and next to useless for many of the military tasks they were bought as part of the defence budget to perform - and therefore, since they can't be used for such mundane military tasks, they'll be much more readily available for all those vitally important VIP flights
.When you consider what two fewer airframes in an already very small tanker fleet will mean to capability, it's enough to make anyone who has even a fleeting knowledge of what's involved in keeping such complex airframes airborne cry.
For Like This - Do That:
Thanks for the response on AH as maneuver. Sounds like US Army doctrine, however, I think most Joint and or Combined Task Force commanders, when CAS (Hornet, A-10, what have you) is not available will fill in that need with AH should the situation warrant, limitations in armament considered. (Ever seen a GBU-12 on an Apache? Me neither).
IIRC, Blackhawk is still offered for foreign sales by Sikorksy with armaments kits on the stub wings/hard points more often used for external fuel tanks. One could, I suppose, deploy Blackhawks that could adapt (with some maintenance hours expended, obviously) from cargo/utilty to armed/attack. Not sure who does that ... memory tells me the Thais were looking into that a few years ago.
Hmm, took a look at Wiki, the variations in kit are quite the mix. Understand Australia chose not to pursue the armed Blackhawk.
Bushranger 71: many thanks for the two responses. I'd need to go back to a few handbooks to see if an M113 fits in a C-130. Maneuver and fires work together when stovepipes are not created in the minds of the C2 network.
Frazzled: I was very sorry to see the SH-2 fall flat in Oz, given that a few places have found the G a good enough fit. Poland, New Zealand ... guessing it was the mission equipment that sank the deal?
I recall being very excited by the SH-2G, which USN ended up only putting in the reserve squadrons. (Navy shrank quite a bit between 1989 and 2000, and has shrunk further since. )
Flew the F in the 80's. I was tickled to see the combining gear box dumped, the T-700 added, and the hover attitude nose pitch significantly reduced. (Good for shipboard ops).
Thanks for the response on AH as maneuver. Sounds like US Army doctrine, however, I think most Joint and or Combined Task Force commanders, when CAS (Hornet, A-10, what have you) is not available will fill in that need with AH should the situation warrant, limitations in armament considered. (Ever seen a GBU-12 on an Apache? Me neither).
IIRC, Blackhawk is still offered for foreign sales by Sikorksy with armaments kits on the stub wings/hard points more often used for external fuel tanks. One could, I suppose, deploy Blackhawks that could adapt (with some maintenance hours expended, obviously) from cargo/utilty to armed/attack. Not sure who does that ... memory tells me the Thais were looking into that a few years ago.
Hmm, took a look at Wiki, the variations in kit are quite the mix. Understand Australia chose not to pursue the armed Blackhawk.
Bushranger 71: many thanks for the two responses. I'd need to go back to a few handbooks to see if an M113 fits in a C-130. Maneuver and fires work together when stovepipes are not created in the minds of the C2 network.
Frazzled: I was very sorry to see the SH-2 fall flat in Oz, given that a few places have found the G a good enough fit. Poland, New Zealand ... guessing it was the mission equipment that sank the deal?
I recall being very excited by the SH-2G, which USN ended up only putting in the reserve squadrons. (Navy shrank quite a bit between 1989 and 2000, and has shrunk further since. )
Flew the F in the 80's. I was tickled to see the combining gear box dumped, the T-700 added, and the hover attitude nose pitch significantly reduced. (Good for shipboard ops).
Join Date: Jul 2006
Location: Australia
Posts: 312
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yes the M113 fits in the C130 fine. In actual fact you could fit two.
The problem with two is that even though they fit their combined weight (depending on model, will exceed the allowable load weight.
By the way the M113 would have to be one of the best buys we ever made, fifty years old, and several rebuilds later, still going strong.
By the way the reason all model C130's served well, is we did not to any degree fiddle with their standards.
Regards
Col
The problem with two is that even though they fit their combined weight (depending on model, will exceed the allowable load weight.
By the way the M113 would have to be one of the best buys we ever made, fifty years old, and several rebuilds later, still going strong.
By the way the reason all model C130's served well, is we did not to any degree fiddle with their standards.
Regards
Col
Join Date: Apr 2000
Posts: 291
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Before giving too much credence to any media article, I think one should look to the source. Re 500N's post #27:
"former senior defence official".
Says it all, doesn't it? I too would love to know why our equipment has to be 'uniquely' different. In being unique, it would be nice if it worked as well - as well.
former senior defence official Fred Bennett
Says it all, doesn't it? I too would love to know why our equipment has to be 'uniquely' different. In being unique, it would be nice if it worked as well - as well.