F-35 Cancelled, then what ?
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Folks,
Perhaps I can contribute here on the ship/aircraft integration issues that have been raised.
On balance, I viewed the comments made by the Group Captain positively. From his 'air power' standpoint, yes, the ship is 'part of the F35 air system'. From the task group commander's point of view, the F35 is 'part of the task force'. I'd suggest that both of these statements can be seen as OK. I was certainly encouraged by the comments about the utility and potential of putting T45 and F35 capabilities together, which shows that the RAF part of the F35 team are approaching the future with a more open mindset. That's all good, I'm generally encouraged.
In my view (and that's all it is) the real test will come when the F35 air group are required to work up with the ship to be able to generate the flexible, reactive and usable 'maritime air power' that the country wants. That will mean building (very probably in deliberate steps) the ability to carry out bad weather day and night ops at high tempo with multiple aircraft, without shore based diversions being available. I'd stress again that this won't be available straight away, but there will need to be a detailed plan to get there. Again, just my view.
On the Walmesley/Blackham evidence to the Select Committee in 2000, I would offer the thought that it may not have been quite as Machiavellian as some would (understandably) think.
The UK went into the CVF project with a quite terrifying lack of knowledge about the details of building very large aircraft carriers. In the early days, a phrase often heard about CVF around the corridors was 'air is free and steel is cheap' - I was told that senior officers had convinced themselves that aircraft carriers were 'basically a big box'. The phrase was used here.This was, I believe, a genuinely held opinion. It was pants.
Aircraft carriers are, by some margin, one of the most complex and difficult weapon systems to design, build and bring into service. There's a reason that only a few countries have ever been able to pull it off effectively, and it's not money. You need a highly professional, experienced and well organised team of ship and aircraft engineers. Sadly, by 2000, the MoD was completing the final demolition of the last vestiges of what used to be called the Air Department (Navy) - AD(N). The science areas that used to support AD(N) had gone many years before that. Here's thought - the last time the MoD tried to build a carrier of this size was the mid 1960s. A 40 year gap will hurt, and it did.
The CVF team were left with almost no direct experience of what was 'right' or 'wrong', which gave the competing teams huge latitude to sell their concepts. That's not a criticism - the people I knew in the team were working damned hard and extremely well to plug the gaps and keep the programme on track. In the event, I think the MoD have done well to get the two ships to where they are today - the biggest delays and cost overruns were caused by overt political interference. The originally quoted price was a political 'fix', and like so many other defence programmes, wholly unrealistic.
Hope these musings help,
Best Regards as ever to all those putting the bits together
Engines
Perhaps I can contribute here on the ship/aircraft integration issues that have been raised.
On balance, I viewed the comments made by the Group Captain positively. From his 'air power' standpoint, yes, the ship is 'part of the F35 air system'. From the task group commander's point of view, the F35 is 'part of the task force'. I'd suggest that both of these statements can be seen as OK. I was certainly encouraged by the comments about the utility and potential of putting T45 and F35 capabilities together, which shows that the RAF part of the F35 team are approaching the future with a more open mindset. That's all good, I'm generally encouraged.
In my view (and that's all it is) the real test will come when the F35 air group are required to work up with the ship to be able to generate the flexible, reactive and usable 'maritime air power' that the country wants. That will mean building (very probably in deliberate steps) the ability to carry out bad weather day and night ops at high tempo with multiple aircraft, without shore based diversions being available. I'd stress again that this won't be available straight away, but there will need to be a detailed plan to get there. Again, just my view.
On the Walmesley/Blackham evidence to the Select Committee in 2000, I would offer the thought that it may not have been quite as Machiavellian as some would (understandably) think.
The UK went into the CVF project with a quite terrifying lack of knowledge about the details of building very large aircraft carriers. In the early days, a phrase often heard about CVF around the corridors was 'air is free and steel is cheap' - I was told that senior officers had convinced themselves that aircraft carriers were 'basically a big box'. The phrase was used here.This was, I believe, a genuinely held opinion. It was pants.
Aircraft carriers are, by some margin, one of the most complex and difficult weapon systems to design, build and bring into service. There's a reason that only a few countries have ever been able to pull it off effectively, and it's not money. You need a highly professional, experienced and well organised team of ship and aircraft engineers. Sadly, by 2000, the MoD was completing the final demolition of the last vestiges of what used to be called the Air Department (Navy) - AD(N). The science areas that used to support AD(N) had gone many years before that. Here's thought - the last time the MoD tried to build a carrier of this size was the mid 1960s. A 40 year gap will hurt, and it did.
The CVF team were left with almost no direct experience of what was 'right' or 'wrong', which gave the competing teams huge latitude to sell their concepts. That's not a criticism - the people I knew in the team were working damned hard and extremely well to plug the gaps and keep the programme on track. In the event, I think the MoD have done well to get the two ships to where they are today - the biggest delays and cost overruns were caused by overt political interference. The originally quoted price was a political 'fix', and like so many other defence programmes, wholly unrealistic.
Hope these musings help,
Best Regards as ever to all those putting the bits together
Engines
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
The UK went into the CVF project with a quite terrifying lack of knowledge about the details of building very large aircraft carriers. In the early days, a phrase often heard about CVF around the corridors was 'air is free and steel is cheap' - I was told that senior officers had convinced themselves that aircraft carriers were 'basically a big box'. The phrase was used here.This was, I believe, a genuinely held opinion. It was pants.
A bit more context on the Select Ctte evidence session might be useful here.
At that stage, the costings for the programme were almost entirely based on the original concept designs for the ships - the famed 40000 tonners - done in 1997. Those concept designs were just that - concepts to assist in sizing the budget for the programme, they did not represent definitive designs and if memory serves, the original programme cost back then was £2.8Bn. There were some assumptions in there - including absence of a 1 or 2* command facility (or indeed AAWC function) which were assumed to be covered by an accompanying T45 or similar. Nor was there to be any significant self-defence capability - some had suggested fitting PAAMS which goes against all lessons learned with US and UK carriers over the years. So, for some VSO the idea that the ship was just a big box with aircraft in it was what stuck. When you think about designing and installing combat systems, those VSO were thinking steel is cheap and air is free compared to electronics - and by and large, that is correct.
Round about the same time, the two competing Prime teams were beginning to design the real ships, based on proposed flypros with real consideration of sortie numbers, package sizes and deck management. These included STOVL and CTOL (and even STOBAR) variants, at which point it started to become clear that the concept 40000 tonners would not meet the requirement and would have to get bigger - even the STOVL ships - to the point that the difference between STOVL and CTOL in size, long seen as a big discriminator, actually became much less important. Which ultimately led to the "adaptable" carrier concept as a hedge against the failure of the STOVL F35 variant. The unfortunate part during this element was that the programme cost was never revised up to reflect the bigger ships, which led to an unfortunate impasse in 2001/2002 when the Primes presented their initial prices, which exceeded the budget by around £600M - for the programme - if memory serves. Thus began an extended series of prevarications where MoD tried to get the cost designed down, while not paying the primes to keep their teams together, all against the backdrop of various brown jobs loudly asking why the ships couldn't just be CVS repeats, because obviously they were much bigger than CVS. At which point the political deferrals and the real cost growth began.
In one sense carriers are less complex than destroyers and frigates, in that if you've designed your flight and hangar deck correctly, you are generally not constrained in fitting all the other elements required into the ship. Surface combatants tend to have much greater competition and conflict between systems and features and much smaller margins and envelopes in which to work. On a carrier, vertical routes for munitions are a particular pain, EMI topsides can cause issues and trying to deconflict accommodation from flight and hangar deck working space noise can be tricky, but in general you have enough room to fit them in. It's just a long list of things to remember, which as Engines alludes to, we hadn't done in decades. The teams (and MoD) did get plenty of help from NAVSEA and NAVAIR and plenty of ship visits to US ships (and CdG), but it's one thing seeing an arrangement, quite another understanding how and why it works. The aviation arrangements on the ships will eventually turn out to be a real eye-opener for both UK (and possibly USN) aircrew and engineers, compared to what they've been used to. Much of that will be the result of designing around a large multi-type TAG from the start.
At that stage, the costings for the programme were almost entirely based on the original concept designs for the ships - the famed 40000 tonners - done in 1997. Those concept designs were just that - concepts to assist in sizing the budget for the programme, they did not represent definitive designs and if memory serves, the original programme cost back then was £2.8Bn. There were some assumptions in there - including absence of a 1 or 2* command facility (or indeed AAWC function) which were assumed to be covered by an accompanying T45 or similar. Nor was there to be any significant self-defence capability - some had suggested fitting PAAMS which goes against all lessons learned with US and UK carriers over the years. So, for some VSO the idea that the ship was just a big box with aircraft in it was what stuck. When you think about designing and installing combat systems, those VSO were thinking steel is cheap and air is free compared to electronics - and by and large, that is correct.
Round about the same time, the two competing Prime teams were beginning to design the real ships, based on proposed flypros with real consideration of sortie numbers, package sizes and deck management. These included STOVL and CTOL (and even STOBAR) variants, at which point it started to become clear that the concept 40000 tonners would not meet the requirement and would have to get bigger - even the STOVL ships - to the point that the difference between STOVL and CTOL in size, long seen as a big discriminator, actually became much less important. Which ultimately led to the "adaptable" carrier concept as a hedge against the failure of the STOVL F35 variant. The unfortunate part during this element was that the programme cost was never revised up to reflect the bigger ships, which led to an unfortunate impasse in 2001/2002 when the Primes presented their initial prices, which exceeded the budget by around £600M - for the programme - if memory serves. Thus began an extended series of prevarications where MoD tried to get the cost designed down, while not paying the primes to keep their teams together, all against the backdrop of various brown jobs loudly asking why the ships couldn't just be CVS repeats, because obviously they were much bigger than CVS. At which point the political deferrals and the real cost growth began.
In one sense carriers are less complex than destroyers and frigates, in that if you've designed your flight and hangar deck correctly, you are generally not constrained in fitting all the other elements required into the ship. Surface combatants tend to have much greater competition and conflict between systems and features and much smaller margins and envelopes in which to work. On a carrier, vertical routes for munitions are a particular pain, EMI topsides can cause issues and trying to deconflict accommodation from flight and hangar deck working space noise can be tricky, but in general you have enough room to fit them in. It's just a long list of things to remember, which as Engines alludes to, we hadn't done in decades. The teams (and MoD) did get plenty of help from NAVSEA and NAVAIR and plenty of ship visits to US ships (and CdG), but it's one thing seeing an arrangement, quite another understanding how and why it works. The aviation arrangements on the ships will eventually turn out to be a real eye-opener for both UK (and possibly USN) aircrew and engineers, compared to what they've been used to. Much of that will be the result of designing around a large multi-type TAG from the start.
Last edited by Not_a_boffin; 29th Sep 2015 at 11:29.
I had a briefing on the UK program in 2002, by which time the ships had grown to their current size and features like automated weapon-handling had been adopted. This was just before a decision was taken to stay with STOVL - at the time, LM and BAES/RR were all a bit worried that if the UK went CATOBAR, the USN would cut the Marine STOVL buy to pure Harrier-replacement, which would make it economically vulnerable.
I made the point at the time that the CV version's range might be desirable. But nobody was thinking EMALS at the time, in the UK, so you needed a separate JP-powered teakettle.
No sooner had UKG decided to stick with STOVL than the JSF weight crisis hit, of course...
Per Mr Boffin's point about carrier experience... By that time, it was 30 years since Newport News and the Navy had designed and built Nimitz, which in turn was a significantly evolved Forrestal. And say what you like about UK industry, but they seem to have done much better on the QEs than the US has done on Ford.
I made the point at the time that the CV version's range might be desirable. But nobody was thinking EMALS at the time, in the UK, so you needed a separate JP-powered teakettle.
No sooner had UKG decided to stick with STOVL than the JSF weight crisis hit, of course...
Per Mr Boffin's point about carrier experience... By that time, it was 30 years since Newport News and the Navy had designed and built Nimitz, which in turn was a significantly evolved Forrestal. And say what you like about UK industry, but they seem to have done much better on the QEs than the US has done on Ford.
Per Mr Boffin's point about carrier experience... By that time, it was 30 years since Newport News and the Navy had designed and built Nimitz, which in turn was a significantly evolved Forrestal. And say what you like about UK industry, but they seem to have done much better on the QEs than the US has done on Ford.
Lots of those US ideas were harvested by the various UK design teams who went to see them and adopted for QE. Many more still will find their way into Ford and I would imagine that time will show their value.
I doubt that Ford and JFK will be the disasters some are keen to portray, just as QNLZ/PoW will prove to be very successful ships for the RN. Once the hype disperses and they're in service, their value will become apparent.
Last edited by Not_a_boffin; 29th Sep 2015 at 13:01.
Disasters? I suppose the overruns and delays are average by Pentagon standards. But I'm still not holding my breath waiting for the promised operating cost reductions.
It will undoubtedly take time to work out the best way of doing it, but taking 25% of the manpower off the ships and providing systems designed to modern (ie supportable) engineering standards and practices is not going to hurt.
Last edited by Not_a_boffin; 29th Sep 2015 at 17:13.
LowObservableAnd say what you like about UK industry, but they seem to have done much better on the QEs than the US has done on Ford.
A brand new 100,000 ton CATOBAR nuclear powered, steam driven, carrier class with state of the art/cutting edge systems has some real challenges and risks. The QE has challenges as well, but is a less complicated ship, with proven main prime movers, a proven C4I system and no cats/traps. So did the QE team really do "much better"?
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A couple of people worth reading at Aviation Week posted a podcast saying it's 10% more than a f-16 and they are looking at 30% drop
Video: The F-35 Tightrope | Defense content from Aviation Week
I also saw SpudmanWP posted the SAR
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_...R_Dec_2014.PDF
The F-16 is $25,541 and the F-35 is $32,554 (11.55% more).
Video: The F-35 Tightrope | Defense content from Aviation Week
I also saw SpudmanWP posted the SAR
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_...R_Dec_2014.PDF
The F-16 is $25,541 and the F-35 is $32,554 (11.55% more).
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"STOVL Performance Baseline 2012 estimate
With 4x1000lb JDAM 2xAIM120, execute 600' STO with combat radius of 550nm"
That spec may not be 2012 spec for the F-35B. They did a lot of shuffling to get to 18,000lb weapon load for A & C and what the B carries.
With 4x1000lb JDAM 2xAIM120, execute 600' STO with combat radius of 550nm"
That spec may not be 2012 spec for the F-35B. They did a lot of shuffling to get to 18,000lb weapon load for A & C and what the B carries.
NaB and Engines both confirm my view that the C2 elements were initially not factored in to the CVF plan, partly because C2 was intended to be conducted from the T45. There was also an aspiration within the 1* Sub Navy Board to convert Illustrious in to a USS Blue Ridge/ Mount Whitney type JFHQ Command Ship once the CVF was commissioned, to save money on the CVF C2 spend (smoke and mirrors!), although this never got to the stage of being a formal Staff Requirement and was probably a more expensive in overall defence budget pipe dream terms anyway!
Last edited by andyy; 30th Sep 2015 at 13:31.
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GR, I think you put up the wrong link. Are you looking for "eurocanards rule"?
ANDY, there has been a whole lot of stuff happening since the metal was locked down on the flat tops
ANDY, there has been a whole lot of stuff happening since the metal was locked down on the flat tops
a1Bill, Oh I agree, i was just trying to add some colour as to why we got where we are, ie the ships of 2015 make look similar to the ships planned as of 2000 but are a whole lot different under the skin.
