The Enemy within
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The Enemy within
I am extremely disappointed at the lack of understanding of air power in the recent debate over the SDSR; indeed it was for this very reason that Lord Trenchard formed an independent Air Force in 1918 – a vision that delivered victory in the War that followed. If the Army had controlled the Air Force in 1940 we would have lost many of our fighter aircraft in France and the Battle of Britain that followed would have had a very different outcome.
At a time when air power has never been more needed (ask any soldier in Afghanistan who is currently only getting less than half the air support he is asking for), only those who do not understand it call for its abolition or its absorption within the other two Services. Regrettably, this is being done by individuals who seek to protect their own self interests, rather than to provide this Country with the Defence capability that it needs to meet the threats of tomorrow – in my dictionary that equates to betrayal or treason and they should think before they speak.
In modern warfare there are always competing priorities for air power in support of different phases of a campaign, or in different geographical areas. It is for this reason that unified air power needs to be controlled centrally and apportioned where the priority is greatest (a central tenet of air power that is universally accepted). Not only is this the most efficient use of assets it is also the most effective because weight of effort can be switched quickly in order to unhinge and defeat an enemy (the Taliban know this which is why they are so quick to discredit air power – something that they know is untrue because most civilian casualties are caused by ground based fire and Taliban action).
Only when there is a need for assets to be permanently attributed to organic tasks, like ship defence or firepower for lightly equipped troops (e.g. the USMC), are aircraft directly allocated to those units. A luxury the UK cannot afford as we have insufficient resources to give each of the RN or Army its own private air force. Ultimately, such a decision would cost more money or result in reducing overall effectiveness – with the obvious results.
This defence review must reduce costs without impacting unduly on capability, only an independent air force can deliver the efficiency required and every other major military power has learned this lesson. In Afghanistan, RAF aircraft operate across the entire country helping and protecting troops wherever they are needed, this allows relatively small numbers of fast aircraft the ability to cover many tasks simultaneously.
What is needed ultimately is a balanced force, and that would be best achieved through a balanced argument – armchair generals who have retired with the benefit of unparalleled air superiority in every campaign they fought (except perhaps the Falklands and look at the casualties suffered in that Campaign) would do best to study their history and recognise how that superiority was achieved. The terrible casualties suffered by our brave soldiers in Afghanistan through relatively low tech threats today would pale in to insignificance if they ever faced a credible air threat. A quick look at the World’s Air Forces will quickly show that other Nations are not so keen to remove their asymmetric advantage or have them parcelled out to have them defeated piecemeal!
At a time when air power has never been more needed (ask any soldier in Afghanistan who is currently only getting less than half the air support he is asking for), only those who do not understand it call for its abolition or its absorption within the other two Services. Regrettably, this is being done by individuals who seek to protect their own self interests, rather than to provide this Country with the Defence capability that it needs to meet the threats of tomorrow – in my dictionary that equates to betrayal or treason and they should think before they speak.
In modern warfare there are always competing priorities for air power in support of different phases of a campaign, or in different geographical areas. It is for this reason that unified air power needs to be controlled centrally and apportioned where the priority is greatest (a central tenet of air power that is universally accepted). Not only is this the most efficient use of assets it is also the most effective because weight of effort can be switched quickly in order to unhinge and defeat an enemy (the Taliban know this which is why they are so quick to discredit air power – something that they know is untrue because most civilian casualties are caused by ground based fire and Taliban action).
Only when there is a need for assets to be permanently attributed to organic tasks, like ship defence or firepower for lightly equipped troops (e.g. the USMC), are aircraft directly allocated to those units. A luxury the UK cannot afford as we have insufficient resources to give each of the RN or Army its own private air force. Ultimately, such a decision would cost more money or result in reducing overall effectiveness – with the obvious results.
This defence review must reduce costs without impacting unduly on capability, only an independent air force can deliver the efficiency required and every other major military power has learned this lesson. In Afghanistan, RAF aircraft operate across the entire country helping and protecting troops wherever they are needed, this allows relatively small numbers of fast aircraft the ability to cover many tasks simultaneously.
What is needed ultimately is a balanced force, and that would be best achieved through a balanced argument – armchair generals who have retired with the benefit of unparalleled air superiority in every campaign they fought (except perhaps the Falklands and look at the casualties suffered in that Campaign) would do best to study their history and recognise how that superiority was achieved. The terrible casualties suffered by our brave soldiers in Afghanistan through relatively low tech threats today would pale in to insignificance if they ever faced a credible air threat. A quick look at the World’s Air Forces will quickly show that other Nations are not so keen to remove their asymmetric advantage or have them parcelled out to have them defeated piecemeal!
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Humans never learn.
And when the next threat comes over the horizon, and history tells us it surely will then we can look forward to the 20-30 year lead in time to it takes to re-quip our forces with frontline equipment. But of course then it will be far too late!
Still, at least we won't have much dept
And when the next threat comes over the horizon, and history tells us it surely will then we can look forward to the 20-30 year lead in time to it takes to re-quip our forces with frontline equipment. But of course then it will be far too late!
Still, at least we won't have much dept
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
A well argued piece. One could believe that this is indeed from TheBWord himself. While it is a cogent arguement for an Independent Air Force it does not address the central question of the composition of that Air Force.
Fox said we can't afford everything. Is he right or wrong?
He questions the need for C130, A400 and C17. While the A400 has similarities with the C130 and can supposedly undertake some of the C17 roles, do we need it?
It would give us a marginal increase in AT at the cost of a third support infrastructure and training cost. Is Fox suggesting cancellation? Cancellation might involve penalty clauses but would avoid all the additional support costs.
Would Fox or TBW advocate a similar axe in one of the FJ types - Typhoon, F3, GR4, GR7/9? The F3 is effectively out of the game. The Typhoon is the new kid on the block. This puts the GR4-GR7/9 in the frame. Chopping the GR4 offers the additional attraction of chopping out the WSO training stream too and in the medium term getting rid of the remaining WSO in the multis.
If MRA4 continues then you should be able to train all the mission crew at one school.
So, how would TBW slice the cake?
Fox said we can't afford everything. Is he right or wrong?
He questions the need for C130, A400 and C17. While the A400 has similarities with the C130 and can supposedly undertake some of the C17 roles, do we need it?
It would give us a marginal increase in AT at the cost of a third support infrastructure and training cost. Is Fox suggesting cancellation? Cancellation might involve penalty clauses but would avoid all the additional support costs.
Would Fox or TBW advocate a similar axe in one of the FJ types - Typhoon, F3, GR4, GR7/9? The F3 is effectively out of the game. The Typhoon is the new kid on the block. This puts the GR4-GR7/9 in the frame. Chopping the GR4 offers the additional attraction of chopping out the WSO training stream too and in the medium term getting rid of the remaining WSO in the multis.
If MRA4 continues then you should be able to train all the mission crew at one school.
So, how would TBW slice the cake?
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Only when there is a need for assets to be permanently attributed to organic tasks, like ship defence or firepower for lightly equipped troops (e.g. the USMC), are aircraft directly allocated to those units. A luxury the UK cannot afford as we have insufficient resources to give each of the RN or Army its own private air force. Ultimately, such a decision would cost more money or result in reducing overall effectiveness – with the obvious results.
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Rumours abound that High Wycombe is rather fast jet focused for SDSR and willing to cast out everything else in order to achieve this - everything. Everyone wants air power for the height, speed, reach and ubiquity we were all taught. I'm constantly surprised how little noise Air Cmd made over UAVs and similar low-level but obviously air-orientated developments - new technology that we should have made more light blue?
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bword
You say:
"A luxury the UK cannot afford as we have insufficient resources to give each of the RN or Army its own private air force."
and then site the falklands as an example:
"armchair generals who have retired with the benefit of unparalleled air superiority in every campaign they fought (except perhaps the Falklands and look at the casualties suffered in that Campaign) would do best to study their history and recognise how that superiority was achieved"
The reason that we had such losses in the Falklands was due to the results of the last time the RAF said that they could do all of the aviating and the RN did not need proper carriers.
The RN needs organic air power.
You mention lack of understanding of air power and efficiency, but you totally fail to understand the other forces and specifically fail to understand how efficiently the other forces manage to support their air arms in terms of manpower and bases.
You say:
"A luxury the UK cannot afford as we have insufficient resources to give each of the RN or Army its own private air force."
and then site the falklands as an example:
"armchair generals who have retired with the benefit of unparalleled air superiority in every campaign they fought (except perhaps the Falklands and look at the casualties suffered in that Campaign) would do best to study their history and recognise how that superiority was achieved"
The reason that we had such losses in the Falklands was due to the results of the last time the RAF said that they could do all of the aviating and the RN did not need proper carriers.
The RN needs organic air power.
You mention lack of understanding of air power and efficiency, but you totally fail to understand the other forces and specifically fail to understand how efficiently the other forces manage to support their air arms in terms of manpower and bases.
bword, I agree with your defence of the need for an Independent Air Force. However, that very name was given to a Strategic Bomber Force, not a Fighter one, and was the war winning component of which you speak. The Battle of Britain prevented defeat, as did the Battle of the Atlantic. It was the strategic bombing campaign, the only way to take the war to the enemy heartland itself, that ensured victory. Nazi Germany lacked such a strategic bomber force and was unable to interfere with the huge arms production ramped up by the soviets in the east, for example. That is why they lost at Kursk, and was a major cause of them losing the war.
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If accepting the precedent of Trenchard's wisdom, and therefore by extrapolation the value of establishing of the Rocks by Royal Warrant... surely Inskip's decision is equally as valid.
Whether we can afford everything is another matter - and unfortunately it is the key driver here.
Whether we can afford everything is another matter - and unfortunately it is the key driver here.
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Apologies to “ The B Word” – I should have checked the monikers already in use! Mine was a play on many levels - I will leave you to make your guesses!
My thread was started to raise intelligent debate – rather than the very asinine one that seems to pervade our newspapers, with so-called informed comment.
I wanted to avoid falling too quickly in to what goes and what stays – that needs to flow from a policy that states what we are and what we must do. If we did, I am confident that air power would have a key role to play in our future, as it has in our past. I have my own views and they are less drastic than those that make headlines. Comment here suggests Air Command is too fast jet centric – I think you will find that impression has now been created by the need to defend so strongly the almost fanatical drive to kill off the very core of our being. It is the voracity of that attack from all quarters that has generated so many questions and thence answers. Undoubtedly there will be trading towards the end of the review – for now there are no direct trade offs being made between one type or another – that may have to come but that is the price of having a force that is too small to do everything. We will have to establish what is more important, but only when we have the policy baseline to do so. If the fast jet critics were to look at the reductions in combat squadrons over the last 20 years they might be surprised. Current plans will have us down to less than 10 (small ~ 12/15 crews) combat sqns (RAF and FAA) by next year (not including OCUs) that is about half the size of the French or German Air Forces!
I do support the capabilities that fast air (manned for now) brings, without expecting to be accused of being a cold war dinosaur. Moreover, the capabilities that we now deploy are more diverse and balanced that at any time in our history. However, we are approaching critical mass in many of those hard edged capabilities that will be difficult to maintain and impossible to recover once lost. We should think very carefully before we trade them in for something else. The last time I looked the word Force was in RAF – our current and future enemies would take full advantage of its loss. I accept that numbers will come under review but they can only be derived once you establish your need. It is no good playing on the world stage when you have a third class act.
The Falklands was another time and may prove to be the last time we have to launch an amphibious task group for a non-discretionary operation. But that is for others to decide and history to prove. My point there was to argue for control of the air, and to remind those who have forgotten what it is to operate without it.
As for “owning” the FAA I make no such play, as I stated some assets need to be dedicated to roles that make complete sense to remain in the ownership of their employers. Of course we have already made a great leap of faith with the joint nature of Joint Force Harrier – aircraft “owned” by the RAF, flown by men and women from both Services and operated from Land and Sea – Joint employment of airpower at its best. JCA is planned to operate similarly.
What I was saying is that air power is inherently flexible and adaptable, and that must include the time, place and method of its employment – that is best done from a position of oversight to the entire campaign and ones beyond it. Our aircraft in Afghanistan could very quickly be retasked to meet another threat (not a million miles away) in very quick time and without skipping a beat. That is what air power brings and why it needs to be controlled by an airman.
My thread was started to raise intelligent debate – rather than the very asinine one that seems to pervade our newspapers, with so-called informed comment.
I wanted to avoid falling too quickly in to what goes and what stays – that needs to flow from a policy that states what we are and what we must do. If we did, I am confident that air power would have a key role to play in our future, as it has in our past. I have my own views and they are less drastic than those that make headlines. Comment here suggests Air Command is too fast jet centric – I think you will find that impression has now been created by the need to defend so strongly the almost fanatical drive to kill off the very core of our being. It is the voracity of that attack from all quarters that has generated so many questions and thence answers. Undoubtedly there will be trading towards the end of the review – for now there are no direct trade offs being made between one type or another – that may have to come but that is the price of having a force that is too small to do everything. We will have to establish what is more important, but only when we have the policy baseline to do so. If the fast jet critics were to look at the reductions in combat squadrons over the last 20 years they might be surprised. Current plans will have us down to less than 10 (small ~ 12/15 crews) combat sqns (RAF and FAA) by next year (not including OCUs) that is about half the size of the French or German Air Forces!
I do support the capabilities that fast air (manned for now) brings, without expecting to be accused of being a cold war dinosaur. Moreover, the capabilities that we now deploy are more diverse and balanced that at any time in our history. However, we are approaching critical mass in many of those hard edged capabilities that will be difficult to maintain and impossible to recover once lost. We should think very carefully before we trade them in for something else. The last time I looked the word Force was in RAF – our current and future enemies would take full advantage of its loss. I accept that numbers will come under review but they can only be derived once you establish your need. It is no good playing on the world stage when you have a third class act.
The Falklands was another time and may prove to be the last time we have to launch an amphibious task group for a non-discretionary operation. But that is for others to decide and history to prove. My point there was to argue for control of the air, and to remind those who have forgotten what it is to operate without it.
As for “owning” the FAA I make no such play, as I stated some assets need to be dedicated to roles that make complete sense to remain in the ownership of their employers. Of course we have already made a great leap of faith with the joint nature of Joint Force Harrier – aircraft “owned” by the RAF, flown by men and women from both Services and operated from Land and Sea – Joint employment of airpower at its best. JCA is planned to operate similarly.
What I was saying is that air power is inherently flexible and adaptable, and that must include the time, place and method of its employment – that is best done from a position of oversight to the entire campaign and ones beyond it. Our aircraft in Afghanistan could very quickly be retasked to meet another threat (not a million miles away) in very quick time and without skipping a beat. That is what air power brings and why it needs to be controlled by an airman.
thebword
No worries on the "handle" front - I just wanted to clarify
I totally agree with your stand point and that we need to maintain a "Force Mix", if at all possible. If this is not possible, then we need to front-load the "high end" capabilities, in order to PFI the "lower end" capabilities (aka AT and AAR). Which is already incoming with FSTA - how much it will save is up for debate though!
The problem is three-fold in my opinion:
1. Not enough money to invest - we've spent it all on point "2"!
2. Insistence on buying British - which is normally costly and late!
3. Still too much "stove-piping" in capability (eg. Typhoon is still too AD focused, Nimrod MRA4 (where on earth does the "A" come from!!!), Sentinel R1 (one trick pony), Rivet Joint (another one trick pony) and the legacy fleet such as AWACS (one trick pony)). Luckily, Reaper is a true multi-role capability, but is still a UOR, and I really hope that JSF/JCA delivers the true multi-role that we need.
Finally, the growth in ISTAR or ISR capability is draining the FJ resource for the current fight. Really this should be a "system of systems" approach - aka CDS' "Combat ISTAR". Sadly, I suspect that SDSR will not have grasped this nettle until it is too late and something stupid like scrapping AWACS will happen. "Control of the Air" is so very important in Air Power and without AWACS we will stabbing in the dark with a few assets. Just like AAR the AWACS is one of the "force multipliers". But we do need to modify it so that it isn't a one trick pony, as we cannot afford to this anymore.
On a plus side, I sense that the Army are not going to get away with the cuts that were so smugly pointing out a couple of months ago. The tanks will be hit hard and also it is not surprising that Brigade rotation for HERRICK past 2014 has not been announced. I know the Govt plan for HMForces to be out by then, but I would have thought the Army would have announced that by now? Maybe, they're not expecting to know which Brigades are available for post 2014?
So how would I carve up the RAF to make it affordable? Remember "Front Line First" that wasn't actually "Front Line First" at all?
Get rid of:
1. PTI branch and ask SERCo to run gyms and also Multi-Stage Fitness Tests - they run hundreds of Leisure Centres accross the UK already.
2. RAF Regt - ask the army to protect our airfields (sorry Rocks, you do a great job, but this is really Land Force's business - especially since you lost Rapier SHORAD).
3. RAF ATC - civilianise with NATS/SERCo, keep a cadre of "Sponsored Reserves" augmented by the ABM branch for theatre based ATC.
4. The ridiculous trg regime to get to theatre - about 6 weeks of PDT followed by a repeat of everything again when you arrive at KAF/BSN (pointless!!). And how difficult can it be not to "op lock" people on JPA as they leave the UK at BZN!!!
5. The majority of MT - get people to use their own cars, public transport or hire cars through companies like "Easy Car Hire". Especially, if we could use our Govt Procurement Cards (GPC) to provide "Value For Money" as they were designed to do!
6. Travel Control departments - the amount of time this wastes, allow us to use GPC and save money!
7. Education centres - outsource!
8. Stn Police Flights - use MPGS and stop the Police trying to do computer security and leave it to the professionals (the A6 branch!).
9. HSE - grow some b@lls and stand up to this shower of mini-Hitlers. For example, how many disabled Typhoon pilots and engineers do we have? Then why on earth does 29 Sqn need expensive disabled access FFS? Jeeeez!! Why on earth can't we self-help and paint/decorate our accomodation anymore?!! Maybe if we did then the buildings might last a bit longer and not need an expensive contractor to come and fix them.
10. Groups - put everything into Air Command, bin 1Gp, 2Gp and 22Gp. Obviously, there would need to be a rebalance of manpower but it should save 30-40% of the manpower.
11. Air Warfare Centre - reduce in size significantly - why are there nearly 1,400 people in the AWC? Most people can't even access the Universal Tactics Manual at present anyway, so it's a self licking lollipop (IMHO).
Now I believe that lot would save a few "high end" capabilities - remember "Front Line First"....
The B Word
No worries on the "handle" front - I just wanted to clarify
I totally agree with your stand point and that we need to maintain a "Force Mix", if at all possible. If this is not possible, then we need to front-load the "high end" capabilities, in order to PFI the "lower end" capabilities (aka AT and AAR). Which is already incoming with FSTA - how much it will save is up for debate though!
The problem is three-fold in my opinion:
1. Not enough money to invest - we've spent it all on point "2"!
2. Insistence on buying British - which is normally costly and late!
3. Still too much "stove-piping" in capability (eg. Typhoon is still too AD focused, Nimrod MRA4 (where on earth does the "A" come from!!!), Sentinel R1 (one trick pony), Rivet Joint (another one trick pony) and the legacy fleet such as AWACS (one trick pony)). Luckily, Reaper is a true multi-role capability, but is still a UOR, and I really hope that JSF/JCA delivers the true multi-role that we need.
Finally, the growth in ISTAR or ISR capability is draining the FJ resource for the current fight. Really this should be a "system of systems" approach - aka CDS' "Combat ISTAR". Sadly, I suspect that SDSR will not have grasped this nettle until it is too late and something stupid like scrapping AWACS will happen. "Control of the Air" is so very important in Air Power and without AWACS we will stabbing in the dark with a few assets. Just like AAR the AWACS is one of the "force multipliers". But we do need to modify it so that it isn't a one trick pony, as we cannot afford to this anymore.
On a plus side, I sense that the Army are not going to get away with the cuts that were so smugly pointing out a couple of months ago. The tanks will be hit hard and also it is not surprising that Brigade rotation for HERRICK past 2014 has not been announced. I know the Govt plan for HMForces to be out by then, but I would have thought the Army would have announced that by now? Maybe, they're not expecting to know which Brigades are available for post 2014?
So how would I carve up the RAF to make it affordable? Remember "Front Line First" that wasn't actually "Front Line First" at all?
Get rid of:
1. PTI branch and ask SERCo to run gyms and also Multi-Stage Fitness Tests - they run hundreds of Leisure Centres accross the UK already.
2. RAF Regt - ask the army to protect our airfields (sorry Rocks, you do a great job, but this is really Land Force's business - especially since you lost Rapier SHORAD).
3. RAF ATC - civilianise with NATS/SERCo, keep a cadre of "Sponsored Reserves" augmented by the ABM branch for theatre based ATC.
4. The ridiculous trg regime to get to theatre - about 6 weeks of PDT followed by a repeat of everything again when you arrive at KAF/BSN (pointless!!). And how difficult can it be not to "op lock" people on JPA as they leave the UK at BZN!!!
5. The majority of MT - get people to use their own cars, public transport or hire cars through companies like "Easy Car Hire". Especially, if we could use our Govt Procurement Cards (GPC) to provide "Value For Money" as they were designed to do!
6. Travel Control departments - the amount of time this wastes, allow us to use GPC and save money!
7. Education centres - outsource!
8. Stn Police Flights - use MPGS and stop the Police trying to do computer security and leave it to the professionals (the A6 branch!).
9. HSE - grow some b@lls and stand up to this shower of mini-Hitlers. For example, how many disabled Typhoon pilots and engineers do we have? Then why on earth does 29 Sqn need expensive disabled access FFS? Jeeeez!! Why on earth can't we self-help and paint/decorate our accomodation anymore?!! Maybe if we did then the buildings might last a bit longer and not need an expensive contractor to come and fix them.
10. Groups - put everything into Air Command, bin 1Gp, 2Gp and 22Gp. Obviously, there would need to be a rebalance of manpower but it should save 30-40% of the manpower.
11. Air Warfare Centre - reduce in size significantly - why are there nearly 1,400 people in the AWC? Most people can't even access the Universal Tactics Manual at present anyway, so it's a self licking lollipop (IMHO).
Now I believe that lot would save a few "high end" capabilities - remember "Front Line First"....
The B Word
Great synopsis there B-Word - do you still have any influence with the likes of Dalton et al? Maybe you should appraise him - the earlier comment on the fast jet focus is worrying - one reason why the RAF should potentially have CEO's that are not from the pilot, single seat background. Could be refreshing if Bryant was the next CAS - less front seat FJ dominance. Not that I'm jealous but I hate to see the rest of the RAF sacrificed for the sake of a few expensive toys!
The GR4 should be axed and if the A400M is procured get rid of the c130J - Would we still need a huge AT fleet if our external operations are going to be limited by lack of funds over the next decades? The C130K should also be totally axed and with it the WSO capability. That would save money getting rid of a branch. We should keep the GR7/9 as its a cheap and effective CAS platform with less of the GR4s limitations. If GR4 goes, close Lossie and Marham too. Keep CH47, bin Merlin (to the Navy). Do all RAF Trg at Cranwell and close Halton. Close Benson move RAF Helo ops to Odiham. Do all FJ trg at one Stn (Valley) and move the RAF Regt into the Army, close Honington. Bin the Red Arrows or get the FO to pay for them and move into one Logs and Admin function across all 3 services. Simples!
The GR4 should be axed and if the A400M is procured get rid of the c130J - Would we still need a huge AT fleet if our external operations are going to be limited by lack of funds over the next decades? The C130K should also be totally axed and with it the WSO capability. That would save money getting rid of a branch. We should keep the GR7/9 as its a cheap and effective CAS platform with less of the GR4s limitations. If GR4 goes, close Lossie and Marham too. Keep CH47, bin Merlin (to the Navy). Do all RAF Trg at Cranwell and close Halton. Close Benson move RAF Helo ops to Odiham. Do all FJ trg at one Stn (Valley) and move the RAF Regt into the Army, close Honington. Bin the Red Arrows or get the FO to pay for them and move into one Logs and Admin function across all 3 services. Simples!
Last edited by Grimweasel; 24th Jul 2010 at 11:27.
Champagne anyone...?
thebword
A well stated piece with which it is fairly difficult to find fault. Air Power is, however, hugely expensive and we, as a fighting force, should be looking to produce the same effect from within a shrinking budget. We cannot afford to sacrifice the other, less dramatic pillars of Air Power simply to support an overly expensive fast air fleet purchase.
You consign the Falklands conflict to another era and that may be so, however we cannot cherry pick which parts of history we would like to fall back on to support our argument. I would contend that in arming to fight in the modern world we can find little in history from which to draw guidance. Our future involvement in warfare will be in coalition conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan and in colonial "adventures" like Sierra Leone. There will be no repeat of the BEF, the Battle of Britain or Malaya. The UK Armed Forces must configure to be lightweight, adaptable, rapidly deployable, relevant and - above all - very well trained. It is our training and the quality of people that has traditionally filled any "gaps" in equipment capabilities.
I'm not a fast jet critic but one only has to look at the relative sizes of the different defence budgets to start seeing holes in this argument. We are given the cash - how we chose to spend it is up to "us". I could take £1000 and get one massively oversized flat screen 3D HD TV for my sitting room and then moan that I need a TV in the bedroom and kitchen. Or I do what my European neighbour has done and go and buy 3 smaller TVs. I then have what I want albeit without the overpriced front room showpiece. I may lose in pub stats with the American exchange officer next door who has a 50" LCD in every room in his house but he's a millionaire and can afford it. Gone are the days of Keeping-up-with-the-Joneses. There is no reason why we can't have umpteen sqns of fast jets (if thats we need to achieve the aim) but one has to cut ones cloth accordingly. How many F/A18s would one get for half the JSF budget? And how much less would we be able to do with them? Not a lot I suggest, especially if you consider who and what we may be going up against in the future.
The B Word
I suspect trimming away support elements of the RAF would save the square root of stuff all, especially when we're talking in terms of cuts of up to 20% of a £36bn budget.
As for "front loading the high end stuff" I refer you to my comments above. Which great air battle are we going to fight outwith a coalition? Yes we need organic AAR and AWACs but not the extent we currently have. And without wishing to be overly defensive your consigning of AT to a "low end" capability just demonstrates the usual FJ mindset that generally can't see past the end of it's radome. How many CQWI & COMAO training packages have come back high-fiving each other for having shot down a few bad guys only to discover they all failed to defend the C130 which was shot down doing the SF/para/whatever insert that was the point of the whole task anyway. Control of the Air isn't a aim in itself, merely a facilitator for other war fighting activities to be able to take place down below. The RAF needs to remember that and configure accordingly if it is to be of any relevance within what is fast becoming a tiny UK defence community.
We do ourselves and Defence in general, no favours through internal quibbles over who has the most important toy in the playground. We need firm, stated direction and policy from the Govt through which we can then configure ourselves accordingly. Any such configuring must be done through reasoned and informed debate, untainted by petty parochialisms.
A well stated piece with which it is fairly difficult to find fault. Air Power is, however, hugely expensive and we, as a fighting force, should be looking to produce the same effect from within a shrinking budget. We cannot afford to sacrifice the other, less dramatic pillars of Air Power simply to support an overly expensive fast air fleet purchase.
You consign the Falklands conflict to another era and that may be so, however we cannot cherry pick which parts of history we would like to fall back on to support our argument. I would contend that in arming to fight in the modern world we can find little in history from which to draw guidance. Our future involvement in warfare will be in coalition conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan and in colonial "adventures" like Sierra Leone. There will be no repeat of the BEF, the Battle of Britain or Malaya. The UK Armed Forces must configure to be lightweight, adaptable, rapidly deployable, relevant and - above all - very well trained. It is our training and the quality of people that has traditionally filled any "gaps" in equipment capabilities.
If the fast jet critics were to look at the reductions in combat squadrons over the last 20 years they might be surprised. Current plans will have us down to less than 10 (small ~ 12/15 crews) combat sqns (RAF and FAA) by next year (not including OCUs) that is about half the size of the French or German Air Forces!
The B Word
I suspect trimming away support elements of the RAF would save the square root of stuff all, especially when we're talking in terms of cuts of up to 20% of a £36bn budget.
As for "front loading the high end stuff" I refer you to my comments above. Which great air battle are we going to fight outwith a coalition? Yes we need organic AAR and AWACs but not the extent we currently have. And without wishing to be overly defensive your consigning of AT to a "low end" capability just demonstrates the usual FJ mindset that generally can't see past the end of it's radome. How many CQWI & COMAO training packages have come back high-fiving each other for having shot down a few bad guys only to discover they all failed to defend the C130 which was shot down doing the SF/para/whatever insert that was the point of the whole task anyway. Control of the Air isn't a aim in itself, merely a facilitator for other war fighting activities to be able to take place down below. The RAF needs to remember that and configure accordingly if it is to be of any relevance within what is fast becoming a tiny UK defence community.
We do ourselves and Defence in general, no favours through internal quibbles over who has the most important toy in the playground. We need firm, stated direction and policy from the Govt through which we can then configure ourselves accordingly. Any such configuring must be done through reasoned and informed debate, untainted by petty parochialisms.
Stopstart
I would say that AT and AAR are at the lower end of what we need from a uniformed capability. However, when it comes to TAC AT, especially iso SF, we definately do need this. But why, oh why, do we have to pretend at playing civvy airports at BZN with Tristars and DISCOM charters. Just TAC AT, that should be our aim...IMHO
LJ
As for "front loading the high end stuff" I refer you to my comments above. Which great air battle are we going to fight outwith a coalition? Yes we need organic AAR and AWACs but not the extent we currently have. And without wishing to be overly defensive your consigning of AT to a "low end" capability just demonstrates the usual FJ mindset that generally can't see past the end of it's radome. How many CQWI & COMAO training packages have come back high-fiving each other for having shot down a few bad guys only to discover they all failed to defend the C130 which was shot down doing the SF/para/whatever insert that was the point of the whole task anyway
LJ
LJ
You beat me to it!
Stopstart
When it comes to Tac AT, then you have my vote. But Tristars and all their support infra and personnel must be expensive and in my opinion uneccessary. There is no point in having loads of FSTA aircraft and AWACS if they don't have the FJs to support - just the odd 3-4 FSTA to support extended range Tac AT ops (but that's a big luxury - in support of your argument, then why rely on the Coalition to provide).
The Coalition argument is also a bit thin, IMHO, it reminds me of this
How do you know that the next Coalition will have the right assets!!!
The B Word
You beat me to it!
Stopstart
When it comes to Tac AT, then you have my vote. But Tristars and all their support infra and personnel must be expensive and in my opinion uneccessary. There is no point in having loads of FSTA aircraft and AWACS if they don't have the FJs to support - just the odd 3-4 FSTA to support extended range Tac AT ops (but that's a big luxury - in support of your argument, then why rely on the Coalition to provide).
The Coalition argument is also a bit thin, IMHO, it reminds me of this
How do you know that the next Coalition will have the right assets!!!
The B Word
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Stopstart, Grimweasel and the “real” B Word, I hear all your arguments and I did try to avoid picking what capabilities should prevail – as I think we generally agree, the review should set the context first. However, here goes on a few points…
The support areas that get such a hard time are relatively small in cost terms, but I accept that we must seek efficiencies where it is right to do so. I can assure you that the examples offered will not make much of a dent in our deficit. Every little bit helps, but we must avoid taking disproportional pain for little gain. The Moral component is critical as we manage our way through the next few years and a potential upturn in the economy; if we lose the trust and sense of worth of our people then any amount of kit will count for nothing.
As for our command structures, a quick look at the Air Command phone book would show that it is not the Groups that dominate our costs. Less than 10% of the Command staff budget is taken up by the Groups, and they run over 90% of the RAF’s final outputs. Also, in case everyone has forgotten (and it would appear some have over the years), command is something we should focus on rather more then just the management of our business (all those MBAs and consultants have done little to improve the way we deliver combat effect). The RAF’s 2* Combatant Commanders are the Group Commanders, just as the Army have their Divisional Commands and the Navy their own 2* appointments. Of course if we are down sizing then we can all down rank. However, take a look across any coalition command structure and see that the influence begins at 2*, not below.
The GR4/GR9 debate is difficult as they both provide utility. The challenge is that you are not comparing like with like and the costs are not as simple as is presented here. There is much more to be saved from cancelling GR9 than the same amount of GR4 squadrons; only by taking larger slices from GR4 do you approach the same savings. Without giving away actual numbers, GR4 provides 4 times more of the RAF’s offensive combat power than GR9. Moreover, with the current situation in Afghanistan, this capability is in increasing demand. Having set out our stall to reduce fleet sizes and reduce costs, going to three small and, therefore, less efficient forces is counter intuitive. In capability terms you also have to balance the loss of mass, penetration, range, and weapons effects against the GR9’s one trump card of embarked capability – so it is a question of risk benefit. We have taken embarked capability at risk for the last 6 years, why not another 6? I have yet to hear the compelling evidence that we will find ourselves in a non-discretionary operation where embarked strike will be required - and no the Falkland Islands is not such a one (I can’t go into why here).
Which leads us to the future and the transition period; JCA is some way off and Typhoon deliveries are still small, you need to maintain some mass in order to have a trained workforce to introduce the new capabilities. Current criticism of Typhoon is unfair, the fleet size is too small to absorb the AD role it currently delivers and still grow in to MR – this will take time. However, both Typhoon and JCA will be great platforms that will provide far more than just the basic combat power roles, in any scenario across the full spectrum of warfare. They are not cheap (and that is the rub) but they will deliver the capability and agility that we seek and will be world beaters.
And just to provide balance and avoid making this a fast jet centric debate…
The other assets that we are intent on buying/replacing all have utility. Lift (rotary and fixed wing) is non-discretionary, but only to the levels required to meet future need – will we continue to run enduring operations at current levels, if not then we could take more risk? Just shaping our future needs on current demands is a mistake and our Coalition Government must have the courage to make the hard decisions without being “blackmailed” by current or past shortfalls. Personally, I think they have the courage to make that change but it will not be easy and the usual lobbies will be in full voice. The recent announcements on Afghanistan may be a signpost that they are ready to make that call, we shall see?
As for the larger ISTAR platforms we could see some rationalisation, but there are no obvious multi role/capability solutions. Each provides unique utility but we will have to make hard choices and platforms such as JCA will revolutionise air power employment in the future – as will future RPAS systems. Of course we also have to decide what things we need to do unilaterally and when we can rely on a coalition to provide capability. This is probably the nub of the problem; my view is that we should seek to provide the harder edge capabilities for three reasons; we have the will and the intent to use them, we are damned good at it, and it buys influence. The key appointments in Coalition HQs and the influence they bring must be bought and earned. If we want to become just another member of the coalition then we can offer the bare minimum and let others do the heavy lifting. Personally, I don’ think the UK is ready to become a bit part player and that means earning that place at the table – let the others do the easy stuff.
The support areas that get such a hard time are relatively small in cost terms, but I accept that we must seek efficiencies where it is right to do so. I can assure you that the examples offered will not make much of a dent in our deficit. Every little bit helps, but we must avoid taking disproportional pain for little gain. The Moral component is critical as we manage our way through the next few years and a potential upturn in the economy; if we lose the trust and sense of worth of our people then any amount of kit will count for nothing.
As for our command structures, a quick look at the Air Command phone book would show that it is not the Groups that dominate our costs. Less than 10% of the Command staff budget is taken up by the Groups, and they run over 90% of the RAF’s final outputs. Also, in case everyone has forgotten (and it would appear some have over the years), command is something we should focus on rather more then just the management of our business (all those MBAs and consultants have done little to improve the way we deliver combat effect). The RAF’s 2* Combatant Commanders are the Group Commanders, just as the Army have their Divisional Commands and the Navy their own 2* appointments. Of course if we are down sizing then we can all down rank. However, take a look across any coalition command structure and see that the influence begins at 2*, not below.
The GR4/GR9 debate is difficult as they both provide utility. The challenge is that you are not comparing like with like and the costs are not as simple as is presented here. There is much more to be saved from cancelling GR9 than the same amount of GR4 squadrons; only by taking larger slices from GR4 do you approach the same savings. Without giving away actual numbers, GR4 provides 4 times more of the RAF’s offensive combat power than GR9. Moreover, with the current situation in Afghanistan, this capability is in increasing demand. Having set out our stall to reduce fleet sizes and reduce costs, going to three small and, therefore, less efficient forces is counter intuitive. In capability terms you also have to balance the loss of mass, penetration, range, and weapons effects against the GR9’s one trump card of embarked capability – so it is a question of risk benefit. We have taken embarked capability at risk for the last 6 years, why not another 6? I have yet to hear the compelling evidence that we will find ourselves in a non-discretionary operation where embarked strike will be required - and no the Falkland Islands is not such a one (I can’t go into why here).
Which leads us to the future and the transition period; JCA is some way off and Typhoon deliveries are still small, you need to maintain some mass in order to have a trained workforce to introduce the new capabilities. Current criticism of Typhoon is unfair, the fleet size is too small to absorb the AD role it currently delivers and still grow in to MR – this will take time. However, both Typhoon and JCA will be great platforms that will provide far more than just the basic combat power roles, in any scenario across the full spectrum of warfare. They are not cheap (and that is the rub) but they will deliver the capability and agility that we seek and will be world beaters.
And just to provide balance and avoid making this a fast jet centric debate…
The other assets that we are intent on buying/replacing all have utility. Lift (rotary and fixed wing) is non-discretionary, but only to the levels required to meet future need – will we continue to run enduring operations at current levels, if not then we could take more risk? Just shaping our future needs on current demands is a mistake and our Coalition Government must have the courage to make the hard decisions without being “blackmailed” by current or past shortfalls. Personally, I think they have the courage to make that change but it will not be easy and the usual lobbies will be in full voice. The recent announcements on Afghanistan may be a signpost that they are ready to make that call, we shall see?
As for the larger ISTAR platforms we could see some rationalisation, but there are no obvious multi role/capability solutions. Each provides unique utility but we will have to make hard choices and platforms such as JCA will revolutionise air power employment in the future – as will future RPAS systems. Of course we also have to decide what things we need to do unilaterally and when we can rely on a coalition to provide capability. This is probably the nub of the problem; my view is that we should seek to provide the harder edge capabilities for three reasons; we have the will and the intent to use them, we are damned good at it, and it buys influence. The key appointments in Coalition HQs and the influence they bring must be bought and earned. If we want to become just another member of the coalition then we can offer the bare minimum and let others do the heavy lifting. Personally, I don’ think the UK is ready to become a bit part player and that means earning that place at the table – let the others do the easy stuff.
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thebword,
Part of the problem the RAF has is in the way it portrays itself to the other 2 Services and the politicians. The attitude "if it flies it must be RAF" articulated most forcefully by the immediately previous CAS (and still argued by some 3*s) does the RAF n o favours at all. Similarly, to articulate that only the RAF does "Air Power" when this is clearly not the case also does your Service no favours. Air Power takes many forms, including AH , the RN's attack and ASaC helos.
I guess the highlight of this attitude was the overt attempt to get rid of the FAA from the Harrier Force. This action did real damage to the RAF in the eyes of both Services and politicians and has not been forgotten by either. The ultimate removal of the capabiliity from Afg and subsequent FE@R reduction in favour of GR4 was cynical and spiteful. The same could be argued for the senseless removal of the, very cost effective, RN Jetstream T3s by the then RAF ACDS(RP).
I am a huge fan of the RAF but they need to get rid of their inferiority complex, be inclusive and start winning friends if they are to have a robust future.
Part of the problem the RAF has is in the way it portrays itself to the other 2 Services and the politicians. The attitude "if it flies it must be RAF" articulated most forcefully by the immediately previous CAS (and still argued by some 3*s) does the RAF n o favours at all. Similarly, to articulate that only the RAF does "Air Power" when this is clearly not the case also does your Service no favours. Air Power takes many forms, including AH , the RN's attack and ASaC helos.
I guess the highlight of this attitude was the overt attempt to get rid of the FAA from the Harrier Force. This action did real damage to the RAF in the eyes of both Services and politicians and has not been forgotten by either. The ultimate removal of the capabiliity from Afg and subsequent FE@R reduction in favour of GR4 was cynical and spiteful. The same could be argued for the senseless removal of the, very cost effective, RN Jetstream T3s by the then RAF ACDS(RP).
I am a huge fan of the RAF but they need to get rid of their inferiority complex, be inclusive and start winning friends if they are to have a robust future.
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
Nothing new here, and C Hinecap summarized why SDSR will be so damaging to the RAF with this comment;
It's like taking candy from a baby for the Army and Navy when the only thing CAS wants to see secured for the future are fast jets. SDSR will demonstrate exactly what this level of paraochialism brings.
Rumours abound that High Wycombe is rather fast jet focused for SDSR and willing to cast out everything else in order to achieve this - everything.