'No blame' Over RAF Tornado Crash
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stab trim,
"causing distress for my pax", well I for one would be scared.
I think this thread needs steering back on track. I read the accident report, I feel those guys were let down by the system - how do you maintain currency on 10 hours a month in that domain ? I'd feel a bit out of the loop flying the 75 with that amount of hours each month, let alone 250' off a scottish hillside.
Let's not devalue this thread with ancient arguments about what we do or do not need, to me it's clear that with the rise in soviet aggression the QRA is most necessary.
"causing distress for my pax", well I for one would be scared.
I think this thread needs steering back on track. I read the accident report, I feel those guys were let down by the system - how do you maintain currency on 10 hours a month in that domain ? I'd feel a bit out of the loop flying the 75 with that amount of hours each month, let alone 250' off a scottish hillside.
Let's not devalue this thread with ancient arguments about what we do or do not need, to me it's clear that with the rise in soviet aggression the QRA is most necessary.
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Fade to Grey
Although I'm not military, indeed I am one of the population you guys are tasked with protecting, I was appalled to see that heavy 'banging machinery' drivers are limited to 10 hours a month.
Fade to Grey states he would feel 'out of the loop' if he was limited to 10 hours/month flying a 757. As a potential passenger in his 757, I'd say I would be pretty worried if I knew my driver was only flying our aeroplane for roughly twenty minutes a day.
I completely agree that flying anything else is simply not the same as flying a front line fast jet. And flying a fast jet means you have to be, basically, the dog's bo11ocks in the driving department.
The government, treasury and even the general public have to understand something very fundamental. If you are going to spend our - my - money on aeroplanes that can fly at 400 kt IAS at 200 feet through a Welsh valley, or accelerate into the sky for four or five miles in sixty seconds and then kill anything it finds we the public don't like, then there is little point unless you are prepared to pay the price of the aeroplane. The price of the aeroplane plus whatever it costs to ensure the young men and women who fly them, can do so properly and with enough opportunity to really learn how to do it, without killing themselves in the process.
I honestly don't mind paying for our fast jets - we need them - but I really don't want some time serving politician telling me he is saving my money, by restricting those highly skilled men and women to twenty mionutes of training a day. How about paying out less in compensation for prisoners whose human rights have been infringed by being in jail?
I agree totally that the crew of BS1 were sacrificed to the civil service accounting system. Thank you guys, but you were let down badly.
Roger.
Fade to Grey states he would feel 'out of the loop' if he was limited to 10 hours/month flying a 757. As a potential passenger in his 757, I'd say I would be pretty worried if I knew my driver was only flying our aeroplane for roughly twenty minutes a day.
I completely agree that flying anything else is simply not the same as flying a front line fast jet. And flying a fast jet means you have to be, basically, the dog's bo11ocks in the driving department.
The government, treasury and even the general public have to understand something very fundamental. If you are going to spend our - my - money on aeroplanes that can fly at 400 kt IAS at 200 feet through a Welsh valley, or accelerate into the sky for four or five miles in sixty seconds and then kill anything it finds we the public don't like, then there is little point unless you are prepared to pay the price of the aeroplane. The price of the aeroplane plus whatever it costs to ensure the young men and women who fly them, can do so properly and with enough opportunity to really learn how to do it, without killing themselves in the process.
I honestly don't mind paying for our fast jets - we need them - but I really don't want some time serving politician telling me he is saving my money, by restricting those highly skilled men and women to twenty mionutes of training a day. How about paying out less in compensation for prisoners whose human rights have been infringed by being in jail?
I agree totally that the crew of BS1 were sacrificed to the civil service accounting system. Thank you guys, but you were let down badly.
Roger.
Landroger:
Well not with me you don't, I'm afraid LR. They were sacrificed, as were the crews of Sea Kings, Chinook, Hercules, Nimrod, another Tornado, and no doubt others as well, by Airworthiness deficiencies. Those deficiencies existed because the existing UK Military Airworthiness Regulations were not enforced by those whose duty it was to do so. They were not enforced by those people because they were instructed/ ordered to not do so by senior Air Officers in the MOD. The politicians, like you and I, may well claim ignorance of such regulations and rely on those in the military and civil service who are professionally required to know them and to enforce them. They were sacrificed by their own, that is the great scandal that needs to be dealt with here.
I agree totally that the crew of BS1 were sacrificed to the civil service accounting system.
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I think in this particular case, Chugalug2, you do need to expand so that we can share your concerns over airworthiness issues.
I certainly was not aware during the extensive period I enjoyed flying the Tornado.
I certainly was not aware during the extensive period I enjoyed flying the Tornado.
(Hours flown per crew, per month) = (Total fleet hours flown per month) / (Number of crews)
Look at the variables in the equation above. Think about who might care about each one...
Total fleet hours flown per month: The Treasury care about this one because it's directly proportional to £££! I think we can safely assume that the £££ has been on a steady decline ever since Options for Change.
Number of Crews: The MoD care about this one because it's a measure by which the population as a whole view can view our military strength. Reducing the number of crews can be seen as cutting the "sharp end" (i.e. not one of the government's legendary "efficiency savings") and is therefore not a step to be taken lightly.
Hours per Crew per month: Only the crews themselves give a stuff about this.
Over the last ten years or so there has been continual downward pressure on the £££ variable. Fleet hours have been affected by the ridiculous cut to Sqn engineering manpower a few years ago ("The answer's 115 engineers; what's the question?"... and a certain AOC should know all about that). The equation has been balanced by reducing the crew hours. Maintaining a constant number of crews allowed the MoD to say "look, we're spending less, and maintaining exactly the capability we had before" ....
This, presumably, was going to continue apace - front line aircrew have all seen the questionnaires from QinetiQ asking "how much of your role training could be conducted in the simulator?".... However, I suspect that the recent upward curve in incident rates has given their Airships pause for thought - which might be a reason why they finally decided to reduce the numbers of crews, both in the Harrier and Tornado GR forces (with more cuts probably on the way). That way at least the remaining crews can attempt to maintain some semblance of capability...
Look at the variables in the equation above. Think about who might care about each one...
Total fleet hours flown per month: The Treasury care about this one because it's directly proportional to £££! I think we can safely assume that the £££ has been on a steady decline ever since Options for Change.
Number of Crews: The MoD care about this one because it's a measure by which the population as a whole view can view our military strength. Reducing the number of crews can be seen as cutting the "sharp end" (i.e. not one of the government's legendary "efficiency savings") and is therefore not a step to be taken lightly.
Hours per Crew per month: Only the crews themselves give a stuff about this.
Over the last ten years or so there has been continual downward pressure on the £££ variable. Fleet hours have been affected by the ridiculous cut to Sqn engineering manpower a few years ago ("The answer's 115 engineers; what's the question?"... and a certain AOC should know all about that). The equation has been balanced by reducing the crew hours. Maintaining a constant number of crews allowed the MoD to say "look, we're spending less, and maintaining exactly the capability we had before" ....
This, presumably, was going to continue apace - front line aircrew have all seen the questionnaires from QinetiQ asking "how much of your role training could be conducted in the simulator?".... However, I suspect that the recent upward curve in incident rates has given their Airships pause for thought - which might be a reason why they finally decided to reduce the numbers of crews, both in the Harrier and Tornado GR forces (with more cuts probably on the way). That way at least the remaining crews can attempt to maintain some semblance of capability...
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Flying hours
Whilst still on the FL some 3 years ago I commented to Mrs F that the lack of practice (and I do mean time airborne each month) was leading to more mistakes. She tells me I said that nothing would be done to address the issue until someone lost their life. The argument about which aircraft should be doing the job is irrelevant, the fact remains that these aircrew were trying to acheive the aim without the tools. The cutting of crews from the front line means that yes the RAF will save money but less people to carry out the task! I think my point is the only way to get an effective force is to finance it accordingly. Cutting the hours leads to mistakes and in this case tragic loss of life. I did the Donny course with Nige, he became a respected and capable aviator. But even the capable ones suffer from skill fade if not able to practice.
RIP Nige and Kenny.
RIP Nige and Kenny.
soddim:
My concern is that there is still, after the various threads on the Chinook, Hercules and Nimrod accidents, a misunderstanding of what Airworthiness is.
So, pedant hat on:
_
Pedant hat off.
Self evidently the pilot's training, currency, checking and continuity has to be such as to ensure that they do not provide for the significant hazard mentioned above. The consensus of those posting here would point to that not being the case, and either the regulations have not been complied with, or they themselves no longer provided for the airworthiness needed. Either way that compromises the aircraft system of which the pilot/crew is part of.
I think in this particular case, Chugalug2, you do need to expand so that we can share your concerns over airworthiness issues.
So, pedant hat on:
_
Definition of Airworthiness_
Airworthiness is defined as “/the ability of an aircraft or other airborne equipment or system to operate with out significant hazard to aircrew, ground crew, passengers (where relevant) or to the general public over which the airborne systems are flown/”.
Airworthiness is defined as “/the ability of an aircraft or other airborne equipment or system to operate with out significant hazard to aircrew, ground crew, passengers (where relevant) or to the general public over which the airborne systems are flown/”.
Self evidently the pilot's training, currency, checking and continuity has to be such as to ensure that they do not provide for the significant hazard mentioned above. The consensus of those posting here would point to that not being the case, and either the regulations have not been complied with, or they themselves no longer provided for the airworthiness needed. Either way that compromises the aircraft system of which the pilot/crew is part of.
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The problem that I see in trying to throw everything into airworthiness, is that the monster would then be to great to manage under one umbrella and would fail. If that happened, it would only help those with a "see, told you so" attitude.
Aviation is a complex , multifacetted beast. The aircrew operators, the aircraft, the ATM system and it's operators, the maintenance organisations, the ground operating organisations all have their part to play in Aviation Safety. The are all links in the chain.
But be cautious of wishing everything to be about "airworthiness"
sw
Aviation is a complex , multifacetted beast. The aircrew operators, the aircraft, the ATM system and it's operators, the maintenance organisations, the ground operating organisations all have their part to play in Aviation Safety. The are all links in the chain.
But be cautious of wishing everything to be about "airworthiness"
sw
Safeware:
Not everything quite, Safeware, but the definition of airworthiness is by design all encompassing. I seem to remember someone on this forum opining that airworthiness merely concerned engineers and not pilots, or words to that effect. Well, it certainly concerns engineers, and the sidewalling of them in the RAF and the MOD is hugely responsible for much of the mess that we have now, but it most certainly does include aircrew as well. You could have the most gold plated airworthy aircraft in the inventory, put an untrained pilot in the driving seat and it immediately falls foul of the definition of airworthy. I didn't decide that, anymore than "Flight Safety concerns you!", that's simply the way it is. Thus the complete training plan, simulators, trainers, checkers, hourly requirements, etc, should ensure that the crew do not compromise that airworthiness but enhance it. The common factor with the more familiar nuts and bolts aspects of airworthiness is of course money. The lack of it denied ESF, functional FADECs, HISLs, IFFs and AAR systems, and now it would seem crew competency. In every case though the deficient systems had to be signed off, including those relating to crew competency. That was when the Airworthiness Regulations were breached, that was when those crews were betrayed.
....trying to throw everything into airworthiness
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Chug, One also has to remember what 553 says about airworthiness beyond the headline that you quote (often):
For peacetime flying, the design standard of a UK military aircraft type, its associated equipment and software may be considered airworthy where the conditions in a and b, or a and c, are met as appropriate:
a For all military aircraft types, their associated equipment and software, the Aircraft Designer has satisfactorily demonstrated, in a Safety Case, the airworthiness of the design. The demonstration of airworthiness may include design analysis, application of specified standards (such as Def Stan 00-970) and procedures, historical evidence of successful use of particular design features, system tests, and ground and air tests to arrive at an overall assessment of airworthiness. The demonstration should be as specified in the aircraft or modification contract including the operating conditions to be applied, and should be undertaken during the development phase for the aircraft or modification.
b The cumulative probability of the loss of an aircraft due to a technical fault and the cumulative probability of a technical failure of the aircraft (inclusive of its systems, structure and stores) which could result in the death of any air crew or passengers, should both be assessed to be of the order of one in a million per flying hour (probability of occurrence 1x10-6 per flying hour) when operated within the conditions used for the airworthiness demonstration.
c Aircraft derived from civil passenger aircraft and used by the MOD in the passenger‑carrying airliner role should meet a higher standard of safety. Such aircraft may be considered to be airworthy if the cumulative probability of the loss of the aircraft due to a technical fault and the cumulative probability of a technical failure of the aircraft (inclusive of its systems, structure and stores) which could result in the death of any aircrew or passengers, are both assessed to be of the order of one in ten million per flying hour (probability of occurrence 1x10‑7 per flying hour) when operated within the conditions used for the airworthiness demonstration.
The Principles of War also apply - Selection and Maintenance of the Aim - diverting into other areas of Aviation Safety is going to dilute what has already been achieved post XV230.
sw
For peacetime flying, the design standard of a UK military aircraft type, its associated equipment and software may be considered airworthy where the conditions in a and b, or a and c, are met as appropriate:
a For all military aircraft types, their associated equipment and software, the Aircraft Designer has satisfactorily demonstrated, in a Safety Case, the airworthiness of the design. The demonstration of airworthiness may include design analysis, application of specified standards (such as Def Stan 00-970) and procedures, historical evidence of successful use of particular design features, system tests, and ground and air tests to arrive at an overall assessment of airworthiness. The demonstration should be as specified in the aircraft or modification contract including the operating conditions to be applied, and should be undertaken during the development phase for the aircraft or modification.
b The cumulative probability of the loss of an aircraft due to a technical fault and the cumulative probability of a technical failure of the aircraft (inclusive of its systems, structure and stores) which could result in the death of any air crew or passengers, should both be assessed to be of the order of one in a million per flying hour (probability of occurrence 1x10-6 per flying hour) when operated within the conditions used for the airworthiness demonstration.
c Aircraft derived from civil passenger aircraft and used by the MOD in the passenger‑carrying airliner role should meet a higher standard of safety. Such aircraft may be considered to be airworthy if the cumulative probability of the loss of the aircraft due to a technical fault and the cumulative probability of a technical failure of the aircraft (inclusive of its systems, structure and stores) which could result in the death of any aircrew or passengers, are both assessed to be of the order of one in ten million per flying hour (probability of occurrence 1x10‑7 per flying hour) when operated within the conditions used for the airworthiness demonstration.
The Principles of War also apply - Selection and Maintenance of the Aim - diverting into other areas of Aviation Safety is going to dilute what has already been achieved post XV230.
sw
Result, one gold plated airworthy aircraft for the use of. For the use of who, Safeware? Stick my untrained pilot into it and the plating will be pealing off like that of a "cheap Changi watch" (one there for those of a certain age)! As for selection and maintenance of the aim, is the aim being that all future accidents are not due to technical failures, but rather Human Factors? I would rather we simply regain the age old aim of RAF Flight Safety; to avoid all avoidable accidents. That, rather than arguing the toss about the definition of airworthiness, or angels dancing on pin heads for that matter, should be our aim. Slashing back the hours to maintain competency is as deadly as issuing an RTS to an aircraft that Boscombe Down refused to fly.
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Chug,
I think that as someone working in the field of Aviation Safety, I'll think I'll just have to disagree with the disparate aspects that you are trying to bring together in one mass.
FWIW, in terms of proportion, non-technical issues cause far more accidents than technical ones, so, let's not make schoolboy errors regarding technical matters but also put as much, if not more effort into those non-technical ones that make up the vast majority of accidents.
sw
I think that as someone working in the field of Aviation Safety, I'll think I'll just have to disagree with the disparate aspects that you are trying to bring together in one mass.
FWIW, in terms of proportion, non-technical issues cause far more accidents than technical ones, so, let's not make schoolboy errors regarding technical matters but also put as much, if not more effort into those non-technical ones that make up the vast majority of accidents.
sw
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Now I see where you are coming from, Chugalug, but I think most aviators understand that airworthiness is an issue to do with the machine and its' suitability for safe operation by a competant crew.
In this case we are, I believe, simply questioning the failure to provide sufficient resources to maintain the competancy of the crew. We are not questioning the airworthiness of the aircraft.
It is, I think, important to separate those two distinct issues as their use as a single issue can otherwise be used to hide a multitude of failings that are better identified separately.
In this case we are, I believe, simply questioning the failure to provide sufficient resources to maintain the competancy of the crew. We are not questioning the airworthiness of the aircraft.
It is, I think, important to separate those two distinct issues as their use as a single issue can otherwise be used to hide a multitude of failings that are better identified separately.
Gents
My own opinion is that you are not as far apart as it may seem. Any differences can, I think, be explained by ones background and role in attaining or maintaining airworthiness. I think many posters have experience in one discipline, but few in both. Haddon-Cave didn’t articulate this very well; his report largely discussed the latter but many in MoD assume he was talking about the former – hence the focus on regulations and procedures being re-written when the real problem is lack of knowledgeable, practical implementation.
The thrust of many comments on this thread is the 10 hours per month flying time. As someone who was taught how to maintain airworthiness before moving to attaining it, my first thought turns to the EP (or LTC) Support Parameters, one of which is fleet flying hours. A key question which needs answering before pointing fingers is - What is the EP Assumption? This is expressed as x hours per year, per aircraft, broken down by FAE, TAE, Half TAE, IR, IR6 (or whatever the latest terms are). You add this up across the fleet and, a simple example, it tells you roughly how much aviation fuel that fleet is allowed in a year.
To any Support Manager/Authority (terms again?) this is THE “fixed” component of the formula that is his entire raison d’etre. It is dictated to him from on high. So, if those ”on high” have agreed this, then that is where I’d look.
The Support Manager’s sole task is to maintain the rest of that support formula – such as repair pipeline times, recovery rates, mean time between removals (not failures) and so on. Everything in that formula can be linked to fundamental components of maintaining Airworthiness. Competence, training, experience etc. For example, the long held rule of thumb is that if the 2nd line recovery rate falls below 50%, then you must begin to rob aircraft. It is the SA’s job to prevent that happening. It can be seen that, if these variable support parameters cannot be maintained due to lack of funding, competence, experience or training, then by definition something must give in the hitherto “fixed” parameters – flying rate and fleet size. So, my second question – Did the 10 hours per month arise from a failure to maintain the Support Parameters rather than a policy decision to reduce?
What has this got to do with airworthiness? The simplest, but crucially important, link is how the money is spent to maintain these Support Parameters. If the SA doesn’t analyse any problems in the above “variables” properly and solve them quickly, then funding is inevitably wasted chasing the solution and the only place that can come from is the pot that funds the most important part of maintaining airworthiness – maintaining the build standard. That pot should be sacrosanct (ring fenced”, but it is the very pot that has been targeted with draconian cuts because so few understand its purpose. If that BS is not maintained, then the Safety Case cannot be properly validated and will quickly become invalid. The above is precisely what has happened in each of the cases Chug refers to.
My own opinion is that you are not as far apart as it may seem. Any differences can, I think, be explained by ones background and role in attaining or maintaining airworthiness. I think many posters have experience in one discipline, but few in both. Haddon-Cave didn’t articulate this very well; his report largely discussed the latter but many in MoD assume he was talking about the former – hence the focus on regulations and procedures being re-written when the real problem is lack of knowledgeable, practical implementation.
The thrust of many comments on this thread is the 10 hours per month flying time. As someone who was taught how to maintain airworthiness before moving to attaining it, my first thought turns to the EP (or LTC) Support Parameters, one of which is fleet flying hours. A key question which needs answering before pointing fingers is - What is the EP Assumption? This is expressed as x hours per year, per aircraft, broken down by FAE, TAE, Half TAE, IR, IR6 (or whatever the latest terms are). You add this up across the fleet and, a simple example, it tells you roughly how much aviation fuel that fleet is allowed in a year.
To any Support Manager/Authority (terms again?) this is THE “fixed” component of the formula that is his entire raison d’etre. It is dictated to him from on high. So, if those ”on high” have agreed this, then that is where I’d look.
The Support Manager’s sole task is to maintain the rest of that support formula – such as repair pipeline times, recovery rates, mean time between removals (not failures) and so on. Everything in that formula can be linked to fundamental components of maintaining Airworthiness. Competence, training, experience etc. For example, the long held rule of thumb is that if the 2nd line recovery rate falls below 50%, then you must begin to rob aircraft. It is the SA’s job to prevent that happening. It can be seen that, if these variable support parameters cannot be maintained due to lack of funding, competence, experience or training, then by definition something must give in the hitherto “fixed” parameters – flying rate and fleet size. So, my second question – Did the 10 hours per month arise from a failure to maintain the Support Parameters rather than a policy decision to reduce?
What has this got to do with airworthiness? The simplest, but crucially important, link is how the money is spent to maintain these Support Parameters. If the SA doesn’t analyse any problems in the above “variables” properly and solve them quickly, then funding is inevitably wasted chasing the solution and the only place that can come from is the pot that funds the most important part of maintaining airworthiness – maintaining the build standard. That pot should be sacrosanct (ring fenced”, but it is the very pot that has been targeted with draconian cuts because so few understand its purpose. If that BS is not maintained, then the Safety Case cannot be properly validated and will quickly become invalid. The above is precisely what has happened in each of the cases Chug refers to.
soddim:
I'm sure that you are right, soddim, but now of all times is surely the time for us all to take stock of the situation and ask simply; "Why did it go so wrong?". Now the easy answer is, of course; "Already asked and dealt with by H-C, nothing to see here, so just move on!". tuc tells us, with all his experience and knowledge of UK Military Airworthiness, that H-C in many ways missed the point and was at times even plain wrong. In particular tuc points out that H-C and the MOD have gone for reforming the airworthiness regulations when the real problem was awareness, knowledge and implementation of them. The regulations didn't cause 62 people to die, not enforcing them did IMHO. The "priesthood" to whom Airworthiness was largely entrusted was that of the engineers, both military and CS. Well, we all know what happened to them, don't we? Thus the faith was left in the hands of the ungodly, ie of the two winged master race and others collectively known hereafter as "The Beancounters". Now it is just possible that if those Beancounters had been as inculcated in the faith as the "Priesthood" they would not have so supinely allowed the money changers into the Temple. I think I'll shut down this analogy now while the going is good! All I'm trying to say is that airworthiness isn't just about the aircraft itself, it extends to the FRC's, ACM etc and to the crew themselves. To use tucs parlance they are just another system within the system. "Competent Crews" don't just happen, they are caused. If they are not caused the total aircraft system constitutes, per the definition, the significant hazard both to themselves and to the General Public they overfly, ie the aircraft is unairworthy!
H-C's solution to all this is, of course, the "Independent within the MOD" MAA, ie the Military Airworthiness Authority. Are we to expect the MAA to give a green light to UK Military Airworthiness with pilots getting a mere 10 flying hours per month on very demanding FJ types as per this thread, merely because that has no bearing on airworthiness? We need to all stop and take stock here, I earnestly suggest.
I think most aviators understand that airworthiness is an issue to do with the machine and its' suitability for safe operation by a competant crew.
H-C's solution to all this is, of course, the "Independent within the MOD" MAA, ie the Military Airworthiness Authority. Are we to expect the MAA to give a green light to UK Military Airworthiness with pilots getting a mere 10 flying hours per month on very demanding FJ types as per this thread, merely because that has no bearing on airworthiness? We need to all stop and take stock here, I earnestly suggest.
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I sincerely hope, Chug, that todays 'two-winged master race' do not have to refer to H-C to work out that 10 hours per month is just asking for disaster. To me the issue is just so obvious that it is not a matter of consulting the rule books or examining the small print. I would not have authorised that flight at low level in that fit in that role - full stop.
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Tuc,
I know Chug and I are not far apart - the issues he sees as needing to be dealt with are valid issues, and the support issues you detail also affect the bottom line. However, as Soddim has acknowledged, parcelling them all up as "airworthiness" isn't the answer.
In many of his posts, Chug looks to the CAA model, however, it isn't the Civil Airworthiness Authority, but Civil Aviation Authority. And byond our shores Airworthiness is seen as a subset of Safety.
So, I have no problem with ensuring that all Chugs concerns are addressed, but not under the single banner of Airworthiness.
sw
I know Chug and I are not far apart - the issues he sees as needing to be dealt with are valid issues, and the support issues you detail also affect the bottom line. However, as Soddim has acknowledged, parcelling them all up as "airworthiness" isn't the answer.
In many of his posts, Chug looks to the CAA model, however, it isn't the Civil Airworthiness Authority, but Civil Aviation Authority. And byond our shores Airworthiness is seen as a subset of Safety.
So, I have no problem with ensuring that all Chugs concerns are addressed, but not under the single banner of Airworthiness.
sw
Safeware
Thanks. What concerns me is that the underlying causes will be missed by a too narrow definition of airworthiness. When you have been told to cancel projects or waive contractual requirements because "it involves integration, that's too risky and costly" and in the same breath urged to get the Safety Case or MAR report out, then you begin to worry at what these people are being taught. Not the regulations and most certainly not how to implement them - which was the base critisicm in the Nimrod report, not the content of the regs themselves.
My point is that, demonstrably, most of the accidents discussed on pprune would have been avoided had the extant regulations (and, in slightly older days, CA Instructions) been followed. Mull, C130 and Nimrod definitely. The airworthiness criticisms in the Sea King and Tornado/Patriot BoI reports would have been avoided had the regs been followed, although in those cases there were other factors (but at least some of the cheese slices wouldn't have been missing altogether). That they weren't followed is entirely down to failure to appreciate the wider and deeper aspects that are only touched upon in the top level regs. As you know, these regs were written in the bygone days or yore when those who had to apply them understood all this detail implicitly. Thus, training, experience, competence of everyone in the chain are vital components of the airworthiness and wider safety processes.
As long as these wider issues are addressed by the MAA I'm reasonably happy to go along with whatever definition they come up with, but at the moment there are too many who still equate airworthiness with the ability to take off and land. It is better to embrace these wider issues up front than to hope someone happens to think of them. I look at the DE&S staff list and cringe at the memory of some senior figures telling me not to bother with 00-55/56/57/970, 05-123/125, Critical Design Reviews, systems integration, EMC testing and a raft of other airworthiness and safety fundamentals - just sign it off, if a problem occurs we'll deal with it as and when. Pity some problems manifested themselves in fatal crashs.
That same attitude still prevails and can be seen in the utterly facile MoD statements, oft repeated on pprune, that "This aircraft fleet has a good track record". That is no justification for deliberately targetting airworthiness funding and telling staff to ignore the regulations. I utterly despise those who were told by Boscombe that aircraft were unsafe yet paid off the contract, made a false declaration and walked away. Their actions have nothing to do with finer points of definition or what the regs say - it is all about people. And I don't think the MAA have the authority or will to sort that one out.
Thanks. What concerns me is that the underlying causes will be missed by a too narrow definition of airworthiness. When you have been told to cancel projects or waive contractual requirements because "it involves integration, that's too risky and costly" and in the same breath urged to get the Safety Case or MAR report out, then you begin to worry at what these people are being taught. Not the regulations and most certainly not how to implement them - which was the base critisicm in the Nimrod report, not the content of the regs themselves.
My point is that, demonstrably, most of the accidents discussed on pprune would have been avoided had the extant regulations (and, in slightly older days, CA Instructions) been followed. Mull, C130 and Nimrod definitely. The airworthiness criticisms in the Sea King and Tornado/Patriot BoI reports would have been avoided had the regs been followed, although in those cases there were other factors (but at least some of the cheese slices wouldn't have been missing altogether). That they weren't followed is entirely down to failure to appreciate the wider and deeper aspects that are only touched upon in the top level regs. As you know, these regs were written in the bygone days or yore when those who had to apply them understood all this detail implicitly. Thus, training, experience, competence of everyone in the chain are vital components of the airworthiness and wider safety processes.
As long as these wider issues are addressed by the MAA I'm reasonably happy to go along with whatever definition they come up with, but at the moment there are too many who still equate airworthiness with the ability to take off and land. It is better to embrace these wider issues up front than to hope someone happens to think of them. I look at the DE&S staff list and cringe at the memory of some senior figures telling me not to bother with 00-55/56/57/970, 05-123/125, Critical Design Reviews, systems integration, EMC testing and a raft of other airworthiness and safety fundamentals - just sign it off, if a problem occurs we'll deal with it as and when. Pity some problems manifested themselves in fatal crashs.
That same attitude still prevails and can be seen in the utterly facile MoD statements, oft repeated on pprune, that "This aircraft fleet has a good track record". That is no justification for deliberately targetting airworthiness funding and telling staff to ignore the regulations. I utterly despise those who were told by Boscombe that aircraft were unsafe yet paid off the contract, made a false declaration and walked away. Their actions have nothing to do with finer points of definition or what the regs say - it is all about people. And I don't think the MAA have the authority or will to sort that one out.
tucumseh:
As succinct a summary of my reservations re the "Independent but within the MOD" MAA that I could ever have wished for tuc. And Safeware makes the very valid point that it is the Military Airworthiness Authority. So if the accident that is the subject of this thread had happened on their watch, having decided that the aircraft was airworthy, might we expect them to say the equivalent of "Sorry, Chief, we don't do safety only airworthiness, you'll have to enquire elsewhere"? This has all the makings of a Whitehall Farce, though the track record to date is perhaps more of a Shakespearean Tragedy. I think tuc has the measure of this. Many years ago the system used to work as well as it did, I suspect, not because of definitions or regulations so much as peoples attitudes and sense of duty. I know this comes across as old Fogey blah, blah, but that strikes me as the nub of it. Unless and until we restore that motivation in people to regain that old Flight Safety philosophy, be they Engineers, Pilots, Cooks, or Bottle washers, we are on a hiding to nothing.
Their actions have nothing to do with finer points of definition or what the regs say - it is all about people. And I don't think the MAA have the authority or will to sort that one out.