Military principles
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Military principles
I know this is a Light Blue forum and I'm about to ask an army type qustion, so excuse me while I put my body armour on
! This is, however, a serious question (research for an OU essay) and I'm sure some knowledgeable chap here will have the answer. I seem to remember from somewhere that, to be successful, an attacking force should outnumber the defending force 3:1 - anyone got any reference for that? Here's hoping.
CB
! This is, however, a serious question (research for an OU essay) and I'm sure some knowledgeable chap here will have the answer. I seem to remember from somewhere that, to be successful, an attacking force should outnumber the defending force 3:1 - anyone got any reference for that? Here's hoping.CB
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No reference without sticking my head in a PAM, and even then it might not be in there. It's just one of those principles that gets drummed into you.
Personally, I'd go in echelon, right flanking with bags of smoke whilst support weapons brassed the place up.
Personally, I'd go in echelon, right flanking with bags of smoke whilst support weapons brassed the place up.
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Like Rock 34 I have no particular reference to point at, and being BAe in an earlier life I've never had to get involved in real fighting.
However lots of books mention the 3:1 ratio as the standard necessity for any invading / overtaking force - one source which might suit your needs is ' One Hundred Days ' by Admiral Sandy Woodward, re. the Falklands 1982.
Good luck with the O.U, and this may be an aviation site, but it ain't light blue, plenty of FAA & Army aviators around !
DZ
However lots of books mention the 3:1 ratio as the standard necessity for any invading / overtaking force - one source which might suit your needs is ' One Hundred Days ' by Admiral Sandy Woodward, re. the Falklands 1982.
Good luck with the O.U, and this may be an aviation site, but it ain't light blue, plenty of FAA & Army aviators around !
DZ
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
CB, don't forget to point up where 3:1 was not the case. Battle of Thermopylae - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia - the Greeks lost but the Persians had even greater superiority.
More accurately even when theoretically 3:1 was not achieved but victory ensured, there may well have been local superiority in time and space.
I have found a reference that should suit your purpose (Google is your friend) but you will see that 3:1 is quoted as Infantry superiority. You will also see reference to time/space that I mentioned.
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More accurately even when theoretically 3:1 was not achieved but victory ensured, there may well have been local superiority in time and space.
I have found a reference that should suit your purpose (Google is your friend) but you will see that 3:1 is quoted as Infantry superiority. You will also see reference to time/space that I mentioned.
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PN
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Seem to remember it is also dependent upon the nature of the defensive structures and the intensity of the exxpected resistance. AFAIK the US invasion of Japan would have required larger numbers than 3:1 due to the expected fanatical opposition. One of the reasons they chose the nuclear option.
On the other hand, the Blitzkrieg in 1940 might have had local superiority in numbers, but above all superiority in mobility (acting as a force multiplier) as well as flying artillery (Luftwaffe tactical air support).
I suppose as long as you can make a convincing case, any number goes..theoretically
On the other hand, the Blitzkrieg in 1940 might have had local superiority in numbers, but above all superiority in mobility (acting as a force multiplier) as well as flying artillery (Luftwaffe tactical air support).
I suppose as long as you can make a convincing case, any number goes..theoretically
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Ask the US forces landing on Omaha beach about superiority ratios.
A well dug-in force with good weapons and training could resist a force 10x bigger if the attacking force had no CAS/NGS.
A well dug-in force with good weapons and training could resist a force 10x bigger if the attacking force had no CAS/NGS.
I don’t think one can simply say 3:1, but there is the “Principle of Four” enshrined in the Manoeuvrist Approach which illustrates the general requirement for numerical superiority of Land forces. The Commander needs:
1.Forces to provide fire to fix an enemy.
2.Forces to Move or Strike
3.A Second echelon to regenerate and support the main effort
4.A Reserve to deal with the unexpected.
These Four elements need not be identical. I suppose this is very simplistic and their effectiveness would depend on “rear” forces, such as artillery, logistics etc, and Air superiority. As our Government doesn’t think such things important, the ratio is probably nearer 10:1, always assuming the ammo has been issued (and the rifle works)! And they have a working radio to call for help with. And a decent armoured vehicle to Manoeuvre in.
1.Forces to provide fire to fix an enemy.
2.Forces to Move or Strike
3.A Second echelon to regenerate and support the main effort
4.A Reserve to deal with the unexpected.
These Four elements need not be identical. I suppose this is very simplistic and their effectiveness would depend on “rear” forces, such as artillery, logistics etc, and Air superiority. As our Government doesn’t think such things important, the ratio is probably nearer 10:1, always assuming the ammo has been issued (and the rifle works)! And they have a working radio to call for help with. And a decent armoured vehicle to Manoeuvre in.
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I'm not sure what the last mailer was referring to, the 3:1 ratio has been quoted for a very long time, way before WWII.
The Americans at Omaha beach suffered heavy casualties because they faced a well dug-in enemy with a vastly superior position ( and weapons ) despite the Allies having Air Superiority, almost Supremacy.
One good soldier in the right place, with rations & ammo', can fend off an army; ( the fictional but realistic book & film ' Brown on Resolution ' springs to mind ) but only for so long, which of course is where the superiority in numbers comes in - as the Falklands participents mentioned, the 3:1 ratio is regarded as standard from the Iron Age to present, but of course it varies if say the defenders have nukes & the attackers have spears !
The Americans at Omaha beach suffered heavy casualties because they faced a well dug-in enemy with a vastly superior position ( and weapons ) despite the Allies having Air Superiority, almost Supremacy.
One good soldier in the right place, with rations & ammo', can fend off an army; ( the fictional but realistic book & film ' Brown on Resolution ' springs to mind ) but only for so long, which of course is where the superiority in numbers comes in - as the Falklands participents mentioned, the 3:1 ratio is regarded as standard from the Iron Age to present, but of course it varies if say the defenders have nukes & the attackers have spears !
Two up, one back and stacks of smoke!!!
However, with the right enablers and multipliers used intelligently, effectively and at the right time, a numerically inferior force stands a pretty good chance or winning.
As I recall, McCarthur made great use of his enabling assets during the UN forces' break out from the Pusan perimeter against a vastly larger force. Indeed it was only things like his use of tactical SIGINT which prevented his forces from being wiped out before they had even started the fight back.
Just one example I know, but it does serve to demonstrate the point that numbers aren't everything. Just ask the boys wandering round here with black bars over their eyes!
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(US) Civil war general Nathan Bedford Forrest,
...not Patton, who probably was even more blunt and direct....
3:1 is an oversimplification (a rather gross simplification in my never humble opinion), for example there's a difference between having superiority of numbers globally and locally - and quality of equipment, preparation, and training will all skew things. Caesar, for example, won plenty of battles against numerically superior opposition, whilst WWI amply illustrated that numbers don't mean a thing against a well entrenched and prepared enemy.
Dave
Forrest is often erroneously quoted as saying his strategy was to "git thar fustest with the mostest," but this quote first appeared in print in a New York Times story in 1917, written to provide colorful comments in reaction to European interest in Civil War generals. Bruce Catton writes:
"Do not, under any circumstances whatever, quote Forrest as saying 'fustest' and 'mostest'. He did not say it that way, and nobody who knows anything about him imagines that he did."[34]
...not Patton, who probably was even more blunt and direct....
3:1 is an oversimplification (a rather gross simplification in my never humble opinion), for example there's a difference between having superiority of numbers globally and locally - and quality of equipment, preparation, and training will all skew things. Caesar, for example, won plenty of battles against numerically superior opposition, whilst WWI amply illustrated that numbers don't mean a thing against a well entrenched and prepared enemy.
Dave
Where to start (those with a low tedium threshold, look away now...)?
First, you could look up FW Lanchester's equations and Paul K Davies, Aggregation, Disaggregation, and the 3:1 Rules in Ground Combat might help, and you might find Kicking Butt by the Numbers useful
If you're looking for more general references, the bunfight between Mearsheimer and Epstein in International Security from the 1988-89 timeframe might fit the bill. In simple terms, Measheimer wrote an article in 1982 about why the Soviets couldn't win in Europe - 'Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe', International Security Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer, 1982), pp. 3-39, and some years later, Epstein wrote a piece in the same journal calling into question the 3:1 force ratio, and the fun (?) started...
The specific references:
Joshua M Epstein, 'Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in Europe', in International Security Vol 12 No 4 (Spring 1988) pp.154-165
John J Mearsheimer's response, 'Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics' in International Security, Vol 13 No 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 54-89,
Response to Mearsheimer by Epstein, 'The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model and the Future of Security Studies' International Security, Vol 13 No 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 90-127
And a response to Mearsheimer by Col Trevor Dupuy, 'Combat Data and the 3:1 Rule' in International Security, Vol 14 No 1 (Summer 1989) pp.195-201. (Dupuy felt that Mearshiemer's piece criticising Epstein's views was in fact more critical of him [Dupuy])
The debate was hotting up nicely and on the verge of getting into proper academic bitching when the Berlin Wall fell and spoiled it all...
Archimedes (MA, Killing Threads with Dull But Hopefully Helpful Info)
First, you could look up FW Lanchester's equations and Paul K Davies, Aggregation, Disaggregation, and the 3:1 Rules in Ground Combat might help, and you might find Kicking Butt by the Numbers useful
If you're looking for more general references, the bunfight between Mearsheimer and Epstein in International Security from the 1988-89 timeframe might fit the bill. In simple terms, Measheimer wrote an article in 1982 about why the Soviets couldn't win in Europe - 'Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe', International Security Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer, 1982), pp. 3-39, and some years later, Epstein wrote a piece in the same journal calling into question the 3:1 force ratio, and the fun (?) started...
The specific references:
Joshua M Epstein, 'Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in Europe', in International Security Vol 12 No 4 (Spring 1988) pp.154-165
John J Mearsheimer's response, 'Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics' in International Security, Vol 13 No 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 54-89,
Response to Mearsheimer by Epstein, 'The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model and the Future of Security Studies' International Security, Vol 13 No 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 90-127
And a response to Mearsheimer by Col Trevor Dupuy, 'Combat Data and the 3:1 Rule' in International Security, Vol 14 No 1 (Summer 1989) pp.195-201. (Dupuy felt that Mearshiemer's piece criticising Epstein's views was in fact more critical of him [Dupuy])
The debate was hotting up nicely and on the verge of getting into proper academic bitching when the Berlin Wall fell and spoiled it all...
Archimedes (MA, Killing Threads with Dull But Hopefully Helpful Info)
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Although quantity has a quality all of its' own, technological superiority can overrule the long-held theories of numerical strength.
The David versus Goliath type of conflict where one has a weapon that is devastatingly accurate and the other has not is today's type of warfare. The old days of ground pounders slogging it out in hand-to-hand fighting produced the numerical equations that might not be valid in modern warfare.
However, since the media nowadays accompany the forces to battle and public opinion heavily influences politicians, if western forces take casualties or non-combatants are killed or maimed, the will to continue influences the outcome. A quick victory is most palatable - a prolonged conflict tends to result in compromise.
The David versus Goliath type of conflict where one has a weapon that is devastatingly accurate and the other has not is today's type of warfare. The old days of ground pounders slogging it out in hand-to-hand fighting produced the numerical equations that might not be valid in modern warfare.
However, since the media nowadays accompany the forces to battle and public opinion heavily influences politicians, if western forces take casualties or non-combatants are killed or maimed, the will to continue influences the outcome. A quick victory is most palatable - a prolonged conflict tends to result in compromise.
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Look up "Battle of Mirbat in Oman"
9 SAS soldiers
30-40 Omani soldiers, gendarmes, and militia facing
250 Adoo guerrillas
plus not forgetting the RAF' help in straffing and dropping a 500lbs bomb on the Adoo position ,
Numbers generaly win every time , and I would rather the odds where in my favour BUT a well armed/ trained force can do suprisingly well!!!!!!!
9 SAS soldiers
30-40 Omani soldiers, gendarmes, and militia facing
250 Adoo guerrillas
plus not forgetting the RAF' help in straffing and dropping a 500lbs bomb on the Adoo position ,
Numbers generaly win every time , and I would rather the odds where in my favour BUT a well armed/ trained force can do suprisingly well!!!!!!!