The Completely Shocking Standard of Journalism
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The Completely Shocking Standard of Journalism
Goodbye, Armed Forces. One force will do | Sam Kiley - Times Online
I am very much looking forward to Friday's The Times to hopefully view the vast mass of vitriolic rebuttal of this totally crass and un-informed drivel that this Pongo has managed to get published in what is allegedly an intelligent newspaper.
Whilst the newspaper has quite clearly made alterations of his comments in the online version, the main one that people read was riddled with errors.
In the paper version he had SeaKings being flown by the Army
..they are under one command....JHC
Like the 30% of CAS support over Afghanistan being provided by the US Navy!
So why earlier in your article ask why we need an RAF at all? How are you going to get there? How are you going to be transported to the battlefield or supplied with food and ammunition?
the Canadians tried it and sucked back, the Aussies tried it and sucked back, the Yanks don't do it. The USMC are a particular capability, for exercising first entry.
They do not have strategic airlift, the USAF provide that.
They do not have undersea protection, the USN provide that.
They have no strategic bombing capability, the USAF provides that.
They do not have significant artillery or armour, the US Army provides that. They don't have Doctors or dentists, the USN provides that. etc.
The concern is that this article, which took up a whole page of the tabloid version of this broadsheet, was riddled with in accuracies, prejudice and dogma. the irony is that this guy probably work for the MOD at the college of knowledge and is drawing a salary just like many of the other civilian so called "tutors"
I suppose it certainly raised the blood pressure of several people of all cloths and had the combined effect of everyone being in agreement that the man is a c@&k!
I am very much looking forward to Friday's The Times to hopefully view the vast mass of vitriolic rebuttal of this totally crass and un-informed drivel that this Pongo has managed to get published in what is allegedly an intelligent newspaper.
Whilst the newspaper has quite clearly made alterations of his comments in the online version, the main one that people read was riddled with errors.
In Britain CH47 Chinooks are flown by RAF pilots, Sea Kings by the Navy, Apache attack helicopters by the Army Air Corps.
Helicopters should be under one command for land operations, which must mean under the direction of the Army
The Navy must give up on its carrier groups. The money saved would be better spent on the helicopter carriers, destroyers, frigates and fast riverine craft that we can actually use in countering insurgency, black operations and humanitarian missions. These are the vessels that are going to give us our global reach — because they can get places quickly and be put to use. An aircraft carrier is merely threatening.
The Army must give up on its tanks and probably its mechanised infantry. It should evolve into an entirely air-and-sea-portable organism capable of sustaining itself, without the staggeringly heavy rear element that we can see at the ever-growing Camp Bastion.
The younger generation of air, land and sea warriors that the past ten years have produced know that the wars they are fighting today will morph into the conflicts of tomorrow. Much as they love their cap badges, they know that subtle, fast and highly trained small, integrated units are the only way to fight the new form of war that is already upon us. There is now a very good case for copying the US Marine Corps and integrating the Army, Navy and Air Force into one.
They do not have strategic airlift, the USAF provide that.
They do not have undersea protection, the USN provide that.
They have no strategic bombing capability, the USAF provides that.
They do not have significant artillery or armour, the US Army provides that. They don't have Doctors or dentists, the USN provides that. etc.
The concern is that this article, which took up a whole page of the tabloid version of this broadsheet, was riddled with in accuracies, prejudice and dogma. the irony is that this guy probably work for the MOD at the college of knowledge and is drawing a salary just like many of the other civilian so called "tutors"
I suppose it certainly raised the blood pressure of several people of all cloths and had the combined effect of everyone being in agreement that the man is a c@&k!
But, to be fair, FC, he has a point....
The debate regarding defence has, to date, been led by a series of articles written by journalists who claim to have some expertise, but who make the sort of mistakes which make Lewis Page's error-ridden pieces seem as though they were written by Clausewitz (or at least Mrs Clausewitz).
There've been many complaints here about the public not engaging with the issue of defence (no, WEBF, that is not a cue for you to link to your old 'public ignorance' thread....
), and one now seems to have broken out - but its a debate which is, to date, not going to produce anything remotely sensible, since the public will, by and large, assume that the likes of Sam Kiley - because he's a war correspondent - will know what they're on about. The risk is that the debate which people have said would be a good thing will turn out to be more dangerous to defence as a whole (and not just the RAF) than not having one at all...
Kiley is not one of the "so-called tutors" at the 'College of Knowledge'.
The debate regarding defence has, to date, been led by a series of articles written by journalists who claim to have some expertise, but who make the sort of mistakes which make Lewis Page's error-ridden pieces seem as though they were written by Clausewitz (or at least Mrs Clausewitz).
There've been many complaints here about the public not engaging with the issue of defence (no, WEBF, that is not a cue for you to link to your old 'public ignorance' thread....
), and one now seems to have broken out - but its a debate which is, to date, not going to produce anything remotely sensible, since the public will, by and large, assume that the likes of Sam Kiley - because he's a war correspondent - will know what they're on about. The risk is that the debate which people have said would be a good thing will turn out to be more dangerous to defence as a whole (and not just the RAF) than not having one at all...Kiley is not one of the "so-called tutors" at the 'College of Knowledge'.
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I know, you're right and I apologise, I couldn't resist. The thing is, the article was so full of rubbish that it didn't deserve the bite. I think Kiley made himself look ridiculous and completely devoid of credibility where military opinion is concerned.
Originally Posted by Archimedes
...journalists who claim to have some expertise, but who make the sort of mistakes which make Lewis Page's error-ridden pieces seem as though they were written by Clausewitz (or at least Mrs Clausewitz).
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
I suppose it certainly raised the blood pressure of several people of all cloths and had the combined effect of everyone being in agreement that the man is a c@&k!
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It does beg a few points for discussion though.
I can't remember the size of the Navy, Army and RAF in the eighties before they were reduced in size, can anyone help me out?
I am getting at the fact that all three services are probably now similar in total size to that of just the army in the 1980's but we retain three services and three headquarters. We also have a PJHQ that controls all operational forces.
Would it not make sense to retain PJHQ (Ops) for operations, establish a PJHQ (Rear) and dispense with the three service headquarters. In this way we could dispense with two out of the current four headquarters and still achieve the same effect.
We are aleady heading this way and it would trim out some of the top end of the rank structure commensurate with a smaller force level. It already works on ops so why not at 'peace'. The names might be different given you wouldn't need the term joint but I am sure you get the sentiment....
HEDP
I can't remember the size of the Navy, Army and RAF in the eighties before they were reduced in size, can anyone help me out?
I am getting at the fact that all three services are probably now similar in total size to that of just the army in the 1980's but we retain three services and three headquarters. We also have a PJHQ that controls all operational forces.
Would it not make sense to retain PJHQ (Ops) for operations, establish a PJHQ (Rear) and dispense with the three service headquarters. In this way we could dispense with two out of the current four headquarters and still achieve the same effect.
We are aleady heading this way and it would trim out some of the top end of the rank structure commensurate with a smaller force level. It already works on ops so why not at 'peace'. The names might be different given you wouldn't need the term joint but I am sure you get the sentiment....
HEDP
Notwithstanding some sensible comments I do so love this simplistic urban myth!
Assuming you do not reduce the size of each of the single services and assuming you do not dispense with any capabilities, why would there be a saving? You still need to provide the planning staffs, the ops staffs, the finance staffs, the policy and airworthiness staffs, the logs staffs etc etc to cover Air, Land and Fleet.
Just pick a post that exists in all 3 single service HQs, something like SO2 G/N/A 5 (Plans in old speak (I think)). Three people doing a full time job. So by the theory above we amalgamate all these posts into one and sack 2 personnel. What do we have? A nervous breakdown???
In this way we could dispense with two out of the current four headquarters and still achieve the same effect.
Just pick a post that exists in all 3 single service HQs, something like SO2 G/N/A 5 (Plans in old speak (I think)). Three people doing a full time job. So by the theory above we amalgamate all these posts into one and sack 2 personnel. What do we have? A nervous breakdown???
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Well, I read it through a couple of times to make sure I was getting the drift of what he's saying...
And, if thats what it takes to be published in The Times......
The word "w@nker" springs to mind.
And, if thats what it takes to be published in The Times......
The word "w@nker" springs to mind.
Archimedes
There've been many complaints here about the public not engaging with the issue of defence (no, WEBF, that is not a cue for you to link to your old 'public ignorance' thread...)
This one you mean?
Widger
Like the 30% of CAS support over Afghanistan being provided by the US Navy!
Isn't it more than 30%?
It Takes A Carrier: Naval Aviation and the Hybrid Fight
Today, one aircraft carrier provides 49 percent of OEF fixed-wing sorties immediately after reporting on station. On a recent deployment, Carrier Air Wing Eight operating from the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) flew more than 3,000 OEF sorties supporting troops-in-contact nearly 500 times. They spent over five months of their deployment off the coast of Pakistan. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has been similar. During my time in the Persian Gulf on board the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76), every type of air wing aircraft directly supported ground operations on a daily basis, including E-2 airborne early warning aircraft flying 4.5 hour missions in-country. In looking at this and other combat operations from Bosnia to Iraq, carriers have proven indispensable, particularly in the key early stages of a conflict.
Later....
In his now famous Foreign Affairs article, Secretary Gates divided U.S. military forces into three groups: 50 percent for conventional warfare or major contingency operations (MCOs), 10 percent for irregular warfare, and 40 percent that could be used for both. In looking at current combat operations and future contingencies, it becomes clear that carrier strike groups hit the sweet spot and in fact make up the most significant portion of that "hybrid" 40 percent.
A typical argument against the aircraft carrier is that it is a remnant of the Cold War or only viable in MCOs. Several analysts would argue otherwise. Tactical aircraft, special operations forces, and helicopters have played key roles during the last 11 years in a wide range of security operations, none of them reaching the level of an MCO. This includes Operation Desert Fox in 1998-when carrier tactical aircraft launched the initial strikes on Iraq-to OEF in 2001. In the early stages of OIF, five carriers provided critical air support for regular and special forces. In the case of the two carriers in the eastern Mediterranean, those support missions spanned more than 700 nautical miles. Amazingly, 8 different strike/fighter orbits were maintained for 27 days.
There are plenty of other examples of carrier hybrid actions. The USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) led tsunami relief efforts in 2004. The USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) deployed with critical special operations forces at the start of OEF. What is most interesting about all of these engagements is that none of them would fit the definition of a Cold War scenario or a traditional major contingency. Carrier strike groups were there when needed, provided crucial support across the spectrum of operations, then redeployed when their work was complete or they were relieved on station by another carrier strike group.
Personally I am confused by Mr Kiley's assertion that helicopter carriers (sic) can get places quickly but an aircraft carrier cannot. Why this sudden urge for writers to advocate an all COIN force structure?
There've been many complaints here about the public not engaging with the issue of defence (no, WEBF, that is not a cue for you to link to your old 'public ignorance' thread...)
This one you mean?
Widger
Like the 30% of CAS support over Afghanistan being provided by the US Navy!
Isn't it more than 30%?
It Takes A Carrier: Naval Aviation and the Hybrid Fight
Today, one aircraft carrier provides 49 percent of OEF fixed-wing sorties immediately after reporting on station. On a recent deployment, Carrier Air Wing Eight operating from the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) flew more than 3,000 OEF sorties supporting troops-in-contact nearly 500 times. They spent over five months of their deployment off the coast of Pakistan. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has been similar. During my time in the Persian Gulf on board the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76), every type of air wing aircraft directly supported ground operations on a daily basis, including E-2 airborne early warning aircraft flying 4.5 hour missions in-country. In looking at this and other combat operations from Bosnia to Iraq, carriers have proven indispensable, particularly in the key early stages of a conflict.
Later....
In his now famous Foreign Affairs article, Secretary Gates divided U.S. military forces into three groups: 50 percent for conventional warfare or major contingency operations (MCOs), 10 percent for irregular warfare, and 40 percent that could be used for both. In looking at current combat operations and future contingencies, it becomes clear that carrier strike groups hit the sweet spot and in fact make up the most significant portion of that "hybrid" 40 percent.
A typical argument against the aircraft carrier is that it is a remnant of the Cold War or only viable in MCOs. Several analysts would argue otherwise. Tactical aircraft, special operations forces, and helicopters have played key roles during the last 11 years in a wide range of security operations, none of them reaching the level of an MCO. This includes Operation Desert Fox in 1998-when carrier tactical aircraft launched the initial strikes on Iraq-to OEF in 2001. In the early stages of OIF, five carriers provided critical air support for regular and special forces. In the case of the two carriers in the eastern Mediterranean, those support missions spanned more than 700 nautical miles. Amazingly, 8 different strike/fighter orbits were maintained for 27 days.
There are plenty of other examples of carrier hybrid actions. The USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) led tsunami relief efforts in 2004. The USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) deployed with critical special operations forces at the start of OEF. What is most interesting about all of these engagements is that none of them would fit the definition of a Cold War scenario or a traditional major contingency. Carrier strike groups were there when needed, provided crucial support across the spectrum of operations, then redeployed when their work was complete or they were relieved on station by another carrier strike group.
Personally I am confused by Mr Kiley's assertion that helicopter carriers (sic) can get places quickly but an aircraft carrier cannot. Why this sudden urge for writers to advocate an all COIN force structure?
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WEBF,
I am not in possession of the stats, but OEF is not all that goes on in theatre. So it would be more than plausible for a CVN to supply 50+% of OEF missions whilst only picking up 30% of the total frag.
Don't get me wrong - I'm a CV fan, but the above might explain the stats.
I am not in possession of the stats, but OEF is not all that goes on in theatre. So it would be more than plausible for a CVN to supply 50+% of OEF missions whilst only picking up 30% of the total frag.
Don't get me wrong - I'm a CV fan, but the above might explain the stats.
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Roland,
I do apologise for appearing simple but I suspect I could have expanded somewhat more.
I think it can generally be expected that we are going to lose some capabilities and numbers (indians) and there is much being made of the fact that the front line is being cut while the number of air ranks appears to rise proportionally as the indians decrease.
yes, I dared to suggest that we cut two headquarters and merely operate with Ops (PJHQ) and Peacetime (perm one from 3). I dont pretend that it would not require an expansion of the one retained and not every post in the two lost could be taken as a saving.
Would it be wrong to think of a number of Groups, Commands and Divisions working to a single peacetime headquarters?
The three SO2 A/G/N that you mention (I would prefer SO2 J5) probably need to co-ordinate somewhat to achieve joint effect whereas a single department would be somewhat streamlined and more efficient.
Simplistic I know but perhaps a starting point for discussion and not necesarily derision..............
HEDP
I do apologise for appearing simple but I suspect I could have expanded somewhat more.
I think it can generally be expected that we are going to lose some capabilities and numbers (indians) and there is much being made of the fact that the front line is being cut while the number of air ranks appears to rise proportionally as the indians decrease.
yes, I dared to suggest that we cut two headquarters and merely operate with Ops (PJHQ) and Peacetime (perm one from 3). I dont pretend that it would not require an expansion of the one retained and not every post in the two lost could be taken as a saving.
Would it be wrong to think of a number of Groups, Commands and Divisions working to a single peacetime headquarters?
The three SO2 A/G/N that you mention (I would prefer SO2 J5) probably need to co-ordinate somewhat to achieve joint effect whereas a single department would be somewhat streamlined and more efficient.
Simplistic I know but perhaps a starting point for discussion and not necesarily derision..............
HEDP
