Chinook Crash 2 June 1994
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This is perhaps a conversation that I haven't the right to be involved in, being an ex long range sniper.
I would just like to add my support to the re-opening of the investigation. Having left the army, I now find my self, employed with a UK based (recently French acquired) electronics company, as a senior quality consultant. Within the "civilian" word it is well known that if you manage to get software packages to be 95% bug free you have done bloody well (not even NASA can do that, no matter what they say). I find it bizarre (fu**ing mad) that the inquiry can blame the pilots and ignore (point blankly refuse) the fact that some aspect of the on board systems (software) could have failed during the flight. Even if the systems were 95% bug free, what little "problem" sits in the 5% that isn't?.
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Tir Tenrie
I would just like to add my support to the re-opening of the investigation. Having left the army, I now find my self, employed with a UK based (recently French acquired) electronics company, as a senior quality consultant. Within the "civilian" word it is well known that if you manage to get software packages to be 95% bug free you have done bloody well (not even NASA can do that, no matter what they say). I find it bizarre (fu**ing mad) that the inquiry can blame the pilots and ignore (point blankly refuse) the fact that some aspect of the on board systems (software) could have failed during the flight. Even if the systems were 95% bug free, what little "problem" sits in the 5% that isn't?.
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Tir Tenrie
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Tir renrie
Thanks for the vote of support. Here's a few figures that might make you miss your next long range shot: The FADEC software was examined by the independent firm EDS Scion. In less than 20% of the software the following anomalies were found.
Category 1 - 56
Category 2 - 193
Category 3 - 132
Category 4 - 104
Despite these, Minister John Spellar stated that none were considered safety critical.
Really???
I know very little about computing and even less about code, but I know that a total of 485 anomalies in less than 20% of code is going to be a problem.
Call me old fashioned or what!!
Thanks for the vote of support. Here's a few figures that might make you miss your next long range shot: The FADEC software was examined by the independent firm EDS Scion. In less than 20% of the software the following anomalies were found.
Category 1 - 56
Category 2 - 193
Category 3 - 132
Category 4 - 104
Despite these, Minister John Spellar stated that none were considered safety critical.
Really???
I know very little about computing and even less about code, but I know that a total of 485 anomalies in less than 20% of code is going to be a problem.
Call me old fashioned or what!!
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Tandemrotor, spot-on! The reason we have to keep this going is so that we can have faith that if, god forbid, the same happens again our families will get the protection and support that they deserve. Rick and John had relatives who were so proud of their sons' achievements. For them to live with the subjective opinion of one hard-faced senior officer must be so difficult. As I've said before, John and Rick may have screwed-up. But Bill Wratten's decision without having evidence beyond reasonable doubt has, and will continue to, cause so much hurt. Fight-on, for the sake of all airmen who may, in the future, pay the ultimate price.
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HPT
I regret Wrotten is probably as untouchable under Scots law as he is in England. One possible line would be a suit for professional negligence in that he utterly failed in his (clearly documented) professional duty to take account of the "No Doubt Whatsoever" requirement before making a posthumous finding of gross negligence. I think any advocate worth his salt should be able to demonstrate that Wrotten's failure was not an error but negligence to a gross degree.
I regret Wrotten is probably as untouchable under Scots law as he is in England. One possible line would be a suit for professional negligence in that he utterly failed in his (clearly documented) professional duty to take account of the "No Doubt Whatsoever" requirement before making a posthumous finding of gross negligence. I think any advocate worth his salt should be able to demonstrate that Wrotten's failure was not an error but negligence to a gross degree.
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I am posting this reply whist reading a totally unconected report involving an accident in the early 90's. The BOI found the Aircraft Captain (AC) "unable in any way to prevent the accident and therefore could not attribute any blame to him." They then decided that it was Handling pilot error 'not negligent'. Observations of the board then reccomended that Cockpit voice Recorders (CVR) would have greatly assisted the board.
The report then continues with the 'chain of events' that led to the accident and holds the 'AC' ultimately to blame due to lack of Judgement. During the report the BOI (plus the rest) advogate the use of restraining harnesses by passengers, ignoring the fact that the uninjured passengers were able to vacate the aircraft quickly as they were unrestrained, had they been strapped in there may have been more injuries or fatalies. BOI's do a very good job but occaisionaly I feel there may be another agenda influencing the report in this case the use of harnesses, in the Chinook crash draw your own conclusions.
The report then continues with the 'chain of events' that led to the accident and holds the 'AC' ultimately to blame due to lack of Judgement. During the report the BOI (plus the rest) advogate the use of restraining harnesses by passengers, ignoring the fact that the uninjured passengers were able to vacate the aircraft quickly as they were unrestrained, had they been strapped in there may have been more injuries or fatalies. BOI's do a very good job but occaisionaly I feel there may be another agenda influencing the report in this case the use of harnesses, in the Chinook crash draw your own conclusions.
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I was working in Scotland at the time of the accident, and certainly agree that there are people other than the pilots with a hand in it. However one thing that has always spiked my curiosity, and perhaps one of you could explain to a dullard, is why was the a/c low level in poor vis, or was it low level because of poor vis?
Whatever the answer, though, there are soo many unanswered questions that I don't understand how the BOI laid the blame at the feet of the crew, particularly when they could not fight back.
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Once more unto the breach, Dear Friends...
Whatever the answer, though, there are soo many unanswered questions that I don't understand how the BOI laid the blame at the feet of the crew, particularly when they could not fight back.
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Once more unto the breach, Dear Friends...
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A Persuader,
Memory dims, but I do recall that the Release to Service at the time imposed a limit of plus 4 degrees Celsius, and even in early June around that part of the world the 4 degree isotherm was below Safety Altitude. As crews had been told that they would be considered personally responsible for anything that went wrong with an aircraft flown outside the release-to-service, it was a compelling reason for planning on staying VFR Low Level.
Memory dims, but I do recall that the Release to Service at the time imposed a limit of plus 4 degrees Celsius, and even in early June around that part of the world the 4 degree isotherm was below Safety Altitude. As crews had been told that they would be considered personally responsible for anything that went wrong with an aircraft flown outside the release-to-service, it was a compelling reason for planning on staying VFR Low Level.
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Still no reply from Minister Hoon in response to my 13 questions (sent 11/06/00).
Here's a couple more in the hope that someone may be able to help him formulate his replies.
1. Could you please confirm the existence of a memo from Boscombe Down critisising the FADEC software, after numerous errors were found. Did this, or any other memo from Boscombe Down conclude with a recommendation that rewriting the [FADEC] software was essential?
2. Why has the Government chosen to ignore the findings of the Scottish Fatal Accident Inquiry, in particular, the ruling by Sir Stephen Young that both pilots should not be blamed?
Perhaps anyone with information that will help Mr Hoon could contact him with the replies. How to get in touch with him is listed earlier in this thread.
"Injustice has no expiry date." - John Cook
Here's a couple more in the hope that someone may be able to help him formulate his replies.
1. Could you please confirm the existence of a memo from Boscombe Down critisising the FADEC software, after numerous errors were found. Did this, or any other memo from Boscombe Down conclude with a recommendation that rewriting the [FADEC] software was essential?
2. Why has the Government chosen to ignore the findings of the Scottish Fatal Accident Inquiry, in particular, the ruling by Sir Stephen Young that both pilots should not be blamed?
Perhaps anyone with information that will help Mr Hoon could contact him with the replies. How to get in touch with him is listed earlier in this thread.
"Injustice has no expiry date." - John Cook
