Chinook - Hit Back Here
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Frank Field & Gerald Howarth have been busy - Questions tabled for written answers on 23 Oct 00 http://www.publications.parliament.u...2/01023w01.htm
Mr Frank Field (Birkenhead): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his Answer of 25th July, Official Report, column 550W, on the Chinook crash, whether the emergency power warning lights were switched on at the time of the impact at the Wilmington crash.(133755)
10N Mr Frank Field (Birkenhead): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his Answer of 25th July, Official Report, column 550W, on the Chinook crash, if he will list the faulty test procedures that his Department was seeking redress for in their litigation claim against Textron Lycoming.(133757)
11N Mr Frank Field (Birkenhead): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his Answer of 25th July, Official Report, column 550W, on the Chinook crash, if he will give details of the outcome of his Department's claim against Textron Lycoming.(133759)
12N Mr Frank Field (Birkenhead): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his Answer of 25th July, Official Report, column 550W, on the Chinook crash, if (a) the Air Accident Investigation Board and (b) his Department have concluded that FADEC was not a factor in the Wilmington crash.(133773)
13N Mr Frank Field (Birkenhead): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his Answer of 25th July, Official Report, column 550W, on the Chinook crash, (a) who made the examination of the FADEC system as quoted in the Air Accident Investigation Board's report to the RAF Board of Inquiry and (b) if that examination found no possible link between the FADEC system and the accident.(133756)
14N Mr Frank Field (Birkenhead): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his Answer of 25th July, Official Report, column 550W, on the Chinook crash, whether Sir William Wratten and Sir John Day knew of his Department's legal claim against the FADEC manufacturer, Textron Lycoming at the time of their investigation into the fatal crash of Chinook ZD576.
38 Mr Gerald Howarth (Aldershot): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what is the function of the Institute of Flight Safety; and what role it performed in the Inquiry into the crash of RAF Chinnook ZD576.(133994)
39 Mr Gerald Howarth (Aldershot): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will list each occasion in the last 10 years in which the Air Accidents Investigation Branch has been involved in the investigation of military accidents.(133995)
40 Mr Gerald Howarth (Aldershot): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will place a copy of the Report of the Air Accidents Investigation Branch investigation of the RAF Chinnook ZD576 in the Library.(133996)
41 Mr Gerald Howarth (Aldershot): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will place in the Library a copy of the statement given by Mr R. Parkinson, Senior Inspector of Air Accidents, to the Royal Air Force Board of Inquiry into the crash of RAF Chinnock ZD576.
Mr Frank Field (Birkenhead): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his Answer of 25th July, Official Report, column 550W, on the Chinook crash, whether the emergency power warning lights were switched on at the time of the impact at the Wilmington crash.(133755)
10N Mr Frank Field (Birkenhead): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his Answer of 25th July, Official Report, column 550W, on the Chinook crash, if he will list the faulty test procedures that his Department was seeking redress for in their litigation claim against Textron Lycoming.(133757)
11N Mr Frank Field (Birkenhead): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his Answer of 25th July, Official Report, column 550W, on the Chinook crash, if he will give details of the outcome of his Department's claim against Textron Lycoming.(133759)
12N Mr Frank Field (Birkenhead): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his Answer of 25th July, Official Report, column 550W, on the Chinook crash, if (a) the Air Accident Investigation Board and (b) his Department have concluded that FADEC was not a factor in the Wilmington crash.(133773)
13N Mr Frank Field (Birkenhead): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his Answer of 25th July, Official Report, column 550W, on the Chinook crash, (a) who made the examination of the FADEC system as quoted in the Air Accident Investigation Board's report to the RAF Board of Inquiry and (b) if that examination found no possible link between the FADEC system and the accident.(133756)
14N Mr Frank Field (Birkenhead): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his Answer of 25th July, Official Report, column 550W, on the Chinook crash, whether Sir William Wratten and Sir John Day knew of his Department's legal claim against the FADEC manufacturer, Textron Lycoming at the time of their investigation into the fatal crash of Chinook ZD576.
38 Mr Gerald Howarth (Aldershot): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what is the function of the Institute of Flight Safety; and what role it performed in the Inquiry into the crash of RAF Chinnook ZD576.(133994)
39 Mr Gerald Howarth (Aldershot): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will list each occasion in the last 10 years in which the Air Accidents Investigation Branch has been involved in the investigation of military accidents.(133995)
40 Mr Gerald Howarth (Aldershot): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will place a copy of the Report of the Air Accidents Investigation Branch investigation of the RAF Chinnook ZD576 in the Library.(133996)
41 Mr Gerald Howarth (Aldershot): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will place in the Library a copy of the statement given by Mr R. Parkinson, Senior Inspector of Air Accidents, to the Royal Air Force Board of Inquiry into the crash of RAF Chinnock ZD576.
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My website was has been mentioned as part of an MP's inquiry into the Mull of Kintyre incident and I have had alot of people e-mailing me with comments on the subject, some of them make for an interesting read.
If you would like to make contact with me please go to the website listed: www.wokka.co.uk
It has been constructed to inform people of exercises and general info that the Chinook helicopter is involved with. The RAF station have not got round to producing a website yet.
If you would like to make contact with me please go to the website listed: www.wokka.co.uk
It has been constructed to inform people of exercises and general info that the Chinook helicopter is involved with. The RAF station have not got round to producing a website yet.
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I'm in the very early stages of trying to negotiate facilities for an e-mail petition (similar to that run by Computer Weekly a while ago). If negotiations are successful I will arrange for it to be posted on the official number 10 Downing Street web page.
I take it that I can rely on contributors to this thread for support.
If all works out OK, I'll let everyone know where to register their support.
Regards
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
I take it that I can rely on contributors to this thread for support.
If all works out OK, I'll let everyone know where to register their support.
Regards
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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In reply to my latest letter to my MP, he has sent me a copy of the Defence Committee’s report on ‘Lessons of the Chinook crash on the Mull of Kintyre’, together with Hansard covering the debate in the House of Commons on the crash, which took place on 27 June this year.
I am ploughing through the documents before replying, but it is certainly heartening to find that there is a lot of support in the house for the call to remove the verdict of gross negligence.
The dis-heartening aspect is the obstinacy of the MoD in refusing to reconsider.
To help me, I would like to know the exact Icing clearance issued to the Mk 2 Chinook in 1994, the freezing level in the vicinity of the Mull at the time of the crash, and the Visual Flight Rules for helicopters at the time.
In my day it was ‘Clear of cloud, in sight of land or water’. There is a suggestion in the Defence Committee report that the pilots required a visibility of at least 5 Km in order to fly visually.
The MoD’s case is now that the ‘gross negligence’ occurred at a stage so early in the flight that any failure or distraction close to the Mull would be irrelevant. Their case would be overturned if the aircraft were being flown within the rules right up until the moment that ‘a reasonable person’ would have done the same.
Any help gratefully received.
We will win this one; it’s just a matter of time!
I am ploughing through the documents before replying, but it is certainly heartening to find that there is a lot of support in the house for the call to remove the verdict of gross negligence.
The dis-heartening aspect is the obstinacy of the MoD in refusing to reconsider.
To help me, I would like to know the exact Icing clearance issued to the Mk 2 Chinook in 1994, the freezing level in the vicinity of the Mull at the time of the crash, and the Visual Flight Rules for helicopters at the time.
In my day it was ‘Clear of cloud, in sight of land or water’. There is a suggestion in the Defence Committee report that the pilots required a visibility of at least 5 Km in order to fly visually.
The MoD’s case is now that the ‘gross negligence’ occurred at a stage so early in the flight that any failure or distraction close to the Mull would be irrelevant. Their case would be overturned if the aircraft were being flown within the rules right up until the moment that ‘a reasonable person’ would have done the same.
Any help gratefully received.
We will win this one; it’s just a matter of time!
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Can answer a few points:
Icing clearance was basically no flight in rain/precip/cloud below +4 degrees.
VFR limits in the Air Staff Orders was 1km/100 ft for ops based in NI. However as you know for helo flights below 3000ft and less than 140kts COCISS also applied.
Will try and find out the 0 degree level
HPT
Icing clearance was basically no flight in rain/precip/cloud below +4 degrees.
VFR limits in the Air Staff Orders was 1km/100 ft for ops based in NI. However as you know for helo flights below 3000ft and less than 140kts COCISS also applied.
Will try and find out the 0 degree level
HPT
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Thanks Hydraulic, just what I'm after.
It's interesting that the most limiting case is 1Km when the defence committeee are working on a figure of 5Km. I have the IAS prior to impact somewhere, seem to remember 160Kts, which would put it outside the COCISOLOW regime.
It would seem likely that with a Safety Altitude of 5900ft (Ben Nevis + 1500') that a climb to fly IFR was not an option.
Surely that alone shoots down Wratten's argument in 'The Times' and elsewhere that they were negligent for not doing it.
Thanks again.
We WILL win this one
It's interesting that the most limiting case is 1Km when the defence committeee are working on a figure of 5Km. I have the IAS prior to impact somewhere, seem to remember 160Kts, which would put it outside the COCISOLOW regime.
It would seem likely that with a Safety Altitude of 5900ft (Ben Nevis + 1500') that a climb to fly IFR was not an option.
Surely that alone shoots down Wratten's argument in 'The Times' and elsewhere that they were negligent for not doing it.
Thanks again.
We WILL win this one
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Arkroyal
If greater than 140 kts, then the criteria are indeed 5km vis, 1.5km horizontally clear of cloud and 1000ft vertically clear of cloud. However to contradict this, the ASOs stated a minima of 250ft cloudbase and 1km vis for ops inside the UKLFS.
HPT
If greater than 140 kts, then the criteria are indeed 5km vis, 1.5km horizontally clear of cloud and 1000ft vertically clear of cloud. However to contradict this, the ASOs stated a minima of 250ft cloudbase and 1km vis for ops inside the UKLFS.
HPT
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Don't forget that in his own article, Wratten stated:
"I wrote that, without the irrefutable evidence of an accident data recorder and a cockpit voice recorder, there is inevitably a degree of speculation as to the precise details of the events prior to impact".
Wratten himself admits that he based his conclusion of absolutely no doubt whatsoever on speculation!! This in itself is enough to negate the findings of the BoI review.
This question is one of the latest thirteen I have sent to Minister Hoon. Replies here as soon as I get them.
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
"I wrote that, without the irrefutable evidence of an accident data recorder and a cockpit voice recorder, there is inevitably a degree of speculation as to the precise details of the events prior to impact".
Wratten himself admits that he based his conclusion of absolutely no doubt whatsoever on speculation!! This in itself is enough to negate the findings of the BoI review.
This question is one of the latest thirteen I have sent to Minister Hoon. Replies here as soon as I get them.
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Cross-Posted from "Lions Armed by Donkeys"
http://www.sunday-times.co.uk/news/p...enws02005.html
British troops 'were within hours' of invading Kosovo
BRITAIN was within just hours of launching a ground invasion of Kosovo when Slobodan Milosevic surrendered last year, a senior commander has revealed. "It was three to four hours, tops," Air Marshal Sir John Day said last week. "That's how close we were."
<snip>
Last week the Commons defence select committee criticised Blair and Clinton for "ruling out" a land attack to remove Serbian forces from Kosovo. The committee had been told by General Sir Mike Jackson, the field commander, that no order to invade was given.
Although this was an accurate statement, the order was only hours away from being delivered, said Day. Blair had believed from an early stage that a ground offensive in some form would have been needed. He had worked hard to win support from the other 18 members of the international alliance, although divisions remained.
<snip>
Day also points to what he sees as failings in the committee's report, which criticised the RAF for a poor "hit rate" on targets and, he says, ignored the bravery of the airmen.
"I feel sorry for the crews, the support teams and the families after this report," said Day. "A lot of people went in under very heavy fire after four hours in the air, then chose not to drop their weapons because they could not be sure of not hitting civilians. None of that courage is recognised in this report."
- The committee were not criticising the crews but the incompetent RAF management and procurement policies. Perhaps if His Airship had played his part in ensuring the procurement of less dodgy kit, the aircrew would have been able to drop their weapons with confidence of hitting the correct target. I seem to recall he was less complimentary to the aircrew of the Chinook he ordered into service in an unproven state when it suited his career. The 'ultimate politician' is now crawling up the Rev. Blair's jacksie.
Bets on the next CDS, chaps?
http://www.sunday-times.co.uk/news/p...enws02005.html
British troops 'were within hours' of invading Kosovo
BRITAIN was within just hours of launching a ground invasion of Kosovo when Slobodan Milosevic surrendered last year, a senior commander has revealed. "It was three to four hours, tops," Air Marshal Sir John Day said last week. "That's how close we were."
<snip>
Last week the Commons defence select committee criticised Blair and Clinton for "ruling out" a land attack to remove Serbian forces from Kosovo. The committee had been told by General Sir Mike Jackson, the field commander, that no order to invade was given.
Although this was an accurate statement, the order was only hours away from being delivered, said Day. Blair had believed from an early stage that a ground offensive in some form would have been needed. He had worked hard to win support from the other 18 members of the international alliance, although divisions remained.
<snip>
Day also points to what he sees as failings in the committee's report, which criticised the RAF for a poor "hit rate" on targets and, he says, ignored the bravery of the airmen.
"I feel sorry for the crews, the support teams and the families after this report," said Day. "A lot of people went in under very heavy fire after four hours in the air, then chose not to drop their weapons because they could not be sure of not hitting civilians. None of that courage is recognised in this report."
- The committee were not criticising the crews but the incompetent RAF management and procurement policies. Perhaps if His Airship had played his part in ensuring the procurement of less dodgy kit, the aircrew would have been able to drop their weapons with confidence of hitting the correct target. I seem to recall he was less complimentary to the aircrew of the Chinook he ordered into service in an unproven state when it suited his career. The 'ultimate politician' is now crawling up the Rev. Blair's jacksie.
Bets on the next CDS, chaps?
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No surprises at all. Exactly what has been suspected ever since the BOI was over-ruled, when they failed to come up with a politically acceptable conclusion.
Someone appears to have been protecting their own career at the expense of dead aircrew's reputations.
Those involved do the RAF a great dis-service.
Please keep at it Brian. This is one terrible injustice that will not lie down or go away until the truth finally comes out.
Someone appears to have been protecting their own career at the expense of dead aircrew's reputations.
Those involved do the RAF a great dis-service.
Please keep at it Brian. This is one terrible injustice that will not lie down or go away until the truth finally comes out.
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It seems that the RAAF have two Chinooks with engine problems that they are refusing to accept from the manufacturer.
http://www.abc.net.au/news/state/qld...1oct2000-3.htm
http://www.abc.net.au/news/state/qld...1oct2000-3.htm
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Hydraulic Palm Tree and Brian
Thanks a lot for all the info by various means.
I guess most people on this thread are familiar with Wratten’s Article in the Sunday Times 18/6/2000 (if not it’s at www.sunday-times.co.uk/news/pages/sti/2000/06/18/stirevnws02007.html ), in which he ‘stands by every word we wrote in reaching the judgement we did.’
Brian quotes from the article above "I wrote that, without the irrefutable evidence of an accident data recorder and a cockpit voice recorder, there is inevitably a degree of speculation as to the precise details of the events prior to impact". Which alone implies that his verdict, (which requires, from QRRAF, that ‘Only in cases where there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever should deceased aircrew be found negligent’, is based on speculation. This is surely enough to have that verdict overturned.
Lets look further in to the muddled mind of ACM Wratten.
In the article he maintains that the crew were negligent because they ‘should have climbed above safety altitude well before they reached the Mull’. He calculates this as 2800’, although the correct figure (accepted by the Defence Committee) is 5900’.
Examination of the weather conditions at the time show that the Sea level temperature was +9 degrees C, which allowing for a normal lapse rate of 2deg per 1000’, gives a +4 deg C level at 2500’.
As the icing clearance of the Mk 2 Chinook was +4, it is quite obvious that the pilots had no such option to climb to a safe altitude, not even Wratten’s incorrect figure.
Still happy you have absolutely no doubt, Sir William?
The Chinook on a track of roughly north impacted the Mull at 151 Kts. groundspeed. Given the local wind quoted as 170 degrees at ‘about’ 30 Knots, an airspeed of about 130 Knots would seem about right. Under VFR the crew were quite entitled to fly ‘Clear of cloud in sight of the surface’ up to a speed of 140 Kts IAS. There is no minimum visibility specified. Wratten maintains that ‘they should have turned away or turned back’. The control positions in the wreckage support the likelihood that they were doing just that. Too late obviously, but as anyone who has flown over a misty sea, judgement of visibility is nigh on impossible until something solid appears. And what if this new and unreliable (accepted fault rate of one every 2.7 hours) machine had thrown up some other distraction at the moment critique?
Still happy you have absolutely no doubt, Sir William?
I could speculate further as to what might have occurred, but there is no point. The only point is that on similar pointless speculation, Sir William Wratten has chosen to destroy the reputations of two of his colleagues. Why he should have done this is open to further debate, and I think uncomfortable questions are about to be asked of him (John Nichol above 02 October).
[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 31 October 2000).]
Thanks a lot for all the info by various means.
I guess most people on this thread are familiar with Wratten’s Article in the Sunday Times 18/6/2000 (if not it’s at www.sunday-times.co.uk/news/pages/sti/2000/06/18/stirevnws02007.html ), in which he ‘stands by every word we wrote in reaching the judgement we did.’
Brian quotes from the article above "I wrote that, without the irrefutable evidence of an accident data recorder and a cockpit voice recorder, there is inevitably a degree of speculation as to the precise details of the events prior to impact". Which alone implies that his verdict, (which requires, from QRRAF, that ‘Only in cases where there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever should deceased aircrew be found negligent’, is based on speculation. This is surely enough to have that verdict overturned.
Lets look further in to the muddled mind of ACM Wratten.
In the article he maintains that the crew were negligent because they ‘should have climbed above safety altitude well before they reached the Mull’. He calculates this as 2800’, although the correct figure (accepted by the Defence Committee) is 5900’.
Examination of the weather conditions at the time show that the Sea level temperature was +9 degrees C, which allowing for a normal lapse rate of 2deg per 1000’, gives a +4 deg C level at 2500’.
As the icing clearance of the Mk 2 Chinook was +4, it is quite obvious that the pilots had no such option to climb to a safe altitude, not even Wratten’s incorrect figure.
Still happy you have absolutely no doubt, Sir William?
The Chinook on a track of roughly north impacted the Mull at 151 Kts. groundspeed. Given the local wind quoted as 170 degrees at ‘about’ 30 Knots, an airspeed of about 130 Knots would seem about right. Under VFR the crew were quite entitled to fly ‘Clear of cloud in sight of the surface’ up to a speed of 140 Kts IAS. There is no minimum visibility specified. Wratten maintains that ‘they should have turned away or turned back’. The control positions in the wreckage support the likelihood that they were doing just that. Too late obviously, but as anyone who has flown over a misty sea, judgement of visibility is nigh on impossible until something solid appears. And what if this new and unreliable (accepted fault rate of one every 2.7 hours) machine had thrown up some other distraction at the moment critique?
Still happy you have absolutely no doubt, Sir William?
I could speculate further as to what might have occurred, but there is no point. The only point is that on similar pointless speculation, Sir William Wratten has chosen to destroy the reputations of two of his colleagues. Why he should have done this is open to further debate, and I think uncomfortable questions are about to be asked of him (John Nichol above 02 October).
[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 31 October 2000).]
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Good article in 'Pilot'.
Dear Geoff the Hoon
Are you aware that your predecessor was involved in a major cover-up concerning the Chinook incident? He was intentionally advised incorrectly. The cover-up was not for security/operational reasons but simply to cover some politically minded/egotistically driven commander of loyal and skilled aviators, who had lost the plot. Suggest you ask Sir Wratten and the like to answer a few questions behind the nearest bike shed.
Yours faithfully(if you agree to back me up when employed by your good self)
Dear Geoff the Hoon
Are you aware that your predecessor was involved in a major cover-up concerning the Chinook incident? He was intentionally advised incorrectly. The cover-up was not for security/operational reasons but simply to cover some politically minded/egotistically driven commander of loyal and skilled aviators, who had lost the plot. Suggest you ask Sir Wratten and the like to answer a few questions behind the nearest bike shed.
Yours faithfully(if you agree to back me up when employed by your good self)
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Skycop,
thanks for the kind words. You are absolutely right. I (and many others) will NOT lie down. I will NOT go away until this injustice is rectified.
WebPilot,
thanks for the info on the RAAF. I'm making further enquiries.
Arkroyal,
you are more than welcome. I also appreciate the support you give me. I think you should be commended for attempting to explore the mind of ACM Wratten. Not a journey to make alone!!
EESDL,
My mate Geoff Hoon has been asked the very questions and I will post both questions and replies as and when he manages the answers.
Everyone,
many, many thanks for your support and comments. I assure you all that I will do whatever I can for Rick and Jon, regardless of timescale.
Regards
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
thanks for the kind words. You are absolutely right. I (and many others) will NOT lie down. I will NOT go away until this injustice is rectified.
WebPilot,
thanks for the info on the RAAF. I'm making further enquiries.
Arkroyal,
you are more than welcome. I also appreciate the support you give me. I think you should be commended for attempting to explore the mind of ACM Wratten. Not a journey to make alone!!
EESDL,
My mate Geoff Hoon has been asked the very questions and I will post both questions and replies as and when he manages the answers.
Everyone,
many, many thanks for your support and comments. I assure you all that I will do whatever I can for Rick and Jon, regardless of timescale.
Regards
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Gross Negligence = "flagrant lack of proper care and attention". (Combined Oxford Dictionary definition). Maybe smiling Bill came to this conclusion to save his own bacon. Who exercised "proper care and attention" when releasing the ac to operational service with so many limitations/restricitions/doubts?
Keep fighting.
Smoothie
Keep fighting.
Smoothie
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Smoothie,
see my posting dated 3 October (Page 7)regarding the decision to deploy the Chinook into operational service.
It is also question 1 of the latest batch to Minister Hoon. Replies here as and when they drop through the door.
Hope this helps.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
see my posting dated 3 October (Page 7)regarding the decision to deploy the Chinook into operational service.
It is also question 1 of the latest batch to Minister Hoon. Replies here as and when they drop through the door.
Hope this helps.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Brian - you might want to look at the post on Rumours & News (if you havn;t found it already) entitled 'FAA finds problems in Boeing audit' - http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/For...ML/010799.html
The post refers to manufacturing issues at Boeing. Whilst not specifically related to the Chinook, if there are systemic problems at Boeing, it could be germane.
Snippet from the post: http://www.airsafetyonline.com/news/2000/10/31/1.shtml
The Federal Aviation Administration found "systemic'' problems with design and production processes at seven Boeing Co. aircraft engineering and manufacturing facilities but concluded that passenger safety was not compromised......."
The post refers to manufacturing issues at Boeing. Whilst not specifically related to the Chinook, if there are systemic problems at Boeing, it could be germane.
Snippet from the post: http://www.airsafetyonline.com/news/2000/10/31/1.shtml
The Federal Aviation Administration found "systemic'' problems with design and production processes at seven Boeing Co. aircraft engineering and manufacturing facilities but concluded that passenger safety was not compromised......."