Chinook - Hit Back Here
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As they were approaching the yacht more or less FROM downwind the only turn which makes any sense would be a turn to the left. But perhaps they were so keen to avoid the yacht they flew into the Mull. For goodness sake, this is all speculation and we are now supporting speculation by quoting bits of speculation from the BOI report. All good fun and, for me, very interesting but is it achieving anything except showing how much DOUBT there is?
Incidentally, I thought that the OC Odiham (BOI review), with access to ALL the information, concluded that the most likely airspeed was 135kts, what he described as the normal transit speed for this aircraft. Of course that was speculation on his part and there must be considerable doubt.
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"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
Incidentally, I thought that the OC Odiham (BOI review), with access to ALL the information, concluded that the most likely airspeed was 135kts, what he described as the normal transit speed for this aircraft. Of course that was speculation on his part and there must be considerable doubt.
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"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"
Guest
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AN ORIGINAL THOUGHT?
Yes – it came as a surprise to me as well!! I tried lying down but it would not go away.
The BOI state at para 48 “The preserved data in the SuperTans and Trimble 8000 systems contained relatively little information concerning the previous history of the flight, as the computers are primarily required to retain data only pertinent to ongoing calculations. Nevertheless, it was determined that a WP change was recorded at a point very close to a direct track from RAF Aldergrove to the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse, 1.75km south west of the impact point, although the time at which this selection was made was not retained.”
The BOI state at para 49 “ Furthermore, it was determined that the SuperTans had performed a computation some 15-18 seconds prior to power down --- but aircraft position information corresponding to that point in time was not recorded.”
IS IT JUST POSSIBLE THESE RECORDED PIECES OF DATA REFER TO THE SAME EVENT?
If the Chinook was traveling at 180kts groundspeed (92.66 metres/sec) then 18 seconds before impact equates to 1.6679 km from impact and 15 seconds before impact equates to 1.39 km. That is a difference of between 81 metres and 360 metres from the calculated WP change selection, less the distance traveled whilst the computation was made.
Yes – it came as a surprise to me as well!! I tried lying down but it would not go away.
The BOI state at para 48 “The preserved data in the SuperTans and Trimble 8000 systems contained relatively little information concerning the previous history of the flight, as the computers are primarily required to retain data only pertinent to ongoing calculations. Nevertheless, it was determined that a WP change was recorded at a point very close to a direct track from RAF Aldergrove to the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse, 1.75km south west of the impact point, although the time at which this selection was made was not retained.”
The BOI state at para 49 “ Furthermore, it was determined that the SuperTans had performed a computation some 15-18 seconds prior to power down --- but aircraft position information corresponding to that point in time was not recorded.”
IS IT JUST POSSIBLE THESE RECORDED PIECES OF DATA REFER TO THE SAME EVENT?
If the Chinook was traveling at 180kts groundspeed (92.66 metres/sec) then 18 seconds before impact equates to 1.6679 km from impact and 15 seconds before impact equates to 1.39 km. That is a difference of between 81 metres and 360 metres from the calculated WP change selection, less the distance traveled whilst the computation was made.
Guest
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Sorry K52 me old china,
The whole point is that we are not interested in the "is it just possible", were interested in the "beyond any doubt whatsoever".
You can speculate till the cows come home and all speculation merely adds to our case -that there is no proof beyond any doubt whatsoever that the pilots were negligent.
The whole point is that we are not interested in the "is it just possible", were interested in the "beyond any doubt whatsoever".
You can speculate till the cows come home and all speculation merely adds to our case -that there is no proof beyond any doubt whatsoever that the pilots were negligent.
Guest
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Latest rumour around the Chinook fleetb at the moment: I know this forum has debated the subject of the RNS 252 but here we go again latest SD is for new CHINS, it is intalled on an aircraft at ODI flying with no technical info for engineers and a few sketchy notes for the crew, sound familar?
Guest
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Take two very experienced pilots. Put them in an aircraft. Ask them to perform a task... There has to be a bloody good reason why they didn't complete it. Oh and it isn't because there's a bit of fog over the Mull... Now start asking the next 20 questions regarding the aircraft...
Guest
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K52, you know very well what I mean by suggesting that to fly at 150kts IAS just before impact would be to speed up from their transit speed.
43 miles in 18 minutes is an average of 143 kts groundspeed. With a tailwind of approx 30 kts their average IAS is about 115 kts. I know you choose to ignore this as it paints the wrong picture for your attack. It is, however, true.
Any calculation based on radio calls made at about the zone boundary, or calculated from a point at about midway between the coast out and coast in points are pure guesswork.
Any flight undertaken by the NI detachment would be treated as in theatre unless specifically authorised otherwise (NI is within the UKLFS). The negligent management failed to do this.
AIDU will most likely not be in posession of the Flying order book in force at the time, so save the call. SH VFR weather limits for the RN were promulgated in JSP318 blue pages. If I remember correctly they were 200' cloudbase and 1Km viz anywhere. RAF SH enjoyed similar easement of the VFR rules, without which SH would be impossible.
You are now grasping at straws with your latest TANS theorising. Why can't you accept that this speculation is pointless. You need evidence beyond any doubt whatsoever. If the main protagonist (you) of the 'hang 'em' faction can't find any, then it is obvious that there is none. QED no proof, no finding of negligence.
Edited due to finger trouble, and server glitches
[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 14 March 2001).]
43 miles in 18 minutes is an average of 143 kts groundspeed. With a tailwind of approx 30 kts their average IAS is about 115 kts. I know you choose to ignore this as it paints the wrong picture for your attack. It is, however, true.
Any calculation based on radio calls made at about the zone boundary, or calculated from a point at about midway between the coast out and coast in points are pure guesswork.
Any flight undertaken by the NI detachment would be treated as in theatre unless specifically authorised otherwise (NI is within the UKLFS). The negligent management failed to do this.
AIDU will most likely not be in posession of the Flying order book in force at the time, so save the call. SH VFR weather limits for the RN were promulgated in JSP318 blue pages. If I remember correctly they were 200' cloudbase and 1Km viz anywhere. RAF SH enjoyed similar easement of the VFR rules, without which SH would be impossible.
You are now grasping at straws with your latest TANS theorising. Why can't you accept that this speculation is pointless. You need evidence beyond any doubt whatsoever. If the main protagonist (you) of the 'hang 'em' faction can't find any, then it is obvious that there is none. QED no proof, no finding of negligence.
Edited due to finger trouble, and server glitches
[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 14 March 2001).]
Guest
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K52,
Sorry old boy but your TANS info is incorrect. The waypoint change and height calculation were 2 different points. Not that it's important really, as the president of the BoI said of the reconstruction of the final seconds; it was an "ESTIMATED final track...it could not be proven that the aircraft flew in a straight line".
Dormouse - thanks for the info - really interesting but I'm not sure it could be brought up at the Lord's inquiry. If you go down that line you get further into the realms of speculation.
The key to winning the argument in front of the Lords will be to show areas of doubt surrounding the crash. As most people can see from reading this forum there are many areas which are not facts - just theories.
If we can show areas of doubt we can win. Luckily we have a few "killer facts" that are undeniable.
Sorry old boy but your TANS info is incorrect. The waypoint change and height calculation were 2 different points. Not that it's important really, as the president of the BoI said of the reconstruction of the final seconds; it was an "ESTIMATED final track...it could not be proven that the aircraft flew in a straight line".
Dormouse - thanks for the info - really interesting but I'm not sure it could be brought up at the Lord's inquiry. If you go down that line you get further into the realms of speculation.
The key to winning the argument in front of the Lords will be to show areas of doubt surrounding the crash. As most people can see from reading this forum there are many areas which are not facts - just theories.
If we can show areas of doubt we can win. Luckily we have a few "killer facts" that are undeniable.
Guest
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John Nichol
Thank you for the assertion John, any chance of an explanation? The BOI found that they had a WP change demand with a position but not a time, and a computation with a time but not a position. You, however, seem to be able to state categorically that these two events took place in two different positions. How, may I ask?
It seems to me, as a mere ex “Truckie” pilot, that a WP change demand would generate a computation. The computation retained in the SuperTans memory was 15-18 secs old at impact but had not been overridden by another computation, despite the aircraft steadily diverging from the computed track to WP B. It therefore seems, to me, reasonable to ask if these two memory extractions refer to the same event
One other point, the BOI state that the WP change demand took place at 1.75km from the impact point. Now the position information for the WP change came from the computer memory, but the computer memory position at power down was some 200m short of the true impact point. As the BOI decided that the position deviation errors would not have increased greatly in the distance between the WP change and impact; is it not reasonable to assume that, when the computer position was 1.75km from impact, the true aircraft position was actually some 200m closer at approx 1.55km from impact?
Ark Royal
I totally agree that the 43nm from lift off to impact would, if traveled in 18 minutes, result in a mean groundspeed of 143kts. I was not aware, however, that a Chinook lifted off at such a high groundspeed. I assumed that it lifted off at a relatively low airspeed and accelerated to cruising speed. That is why I suggested that a more realistic assessment of groundspeed would be achieved by taking the time and distance from the CTR boundary. Allowing 13 minutes (reported time 12 minutes) that would give a mean groundspeed of 152kts.
Of course that is only a rough indication, as the aircraft flew at approx 100ft from Aldergrove to the coast. Now, they may have traveled at very high speed at low level over NI; but I cannot help but feel that 130kts+ at 100ft would not have done much for passenger comfort.
Now I know that you have this 30kts tailwind fixed in your mind, and I assume it comes from the AAIB calculated wind at impact of 180/30kts (the forecast 1000ft wind was 170/20kts). As the aircraft Track was 027 degrees then only approx half of that windspeed would have been tail component. To get the 30kts tail component that you insist on using would require a windspeed of approx 60kts at between 200-400ft. I am a little rusty on the Beaufort Scale, but would that not equate to something around Force 8-9 on the surface? I feel sure the yachtsman would have mentioned that in his evidence.
Of course the only evidence we have from eyewitnesses regarding the windspeed near the Mull is from all those (11?) who were there at the time of the accident. The wind at the level of the lighthouse was described as “almost calm” whilst it was described as “strong and blustery” further up the hill. The lighthouse elevation is 300ft, smack in the middle of the yachtsmen’s height estimate for the Chinook of 200-400ft when he saw it 2-3nm from the Mull.
I very much doubt whether AIDU keep anyone’s Flying Order Book other than Northolt’s. They will only have that one for the rules on Airfield driving. What I was referring to was the Flight Information Handbook (FIH) which gives the VFR requirements for all aircraft types.
Finally, I am not the “chief protagonist” of a “hang ‘em” or any other faction (although I suppose I should be flattered by the appellation of “chief”). I merely hold a different opinion to the one you originally held when you first joined this thread. At that time, I seem to remember, you were fulminating at the audacity of 2 Air Marshals “overturning the verdict of a properly constituted Board of Inquiry”. I would point out that you are now not only criticizing myself, but also ALL the reviewing Officers (including the then CAS) as well as AAIB and the members of the Board.
[This message has been edited by K52 (edited 16 March 2001).]
Thank you for the assertion John, any chance of an explanation? The BOI found that they had a WP change demand with a position but not a time, and a computation with a time but not a position. You, however, seem to be able to state categorically that these two events took place in two different positions. How, may I ask?
It seems to me, as a mere ex “Truckie” pilot, that a WP change demand would generate a computation. The computation retained in the SuperTans memory was 15-18 secs old at impact but had not been overridden by another computation, despite the aircraft steadily diverging from the computed track to WP B. It therefore seems, to me, reasonable to ask if these two memory extractions refer to the same event
One other point, the BOI state that the WP change demand took place at 1.75km from the impact point. Now the position information for the WP change came from the computer memory, but the computer memory position at power down was some 200m short of the true impact point. As the BOI decided that the position deviation errors would not have increased greatly in the distance between the WP change and impact; is it not reasonable to assume that, when the computer position was 1.75km from impact, the true aircraft position was actually some 200m closer at approx 1.55km from impact?
Ark Royal
I totally agree that the 43nm from lift off to impact would, if traveled in 18 minutes, result in a mean groundspeed of 143kts. I was not aware, however, that a Chinook lifted off at such a high groundspeed. I assumed that it lifted off at a relatively low airspeed and accelerated to cruising speed. That is why I suggested that a more realistic assessment of groundspeed would be achieved by taking the time and distance from the CTR boundary. Allowing 13 minutes (reported time 12 minutes) that would give a mean groundspeed of 152kts.
Of course that is only a rough indication, as the aircraft flew at approx 100ft from Aldergrove to the coast. Now, they may have traveled at very high speed at low level over NI; but I cannot help but feel that 130kts+ at 100ft would not have done much for passenger comfort.
Now I know that you have this 30kts tailwind fixed in your mind, and I assume it comes from the AAIB calculated wind at impact of 180/30kts (the forecast 1000ft wind was 170/20kts). As the aircraft Track was 027 degrees then only approx half of that windspeed would have been tail component. To get the 30kts tail component that you insist on using would require a windspeed of approx 60kts at between 200-400ft. I am a little rusty on the Beaufort Scale, but would that not equate to something around Force 8-9 on the surface? I feel sure the yachtsman would have mentioned that in his evidence.
Of course the only evidence we have from eyewitnesses regarding the windspeed near the Mull is from all those (11?) who were there at the time of the accident. The wind at the level of the lighthouse was described as “almost calm” whilst it was described as “strong and blustery” further up the hill. The lighthouse elevation is 300ft, smack in the middle of the yachtsmen’s height estimate for the Chinook of 200-400ft when he saw it 2-3nm from the Mull.
I very much doubt whether AIDU keep anyone’s Flying Order Book other than Northolt’s. They will only have that one for the rules on Airfield driving. What I was referring to was the Flight Information Handbook (FIH) which gives the VFR requirements for all aircraft types.
Finally, I am not the “chief protagonist” of a “hang ‘em” or any other faction (although I suppose I should be flattered by the appellation of “chief”). I merely hold a different opinion to the one you originally held when you first joined this thread. At that time, I seem to remember, you were fulminating at the audacity of 2 Air Marshals “overturning the verdict of a properly constituted Board of Inquiry”. I would point out that you are now not only criticizing myself, but also ALL the reviewing Officers (including the then CAS) as well as AAIB and the members of the Board.
[This message has been edited by K52 (edited 16 March 2001).]
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Never mind the small talk. Never mind the finer calcucations. Last year a Hawk flew into the ground in N.Yorks. The crew were absolved. During the same period a JT was awarded a Goood show for finding a delaminating control pallet in a CH47 (the result of which would have been uncontrolled a/c inputs-findings of the investigation). Equate
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Has a handle
I'm afraid I cannot comment on recent accidents as for some reason I was left off the distribution list once I took the Redundancy.
The finding of negligence was based on the crew continuing to attempt to fly VFR in weather conditions that precluded that option. As the BOI succinctly put it " The weather was suitable for the Task but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre".
The crew did not comply with that requirement.
I'm afraid I cannot comment on recent accidents as for some reason I was left off the distribution list once I took the Redundancy.
The finding of negligence was based on the crew continuing to attempt to fly VFR in weather conditions that precluded that option. As the BOI succinctly put it " The weather was suitable for the Task but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre".
The crew did not comply with that requirement.
Guest
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I think a "back to basics" might work here, at least for the familes of the pilots if not also for those with their own thoughts about why it happened and what could have happened differently. My ramblings are based on recollections of this thread and other sources, but may be flawed in my telling - feel free to correct me.
1. The aircraft crashed in bad weather on the Mull, killing all on board. I think I've got that fact down pat.
2. The BOI stated ( in different words to mine ) that there was no way of telling exactly what happened in the cockpit in the last minutes and moments of the flight, and therefore there was some doubt as to the exact sequence of events.
3. Air Force regulations in force at the time stated that deceased aircrew should be found guilty of gross negligence "only if there is absolutely no doubt as to the findings". However, see point 2.
4. AVM Wratten and Day started their musings on the BOI by effectively saying "there is doubt as to actually what happened", but then imposed a finding of gross negligence on the BOI despite having less experience of SH ops than those doing the BOI'ing.
5. Therefore, looking at point 3 and 4, because there was doubt about exactly what happened, the finding of gross negligence flies in the face of the regulations, and ( here's where I get a tad emotional ) is the root of Wratten's arrogance in subsequent years to those who dare contradict him.
I don't wish to offend anyone, especially as those contributing to this thread have immeasurably more experience in the day to day operation of military aircraft, especially support helicopters, than myself. However, the above summary, in my mind, is the one BIG BIG flaw in AVM Wratten's argument, and as such I really don't see why any other factors need to be taken into account.
My feelings for those analysing and theorising in great depth - they're trying to avoid dying in a similar manner by understanding what DID happen, but of course, we'll never really know, all you can do is to learn what you can from the tragic events leading up to the crash on the Mull that day.
1. The aircraft crashed in bad weather on the Mull, killing all on board. I think I've got that fact down pat.
2. The BOI stated ( in different words to mine ) that there was no way of telling exactly what happened in the cockpit in the last minutes and moments of the flight, and therefore there was some doubt as to the exact sequence of events.
3. Air Force regulations in force at the time stated that deceased aircrew should be found guilty of gross negligence "only if there is absolutely no doubt as to the findings". However, see point 2.
4. AVM Wratten and Day started their musings on the BOI by effectively saying "there is doubt as to actually what happened", but then imposed a finding of gross negligence on the BOI despite having less experience of SH ops than those doing the BOI'ing.
5. Therefore, looking at point 3 and 4, because there was doubt about exactly what happened, the finding of gross negligence flies in the face of the regulations, and ( here's where I get a tad emotional ) is the root of Wratten's arrogance in subsequent years to those who dare contradict him.
I don't wish to offend anyone, especially as those contributing to this thread have immeasurably more experience in the day to day operation of military aircraft, especially support helicopters, than myself. However, the above summary, in my mind, is the one BIG BIG flaw in AVM Wratten's argument, and as such I really don't see why any other factors need to be taken into account.
My feelings for those analysing and theorising in great depth - they're trying to avoid dying in a similar manner by understanding what DID happen, but of course, we'll never really know, all you can do is to learn what you can from the tragic events leading up to the crash on the Mull that day.
Guest
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A few points...
1. I heard somewhere that it looked from the IFF that someone may have been in the middle of dialling up 7700 - is this the case? If so, why?
2. On the last post, is it not conceivable that, if, for example the FADEC caused an undemanded spool up the crew may have left VFR unintentionally? Clearly, better up than down...?
3. As for the passenger comfort at 100' - true but then better to limit groundfire exposure and bump people around than sail plainly around at medium level for people to see.
1. I heard somewhere that it looked from the IFF that someone may have been in the middle of dialling up 7700 - is this the case? If so, why?
2. On the last post, is it not conceivable that, if, for example the FADEC caused an undemanded spool up the crew may have left VFR unintentionally? Clearly, better up than down...?
3. As for the passenger comfort at 100' - true but then better to limit groundfire exposure and bump people around than sail plainly around at medium level for people to see.
Guest
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Just to let you all know, that due to the impending removal of all Hotmail accounts from the pprune site, I have changed my e-mail address. You guessed it.....
[email protected]
Regards
Brian
(Still an irritating sod!)
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
[This message has been edited by Brian Dixon (edited 16 March 2001).]
[email protected]
Regards
Brian
(Still an irritating sod!)
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
[This message has been edited by Brian Dixon (edited 16 March 2001).]
Guest
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Here (I hope) is the link to the full debate by Lord Chalfont.
www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199697/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds01/text/10305-22.htm#10305-22_spnew2
Hope it works!
Regards
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
[This message has been edited by Brian Dixon (edited 16 March 2001).]
www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199697/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds01/text/10305-22.htm#10305-22_spnew2
Hope it works!
Regards
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
[This message has been edited by Brian Dixon (edited 16 March 2001).]
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K52
Perhaps the following will help:
"Baroness Symons [HoL, 11 July 2000]: {quotes AOC].. From this I am reluctantly drawn to the conclusion that the operating pilots could and would have avoided this accident had they followed a different course of action from the one they chose to pursue"
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean [HoL, 12 July 2000]: The flight plan indicated a route to the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse and then a course change to port [~15 deg] on a track following the western shoreline of the Mull. .. There is no evidence of any significant change of course and none of the decision, if any, that the crew made. .. As they had not done so, they could--and, under the rules, should--have either turned away from the Mull immediately or slowed down and climbed to a safe altitude."
The Baroness uses 'could' even though the decision the crew took is not known and the AOC uses 'chose' on the same lack of evidence. It is quite possible that they were unable to do what they should have done and probably had decided to do.
Others
Does anyone know who piloted the second Chinook seen flying low in a northerly direction on the north Antrim coast about 5.30pm that same evening? If you can shed any light on this mystery, please email me.
[This message has been edited by Ben Leice (edited 16 March 2001).]
[This message has been edited by Ben Leice (edited 17 March 2001).]
Perhaps the following will help:
"Baroness Symons [HoL, 11 July 2000]: {quotes AOC].. From this I am reluctantly drawn to the conclusion that the operating pilots could and would have avoided this accident had they followed a different course of action from the one they chose to pursue"
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean [HoL, 12 July 2000]: The flight plan indicated a route to the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse and then a course change to port [~15 deg] on a track following the western shoreline of the Mull. .. There is no evidence of any significant change of course and none of the decision, if any, that the crew made. .. As they had not done so, they could--and, under the rules, should--have either turned away from the Mull immediately or slowed down and climbed to a safe altitude."
The Baroness uses 'could' even though the decision the crew took is not known and the AOC uses 'chose' on the same lack of evidence. It is quite possible that they were unable to do what they should have done and probably had decided to do.
Others
Does anyone know who piloted the second Chinook seen flying low in a northerly direction on the north Antrim coast about 5.30pm that same evening? If you can shed any light on this mystery, please email me.
[This message has been edited by Ben Leice (edited 16 March 2001).]
[This message has been edited by Ben Leice (edited 17 March 2001).]
Guest
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If u try and get close to the 'assumed ' semantics in the cockpit, then u will end up in the predicament of a crew that did'nt 'basically' acheive the aim, however if u accept (re-my last post) that the crew had no powers to overcome the problem they found thereselves faced with. Then u r in a different game.
