Chinook - Hit Back Here

[John Nichol]

John Farley and BinRound,

Your points are well made and legitimate.

BinR - what you say is true, but my point is that there is no evidince to say that it happened. I know that all of us accept that good aviators can make mistakes but in this case we simply don't know what happened and that is enough to avoid the final verdict of gross negligence.

Could it have been a UCFM? Could it have been a lose article? Could it have been a FADEC failure or any other fault that left no trace. I don't know the answer to these questions. More importantly I don't say that it is impossible that the crew were at fault - simply that there is no evidence that they were.

John F - Your comments are valid but they pre-supose that everything was hunky dory in the aircraft. We simply do not know what was going on in the cockpit. You ask, "why did they not change track"? Just suppose they were unable to. In many ways you answer your own questions "it is one of the most uncertain aviation accidents".

This is the crux of the matter, no CVR and ADR mean no solid info. All that remains is speculation as Andy Pulford the BoI president admitted.

Speculation is fine, indeed it is paramount to ensure lessons are learned. Speculation is not evidence enough to trash the reputations of two good pilots.

PS. jackonicko, not sure exactly how I "Łucked up in the War". Let's start a new thread on that, just for fun eh?

cheers all

[Hoist-to-Crew]

Remember reading in a computer magazine(think it was computer weekly but can't honestly say) last year about Chinook computer problems. It stated that in the states a couple of chinny's had rolled inverted when certain error code appeared on the fadec. One crew managed to get it the right way round again and crawl out of the wreckage. Is it not possible that we may have had a similar problem here or if not then something for the future? Being inverted in a helo at low-level would certainly focus my mind on something else rather than the fog bank rapidly approaching.

[smooth approach]

Guys, let's get back to basics. The ac hit the ground at pretty close to normal cruising speed. Rick and John didn't avoid until it was too late. Therefore the logical conclusion has to be one of the following:

a. They were sitting "picking their noses".

b. Something was going on within the cockpit.

With a lack of physical evidence to prove either 'a' or 'b' the conclusion must be NPD. Let's not get sidetracked by FADEC. FADEC is only one of the many possible technical problems.

PS How secret was the conference in Scotland? Suppose it was just a jolly to say goodbye to a couple of people leaving the NI Security Forces.

[Junglie]

John

Well done, this is obviously the place to get the feeling of the current aircrew, without visiting the crewrooms of all the front line Squadrons. Feelings on this one? One word Disgusted. With all the factors involved with this tragic accident and all the links of the chain i.e. Questions about FADEC, the crews reluctance to fly the MK 2 across the board and the huge pressure whether exerted or not from above to get this massively high profile task done. I have not recently re-read the BOI findings but as i understand it the call of negligence did not come from Andy Pulford but higher up. Yeah thanks very much, so if i make a mistake(and i'm not saying the boys did) and take some VVIPS into a hillside and no one knows what really happened is this the trend now? Will i get hung out to dry? Will my family suffer the awful trauma on top of my death of being told i was grossly negligent?? Where is our back up? In fact if no one is going to protect the people they get to carry out these ill advised missions in both peace and war why do we do it? This is a tragic illustration of lack of some dynamic leadership. Why is the CO of their Squadron? The Station Commander and the boss of the Air Force not screaming for justice and stop this ridiculous witch hunt and have this thrown out.

Loyalty works BOTH ways or so i thought!!

[Jackonicko]

John,

Please forgive any previous mention of Łuck-ups.

Edited as per Liam's request. Had thought this was common knowledge. I've even seen it in print. But your reaction makes me withdraw it and apologise unreservedly.

That OK?

[This message has been edited by Jackonicko (edited 22 June 2000).]

[ShyTorque]

John,

For this to progress, questions need to be asked on the lines of the following:

Did the Chinook MK2 have a full release to service? IF NOT, WHY NOT and who sanctioned it entering squadron service? Is this allowed under RAF regulations and has it been allowed before? Why had test flying been suspended at Boscombe Down? What limitations were placed on the aircraft as a type and on the airframe in question? What deferred defects were in the tech. log? Was there an IFR option for the crew of the aircraft in question? Is it true that the navigation equipment on this aircraft had been prone to unresolved errors prior to the final flight? Is it true that the board of inquiry found evidence that there may have been an intercom problem which may have prevented proper communication between the pilot responsible for navigation and the pilot flying?

Who commanded this crew to fly this sortie on this aircraft? What was the purpose of the flight?
Bearing in mind the "high military value" of the passengers, why were they not flown airport to airport in a fully proven aircraft type (including fixed wing, planned IFR transit)?

If mistakes were made in the way this or any other aircraft type entered into service, who in the hierarchy of the RAF would be held responsible (or perhaps even NEGLIGENT)? If errors were made in the way this flight was ordered and authorised, who would have been responsible?

I am sure we know the answers to most, if not all of these questions.

Good luck with your article, John. Please make it a good one.

[This message has been edited by ShyTorque (edited 25 August 2000).]

[ShyTorque]

Jackonicko,

It's up to JN to reply if he wishes to take your bait but could that be left for a different forum so as not to divert attention from the main issue on this one?

p.s. John, can you remember anything about the Coningsby PU after the open day in 1993? Er, No, I thought not!

Whoops, Oh bu**er, now I'm doing it, too!

[This message has been edited by ShyTorque (edited 22 June 2000).]

[John Nichol]

Thanks for everything guys; it's now on the editor's desk so we shall see if it makes the final cut on Sunday. Regarding the comments about simplification; it's important to remember that we are trying to raise the awareness in the minds of the general population - not experienced aircrew.

Jack & Liam. I really am not offended by the comments; I've heard them many times before made by both friend and foe.

I am more than happy to give a detailed account of what went on on the 17th Jan 91 but I don't think this is the thread for my story. If anyone wants to open a fresh one with a question I will be more than happy to answer the points as honestly as I can. Perhaps we all might learn something. No problem either way.

I'm away all weekend now (at Waddington if anyone is going and fancies a beer) but will be back Sunday PM.

Thanks again.

JN

[This message has been edited by John Nichol (edited 23 June 2000).]

[twinboom]

J. Nichol. Pse. see my post on WWW's similar thread - although I fear it has come too late for your copy date?

(To answer a much earlier question.
Bill Wratten has been retired some time now so, it would seem to me, has no 'side' in this other than that which he declares in his S.Times piece.)

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[Bag Man]

John

There seems to be a disproportionate amount of time and effort going into the "let's blame A to protect B" theories.

The issue here is one of preventing this loss of life from happening again. The "links in the chain" need to be identified and published for the benefit of all. Pilots being found 'grossly negligent' (whatever the military definition) is of no use in preventing a repeat performance.

Let us know why this aircraft was in cloud, below SALT, and carrying every VIP in NATO?

[This message has been edited by Bag Man (edited 25 June 2000).]

[bearb8er]

For John's 25 Jun 00 Sunday Times article, see http://www.sunday-times.co.uk and look under 'Review' for the item 'The crash looks very different from the cockpit'.

[This message has been edited by bearb8er (edited 24 June 2000).]

[Brian Dixon]

Firstly I fel that I should point out that I am not a pilot and accept that I am somewhat of an intruder to this site. I used to work with Rick and Jon and have been fighting the ludicrous decision of the BOI reviewing officers since the findings were announced.

I have been campaigning to the best of my ability and am not the most popular bloke to be in regular contact with the Defence Minister. My MP is fully supportive and has helped me to get issues raised in the House.

Being a non pilot, I would like permission from those qualified to use this site, to air my views and ask for help on this site. Samples of my work can be found on the following site: www.pm.gov.uk - Your Say - Speakers Corner - Defence - Chinook Crash (Several folders).

I am well versed in this incident and work closely with many people including Rick's father, John.

There is a new group which has formed, called the Mull of Kintyre Group and I would ask that you contact your own MP's and ask them to register their support with the office of Lord Chalfont. Also ask them to raise your concerns with Minister Hoon. I'm sure he will be delighted to receive some more correspondence on this issue.

I will await replies to this posting before continuing.

Respectfully
Brian Dixon

[Rock & A Hardplace]

Brian

I am not going to pretend to know anything about this emotive subject. Therefore, will not comment, apart from congratulating John and you for striving to find out the truth.

However, a question on the link to "Speakers Corner", have you received any feed back from your comments on this forum from the government. As I have posted there in the past and received none whatsoever.

[Brian Dixon]

Thanks for your congratulations. I have never had any replies from the Government on the web site either, but they do have a disclaimer stating that they are read (yeh right).
That's why I result to good old fashioned pen and paper and e-mails direct to the MPs themselves. The good thing is, they don't like the e-mails. Shame!
Hoon has a letter from me at the moment asking 13 direct questions such as why has the Tench report not been published, Why have black boxes yet to be fitted to Chinooks, Is AVM Day one of the individuals responsible for authorising into service the Mk 2 as well as being one of the reviewing officers of the BOA as well as being one of those able to recommend the re-opening of the Inquiry? I'll keep you all up to date when (if) I get the replies.

Finally, a question to you all out there. How would you feel if you were made to fly an aircraft which was not issued with current flight reference cards? Think about it and perhaps ask some questions.

Regards to all.
Brian

[Tandemrotor]

Well said Junglie. Take it from me, thoughts exactly like yours exercised the minds of those that died on 2 Jun 94.

Let's look at the main allegation:

The a/c was too fast, too low in poor weather.

1) Too fast; the AAIB estimate from ground witness marks, the spread of wreckage, and some slightly unclear witness marks on flight instruments that the a/c impacted the Mull at an approx groundspeed of 150 kts. A computer model from Boeing, suggests a requirement for a pre-existing IAS of 150kts 2.9 secs prior to impact. A DRA computer model (not based on a chinook at all) appears to support the the Boeing version.The only other evidence regarding speed comes from a yachtsman, who sees the a/c 2 miles from the Mull, and suggests it was flying no faster than many RN Seakings he has seen in the area, he estimates that speed to be 60-90kts.

No other evidence whatsoever, real or imagined, exists to tell us what speed the a/c was flying at as it approached the Mull.

The suggestion that the a/c was attempting a cruise climb at this speed (5kts short of vne) is 'unrecognisable as a chinook technique'. -Not my words, but the words of the Stn Cdr RAF Odiham, Gp Cpt Crawford, in his remarks as the first reviewing officer to the Board of Inquiry.

2) Too low; the Auth sheets for the trip show a standard NI authorisation regarding altitude. apart (obviously) from the moment of impact, there is no evidence whatsoever that the a/c crew exceeded the auth at any time. Okay the a/c was flying below MSA when it crashed, but that only becomes relevant when the weather precludes flight in accordance with VFR! So the key becomes, how certain can we be of the weather being experienced by the crew as they approached the Mull?

3) It has become received wisdom that the crew pressed on in crap weather, right. Well actually, again, this version of events doesn't quite stack up. The crap weather was present in the form of localised hill fog on the hillside of the Mull, as reported by numerous witnesses that day, but that is of very little relevance to our crew in the a/c. probably of more relevance is the view of a witness in NI, looking towards the cloud shrouded landmass of the Mull as the accident a/c overflys her house. More relevant still, is the evidence of our yachtsman (who as you may recall sees the a/c 2 miles from the accident site). In sworn evidence to the FAI, he states that he can clearly see the coastline of the Mull upto the wall surrounding the Mull lighthouse (300' above sea level), but more than that, he believes the crew of the a/c could see it too!

Many pilots would agree that the widely quoted 'waypoint change' simply reinforces the idea that the crew had sighted their turning point, and had dispensed with the nav data associated with that position. What their plan then was, is of course speculation, but it doesn't seem beyond the bounds of possibility that they intended to continue at low level, over the sea, along the western coastline of the Mull. As for exactly what happened next, I can only say I do not know. But knowing the appalling state of the Mk2 chinook at that time, it seems to me to be quite plausible that any climb or entry into cloud may not have been a deliberate choice, or act on the part of the two pilots.

In any event, it is impossible to recreate the sequence of events leading up to the crash with any degree of certainty. It is absolutely crazy, without the benefit of survivors, eye witnesses, voice or data recorders, radar traces or radio calls, to suggest that there is absolutely no doubt WHATSOEVER that these deceased pilots were negligent.

But don't believe me, get a full copy of the report. I'm sure the MOD would be delighted to provide a copy to anyone and everyone, as they are completely confident that they have got it right, and I am just a wilfully ignorant mischief maker.

When you read it, bear in mind that Wg Cdr Pulford did an excellent job in pieceing together, what even the AAIB describe, as their most difficult investigation to date. But he and his team did not find the 2 pilots negligent, indeed, he said they should not be criticised for human failings. Presumably, he appreciated that the limited amount of evidence failed to satisfy the standard of proof required to find negligence, even though he had a duty so to find.

After that other reviewing officers also failed to attribute the crash to pilot negligence, though they too had the same duty so to find.

As we all know, the Fatal Accident Inquiry in Scotland also failed to find persuasive evidence to criticise the pilots.

Sadly the news for messrs Wratten and Day is that they are the ones looking more and more isolated. It is they who are out of step with the evidence, and not the growing number who disagree with them.

Sir Wratten should consider himself fortunate to be able to defend himself in public, and give his version of events. Those at the very heart of this case have never enjoyed that luxury.

[This message has been edited by Tandemrotor (edited 03 July 2000).]

[Tandemrotor]

keep this running

[bytio]

Its good to see that there is still a strong feeling about this case, and hope that it continues until the gov't are forced to recognise how unjust the result was.
I have flown with Rick, John, and the not too often mentioned crewmen Graham Forbes and Kevin Hardie.

Anyone who has flown in a multi crew environment must realise the difference that a strong and capable crew can make to the safety and success of a flight. The rear crew on this flight have been virtually considered irrelevant to the safety of that flight as they would be (as AVM Day thought) too busy looking after the passengers.
I know that if Kevin or Graham were unhappy about the weather and the continued safety of the flight there is no way that they would have sat back without saying anything. I feel sure Rick and John would have reacted accordingly.

My point here is that AVM Day treated this flight as if it was two crew and not four thus not having a grasp of the way this crew and others work together as a team. If you were in the back seat of a car about to turn onto the motorway against the flow of traffic I feel sure we would all encourage the driver to change his mind!

[Brian Dixon]

On 13 June Mr Tom Brake MP asked the question: "To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if his Department requires manufacturers to provide complete flight reference cards prior to releasing an aircraft into operational service; if the Chinook Mk2 had a complete set of flight reference cards at the time of the fatal crash of ZD576 in June 1994; and if these included drills covering the possibility of FADEC malfunctions."

Minister Spellar replied: "All manufacturers of new Ministry of Defence aircraft are continually required to provide full aircrew documentation prior to release to operational service. This documentation included both Aircrew Manual and Flight Reference Cards. The Chinook Mk2 had a complete set of Flight Reference Cards in June 1994. This contained all the normal and emergency operating drills in force at that time, including drills for a possible FADEC malfunction."

Having campaigned for the past 5+ years, I was under the impression that some of the flight manuals had pages which stated "To be issued" where flight emergency information should have been. Is there anyone out there who can clarify this matter for me. Has Minister Spellar made a mistake, or have I got it wrong. I thought that someone had testified at the BOI and the Fatal Accident Inquiry that not all emergency information had been issued. All seems a bit fishy to me. Still, the campaign goes on.......

[MTP]

Hoist-to-crew

Ref your comments about the inverted US Chinooks - I am aware of 2 accidents recently involving inverting CH47s. The first one was a standard D model which rolled 360 after the flying controls locked. It came wings level again at about 200 feet and the crew were able to land (and change their shorts!). The other was an E-model which rolled when IMC in a CB. They had lost their instruments (glass) and got disorientated after a lightning strike. While inverted they pulled max power for an abort with obvious consequences.

With regards FADEC in these cases - the US army D model doesn't have FADEC. The current E-models have newer and better engines with excellent FADEC software. I believe, but don't know for certain, that the older Es were also sans FADEC. In any case it is not possible for a FADEC error to invert the aircraft. The FADEC (despite the many serious bugs when it was introduced) has some authority over the engines individually and also the RRPM but cannot affect the flying controls or provide asymetric lift.


Thanks for your work on this one John. I haven't seen the article (is there a link available?) but I hope it appeared in full and will have the desired effect. I hope also that it was able to put the 'safety altitude' point to rest. Many people seem to think that they were trogging along at 150 kts IAS in IMC at low level. I believe 150 kts GS with a 20-30 kt tailwind in VMC (until the last second or two) is more accurate.

[BossEyed]

I see from the "Pilot" magazine website that in the August issue (published 21 July) there is an article entitled "Why those Chinook pilots were negligent" - Sir William Wratten defends his conclusions on this tragedy.

Don't know if this is a new piece, or a reprint of the Sunday Times article.

MTP - I believe all MH-47Es had/have FADEC equipped 714 engines.

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BossEyed 8-)