Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
WK
Why do you need someone else to agree or disagree - are you suggesting I have lied about the instrumentation layout of the Chinook HC Mk 2? I have stated facts and they don't need corroboration, so accept them and don't piss people off, especially someone trying to help you understand the system!
Is there no one else on this forum who is willing to agree or disagree with Chinook240's statement that the STANS was not "connected" to the horizontal situation indicators?
Now we have the gutter language.
Why do you need someone else to agree or disagree - are you suggesting I have lied about the instrumentation layout of the Chinook HC Mk 2? I have stated facts and they don't need corroboration, so accept them and don't piss people off, especially someone trying to help you understand the system!
Well said C240. It is about time someone did.
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Just by chance I picked up this on the net. It is from a book called "How to win arguments when you have no case" by someone apparently called Tony Bliar. The book had been roughly handled, only scraps remain legible, e.g.
"Stop answering questions. Better still, invent questions you would like to be asked and answer those
If pressed, try and change the thread to something else
If criticised take the moral high ground. Adopt an air of injured probity
Categorise you opponents as childish and unreasonable and all criticism as unwarrented abuse.."
Dick
"Stop answering questions. Better still, invent questions you would like to be asked and answer those
If pressed, try and change the thread to something else
If criticised take the moral high ground. Adopt an air of injured probity
Categorise you opponents as childish and unreasonable and all criticism as unwarrented abuse.."
Dick
bast0n:
A chip off the old bast0n block, eh?
LB, instead of admonishing the style and language of others' posts, since we have a hierarchy of well respected moderators for that role (OK, I need the points!), your expertise and experience as a Meteorologist might be put to better use in addressing the met aspects of this accident. The MOD's case (and also that of their apologists who post here) is that because observers on the Mull were shrouded in mist and fog to varying degrees (caused by the orographic cloud covering the hill side), ipso facto the aircraft was in cloud at its turning point off shore. Thus the pilots failed to maintain VMC at that point and thus instantly became Grossly Negligent. All this despite another witness out to sea seeing them go past and who could make out the Mull shoreline as well.
I summarise of course, but does the MOD case make sense to you, given that it is crucial to the Reviewing Officers' Finding? Your input in this would be of great interest and much appreciated.
Regards, Chug
Well done LB - keep it up.
LB, instead of admonishing the style and language of others' posts, since we have a hierarchy of well respected moderators for that role (OK, I need the points!), your expertise and experience as a Meteorologist might be put to better use in addressing the met aspects of this accident. The MOD's case (and also that of their apologists who post here) is that because observers on the Mull were shrouded in mist and fog to varying degrees (caused by the orographic cloud covering the hill side), ipso facto the aircraft was in cloud at its turning point off shore. Thus the pilots failed to maintain VMC at that point and thus instantly became Grossly Negligent. All this despite another witness out to sea seeing them go past and who could make out the Mull shoreline as well.
I summarise of course, but does the MOD case make sense to you, given that it is crucial to the Reviewing Officers' Finding? Your input in this would be of great interest and much appreciated.
Regards, Chug
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Just by chance I picked up this on the net. It is from a book called "How to win arguments when you have no case" by someone apparently called Tony Bliar. The book had been roughly handled, only scraps remain legible, e.g.
"Stop answering questions. Better still, invent questions you would like to be asked and answer those
If pressed, try and change the thread to something else
If criticised take the moral high ground. Adopt an air of injured probity
Categorise you opponents as childish and unreasonable and all criticism as unwarrented abuse.."
Dick
"Stop answering questions. Better still, invent questions you would like to be asked and answer those
If pressed, try and change the thread to something else
If criticised take the moral high ground. Adopt an air of injured probity
Categorise you opponents as childish and unreasonable and all criticism as unwarrented abuse.."
Dick
This is why I should have studied harder at school as it would have given me the smarts to come up with this sort of crackingly smart put down in stead of pondering an analogy with regards to the TV off button.
Trouble is anything this cutting usually has some disgruntled and thoroughly belittled chap chipping away at your grammar or spelling............................ooops too late
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Agreed Jindy.
Perhaps it's time to revisit Brian Dixon's second post on this thread,and I hope he does not mind me repeating it.
The following is a letter published in the Sunday Herald on 10 Feb 02.
Perhaps it's time to revisit Brian Dixon's second post on this thread,and I hope he does not mind me repeating it.
The following is a letter published in the Sunday Herald on 10 Feb 02.
Why the MoD must pardon the Chinook pilots. .By Malcolm Rifkind, Secretary Of State For Defence 1992-1995
. .The defence secretary and the Prime Minister are in danger of making themselves look very foolish. . .Last week a high-powered House of Lords select committee published its report into the 1994 Chinook air disaster that caused the deaths of the cream of British military intelligence. . .The select committee was chaired by the formidable Lord Jauncey, a former Lord of Appeal and a judge whom I know from my own experience to be a person of the highest ability and integrity. He was assisted by four colleagues, two of whom are distinguished QCs. They had no axe to grind and they approached their task with great professionalism.
They concluded, unanim-ously, that it would be wrong for the Ministry of Defence to maintain the finding of gross negligence against the deceased pilots of the Chinook made eight years ago by two senior RAF air-marshals. . .The immediate reaction of the government was made by armed forces minister Adam Ingram within hours of the publication of the report. He could hardly have had time to read it, but he appeared to dismiss it as containing nothing new. The implication was that the government would not budge.
That in itself would not run counter to any of the previous behaviour of the Ministry of Defence. There has already been a fatal accident inquiry, under a Scottish sheriff, which concluded that the finding of gross negligence was unsafe and should not be maintained. The government ignored that.
The Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons, its most important select committee, has accused the Ministry of Defence of arrogance and called for the verdict to be put aside. They have been ignored for their pains. There have been various studies of the accident by aeronautics and com puter experts, all of whom have concluded that technical problems may have caused the accident. Their views have been dismissed.
To make matters worse, the RAF has changed its procedures so that never again will air-marshals be asked to allocate blame for air accidents. They will try to identify the technical causes of air accidents but leave questions of blame to the civilian courts. The Chinook case, therefore, re mains a hangover from a discredited procedure, but the Ministry of Defence clings to the air-marshals' decision with all the tenacity of a rottweiler.
I confess I have a personal interest in this case. I was the secretary of state for defence at the time the air- marshals reached their decision. I endorsed it and reported its conclusion to parliament. . .I recall being sad that the pilots were being blamed, but at that time I had no reason to question the conclusion of the RAF that gross negligence was the cause of the accident. These are highly complex and technical matters. A defence secretary has no more specialist knowledge of why an aircraft might have crashed than a health secretary would have on why a heart transplant had gone wrong. One must, to a considerable extent, trust the judgement of one's senior advisers.
Why, then, have I changed my mind and called for the verdict to be set aside? . .The main reason is the substantial volume of evidence that has since emerged concerning the technical faults that the Chinook was experiencing at the time -- the problems with the computer software and other difficulties that had, on occasion, led to the Chinook helicopters being grounded.
The Ministry of Defence has admitted these defects, but has always argued that as these technical problems could not -- in their view -- have contributed to the Mull of Kintyre accident, they did not invalidate the verdict. For the same reason, it had not been felt necessary to draw them to the attention of the relevant ministers. That view has been consistently challenged by aeronautics experts over the past eight years.
The RAF's own rules made it clear that a verdict of gross negligence could be reached only if there were absolutely no doubt. Much doubt has emerged, as Lord Jauncey and his eminent colleagues have concluded. . .The current position of the Ministry of Defence is untenable on two counts. First, they rest on the air-marshals' conclusion that, as no other cause of the accident has been identified, it can only be explained by the gross negligence of the pilots. Such reverse reasoning would be dismissed in any civilian court, where one would be required to provide hard evidence that points to negligence. You cannot merely assume negligence in the absence of any other explanation.
The second failure of ministers is more fundamental. Again and again they say they will reconsider the verdict only if new evidence appears which was not considered by the air- marshals. They know perfectly well that after eight years it is highly unlikely that any new evidence will ever appear. We will probably never have any hard evidence as to what caused the accident on that fateful day. . .But that is irrelevant. The point at issue is not whether there is new evidence, but whether the known facts justified the air-marshals in finding that the pilots had been grossly negligent.
When a Scottish sheriff, the Public Accounts Committee, numerous aeronautics experts and now a House of Lords select committee chaired by a senior judge all advise that a verdict of gross negligence is unsustainable on the known facts, it is the height of stubbornness and obduracy for ministers to refuse to consider using their discretion. . .In one sense the families of the pilots have already won their campaign. The reputation of the two pilots has already been restored, given the huge weight of professional expertise that has rejected the verdict. If the two air-marshals and the government refuse to retract that rejected verdict, that reflects on them and on their judgement.
I have the greatest respect for the RAF and for the Ministry of Defence. Those who work there, including the two air-marshals (who are now retired), are people of great integrity and professionalism. I do not believe there is any cover-up, or any sinister explanation for their refusal to set aside the negligence verdict. . .But there is a culture of resentment at others seeking to second-guess RAF expertise. To acknowledge a mistake would hurt, and might reopen many policy questions. I am sure there are many who wish this whole issue would just go away.
Yet it will not. There are basic issues of natural justice at stake. It is, in any event, no longer for the RAF or for the officials in the Ministry of Defence to decide. This sort of issue is exactly why we have ministers; why ministers are accountable to parliament and to the public for the actions of those under them.
Mr Hoon and the Prime Minister cannot hide any longer behind the air-marshals and the Ministry of Defence. When issues of natural justice are at stake ministers must exercise their own judgment. If Mr Hoon is too blinkered or too overwhelmed by his officials to act, the Prime Minister must do so for him.
There are none so blind as those who will not see.
[ 11 February 2002)
. .The defence secretary and the Prime Minister are in danger of making themselves look very foolish. . .Last week a high-powered House of Lords select committee published its report into the 1994 Chinook air disaster that caused the deaths of the cream of British military intelligence. . .The select committee was chaired by the formidable Lord Jauncey, a former Lord of Appeal and a judge whom I know from my own experience to be a person of the highest ability and integrity. He was assisted by four colleagues, two of whom are distinguished QCs. They had no axe to grind and they approached their task with great professionalism.
They concluded, unanim-ously, that it would be wrong for the Ministry of Defence to maintain the finding of gross negligence against the deceased pilots of the Chinook made eight years ago by two senior RAF air-marshals. . .The immediate reaction of the government was made by armed forces minister Adam Ingram within hours of the publication of the report. He could hardly have had time to read it, but he appeared to dismiss it as containing nothing new. The implication was that the government would not budge.
That in itself would not run counter to any of the previous behaviour of the Ministry of Defence. There has already been a fatal accident inquiry, under a Scottish sheriff, which concluded that the finding of gross negligence was unsafe and should not be maintained. The government ignored that.
The Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons, its most important select committee, has accused the Ministry of Defence of arrogance and called for the verdict to be put aside. They have been ignored for their pains. There have been various studies of the accident by aeronautics and com puter experts, all of whom have concluded that technical problems may have caused the accident. Their views have been dismissed.
To make matters worse, the RAF has changed its procedures so that never again will air-marshals be asked to allocate blame for air accidents. They will try to identify the technical causes of air accidents but leave questions of blame to the civilian courts. The Chinook case, therefore, re mains a hangover from a discredited procedure, but the Ministry of Defence clings to the air-marshals' decision with all the tenacity of a rottweiler.
I confess I have a personal interest in this case. I was the secretary of state for defence at the time the air- marshals reached their decision. I endorsed it and reported its conclusion to parliament. . .I recall being sad that the pilots were being blamed, but at that time I had no reason to question the conclusion of the RAF that gross negligence was the cause of the accident. These are highly complex and technical matters. A defence secretary has no more specialist knowledge of why an aircraft might have crashed than a health secretary would have on why a heart transplant had gone wrong. One must, to a considerable extent, trust the judgement of one's senior advisers.
Why, then, have I changed my mind and called for the verdict to be set aside? . .The main reason is the substantial volume of evidence that has since emerged concerning the technical faults that the Chinook was experiencing at the time -- the problems with the computer software and other difficulties that had, on occasion, led to the Chinook helicopters being grounded.
The Ministry of Defence has admitted these defects, but has always argued that as these technical problems could not -- in their view -- have contributed to the Mull of Kintyre accident, they did not invalidate the verdict. For the same reason, it had not been felt necessary to draw them to the attention of the relevant ministers. That view has been consistently challenged by aeronautics experts over the past eight years.
The RAF's own rules made it clear that a verdict of gross negligence could be reached only if there were absolutely no doubt. Much doubt has emerged, as Lord Jauncey and his eminent colleagues have concluded. . .The current position of the Ministry of Defence is untenable on two counts. First, they rest on the air-marshals' conclusion that, as no other cause of the accident has been identified, it can only be explained by the gross negligence of the pilots. Such reverse reasoning would be dismissed in any civilian court, where one would be required to provide hard evidence that points to negligence. You cannot merely assume negligence in the absence of any other explanation.
The second failure of ministers is more fundamental. Again and again they say they will reconsider the verdict only if new evidence appears which was not considered by the air- marshals. They know perfectly well that after eight years it is highly unlikely that any new evidence will ever appear. We will probably never have any hard evidence as to what caused the accident on that fateful day. . .But that is irrelevant. The point at issue is not whether there is new evidence, but whether the known facts justified the air-marshals in finding that the pilots had been grossly negligent.
When a Scottish sheriff, the Public Accounts Committee, numerous aeronautics experts and now a House of Lords select committee chaired by a senior judge all advise that a verdict of gross negligence is unsustainable on the known facts, it is the height of stubbornness and obduracy for ministers to refuse to consider using their discretion. . .In one sense the families of the pilots have already won their campaign. The reputation of the two pilots has already been restored, given the huge weight of professional expertise that has rejected the verdict. If the two air-marshals and the government refuse to retract that rejected verdict, that reflects on them and on their judgement.
I have the greatest respect for the RAF and for the Ministry of Defence. Those who work there, including the two air-marshals (who are now retired), are people of great integrity and professionalism. I do not believe there is any cover-up, or any sinister explanation for their refusal to set aside the negligence verdict. . .But there is a culture of resentment at others seeking to second-guess RAF expertise. To acknowledge a mistake would hurt, and might reopen many policy questions. I am sure there are many who wish this whole issue would just go away.
Yet it will not. There are basic issues of natural justice at stake. It is, in any event, no longer for the RAF or for the officials in the Ministry of Defence to decide. This sort of issue is exactly why we have ministers; why ministers are accountable to parliament and to the public for the actions of those under them.
Mr Hoon and the Prime Minister cannot hide any longer behind the air-marshals and the Ministry of Defence. When issues of natural justice are at stake ministers must exercise their own judgment. If Mr Hoon is too blinkered or too overwhelmed by his officials to act, the Prime Minister must do so for him.
There are none so blind as those who will not see.
[ 11 February 2002)
Last edited by Romeo Oscar Golf; 15th Jan 2011 at 19:20. Reason: addition
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Chinook240
I thought I had initially posted appreciation of your kicking off discussion on this topic – I had hoped others would join in to establish the nav/avionics setup that is really a basis for understanding how they got their way around.
Why I pushed for other opinions was to try and get other inputs (developing the picture, as it were) and also a second opinion on what was a surprising difference from other similar systems. As I believe I have said in previous posts, that this option was not available in HC2 Chinooks was an interesting issue in its own right – the 47D had it.
While the Americans publicise procedures rather well (obviously not OPSEC ones) for their own airmen to brush up on, there is very little in the public domain for equivalent UK procedures and systems – hence the need for anyone researching incidents such as this one to ask basic questions on forums such as this.
The hostility towards nav questions on this forum contrasts with the endless banter on airworthiness, weather, and legal points that has so smothered debate – I believe there is enough evidence for a planned, controlled approach to a specific point on the Mull that would clear the pilots’ names (because it has not been acknowledged in prior inquiries that they had had an additional task) and that it would be a shame if the analysis/arguments supporting this were to be derailed because of some minor difference in understanding/use of instruments – let’s clear all this up?
And so I press on:
While I appreciate that such crews on operational flights would have been doing it by the eyeball and map, they had been essentially doing route flying over sea with practically featureless land ahead – the “steer meter” on the Attitude Director Indicator (or whatever you call yours) was driven by compound data that the HP blindly followed while the NHP would have been checking the CDU which had been in GPS mode – one would have thought that simply using the HSI would have been an option requiring less workload on the simple route flying part if this had been an option. (Comment/correction gladly received!)
I thought I had initially posted appreciation of your kicking off discussion on this topic – I had hoped others would join in to establish the nav/avionics setup that is really a basis for understanding how they got their way around.
Why I pushed for other opinions was to try and get other inputs (developing the picture, as it were) and also a second opinion on what was a surprising difference from other similar systems. As I believe I have said in previous posts, that this option was not available in HC2 Chinooks was an interesting issue in its own right – the 47D had it.
While the Americans publicise procedures rather well (obviously not OPSEC ones) for their own airmen to brush up on, there is very little in the public domain for equivalent UK procedures and systems – hence the need for anyone researching incidents such as this one to ask basic questions on forums such as this.
The hostility towards nav questions on this forum contrasts with the endless banter on airworthiness, weather, and legal points that has so smothered debate – I believe there is enough evidence for a planned, controlled approach to a specific point on the Mull that would clear the pilots’ names (because it has not been acknowledged in prior inquiries that they had had an additional task) and that it would be a shame if the analysis/arguments supporting this were to be derailed because of some minor difference in understanding/use of instruments – let’s clear all this up?
And so I press on:
While I appreciate that such crews on operational flights would have been doing it by the eyeball and map, they had been essentially doing route flying over sea with practically featureless land ahead – the “steer meter” on the Attitude Director Indicator (or whatever you call yours) was driven by compound data that the HP blindly followed while the NHP would have been checking the CDU which had been in GPS mode – one would have thought that simply using the HSI would have been an option requiring less workload on the simple route flying part if this had been an option. (Comment/correction gladly received!)
WK,
Thank you. I have happily answered numerous PMs from you and others on the operation of the RAF Chinook. Your request for 'second opinions' did not appear to reflect appreciation of that. I have not detected any hostility to nav questions, perhaps as many of the contributors have a low-level VFR navigational background and understand the nature of those operations.
The bespoke nature of the avionics in UK aircraft will not be a surprise to many, the Chinook Mk 3 being a case in point!
Thank you. I have happily answered numerous PMs from you and others on the operation of the RAF Chinook. Your request for 'second opinions' did not appear to reflect appreciation of that. I have not detected any hostility to nav questions, perhaps as many of the contributors have a low-level VFR navigational background and understand the nature of those operations.
The bespoke nature of the avionics in UK aircraft will not be a surprise to many, the Chinook Mk 3 being a case in point!
Last edited by chinook240; 16th Jan 2011 at 08:34.
Sir MR:
With great respect Sir Malcolm there is evidence, and before a judge at this very moment. Whether it be "new" and what the MOD means by "new" is irrelevant. It is evidence and seems indeed to indicate Gross Negligence, but that of course is for his Lordship to decide upon. A very serious and sombre situation but one which I feel should at least result in the infamous and unjust finding, albeit by
to be cast aside, given that what evidence there is may indeed point to Gross Negligence, just not by those so nominated by the two Air Marshals.
Let Right Be Done!
The second failure of ministers is more fundamental. Again and again they say they will reconsider the verdict only if new evidence appears which was not considered by the air- marshals. They know perfectly well that after eight years it is highly unlikely that any new evidence will ever appear. We will probably never have any hard evidence as to what caused the accident on that fateful day. . .But that is irrelevant.
people of great integrity and professionalism
Let Right Be Done!
As with LB, bast0n, let us leave approval or castigation to the mods and stick to the job in hand. For instance I have already asked you once to explain your stance on this accident. It appears to me that you accept the MOD version, as briefly described by me to LB, but demure at the official finding of Gross Negligence, preferring instead a more conciliatory one of Pilot error.
Is that correct, if so how do you arrive at that? For myself, if what happened was indeed as per W & D's version, I would have little difficulty with a finding of Negligence, though "Gross" would be laying it on a bit. As I do not accept their version of events at all it follows that I do not agree in any way with their finding but you do it seems, though not with its severity. Care to explain?
Is that correct, if so how do you arrive at that? For myself, if what happened was indeed as per W & D's version, I would have little difficulty with a finding of Negligence, though "Gross" would be laying it on a bit. As I do not accept their version of events at all it follows that I do not agree in any way with their finding but you do it seems, though not with its severity. Care to explain?
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Chugs et al:
How many times does it need to be said?
Baston is a troll.
He just floats by throwing out his "arguments" but, when challenged, admits that "Gross Negligence" is unwarranted. The whole point of the thread is that "Gross Negligence" is unwarranted. Why on earth would you respond?
How many times does it need to be said?
Baston is a troll.
He just floats by throwing out his "arguments" but, when challenged, admits that "Gross Negligence" is unwarranted. The whole point of the thread is that "Gross Negligence" is unwarranted. Why on earth would you respond?
AA,
With respect labelling a fellow aviator as a troll, and one who flew helicopters operationally before many on here were even ideas, good or bad, doesn't seem to be any more helpful than LB's amusement or indeed bast0n's valedictory comments re others' posts. Hopefully he will allow me that liberty as he and I are of much the same vintage I think. We are all, well nearly all, professionals, be it past or present. That is why I invite bast0n to explain why he accepts W&D's version but not their finding. If he cannot do so in a professional manner then he will be found unconvincing by his fellow professionals, and I am sure he knows that. This isn't some pubescent chat site about music or motors but a forum for professional aviators posting on a thread aimed at reversing an injustice that cries out for a proper resolution. Far from dissolving into a pointless morass, it is my belief that this thread will soon witness that resolution. If that is indeed the case it will be thanks in no small measure to the perseverance of the professionals who know that these pilots were scapegoats to a dishonourable and disreputable scandal.
With respect labelling a fellow aviator as a troll, and one who flew helicopters operationally before many on here were even ideas, good or bad, doesn't seem to be any more helpful than LB's amusement or indeed bast0n's valedictory comments re others' posts. Hopefully he will allow me that liberty as he and I are of much the same vintage I think. We are all, well nearly all, professionals, be it past or present. That is why I invite bast0n to explain why he accepts W&D's version but not their finding. If he cannot do so in a professional manner then he will be found unconvincing by his fellow professionals, and I am sure he knows that. This isn't some pubescent chat site about music or motors but a forum for professional aviators posting on a thread aimed at reversing an injustice that cries out for a proper resolution. Far from dissolving into a pointless morass, it is my belief that this thread will soon witness that resolution. If that is indeed the case it will be thanks in no small measure to the perseverance of the professionals who know that these pilots were scapegoats to a dishonourable and disreputable scandal.
bast0n:
Quote:
Well done LB - keep it up.
A chip off the old bast0n block, eh?
LB, instead of admonishing the style and language of others' posts, since we have a hierarchy of well respected moderators for that role (OK, I need the points!), your expertise and experience as a Meteorologist might be put to better use in addressing the met aspects of this accident. The MOD's case (and also that of their apologists who post here) is that because observers on the Mull were shrouded in mist and fog to varying degrees (caused by the orographic cloud covering the hill side), ipso facto the aircraft was in cloud at its turning point off shore. Thus the pilots failed to maintain VMC at that point and thus instantly became Grossly Negligent. All this despite another witness out to sea seeing them go past and who could make out the Mull shoreline as well.
I summarise of course, but does the MOD case make sense to you, given that it is crucial to the Reviewing Officers' Finding? Your input in this would be of great interest and much appreciated.
Regards, Chug
Regarding the Met. there seems to be little to add, in fact nothing, even allowing for the fact that I used to lecture RAF pupils on The Hazards of Weather as part of ab initio, refresher and Nav. courses.
May I point out that BastOn and langleybaston have no connection, living or dead, fictional or otherwise.
Quote:
Well done LB - keep it up.
A chip off the old bast0n block, eh?
LB, instead of admonishing the style and language of others' posts, since we have a hierarchy of well respected moderators for that role (OK, I need the points!), your expertise and experience as a Meteorologist might be put to better use in addressing the met aspects of this accident. The MOD's case (and also that of their apologists who post here) is that because observers on the Mull were shrouded in mist and fog to varying degrees (caused by the orographic cloud covering the hill side), ipso facto the aircraft was in cloud at its turning point off shore. Thus the pilots failed to maintain VMC at that point and thus instantly became Grossly Negligent. All this despite another witness out to sea seeing them go past and who could make out the Mull shoreline as well.
I summarise of course, but does the MOD case make sense to you, given that it is crucial to the Reviewing Officers' Finding? Your input in this would be of great interest and much appreciated.
Regards, Chug
Regarding the Met. there seems to be little to add, in fact nothing, even allowing for the fact that I used to lecture RAF pupils on The Hazards of Weather as part of ab initio, refresher and Nav. courses.
May I point out that BastOn and langleybaston have no connection, living or dead, fictional or otherwise.
Little to add to what LB? If you have previously posted your professional thoughts on the matter then I must have missed them. If so I apologise and wonder if you would be so good as to repeat them. If not then all I am asking for is your reaction to the RO's case that because the Mull was shrouded in what is evidently very typical cloud hugging the hillside when there is a stiff onshore breeze, that said cloud would have definitely extended offshore and thus engulf the turning point with no doubt whatsoever. For that is the MOD case and seems totally unsubstantiated to me.
You tell us that you are amused at the level of discourse on this thread, so I invite you to raise the tone and give us your professional opinion, if you would please be so kind. Thank you.
You tell us that you are amused at the level of discourse on this thread, so I invite you to raise the tone and give us your professional opinion, if you would please be so kind. Thank you.
I do not know if the BoI called an expert witness regarding weather. I would, of course be interested in what he/she said, if anything, but can hardly be expected to agree/ disagree with said witness without access to all the facts.
My stance is founded on a more basic premise, which is that gross negligence needed to have been proven beyond all reasonable doubt, and clearly was not.
My stance is founded on a more basic premise, which is that gross negligence needed to have been proven beyond all reasonable doubt, and clearly was not.