Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Old Duffer
An interesting post which doesn’t actually contradict anything I’ve said.
The evidence presented to, and accepted by, Haddon-Cave demonstrated how the adverse effects of RAF policy (not MoD) to curtail spending on maintaining airworthiness was progressive. The problem I have is that he ignored the known start date and inexplicably set his own – 1998. That start date is not something I made up – it is contained in the evidence presented to an inquiry which reported direct to PUS. This evidence was first collated in 1994 and later published in 1996. The report made the point that one Fast Jet project had largely escaped the failings, emphasising what many here say – that it is people who are most important in this. There is another, more detailed reason why RW suffered more, and more quickly, than RAF FJ; but I won’t bother you with detail.
Your 2 Star sounds a sensible man. Most I know are. He cannot be the same as mine at that time – a man who told anyone who would listen that he was fed up with engineers spending money on airworthiness. You will appreciate the structure of MoD means that it only took that one man’s attitude to adversely affect his entire equipment range. Even if the aircraft that used his equipment managed airworthiness well (as you say, many did) the affects of the equipment not being maintained would, over time, creep up on them. I know from experience that aircraft offices do not necessarily get into the detail of ensuring all the equipment is up to scratch, especially when it is common to other types. Platform offices depend on equipment offices to do their job, and assume they will. Likewise, equipment offices (at the time) depended on component offices. MoD runs on such dependencies. For example, the Chinook office clearly didn’t understand the background to the multiple equipment faults and defects noted by the BoI and I would not have expected them to. They relied on my 2 Star. He let them down.
If I asked if you were content that something simple like the RIMs for your Fast Jet’s avionic equipment were valid and up to date I’m sure you wouldn’t know. Your cunning Plan of 1990 would tell you that was a dependency and you relied on (my boss) who, unknown to you, was actively chopping our funding. In 1990-94, I’d say with 100% certainty that they were gradually going out of date. That meant your Safety Case was being progressively invalidated and your RTS audit trail was evaporating. That doesn’t mean you had immediate problems, but I can assure you they crept up on your successors. This happened to some more quickly than others. That it hit Chinook in 1993 is not merely my opinion – it is clearly stated in the evidence of the BoI Report and Boscombe correspondence of the day. But they (the BoI) didn’t explore the problems; perhaps because they didn’t understand the information in front of them.
Sometimes the “hit” wasn’t serious and was taken as a gentle warning. When it hit Lynx the “only” problem was aircrew with short term breathing difficulties (something your opposite number on Lynx took very seriously, but my boss dismissed with “Let them ground the fleet if they want, I’m not paying to fix a (critical) safety problem this year”. I ignored him and made safe – the people aspect I mentioned. On other occasions, the “hit” manifested itself as a catastrophic loss, such as Hercules and Nimrod. But, sooner or later, it hit everyone; to a greater or lesser degree. That is beyond any doubt. And that is what the Haddon-Cave report is all about and why a pan-MoD Military Aviation Authority was established, not a Nimrod MAA.
An interesting post which doesn’t actually contradict anything I’ve said.
The evidence presented to, and accepted by, Haddon-Cave demonstrated how the adverse effects of RAF policy (not MoD) to curtail spending on maintaining airworthiness was progressive. The problem I have is that he ignored the known start date and inexplicably set his own – 1998. That start date is not something I made up – it is contained in the evidence presented to an inquiry which reported direct to PUS. This evidence was first collated in 1994 and later published in 1996. The report made the point that one Fast Jet project had largely escaped the failings, emphasising what many here say – that it is people who are most important in this. There is another, more detailed reason why RW suffered more, and more quickly, than RAF FJ; but I won’t bother you with detail.
Your 2 Star sounds a sensible man. Most I know are. He cannot be the same as mine at that time – a man who told anyone who would listen that he was fed up with engineers spending money on airworthiness. You will appreciate the structure of MoD means that it only took that one man’s attitude to adversely affect his entire equipment range. Even if the aircraft that used his equipment managed airworthiness well (as you say, many did) the affects of the equipment not being maintained would, over time, creep up on them. I know from experience that aircraft offices do not necessarily get into the detail of ensuring all the equipment is up to scratch, especially when it is common to other types. Platform offices depend on equipment offices to do their job, and assume they will. Likewise, equipment offices (at the time) depended on component offices. MoD runs on such dependencies. For example, the Chinook office clearly didn’t understand the background to the multiple equipment faults and defects noted by the BoI and I would not have expected them to. They relied on my 2 Star. He let them down.
If I asked if you were content that something simple like the RIMs for your Fast Jet’s avionic equipment were valid and up to date I’m sure you wouldn’t know. Your cunning Plan of 1990 would tell you that was a dependency and you relied on (my boss) who, unknown to you, was actively chopping our funding. In 1990-94, I’d say with 100% certainty that they were gradually going out of date. That meant your Safety Case was being progressively invalidated and your RTS audit trail was evaporating. That doesn’t mean you had immediate problems, but I can assure you they crept up on your successors. This happened to some more quickly than others. That it hit Chinook in 1993 is not merely my opinion – it is clearly stated in the evidence of the BoI Report and Boscombe correspondence of the day. But they (the BoI) didn’t explore the problems; perhaps because they didn’t understand the information in front of them.
Sometimes the “hit” wasn’t serious and was taken as a gentle warning. When it hit Lynx the “only” problem was aircrew with short term breathing difficulties (something your opposite number on Lynx took very seriously, but my boss dismissed with “Let them ground the fleet if they want, I’m not paying to fix a (critical) safety problem this year”. I ignored him and made safe – the people aspect I mentioned. On other occasions, the “hit” manifested itself as a catastrophic loss, such as Hercules and Nimrod. But, sooner or later, it hit everyone; to a greater or lesser degree. That is beyond any doubt. And that is what the Haddon-Cave report is all about and why a pan-MoD Military Aviation Authority was established, not a Nimrod MAA.
Hi Thud. Seasons greetings!
Sounds familiar!.....
For me (and Chinook HC2, 1994) it could read:
I was involved at Sqn level, thought at the time it was just the RAF's way of doing things and got on with it. However, 6/6 hindsight does make me wonder if the procedure (aircraft arrived with no ODM, ACM or even FRCs, just some handling observations stapled to the HC1 FRC's) was another instance of the new regime.
We both just 'got on with it'. Luckily for us we got away with it.
I was involved at Sqn level, thought at the time it was just the AAC's way of doing things and got on with it. However, 6/6 hindsight does make me wonder if the procedure (aircraft arrived with no ODM, ACM or even FRCs, just some handling observations) was the first instance of the new regime.
For me (and Chinook HC2, 1994) it could read:
I was involved at Sqn level, thought at the time it was just the RAF's way of doing things and got on with it. However, 6/6 hindsight does make me wonder if the procedure (aircraft arrived with no ODM, ACM or even FRCs, just some handling observations stapled to the HC1 FRC's) was another instance of the new regime.
We both just 'got on with it'. Luckily for us we got away with it.
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Chinook
Old Duffer. Thanks for the breath of fresh air. I have no idea who you are, but I note your " I don’t recognise the comments regarding a campaign amongst the high priced help to play down airworthiness issues from about 1987 or so, as stated by tu." I was around just earlier than that, and I do not recognise those comments either. Regards JP
I guess we all rather see what we want to see in these pages, JP, but I find a lot of what tuc has posted confirmed in Old Duffer's post. He admits to not being an AS Eng, and notes the "bigotry" that his appointment caused when made IPT boss but also tells us he had the good fortune to have an Eng 2* who assisted him in assuming airworthiness responsibility. His story both confirms what tuc has told us, that Engs were gradually removed from such key positions, being replaced by non airworthiness qualified officers (often suppliers), and shows how these changes varied from IPT to IPT (in this case greatly mollified by the attitude and expertise of his Eng 2*). Nonetheless I would say that his account displays the trend of what was happening, where a non-Eng boss had Responsibility for airworthiness but a subordinate Eng the Authority. I wonder what would have happened if that IPT had faced the savage cuts that other (non FJ ones?) suffered. Would responsibility have deferred to authority or pushed through the required savings at the cost of airworthiness as happened elsewhere?
JP
The facts are clear. By challenging what I am merely reiterating, you are denying parts of the ZD576 BoI report, the existence of Boscombe correspondence that has been extensively quoted by the FAI, HofC and HofL, and the content of official reports available under FoI and by download.
I am sure Lord Philip will be most interested in your submission denying these events and take a balanced view of the evidence before him. I'm equally sure he will seek clarification on what parts of the official record (above) you agree with and ask himself why you are being so selective.
But, as ever, you are entitled to your opinion, which I would never seek to deny you.
The root problems centre on AMSO / RAF Chief Engineer (two appointments which were sometimes combined). As you have stated many times you have no knowledge of or interest in airworthiness, one assumes you have no links to these posts. So, I am at a loss to understand your sudden interest, but would invite you to consider this;
Haddon-Cave claimed airworthiness was fine and dandy prior to 1998, linking its demise to the disestablishment of the RAF Chief Engineer post. (ACM Alcock, who can be named here as he has written to the press supporting the gross negligence verdict). If Haddon-Cave was correct, and the CE carried the authority to resolve airworthiness problems (and responsibility to prevent them in the first place), what precisely did he do when confronted with the long list of failures revealed in the ZD576 BoI report or the notification of severe problems in the first place (a notification he would have inherited in 1991)?
Not an awful lot, if anything. Something confirmed by Sir Robert Walmsley (CDP) when giving evidence to the Public Accounts Committee in 1998 (when he confirmed long standing airworthiness problems on Chinook, that were only just being addressed 2 years after Alcock left post, 4 years after the crash and 9 years after being notified to AMSO). Perhaps therein lies the reason for his belated interest. Are you saying Sir Robert is also wrong? Senior staffs routinely try to outwit and deceive these committees. Why would he readily concede such a point? (Because his briefing revealed far worse!).
Sorry, when someone has a vested interest, they're not exactly neutral.
The facts are clear. By challenging what I am merely reiterating, you are denying parts of the ZD576 BoI report, the existence of Boscombe correspondence that has been extensively quoted by the FAI, HofC and HofL, and the content of official reports available under FoI and by download.
I am sure Lord Philip will be most interested in your submission denying these events and take a balanced view of the evidence before him. I'm equally sure he will seek clarification on what parts of the official record (above) you agree with and ask himself why you are being so selective.
But, as ever, you are entitled to your opinion, which I would never seek to deny you.
The root problems centre on AMSO / RAF Chief Engineer (two appointments which were sometimes combined). As you have stated many times you have no knowledge of or interest in airworthiness, one assumes you have no links to these posts. So, I am at a loss to understand your sudden interest, but would invite you to consider this;
Haddon-Cave claimed airworthiness was fine and dandy prior to 1998, linking its demise to the disestablishment of the RAF Chief Engineer post. (ACM Alcock, who can be named here as he has written to the press supporting the gross negligence verdict). If Haddon-Cave was correct, and the CE carried the authority to resolve airworthiness problems (and responsibility to prevent them in the first place), what precisely did he do when confronted with the long list of failures revealed in the ZD576 BoI report or the notification of severe problems in the first place (a notification he would have inherited in 1991)?
Not an awful lot, if anything. Something confirmed by Sir Robert Walmsley (CDP) when giving evidence to the Public Accounts Committee in 1998 (when he confirmed long standing airworthiness problems on Chinook, that were only just being addressed 2 years after Alcock left post, 4 years after the crash and 9 years after being notified to AMSO). Perhaps therein lies the reason for his belated interest. Are you saying Sir Robert is also wrong? Senior staffs routinely try to outwit and deceive these committees. Why would he readily concede such a point? (Because his briefing revealed far worse!).
Sorry, when someone has a vested interest, they're not exactly neutral.
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John Purdey,
In my absence nothing has changed. You clutch like a drowning man at the straw offered by Old Duffer, but studiously ignore the response by Tucumseh.
Are you suggesting that the fine work done by OD and his team somehow excuses the slipshod work done on Nimrod, Hercules, Chinook etc.
Is your attitude to Flight Safety. "Well, one out of ten can't be bad?"
And Caz,
See you make yet again another inaccurate statement, and then have no answers to the simple questions of John Blakeley
Happy New Year
In my absence nothing has changed. You clutch like a drowning man at the straw offered by Old Duffer, but studiously ignore the response by Tucumseh.
Are you suggesting that the fine work done by OD and his team somehow excuses the slipshod work done on Nimrod, Hercules, Chinook etc.
Is your attitude to Flight Safety. "Well, one out of ten can't be bad?"
And Caz,
See you make yet again another inaccurate statement, and then have no answers to the simple questions of John Blakeley
Happy New Year
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Chinook
Tuc. You quote me as "having no knowledge of or interest in airworthiness". A very strange allegation against a GD/P with over 4000 hours! Happy New Year! JP
Last edited by John Purdey; 30th Dec 2010 at 11:20. Reason: punctuation
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John Purdey
I must say that, to this other old duffer, "tucumseh" has a point. I distinctly recall you replying to my first post claiming Release to Service aspects are beyond your expertise. I would have thought any pilot, be he fixed or rotary, would understand the RTS failings recorded in the official papers, regardless of one's experience or type.
With best wishes for 2011 to everyone.
Ralph
I must say that, to this other old duffer, "tucumseh" has a point. I distinctly recall you replying to my first post claiming Release to Service aspects are beyond your expertise. I would have thought any pilot, be he fixed or rotary, would understand the RTS failings recorded in the official papers, regardless of one's experience or type.
With best wishes for 2011 to everyone.
Ralph
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John Purdey
I am afraid this old duffer is now utterly Kohn-fused.
In your reply to me, at post number 6008 you said “The Release to Service aspects of this sad business are beyond my expertise”.
The “RTS aspects” can be summarised as;
a. Boscombe Down stated safety critical software was positively dangerous and recommended to Controller Aircraft and the RAF that the aircraft should not fly in Service. Controller Aircraft did not see fit to amend this advice to ACAS.
b. ACAS declared the aircraft safe and released it for Service flying.
Not even MoD denies these facts.
What level of expertise does MoD require of its officers to identify and understand the fundamental contradiction between a. and b. and the pressing need for those responsible to resolve the conflict before ordering junior officers to fly the aircraft? My instinct, and expertise such as it is, tells me the likes of “tucumseh”, “chugalug”, “john blakeley” and other proponents of aviation safety and adherence to simple regulations have made a solid case, which I hope the Lord Philip thoroughly investigates.
My eyes have indeed been opened today on the level of thinking senior staffs applied to this very sad case.
I am afraid this old duffer is now utterly Kohn-fused.
In your reply to me, at post number 6008 you said “The Release to Service aspects of this sad business are beyond my expertise”.
The “RTS aspects” can be summarised as;
a. Boscombe Down stated safety critical software was positively dangerous and recommended to Controller Aircraft and the RAF that the aircraft should not fly in Service. Controller Aircraft did not see fit to amend this advice to ACAS.
b. ACAS declared the aircraft safe and released it for Service flying.
Not even MoD denies these facts.
What level of expertise does MoD require of its officers to identify and understand the fundamental contradiction between a. and b. and the pressing need for those responsible to resolve the conflict before ordering junior officers to fly the aircraft? My instinct, and expertise such as it is, tells me the likes of “tucumseh”, “chugalug”, “john blakeley” and other proponents of aviation safety and adherence to simple regulations have made a solid case, which I hope the Lord Philip thoroughly investigates.
My eyes have indeed been opened today on the level of thinking senior staffs applied to this very sad case.
JP, I too am confused, like tuc and Ralph Kohn. You have consistently claimed to have no knowledge or expertise concerning airworthiness, merely airmanship, and now we discover that you are not only a very experienced GD/P but also the recipient of a stringent engineering apprenticeship, by which I take it you mean Halton. Stringent indeed! So how does that impressive professional background gel with posts (replying to my 6611) from you such as this:
As my builder friend would say, "You've been 'aving a larf, aint'cher?", or was it merely being disingenuous?
Chinook
Chugalug. Your four questions; if you scroll back you will see that I have kept away from the airworthiness aspects of this sad tale on which you try to attack me, simply because I do not have the necessary expertise. I have stuck to airmanship matters, and in particular to the fact that this aircraft flew in IMC well below its safety altitude.
Chugalug. Your four questions; if you scroll back you will see that I have kept away from the airworthiness aspects of this sad tale on which you try to attack me, simply because I do not have the necessary expertise. I have stuck to airmanship matters, and in particular to the fact that this aircraft flew in IMC well below its safety altitude.
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Chinook
R Kohn. I was not Boscombe Down, nor CA, nor ACAS, and I do not therefore understand your problem. What is more, in those somewhat far-off days, airworthiness was not the contentious issue that it apparently became in the period dealt with by Tuc. The contention seems to have started with a period of financial cuts, and that was certainly after my time. In my day the rules were quite clear, and being GD with engineering experience, folk like me followed them, and there were no disasters- why should therte be? By all means talk to the folk who were there at the time, but be good enough not to attack those who did a very good job in my day.
And, just to change the subject back to where IMHO it should be, what about an aircraft flying towards and in to IMC below its safety altitude?
With all good wishes for the New Year, and that is my last word!! JP
And, just to change the subject back to where IMHO it should be, what about an aircraft flying towards and in to IMC below its safety altitude?
With all good wishes for the New Year, and that is my last word!! JP
Last edited by John Purdey; 30th Dec 2010 at 20:22. Reason: incomplete
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Bertie
Eh..............?
Happy New Year has clearly started already!
Anyway - Happy New Year to you all.
What the witness reported from where he was sounded ok to to me.
Happy New Year has clearly started already!
Anyway - Happy New Year to you all.
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Flying toward and in IMC below Safety Altitude
Yes JP
But what as never been established even to Balance of Probabilities, instead of No Doubt Whatsoever is:
a. Did the crew take the aircraft to the scene of the accident.
b. Did the aircraft take the crew to the scene of the accident.
Remember Burke? You never comment on his evidence, because his evidence alone blows your case clean out of the water.
But what as never been established even to Balance of Probabilities, instead of No Doubt Whatsoever is:
a. Did the crew take the aircraft to the scene of the accident.
b. Did the aircraft take the crew to the scene of the accident.
Remember Burke? You never comment on his evidence, because his evidence alone blows your case clean out of the water.
"No they don't, they centre on airmanship and captaincy and why two competent pilots flew a serviceable aircraft into the ground".
I submit that nobody knows why, which is precisely why the verdict was unsound.
All the theorising, all the use of the cybernet, all the hot air, all the irascible exchanges by proponents of this and that, and it all comes down to nobody knows.
QED
I submit that nobody knows why, which is precisely why the verdict was unsound.
All the theorising, all the use of the cybernet, all the hot air, all the irascible exchanges by proponents of this and that, and it all comes down to nobody knows.
QED
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Balance of Probabilities
Dalek,
Absolutely right - option "a" has never been proven, and as the House of Lords Inquiry acknowledged, after a much fuller investigation than the BoI ever carried out, is anyway not provable except by speculation - not a normally accepted definition of "no doubt whatsover". I believe that the balance of probabilities arguments now point heavily to option "b" unless of course your minds are totally closed to the facts. The "biased" starting assumption that this accident was caused by the crew, a flawed investigation, and an even more flawed analysis and review, the airworthiness and fitness for purpose issues, the history of ZD 576 itself, the change of waypoint, the meticulous flight planning (to quote Stn Cdr Aldergrove's comments) and the experience of this crew and its training to cope with the weather and a low-level approach to the Mull (the first 4 paragraphs of Stn Cdr Odiham's comments), together with the evidence of Mk 2 experienced pilots such as Sqn Ldr Burke, all point the balance to option "b" in my opinion.
The irony is that none of this was meant to be seen outside the "system". When John Major made the RAF release the Inquiry, and the external investigations started, the result was that far from "protecting" the MOD and the RAF from the results of their decision to operate the aircraft, a management decision that on investigation some might feel was negligent, or even grossly negligent, this verdict has, sadly along with other avoidable airworthiness and fitness for purpose related accidents, really opened Pandora's box. Not just on the unjust verdict for the Chinook pilots but on the wider issues, including, of course, the RAF's attitude, as it then appears to have been, to their "duty of care". Add in the totally different conclusions that the same Reviewing Officers, commenting at the same time, reached on the Glen Ogle Tornado accident in September 1994, where there were no doubts as to what had happened or the serviceability of the aircraft, and, IMHO, you also have to question the (in)consistency and (un)fairness of "RAF justice" at the time.
JB
Absolutely right - option "a" has never been proven, and as the House of Lords Inquiry acknowledged, after a much fuller investigation than the BoI ever carried out, is anyway not provable except by speculation - not a normally accepted definition of "no doubt whatsover". I believe that the balance of probabilities arguments now point heavily to option "b" unless of course your minds are totally closed to the facts. The "biased" starting assumption that this accident was caused by the crew, a flawed investigation, and an even more flawed analysis and review, the airworthiness and fitness for purpose issues, the history of ZD 576 itself, the change of waypoint, the meticulous flight planning (to quote Stn Cdr Aldergrove's comments) and the experience of this crew and its training to cope with the weather and a low-level approach to the Mull (the first 4 paragraphs of Stn Cdr Odiham's comments), together with the evidence of Mk 2 experienced pilots such as Sqn Ldr Burke, all point the balance to option "b" in my opinion.
The irony is that none of this was meant to be seen outside the "system". When John Major made the RAF release the Inquiry, and the external investigations started, the result was that far from "protecting" the MOD and the RAF from the results of their decision to operate the aircraft, a management decision that on investigation some might feel was negligent, or even grossly negligent, this verdict has, sadly along with other avoidable airworthiness and fitness for purpose related accidents, really opened Pandora's box. Not just on the unjust verdict for the Chinook pilots but on the wider issues, including, of course, the RAF's attitude, as it then appears to have been, to their "duty of care". Add in the totally different conclusions that the same Reviewing Officers, commenting at the same time, reached on the Glen Ogle Tornado accident in September 1994, where there were no doubts as to what had happened or the serviceability of the aircraft, and, IMHO, you also have to question the (in)consistency and (un)fairness of "RAF justice" at the time.
JB
Last edited by John Blakeley; 31st Dec 2010 at 16:05.
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Originally Posted by lb
and it all comes down to nobody knows.
Airworthiness, Captaincy, airmanship, possible dereliction of duty by Senior Officers - all have their place, but you are absolutely right in your statement.