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Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

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Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

Old 24th Nov 2010, 08:17
  #7061 (permalink)  
 
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Sorry Fitter,
I was imprecise with my last. I should simply have said I agree with one of Walters major points. The turbulence over the cliff would make assessment of intended ROC a bit of a lottery
The final three lines of his entry (I consider) speculative.

Last edited by dalek; 24th Nov 2010 at 11:19.
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Old 29th Nov 2010, 11:46
  #7062 (permalink)  
 
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bankmeadow - re your 7138.

It is really quite simple. The BOI stated that "the forecast weather was suitable for the Flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre".

To put that another way "the forecast weather was suitable for the flight but would have precluded flight in accordance with VFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."

Both those statements have the same meaning in Flight Safety terms - as they approached the Mull they should have been at or above Safety Altitude until they were unequivocably certain that the en route weather ahead was suitable for low level flight at high speed.

Before we get into the argument that SH do not operate that way, let us be quite clear that this was not an SH Task but a routine Passenger Transit Flight utilising In Theatre SH assets.
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Old 29th Nov 2010, 12:06
  #7063 (permalink)  
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Both those statements have the same meaning in Flight Safety terms - as they approached the Mull they should have been at or above Safety Altitude until they were unequivocably certain that the en route weather ahead was suitable for low level flight at high speed.
- which as you well know would have meant abandoning the trip and returning to Belfast due to a/c limitations NOT FORGETTING the fact that if they had been 'at or above Safety Altitude' they would have had NO way of knowing what the 'en route weather ahead was' since they would have been IMC. Based on your analysis (which renders the flight un-flyable), why was the authorising officer not charged with negligence?

Has it occurred to you that they might have been unequivocably certain that the en route weather ahead was suitable for low level flight at high speed on their planned route?

Define 'vicinity' too, while/if you are answering.
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Old 29th Nov 2010, 12:33
  #7064 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by cazatou View Post
bankmeadow - re your 7138.

It is really quite simple, in fact it's that simple I am suprised some folk still to this day are struggling with it. The BOI stated that "the forecast weather was suitable for the Flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre" but only if the forecast weather had been an accurate reflection of what was the actual weather, but as the very term "forecast" implies only a possibility then that is exactly what it was.

To put that another way "the forecast weather was suitable for the flight but would have precluded flight in accordance with VFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre." if the forecast weather accurately reflected the actual weather at the time the Chinook approached the Mull

Both those statements have the same meaning in Flight Safety terms - as they approached the Mull they should have been at or above Safety Altitude if the forecast weather reflected the actual weather but if the Chinook was still legally VFR as it approached the Mull then remaining belowy SA was not a problem and they could then remain happily and legally below SA and satisfy the VFR criteria until they were unequivocably certain that the en route weather ahead was suitable for low level flight at high speed.

Before we get into the argument that SH do not operate that way, let us be quite clear that this was not an SH Task but a routine Passenger Transit Flight utilising In Theatre SH assets. I stand by to be corrected but this is a new one on me
Caz,

None of this is very difficult and with your history I am really not sure why you are unable to quite get it?
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Old 29th Nov 2010, 13:04
  #7065 (permalink)  
 
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Caz:

I believe that until you have explained yourself with regard to your deliberately disingenuous posts I mentioned in my 7081 you really don't belong in this conversation. I'm now calling them deliberately disingenuous because I noticed you posting here on several occasions in the nearly two weeks since I posted that but you have been conspicuously absent from this thread. One can only suppose that you now felt it safe to pop your head above the parapet. You were, of course, wrong.
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Old 29th Nov 2010, 15:06
  #7066 (permalink)  
 
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Cazatou Reality. An excellent example of an oxymoron.

Olive,
If what Caz says is correct, the crew did not commit their act of negligence close to Waypoint change. They did so the moment they decided to fly the mission. They, the Authorising Officer and anyone of Rank present, who did not attempt to stop them flying are all guilty of negligence.

Now since the BOI, PAC, FAI,HOL, even Wratten and Day have never said the crew were wrong to attempt the sortie, perhaps it is you that require the reality check.
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Old 29th Nov 2010, 15:19
  #7067 (permalink)  
 
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I'm having difficulty differentiating between a SH task and a Routine Passenger Flight. Were there any additional/different criteria in GASOs?

I ask this because it takes us back round a previous buoy. If GASOs did have a different (higher?) requirement for "passenger flights", the the negligence on behalf of the hierarchy and the tasking chain is even stronger, bearing in mind all the airworthiness issues. Alternatively, the task was merely a routine SH task and the sad fact that there were so many fatalities should be divorced from the circumstances leading to the accident. This begs the question, if exactly the same accident had occurred with the only fatalities being four crew and a couple of servicemen going along on a buck-shee golfing weekend, would we be having this discussion?
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Old 29th Nov 2010, 15:25
  #7068 (permalink)  
 
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Olive Oyl wrote:
he is simply handing out another shovel for the ill-informed to dig themselves into a hole.
Pot, meet kettle...........
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Old 29th Nov 2010, 16:19
  #7069 (permalink)  
 
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Cazatou's posts usually bring the arguments here back to reality with a bump that many don't like becaue he exposes the cracks and flaws in their arguments.
By deliberately altering the "evidence"... Oh, that's OK then.
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Old 29th Nov 2010, 17:37
  #7070 (permalink)  
 
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Olive

At #7113 you said;

Instrument Flight Rules are there for a reason and are not negotiable by individuals, no matter how clever/experienced/respected they might be.
What was non-negotiable, long before the final flight of ZD576 was even considered, was full compliance with mandatory regulations designed to ensure an airworthy aircraft was provided for the task. So says the Secretary of State for Defence. I merely agree.

It was not clever to ignore these regulations and withhold vital safety related information from aircrews. No experienced person would do that without realising the risk and possible consequences. By taking that risk, ACAS and his cohorts lost any respect they may have had.

By virtue of the above negligence, this can in no way be described as a routine passenger flight. If the tasking organisation knew of this negligence, it was a quite deliberate gamble with 29 lives. If they did not know, that is further evidence of higher negligence because the regulations require dissemination of such information; otherwise no-one can make an informed decision on the aircrafts suitability for that purpose. Is there anyone here who truly believes an aircraft with absolutely no clearance whatsoever to use any navigation or communications equipment was remotely suitable?
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Old 29th Nov 2010, 19:03
  #7071 (permalink)  
 
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tuc

Thank you for yet another post which, in its clarity and simplicity, provides a devastating answer to all those trying to obscure the true circumstances which Lord Philip is now reviewing.
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Old 29th Nov 2010, 19:24
  #7072 (permalink)  
 
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Chinook

Tuc. Before we go off on yet another tangent, what on earth has your last post got to do with an aircraft flying below its safety height in IMC? Please enlighten me. JP
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Old 29th Nov 2010, 19:33
  #7073 (permalink)  
 
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dalek

It really is quite simple.

1. The Forecast weather required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre. To put it another way - it precluded flight in accordance with VFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre.

2. The Actual weather as reported by 2 Qualified Met Observers and 8 other eyewitnesses at the time of the crash required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre. IT PRECLUDED FLIGHT IN ACCORDANCE WITH VFR.

3. You were not there - and I freely admit that I was not there.

4. None of the other numerous contributors to this thread were there.

The difference is that I believe the evidence sworn on oath by those who were actually present on the Mull and witnessed the events that tragic evening.

The RN SAR Helicopters from Prestwick estimated the visibility as 10-15 feet as they attempted to hover taxi to to the crash site. They gave up and relocated to the HLS.

The Police, Fire and Medical Services gave evidence as to the weather as they attempted in vain to give succour to the victims.

Apart from the Emergency Services evidence there were those 10 eyewitnesses in the vicinity of the crash that evening - yet you are adamant that all these people are wrong; and the you (who was not there) can categorically state that you are right.

Your loyalty to your friends does you credit - your attempts to apportion blame to others when the Captain of the Aeroplane has ultimate responsibility for the actual conduct of the Flight does not. I always had one view on the the responsibility of the Captain THE BUCK STOPS HERE
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Old 29th Nov 2010, 19:46
  #7074 (permalink)  
 
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John Purdey

My post is factual and confirmed by MoD.

Your supposition - is just that.


May I suggest you establish what contributory factors were open to the Board of Inquiry and ask yourself why they did not mention Organistional Fault, despite being presented with ample evidence.

If you do not think this is relevant, perhaps you would care to list those mandated components of airworthiness you believe should not be mandated - starting with those ignored / considered optional by MoD in 1993/4.

If you truly do not understand what I'm talking about, then you can have no practical knowledge of aviation safety. I happen to believe you do know exactly what I'm saying and do not care for the ramifications should the truth be revealed by Lord Philip; in the same way Mr Haddon-Cave named senior staffs.

I await your pearls of wisdom on why the Secretary of State is wrong - because it is his regulations you are arguing against, not mine.
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Old 29th Nov 2010, 19:48
  #7075 (permalink)  
 
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JP,

When it suits you, you come on here with your little questions, whilst many asked of you seem to go unanswered. Your pomposity knows no bounds, and like many of your ilk you are unlikely to ever get it. Have you ever considered playing in the traffic?
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Old 29th Nov 2010, 19:57
  #7076 (permalink)  
 
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Abbeyroad

When it suits you, you come on here with your little questions, whilst many asked of you seem to go unanswered. Your pomposity knows no bounds, and like many of your ilk you are unlikely to ever get it. Have you ever considered playing in the traffic?
Do you think that this sort of outburst adds anything to the solution of a tragic accident.......................?

No - I thought not.
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Old 29th Nov 2010, 20:41
  #7077 (permalink)  
 
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Chinook

Tuc. Let me try another tack. If we assume for the sake of this discussion (and I do not claim to know one way or the other) that the aircraft was not airworthy, would that absolve the crew from their responsibilities to conduct the flight according to the normal rules of airmanship? JP
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Old 29th Nov 2010, 20:59
  #7078 (permalink)  
 
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Airborne Aircrew

Chapter and Verse please on how I "altered the evidence". The completed BOI was waiting on my desk when I arrived at HQ 1 Gp. I would have to have altered not only those copies at HQ 1 Gp but also those at HQ STC, MODPE and MOD - a total of around 40 copies. I did not hold an Entry Pass for any of those other Establishments.

Of course you could always justify or apologise for your statement - but I won't hold my breath.
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Old 29th Nov 2010, 21:21
  #7079 (permalink)  
 
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John Purdey

My opinion is that the responsibility you mention remains with the crew so long as the airworthiness chain is intact. There may be other aspects aircrew would raise but that is my take as someone holding airworthiness delegation. The notion that the buck stops with them does not hold water if this Duty of Care requirement is not met. It was not. In such cases, blame may be shared, but it cannot be placed solely on the crew.

The RAF hierarchy had a higher responsibility to ensure they had an aircraft that was demonstrably suitable for the task. MoD have provided evidence it was not. That evidence should be sufficient to introduce even more doubt. Greater minds than mine agree.

As I have always said, the crew may have erred, but no-one knows for certain. But the MoD hierarchy most definitely erred to a greater degree, between November 1993 (ACAS signing the RTS) and 2nd June 1994. As I have also said, Haddon-Cave QC expressed this learned opinion and named and shamed, for far lesser offences - MoD and Ministers agreed with him.

What did the Nimrod Review say was the root cause? The ethos that safety could be set aside for financial gain/savings. Was this the case prior to ACAS signing the Chinook RTS? Yes. Did he know? I don't know but he must be an ostrich if he didn't. Did the RAF know and were they warned? Yes. What did the RAF Chief Engineer do about the raft of airworthiness failures noted in the various inquiries? S.F.A. Had the lessons from ZD576 been learned, perhaps other accidents and deaths could have been prevented.

I do hope those involved at the time (1987-94) in AMSO, AML and MoD(PE) are interviewed by Lord Philip. They should be given the opportunity to explain. Unfortunately, that luxury is denied the crew who, I am sure, would have been appalled to know their aircraft had been declared "dangerous" and unairworthy by Boscombe Down. Had they survived, their defence would have been very robust.
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Old 29th Nov 2010, 21:35
  #7080 (permalink)  
 
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Chinook

Tuc. Do I take it from your "My opinion is that the responsibility you mention remains with the crew so long as the airworthiness chain is intact" .... means that if the a/c was not airworthy, then the crew were free to ignore the rules of airmanship? Or,? JP
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