Fury at Def Sec over Helicopter Shortage
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Fury at Def Sec over Helicopter Shortage
The Times: Fury over MoD refusal to buy more helicopters for Afghanistan troops
The Defence Secretary today faced a furious reaction after ruling out buying more helicopters for the British forces in Afghanistan. British military commanders have been clamouring for more helicopters since the operation in Helmand province was launched in 2006.
Last month Brigadier Ed Butler, who commanded 16 Air Assault Brigade in Helmand province in 2006 told MPs that the lack of helicopters meant the Taleban had been able to force British troops off the roads by using roadside bombs. He pointed out that in Northern Ireland there were 70 helicopters for 10,000 to 15,000 troops but in Afghanistan, with casualties rising steeply in the fiercest fighting since the Korean War, there were far fewer.
Today Bob Ainsworth said up to eight Merlin helicopters would be transferred from Iraq to Afghanistan and eight Chinooks which are being converted from special forces’ aircraft to basic troop carriers would also be sent. But he said he had no plans to buy extra aircraft and said helicopters were not the answer to improving mobility for the troops.
He was speaking after the Ministry of Defence announced another death in Afghanistan - the seventh in a week and the 176th since the campaign began in 2001.
His remarks, after giving a speech on Afghanistan at Chatham House in London, brought a furious response from a former senior diplomat in the audience who said the troops in Helmand province had been forced to “borrow” ten American helicopters in order to launch Operation Panther’s Claw, which currently involves 3,000 British troops in battles with the Taleban.
Sir Brian Crowe, deputy chairman of Chatham House, said the helicopter issue was “a real scandal” and told Mr Ainsworth that his son, who was serving in Helmand, had had no helicopters when he was sent on a dawn assault more than a year ago.
Mr Ainsworth acknowledged that British troops in Operation Panther’s Claw had used American helicopters but said Britain was part of a coalition and that it was invaluable to have the Americans in Helmand. “We could never match the helicopter assets of the Americans,” he said.
Mr Ainsworth also made an indirect verbal swipe at General Sir Richard Dannatt, the head of the Army, when he was asked whether he was going to send more troops to Afghanistan. “We’ve got 9,000 there at the moment. We have to get the balance right. Those who want to send more are the same ones who warned that current operations could break the Army,” he said.
This was a comment made by General Dannatt in an interview when he was talking about the strain of running simultaneous operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Earlier this year, in an interview with The Times, General Dannatt revealed he wanted to send another 2,000 troops to Afghanistan. His recommendation to ministers was rejected by Gordon Brown.
In his speech at the Chatham House think-tank - his first since taking over from John Hutton as Defence Secretary last month - Mr Ainsworth called for patience from the public over the campaign. He insisted progress was being made but warned there would be more casualties and praised the Armed Forces for the sacrifices they were making. He revealed that more than 200 had been wounded this year, a fifth of them seriously.
However, he warned: “If we leave now the Taleban will take control and al-Qaeda will return. “In the face of the casualties we are seeing, it is understandable when people ask, is this too difficult. But this is not the message I got in Afghanistan. People don’t want the Taleban back and we must stay and finish the job. If you come you must stay.”
Referring to the controversy over protection for the troops, Mr Ainsworth insisted heavily armoured vehicles were not always the solution. “Sacrificing manoeuvrability for heavy armour in every circumstance is not the answer,” he said.
Everything was being done, he said, to target the bomb-makers behind the Taleban’s roadside bomb campaign. He said success in Afghanistan would be measured by “how safe the public feel and how far peaceful life can be resumed”.
The Defence Secretary today faced a furious reaction after ruling out buying more helicopters for the British forces in Afghanistan. British military commanders have been clamouring for more helicopters since the operation in Helmand province was launched in 2006.
Last month Brigadier Ed Butler, who commanded 16 Air Assault Brigade in Helmand province in 2006 told MPs that the lack of helicopters meant the Taleban had been able to force British troops off the roads by using roadside bombs. He pointed out that in Northern Ireland there were 70 helicopters for 10,000 to 15,000 troops but in Afghanistan, with casualties rising steeply in the fiercest fighting since the Korean War, there were far fewer.
Today Bob Ainsworth said up to eight Merlin helicopters would be transferred from Iraq to Afghanistan and eight Chinooks which are being converted from special forces’ aircraft to basic troop carriers would also be sent. But he said he had no plans to buy extra aircraft and said helicopters were not the answer to improving mobility for the troops.
He was speaking after the Ministry of Defence announced another death in Afghanistan - the seventh in a week and the 176th since the campaign began in 2001.
His remarks, after giving a speech on Afghanistan at Chatham House in London, brought a furious response from a former senior diplomat in the audience who said the troops in Helmand province had been forced to “borrow” ten American helicopters in order to launch Operation Panther’s Claw, which currently involves 3,000 British troops in battles with the Taleban.
Sir Brian Crowe, deputy chairman of Chatham House, said the helicopter issue was “a real scandal” and told Mr Ainsworth that his son, who was serving in Helmand, had had no helicopters when he was sent on a dawn assault more than a year ago.
Mr Ainsworth acknowledged that British troops in Operation Panther’s Claw had used American helicopters but said Britain was part of a coalition and that it was invaluable to have the Americans in Helmand. “We could never match the helicopter assets of the Americans,” he said.
Mr Ainsworth also made an indirect verbal swipe at General Sir Richard Dannatt, the head of the Army, when he was asked whether he was going to send more troops to Afghanistan. “We’ve got 9,000 there at the moment. We have to get the balance right. Those who want to send more are the same ones who warned that current operations could break the Army,” he said.
This was a comment made by General Dannatt in an interview when he was talking about the strain of running simultaneous operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Earlier this year, in an interview with The Times, General Dannatt revealed he wanted to send another 2,000 troops to Afghanistan. His recommendation to ministers was rejected by Gordon Brown.
In his speech at the Chatham House think-tank - his first since taking over from John Hutton as Defence Secretary last month - Mr Ainsworth called for patience from the public over the campaign. He insisted progress was being made but warned there would be more casualties and praised the Armed Forces for the sacrifices they were making. He revealed that more than 200 had been wounded this year, a fifth of them seriously.
However, he warned: “If we leave now the Taleban will take control and al-Qaeda will return. “In the face of the casualties we are seeing, it is understandable when people ask, is this too difficult. But this is not the message I got in Afghanistan. People don’t want the Taleban back and we must stay and finish the job. If you come you must stay.”
Referring to the controversy over protection for the troops, Mr Ainsworth insisted heavily armoured vehicles were not always the solution. “Sacrificing manoeuvrability for heavy armour in every circumstance is not the answer,” he said.
Everything was being done, he said, to target the bomb-makers behind the Taleban’s roadside bomb campaign. He said success in Afghanistan would be measured by “how safe the public feel and how far peaceful life can be resumed”.
Helicopters in Afghanistan
If it was not that they would be an instant liability, any potential Armed Forces Minister or Def Sec (Prime Ministers as well) should be made to serve 6 months in theatre with British troops, or have had real military service - they might then sound as they know something of what they speak! Saw part of Ainsworth's speech on the News - only instance of reality was when he said that operations in theatre would continue, and that (sadly) there will be more deaths of UK service personnel.
Wander00
Wander00
Mr Ainsworth also made an indirect verbal swipe at General Sir Richard Dannatt, the head of the Army, when he was asked whether he was going to send more troops to Afghanistan. “We’ve got 9,000 there at the moment. We have to get the balance right. Those who want to send more are the same ones who warned that current operations could break the Army,” he said.
Exactly Mr Ainsworth! The same Bosses who have warned you there aren't enough helicopters are the same Bosses who have warned you that 9000 troops aren't enough. They are the same Bosses that have warned you that to do the job properly will overstretch the Armed Forces and yet the Government is not willing to procure / spend more. If you want a successful campaign then the treasury should pay for it in cash and not with the lives of exhausted, under equipped personnel.
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Note also the lies:
"Today Bob Ainsworth said up to eight Merlin helicopters would be transferred from Iraq to Afghanistan and eight Chinooks which are being converted from special forces’ aircraft to basic troop carriers would also be sent. But he said he had no plans to buy extra aircraft and said helicopters were not the answer to improving mobility for the troops. "
If an extra 8 Chinooks are sent out, I'll eat my hat. If they are these particular beasts I'll eat your hat.
"Today Bob Ainsworth said up to eight Merlin helicopters would be transferred from Iraq to Afghanistan and eight Chinooks which are being converted from special forces’ aircraft to basic troop carriers would also be sent. But he said he had no plans to buy extra aircraft and said helicopters were not the answer to improving mobility for the troops. "
If an extra 8 Chinooks are sent out, I'll eat my hat. If they are these particular beasts I'll eat your hat.
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Oh dear Mr Ainsworth, you really should get a better brief before going in front of the cameras and if I read previous posts correctly then someones son should be able to give you the 'home truth' fresh from those that venture outside of the wire in Helmand and you certainly do not need me to tell you the position of risk that you are placing the service men and women on the ground due to your unbelievable failure to recognise and accept that you will have do battle with the Prime Minister and H M Treasury to secure funding for essential (and yes it is essential) equipment here and now (and not convieniently after an election when you will have handed your desk/CV enhancing portfolio to another incumbent.
Brigadier Butler was absolutely right and why have we all of sudden forgotten the valuable and costly lessons learned during Northern Ireland where the preferred terrorist MO was also IEDs.
How many remember how busy Bessbrook and Aldergrove were with helicopter operations due to the threat posed to the troops on the ground.
Of course 'borrowing' US helicopters for a deliberate mission as part of a Coalition Op is the norm, and there have been rare occurences when we have supported the US.
But the routine framework tasking, for routine British troops, remains the responsibility of Bristish helicopters and quite simply there is not enough which instantly forces a commander to look at other options (including road moves).
The Sec of State for Defence cannot have it both ways, in one paragraph saying that helicopters are not the solution:
But he said he had no plans to buy extra aircraft and said helicopters were not the answer to improving mobility for the troops.
and yet in the same interview saying neither is heavily armoured vehicles:
Referring to the controversy over protection for the troops, Mr Ainsworth insisted heavily armoured vehicles were not always the solution. “Sacrificing manoeuvrability for heavy armour in every circumstance is not the answer,” he said.
So if mobility (which assists in ground forces protection) in the form of helicopters is not the solution and manoeuvrability (defined as mobility + firepower) then what was really missing from Mr Ainsworths interview was an insight into what his department does think the solution to improving ground forces mobility is?
Would anyone like to re-visit the Battlefield Helicopter NAO report of 2003 (post 9/11) and see exactly what has been done by the Govt/MoD to satisfy the findings? 8 Danish Merlins (nearly) and 8 CH47s - (maybe nearly unlikely).
Brigadier Butler was absolutely right and why have we all of sudden forgotten the valuable and costly lessons learned during Northern Ireland where the preferred terrorist MO was also IEDs.
How many remember how busy Bessbrook and Aldergrove were with helicopter operations due to the threat posed to the troops on the ground.
Of course 'borrowing' US helicopters for a deliberate mission as part of a Coalition Op is the norm, and there have been rare occurences when we have supported the US.
But the routine framework tasking, for routine British troops, remains the responsibility of Bristish helicopters and quite simply there is not enough which instantly forces a commander to look at other options (including road moves).
The Sec of State for Defence cannot have it both ways, in one paragraph saying that helicopters are not the solution:
But he said he had no plans to buy extra aircraft and said helicopters were not the answer to improving mobility for the troops.
and yet in the same interview saying neither is heavily armoured vehicles:
Referring to the controversy over protection for the troops, Mr Ainsworth insisted heavily armoured vehicles were not always the solution. “Sacrificing manoeuvrability for heavy armour in every circumstance is not the answer,” he said.
So if mobility (which assists in ground forces protection) in the form of helicopters is not the solution and manoeuvrability (defined as mobility + firepower) then what was really missing from Mr Ainsworths interview was an insight into what his department does think the solution to improving ground forces mobility is?
Would anyone like to re-visit the Battlefield Helicopter NAO report of 2003 (post 9/11) and see exactly what has been done by the Govt/MoD to satisfy the findings? 8 Danish Merlins (nearly) and 8 CH47s - (maybe nearly unlikely).
Last edited by MaroonMan4; 8th Jul 2009 at 17:40.
If an extra 8 Chinooks are sent out, I'll eat my hat. If they are these particular beasts I'll eat your hat.
MaroonMan - what happened to your prevoius thread on this subject?
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It is a fact that, regardless of which position in government that it occupies, you can not polish a turd.
Roll on the next General Election, hoping of course that, should Dr Fox occupy the office that he currently shadows, he remembers some of his time within the family that is the UK Armed Forces and is a change for the better.
There's a war on; someone tell Labour
Roll on the next General Election, hoping of course that, should Dr Fox occupy the office that he currently shadows, he remembers some of his time within the family that is the UK Armed Forces and is a change for the better.
There's a war on; someone tell Labour
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240,
Removed as it was a thread too close to the spate of weekend deaths of UK personnel and the 'hypothetical' link between recent deaths in AFG that could be as a direct result of lack for those on the ground to use the option to fly/ re-supply by SH (as per Bosnia/ NI) was in itself too soon to family's that may be viewing the thread.
Now though I don't think you need random people like us to silently scream in despair on back water threads like this as eventually (and fortunately) the British people and media are not as stupid as some would like them to be and now the British public (whether they support the political intent of Afghanistan or not) now recognise the direct link between sufficient Support Helicopter lift v body bags.
Removed as it was a thread too close to the spate of weekend deaths of UK personnel and the 'hypothetical' link between recent deaths in AFG that could be as a direct result of lack for those on the ground to use the option to fly/ re-supply by SH (as per Bosnia/ NI) was in itself too soon to family's that may be viewing the thread.
Now though I don't think you need random people like us to silently scream in despair on back water threads like this as eventually (and fortunately) the British people and media are not as stupid as some would like them to be and now the British public (whether they support the political intent of Afghanistan or not) now recognise the direct link between sufficient Support Helicopter lift v body bags.
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Uh oh! Civvie on the thread, watcha.
But, in the world of suits, if one's tempo short of airframes then to the lease companies one goes.
Shirlely, some friendly state could wet or dry lease aerial assets to fill the gap?
MIL -8 anyone?
Don't hit too hard I bruise easily,
Sir George Cayley
But, in the world of suits, if one's tempo short of airframes then to the lease companies one goes.
Shirlely, some friendly state could wet or dry lease aerial assets to fill the gap?
MIL -8 anyone?
Don't hit too hard I bruise easily,
Sir George Cayley
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We all know we don't have the right balance of equipment at the moment.
But whose fault is that?
It is wrong to blame the politicians of today for the mistakes of the politicians and military leaders of the past. The root of the problems that we have today lie in the inflexibility and mistakes of the procurement process in the eighties and nineties, when the foundations for our current equipment palette was painted. "Options for Change" was a military and political plan that was supposed to see us through to today and beyond, at the end of a major confrontation. We only got it partly right.
The army substantially divested itself of heavy armour, and partly invested in expeditionary and special forces - but not sufficiently, and woefully underinvested in equipment (except Apache - though probably Cobra would have been better for CAS and ease of maintenance). But overall they came out surprisingly well - maybe 8/10 overall for effectiveness of their strategic reform.
The RN correctly kept our core nuclear deterrent, but only reluctantly divested in aircraft carriers, and as a result were forced to underinvest in frigates which are our best asset for global diplomatic projection (note diplomatic, not power, projection). Maybe 6/10 for their efforts.
The RAF score maximum 3/10. With their heads firmly entrenched in 1941, they pursued a strategy of prioritising air defence procurement. SH, tropp transport and even AAR languished. It is not as if procurement lead times were too long for reaction to changing times. Typhoon was not irreversibly signed until a year after "Options for Change". Even then it was not too late - had Eurofighter listened to the French, we might have ended up with a swing-role aircraft (Rafale) that could be effective in CAS(TODAY), fly off carriers (TODAY), and still be effective in air defence (TODAY). Instead we ended up with enormous investment in a very impressive but entirely useless swingish-role air defence fighter which can only at great expense be converted to an inefficient CAS role and may never be adaptable to fly from a carrier.
But the most important question is why the RAF were able to win the argument in 1992 at the expense of the army and the RN? The answer lies with the politicians - RAF procurement supplies more jobs than the RN, and RN procurement supplies more jobs than the army.
So until we break the cycle of creating high tech weaponry to suit employment needs, we might never get out of the cycle we have been in since end of WW2.
But whose fault is that?
It is wrong to blame the politicians of today for the mistakes of the politicians and military leaders of the past. The root of the problems that we have today lie in the inflexibility and mistakes of the procurement process in the eighties and nineties, when the foundations for our current equipment palette was painted. "Options for Change" was a military and political plan that was supposed to see us through to today and beyond, at the end of a major confrontation. We only got it partly right.
The army substantially divested itself of heavy armour, and partly invested in expeditionary and special forces - but not sufficiently, and woefully underinvested in equipment (except Apache - though probably Cobra would have been better for CAS and ease of maintenance). But overall they came out surprisingly well - maybe 8/10 overall for effectiveness of their strategic reform.
The RN correctly kept our core nuclear deterrent, but only reluctantly divested in aircraft carriers, and as a result were forced to underinvest in frigates which are our best asset for global diplomatic projection (note diplomatic, not power, projection). Maybe 6/10 for their efforts.
The RAF score maximum 3/10. With their heads firmly entrenched in 1941, they pursued a strategy of prioritising air defence procurement. SH, tropp transport and even AAR languished. It is not as if procurement lead times were too long for reaction to changing times. Typhoon was not irreversibly signed until a year after "Options for Change". Even then it was not too late - had Eurofighter listened to the French, we might have ended up with a swing-role aircraft (Rafale) that could be effective in CAS(TODAY), fly off carriers (TODAY), and still be effective in air defence (TODAY). Instead we ended up with enormous investment in a very impressive but entirely useless swingish-role air defence fighter which can only at great expense be converted to an inefficient CAS role and may never be adaptable to fly from a carrier.
But the most important question is why the RAF were able to win the argument in 1992 at the expense of the army and the RN? The answer lies with the politicians - RAF procurement supplies more jobs than the RN, and RN procurement supplies more jobs than the army.
So until we break the cycle of creating high tech weaponry to suit employment needs, we might never get out of the cycle we have been in since end of WW2.
had Eurofighter listened to the French, we might have ended up with a swing-role aircraft (Rafale) that could be effective in CAS(TODAY), fly off carriers (TODAY), and still be effective in air defence (TODAY). Instead we ended up with enormous investment in a very impressive but entirely useless swingish-role air defence fighter which can only at great expense be converted to an inefficient CAS role and may never be adaptable to fly from a carrier.
And, for the umpteenth time, the Typhoon was intended from the outset to replace the Jaguar so even though Max Hastings and Lewis Page can't get it into their heads, one would hope that most people here and thus familiar with aviation would appreciate the fact that a pure AD aircraft was never going to be selected for that role.
The air-ground capability is thus not an issue of adaption of a fighter aircraft into a poor attack aircraft but one of clearing the weapons for use; the sequencing of clearances was for the AA role first, with AG following. If you are going to brand the Typhoon:
very impressive but entirely useless swingish-role air defence fighter which can only at great expense be converted to an inefficient CAS role and may never be adaptable to fly from a carrier.
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the Typhoon was intended from the outset to replace the Jaguar
the Typhoon was intended from the outset to replace the Jaguar and the Tornado. If it was meant to replace the Jaguar then we would have ordered 112 of them. Instead we bought 232 of them.
I can see why you read it that way, Spheroid, thanks to my imprecise wording. The point I was making - badly - was that if the Jag was one of the aircraft types it was meant to replace, what was then EFA could not be just an air superiority type only since it wouldn't meet the RAF requirement.
While I'd want to check, ISTR that it was at one point also trumpeted as a replacement for the remaining AD Phantoms as well as the F3 and Jag.
While I'd want to check, ISTR that it was at one point also trumpeted as a replacement for the remaining AD Phantoms as well as the F3 and Jag.
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Typhoon was supposed to replace the Jaguar and the Phantom and then after that was retired, the F3. Hence the numbers.
I keep ending up with the same problem with many threads on Prune. This Government will not fund the armed forces to the levels that are needed. There, I've said it. Bang goes my Knighthood....time for bed.
I keep ending up with the same problem with many threads on Prune. This Government will not fund the armed forces to the levels that are needed. There, I've said it. Bang goes my Knighthood....time for bed.
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Had Eurofighter listened to the French, the RAF's current combat aircraft would be called the Squall FGR1 and built almost entirely in France, with French engines and French avionics. We'd have an aircraft which'd be able to fly off aircraft carriers we don't have too
Fact is that we have spend a substantial part of our ongoing defence budget on a useless, inflexible air-defence aircraft, when the budget should have gone to the army and to RAF SH, AAR, and Air Transport.
The French only got it mildly less wrong. At least they spent most of their budget on an adaptable air-defence/CAS/Carrier aircraft, even though their global priorities were less ambitious than ours, and even though their priorities should also have been expeditionary.
We have wasted several generations of defence budgets, not to mention many young lives, on the utter folly that is Typhoon.
The politicians of the early nineties are to blame for our current equipment imbalance. They had to rely on recommendations from the military chiefs of the time for advice. Unfortunately RAF advice won.
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"had Eurofighter listened to the French, we might have ended up with a swing-role aircraft (Rafale) that could be effective in CAS(TODAY)"
dropping a couple of LGB's with a legacy aircraft (etandard) designating for you is considered effective?
dropping a couple of LGB's with a legacy aircraft (etandard) designating for you is considered effective?
I'm so sorry, Cirrus. I didn't realise that my attempt to inject a few basic facts into the discussion was so unwelcome. I shall desist from doing so in future and shall accept all your pronouncements as gospel, even when I know them to be wrong.
[Departs tugging forelock and muttering 'patronising
' under his breath...) 
[Departs tugging forelock and muttering 'patronising
' under his breath...)