Oh dear Mr Ainsworth, you really should get a better brief before going in front of the cameras and if I read previous posts correctly then someones son should be able to give you the 'home truth' fresh from those that venture outside of the wire in Helmand and you certainly do not need me to tell you the position of risk that you are placing the service men and women on the ground due to your unbelievable failure to recognise and accept that you will have do battle with the Prime Minister and H M Treasury to secure funding for essential (and yes it is essential) equipment here and now (and not convieniently after an election when you will have handed your desk/CV enhancing portfolio to another incumbent.
Brigadier Butler was absolutely right and why have we all of sudden forgotten the valuable and costly lessons learned during Northern Ireland where the preferred terrorist MO was also IEDs.
How many remember how busy Bessbrook and Aldergrove were with helicopter operations due to the threat posed to the troops on the ground.
Of course 'borrowing' US helicopters for a deliberate mission as part of a Coalition Op is the norm, and there have been rare occurences when we have supported the US.
But the routine framework tasking, for routine British troops, remains the responsibility of Bristish helicopters and quite simply there is not enough which instantly forces a commander to look at other options (including road moves).
The Sec of State for Defence cannot have it both ways, in one paragraph saying that helicopters are not the solution:
But he said he had no plans to buy extra aircraft and said helicopters were not the answer to improving mobility for the troops.
and yet in the same interview saying neither is heavily armoured vehicles:
Referring to the controversy over protection for the troops, Mr Ainsworth insisted heavily armoured vehicles were not always the solution. “Sacrificing manoeuvrability for heavy armour in every circumstance is not the answer,” he said.
So if mobility (which assists in ground forces protection) in the form of helicopters is not the solution and manoeuvrability (defined as mobility + firepower) then what was really missing from Mr Ainsworths interview was an insight into what his department does think the solution to improving ground forces mobility is?
Would anyone like to re-visit the Battlefield Helicopter NAO report of 2003 (post 9/11) and see exactly what has been done by the Govt/MoD to satisfy the findings? 8 Danish Merlins (nearly) and 8 CH47s - (maybe nearly unlikely).
Last edited by MaroonMan4; 8th Jul 2009 at 17:40.