Fury at Def Sec over Helicopter Shortage
Ptc Remf
And the primary role of the RAF is.....?!
It's easy to rubbish the Typhoon, but it seems it's impossible for some to admit that it might just have a role in the modern world. Even if that might not be in hot, mountainous places just yet.
BV
It's easy to rubbish the Typhoon, but it seems it's impossible for some to admit that it might just have a role in the modern world. Even if that might not be in hot, mountainous places just yet.
BV
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And the primary role of the RAF is.....?!
I'm not rubbishing the typhoon , after chatting to the pilots and doing ET with it , I'm more than sure it is a very capable aircraft , but the requirement at the moment and for the last 6 yrs is for a capable CAS platform and not an Air Defender.
'Credit' where it's due.
The shortage of helicopter lift in Afghanistan should not come as much of a surprise to anyone.
A massive 38% shortfall in helicopter lift was identified by the NAO years ago. Since then, the shortfall has been worsened as ageing fleets have been reduced by wastage and attrition, and as Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed that some platforms are actually worth not much more than the square root of bug.ger all in hot and high conditions.
And the Government's response?
To reduce the cash available for Future Rotorcraft from £4.5 Bn to a tad over £3 Bn, and then to spend most of it on:
1) The Royal Navy's Merlin CSP - an update to an irrelevant Cold War ASW platform - £900 m
2) FLynx - primarily for the Royal Navy's vital need to replace the Lynx HMA8 - another £1 Bn
3) Chinook fix to field £250 m to get just eight Chinooks back onto the books
4) SAR-H £750 m.
Total: £2.9 Bn.
not much left for support helicopters - Puma and Commando replacements, recapitalising Chinook and bringing Merlin to full strength.
We could argue all day about whether spending the lion's share of FRC money on grey funnel lines helicopters is or is not a good idea, but to do so on these particular platforms first, before sorting the identified shortfall in battlefield and amphibious lift would seem to me to suggest that whoever doles out the pennies from the pot marked 'choppers' has never heard of prioritisation.
The shortage of helicopter lift in Afghanistan should not come as much of a surprise to anyone.
A massive 38% shortfall in helicopter lift was identified by the NAO years ago. Since then, the shortfall has been worsened as ageing fleets have been reduced by wastage and attrition, and as Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed that some platforms are actually worth not much more than the square root of bug.ger all in hot and high conditions.
And the Government's response?
To reduce the cash available for Future Rotorcraft from £4.5 Bn to a tad over £3 Bn, and then to spend most of it on:
1) The Royal Navy's Merlin CSP - an update to an irrelevant Cold War ASW platform - £900 m
2) FLynx - primarily for the Royal Navy's vital need to replace the Lynx HMA8 - another £1 Bn
3) Chinook fix to field £250 m to get just eight Chinooks back onto the books
4) SAR-H £750 m.
Total: £2.9 Bn.
not much left for support helicopters - Puma and Commando replacements, recapitalising Chinook and bringing Merlin to full strength.
We could argue all day about whether spending the lion's share of FRC money on grey funnel lines helicopters is or is not a good idea, but to do so on these particular platforms first, before sorting the identified shortfall in battlefield and amphibious lift would seem to me to suggest that whoever doles out the pennies from the pot marked 'choppers' has never heard of prioritisation.
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And the primary role of the RAF is.....?!
No it isn't in the big picture, much to the army's consternation. You could call it defence of the UK and its territories or carrying out British defence policy or something similar. Sometimes that means supporting the "boots on the ground" sometimes it doesn't. Don't forget that at the end of the day the army is also just supporting the big picture political objective.
And how many times do people have to post before the thickos get it - Typhoon was always designed as swing/multi role. It has replaced single role aircraft so added flexibility as well as capability. It was planned to replace F3 first (the RAF's only A-A aircraft for the slow ones) so was always planned to get A-A capability first (when is it getting that btw
?) It was considered that the Harrier and GR4 fleets would provide sufficient CAS/AI capability in the meantime. Even as recently as 2000 nobody knew that we were going to embroil ourselves in a long term tribal counter-insurgency war halfway around the world.
The AT/AAR problems were identified a long time ago, it is just the solution that sucks.
Helos have definitely been the poor relation for too long - but that partly, perhaps came from the fact that they were ticking along nicely, doing what the army wanted in NI and not seen as having a big role outside that. Lack of foresight and flexibility, perhaps.
People can whine about the wrong equipment as much as they like but defence procurement (and training) lead times are huge, we cannot wave a magic wand and get the perfect kit as a war kicks off. So for me the big lesson is that we cannot foresee exactly what form future wars will take (despite what CGS says) so we must have a balanced and flexible air force (and navy). Whilst the current war in Afghanistan is and should be our highest priority, we cannot let it lead us down the dead end of creating a counter-insurgency only armed forces.
To support the boots on the ground !
And how many times do people have to post before the thickos get it - Typhoon was always designed as swing/multi role. It has replaced single role aircraft so added flexibility as well as capability. It was planned to replace F3 first (the RAF's only A-A aircraft for the slow ones) so was always planned to get A-A capability first (when is it getting that btw
?) It was considered that the Harrier and GR4 fleets would provide sufficient CAS/AI capability in the meantime. Even as recently as 2000 nobody knew that we were going to embroil ourselves in a long term tribal counter-insurgency war halfway around the world. The AT/AAR problems were identified a long time ago, it is just the solution that sucks.
Helos have definitely been the poor relation for too long - but that partly, perhaps came from the fact that they were ticking along nicely, doing what the army wanted in NI and not seen as having a big role outside that. Lack of foresight and flexibility, perhaps.
People can whine about the wrong equipment as much as they like but defence procurement (and training) lead times are huge, we cannot wave a magic wand and get the perfect kit as a war kicks off. So for me the big lesson is that we cannot foresee exactly what form future wars will take (despite what CGS says) so we must have a balanced and flexible air force (and navy). Whilst the current war in Afghanistan is and should be our highest priority, we cannot let it lead us down the dead end of creating a counter-insurgency only armed forces.
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in Ireland the temperatures were not +45*C and the ground a minimum of 3000AMSL.
The reality is that when most of this equipment was ordered it would have been considered a "waste" if it had been upengined or otherwise modified for those climates ("we're worried about Ivan old boy, not Rommel")
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The numpty that compares A-A kills with CAS sorties as a stat for procurement misses the point that No A-A Kills MEANS that the last 50 years of QRA WAS successful!!!!! - sometimes a deterrent is a tactic (don't seem to recall any Live Trident launches either!).
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No doubt more SH is needed for UK forces in AFG but it is not going to stop casualties, the US have more SH than you can shake a stick at but are still suffering.
The EF have assessed our tactics and are targeting us as effectively as they think they can at the moment, their IED's appear to cause limited fatalities (plus injured) each time. If we change the way we do things so will they, perversely we could make ourselves more vulnerable.
The EF have assessed our tactics and are targeting us as effectively as they think they can at the moment, their IED's appear to cause limited fatalities (plus injured) each time. If we change the way we do things so will they, perversely we could make ourselves more vulnerable.
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The lack of Hot/High capability can be traced back to decisions made in the 1970's not to operate east of suez. When another Labour Govt buggered up the economey and expected HM forces to cut back to bail them out. It was reinforced in the 80's by the Tories NATO centric defence policy. The whole way through operating out of area was never seen as a serious option. If you want proof speak to the poor sods on the Type 23's Patroling the persian gulf (and now of Somalia) before Iraq/Afghanistan even kicked of. In a Frigate designed for the North Atlantic with limited to non existant airconditioning. The armed forces as a whole are paying the price for decades of cuts and lack of political will or vision.
I wonder does Ainsworth mean that troops will have to walk as helicopters and armoured vehicles aren't suitable?
I wonder does Ainsworth mean that troops will have to walk as helicopters and armoured vehicles aren't suitable?
Ptc Remf
No it isn't old chap.
As much as I agree it is an extremely worthwhile and important role, it is not the primary role of the RAF.
In suggesting otherwise, you are rubbishing the Typhoon by inference.
I agree we need a good CAS platform. Amongst other things.
Defence of UK airspace remains a vital role and a GR9/GR4/A-10 just doesn't cut the mustard in that respect.
BV
As much as I agree it is an extremely worthwhile and important role, it is not the primary role of the RAF.
In suggesting otherwise, you are rubbishing the Typhoon by inference.
I agree we need a good CAS platform. Amongst other things.
Defence of UK airspace remains a vital role and a GR9/GR4/A-10 just doesn't cut the mustard in that respect.
BV
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Oh dear, how very sad indeed.....
No wonder H M Treasury and spin doctors win every time as every time there is anything that requires unity someone somewhere has to start infighting...
Very depressing indeed and is probably why we will end up being run ragged by the Treasury and Politician's spin doctors.
This has nothing to do with Typhoon, or the Carriers or Trident.
It is about helicopters for a war that we are fighting here and now.
And to answer GBZ - I believe that you are missing the point that the shortage of helicopters is not just about AFG, but for future conflicts as well. AFG is sadly highlighting what pathetic aircraft you have (although through no fault of the operators and support personnel). Littoral Manoeuvre my back side - when you have something that can lift a decent payload over a decent distance over all environments (not just Norway), then you may recognise that the shortage of helicopters is as a result of some appalling indecision and delaying that will effect your sphere of expertise as it does mine (and remember I am also with you on many an occasion and end up doing most of your lifting).
Again, it appears so obvious that here and now helicopters are needed, and historically as the NAO said that there were not enough Battlefield Helicopters and therefore I am pretty convinced that whatever service or political party or government advisory board you come from it is a dead cert that the future Defence Review will also say (again) that the UK needs more Battlefied Helicopters.
So with that decision staring us in the face....FASH/SABR/FCR/FMH being slopey shouldered and delayed so many times....lets just get on and make the decision to procure and/or replace more helicopters-soon-very soon.
And Ivan, I really do hope that your comment is posted from personal experience and not as a voyeur as I most certainly beg to differ and both Northern Ireland and Bosnia saw the rapid mobility afforded by helicopter lift not only assist in protecting the guys on the ground, but also reducing the over land supply requirement.
The 'EF' may have assessed our tactics, but at the moment we have very little 'golf clubs' to choose from as the cliche golf bag has some very limited clubs. It would be a tactical advantage to our servicemen and women to be able to give them the tactical choice - maybe move by air, maybe move by land, maybe a bit of both, maybe a deception plan, maybe routine frame work VCP patrolling....who knows....but at the moment it appears that due to the lack of helicopters the choice offered to to the servicemen and women is limited and therefore more predictable moves by land.
Helicopters are not the panacea, but I would suggest that they are long overdue, will be involved in nearly every operation in the next 20 years at least and far more importantly can add value, make a difference and provide the commanders on the ground with a choice of how to manoeuvre in an operation that has many boots on the ground.
No wonder H M Treasury and spin doctors win every time as every time there is anything that requires unity someone somewhere has to start infighting...
Very depressing indeed and is probably why we will end up being run ragged by the Treasury and Politician's spin doctors.
This has nothing to do with Typhoon, or the Carriers or Trident.
It is about helicopters for a war that we are fighting here and now.
And to answer GBZ - I believe that you are missing the point that the shortage of helicopters is not just about AFG, but for future conflicts as well. AFG is sadly highlighting what pathetic aircraft you have (although through no fault of the operators and support personnel). Littoral Manoeuvre my back side - when you have something that can lift a decent payload over a decent distance over all environments (not just Norway), then you may recognise that the shortage of helicopters is as a result of some appalling indecision and delaying that will effect your sphere of expertise as it does mine (and remember I am also with you on many an occasion and end up doing most of your lifting).
Again, it appears so obvious that here and now helicopters are needed, and historically as the NAO said that there were not enough Battlefield Helicopters and therefore I am pretty convinced that whatever service or political party or government advisory board you come from it is a dead cert that the future Defence Review will also say (again) that the UK needs more Battlefied Helicopters.
So with that decision staring us in the face....FASH/SABR/FCR/FMH being slopey shouldered and delayed so many times....lets just get on and make the decision to procure and/or replace more helicopters-soon-very soon.
And Ivan, I really do hope that your comment is posted from personal experience and not as a voyeur as I most certainly beg to differ and both Northern Ireland and Bosnia saw the rapid mobility afforded by helicopter lift not only assist in protecting the guys on the ground, but also reducing the over land supply requirement.
The 'EF' may have assessed our tactics, but at the moment we have very little 'golf clubs' to choose from as the cliche golf bag has some very limited clubs. It would be a tactical advantage to our servicemen and women to be able to give them the tactical choice - maybe move by air, maybe move by land, maybe a bit of both, maybe a deception plan, maybe routine frame work VCP patrolling....who knows....but at the moment it appears that due to the lack of helicopters the choice offered to to the servicemen and women is limited and therefore more predictable moves by land.
Helicopters are not the panacea, but I would suggest that they are long overdue, will be involved in nearly every operation in the next 20 years at least and far more importantly can add value, make a difference and provide the commanders on the ground with a choice of how to manoeuvre in an operation that has many boots on the ground.
Last edited by MaroonMan4; 9th Jul 2009 at 22:18.
Ok, having watched this with interest over the past few days, I was at a meeting in Town where a member of the DEC community made a comment which planted a seed.
Playing devil's advocate - what if it were to be suggested that the lack of rotary has less to do with the Govt refusing to fund / deploy them and more to do with MOD internal management?
At the end of the day, there is a finite pot of cash for Defence; some of that will go on salaries, some of that will go on maintaining infrastructure etc and some of that will go on procurement. What the element of funding earmarked for procurement and equipment development is spent on is down to the capability managers, scrutineers and various heads of capability right the way up to the respective heads of service. Is it not the responsibility of capability managers and heads of capability to argue their corners and fight for the necessary funding to ensure their capability is both qualitatively and quantitatively sufficient for the tasks the sharp-end are being asked to perform? If the requirement is pressing enough, and a robust enough case is presented, then funding could/should/might be able to be taken from other capabilities that are less pressing in the current circumstances.
Following this line of argument to its logical conclusion, is the lack of rotary assets in theatre not down to a failure of the capability managers up to heads of service to argue their cases robustly enough, as well as the MOD's complete inability to manage its budgets and procurement strategies to ensure that finite funding lines are not squandered?
Or should we just take the view that the principle of collective responsibility runs throughout Govt, and therefore, as SoS Defence is part of that Govt, then the Govt as a whole is responsible for the abject failure to address the NAO BH audit report findings in a meaningful manner?
Playing devil's advocate - what if it were to be suggested that the lack of rotary has less to do with the Govt refusing to fund / deploy them and more to do with MOD internal management?
At the end of the day, there is a finite pot of cash for Defence; some of that will go on salaries, some of that will go on maintaining infrastructure etc and some of that will go on procurement. What the element of funding earmarked for procurement and equipment development is spent on is down to the capability managers, scrutineers and various heads of capability right the way up to the respective heads of service. Is it not the responsibility of capability managers and heads of capability to argue their corners and fight for the necessary funding to ensure their capability is both qualitatively and quantitatively sufficient for the tasks the sharp-end are being asked to perform? If the requirement is pressing enough, and a robust enough case is presented, then funding could/should/might be able to be taken from other capabilities that are less pressing in the current circumstances.
Following this line of argument to its logical conclusion, is the lack of rotary assets in theatre not down to a failure of the capability managers up to heads of service to argue their cases robustly enough, as well as the MOD's complete inability to manage its budgets and procurement strategies to ensure that finite funding lines are not squandered?
Or should we just take the view that the principle of collective responsibility runs throughout Govt, and therefore, as SoS Defence is part of that Govt, then the Govt as a whole is responsible for the abject failure to address the NAO BH audit report findings in a meaningful manner?
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Short of helicopter's ? Perhaps this sobering document might shed some light on it.
http://www.dasa.mod.uk/natstats/ukds...05Chapter4.pdf
And these figures only go up to 2004.
Go here Defence Analytical Services and Advice Website for figures 1990-2007
http://www.dasa.mod.uk/natstats/ukds...05Chapter4.pdf
And these figures only go up to 2004.
Go here Defence Analytical Services and Advice Website for figures 1990-2007
Last edited by Tappers Dad; 9th Jul 2009 at 22:32. Reason: Addition information
"At the end of the day, there is a finite pot of cash for Defence; some of that will go on salaries, some of that will go on maintaining infrastructure etc and some of that will go on procurement. What the element of funding earmarked for procurement and equipment development is spent on is down to the capability managers, scrutineers and various heads of capability right the way up to the respective heads of service. Is it not the responsibility of capability managers and heads of capability to argue their corners and fight for the necessary funding to ensure their capability is both qualitatively and quantitatively sufficient for the tasks the sharp-end are being asked to perform? If the requirement is pressing enough, and a robust enough case is presented, then funding could/should/might be able to be taken from other capabilities that are less pressing in the current circumstances.
Following this line of argument to its logical conclusion, is the lack of rotary assets in theatre not down to a failure of the capability managers up to heads of service to argue their cases robustly enough, as well as the MOD's complete inability to manage its budgets and procurement strategies to ensure that finite funding lines are not squandered?"
Spending money on RN priorities like Merlin CSP and FLynx has stuffed the more urgent priority of recapitalising helicopter lift, in other words.
Just as spending money on carriers and Trident replacement will divert finite resources from other more relevant and important priorities.
You have to admire Grey Funnel Lines. They always put their case well, and they always offer compelling arguments.
You only have to look at the 100th anniversary of Naval Aviation, which overshadowed the RAF's 90th birthday, and which will doubtless outshine the true 100th anniversary of military aviation in the UK in 2011. (The Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers was formed on 1 April 1911).
So what exactly happened in RN Air in 1909? What exactly are we celebrating 100 years of? Not the RNAS, which formed in July 1914. Not even the Naval Wing of the RFC (12 April 1912). Not even the start date of Navy pilot training (1911).....
So what was it? What is this glorious event whose anniversary we salute?
It was on 7th May 1909 that the Admiralty first set aside £35,000 for the development of an airship. Not for the rollout of that airship (which was hardly an event worth celebrating), nor the first flight (um, it didn't fly). But the anniversary of getting the funding for what turned out to be a farcical failure.
The airship in question was the HMA 1 (the Mayfly), which was initially too heavy too fly, and after it was lightened it was too weak and was broken by a gust of wind whilst being moved out of its hangar.
Isn't that what the Israelis call Chutzpah?
Following this line of argument to its logical conclusion, is the lack of rotary assets in theatre not down to a failure of the capability managers up to heads of service to argue their cases robustly enough, as well as the MOD's complete inability to manage its budgets and procurement strategies to ensure that finite funding lines are not squandered?"
Spending money on RN priorities like Merlin CSP and FLynx has stuffed the more urgent priority of recapitalising helicopter lift, in other words.
Just as spending money on carriers and Trident replacement will divert finite resources from other more relevant and important priorities.
You have to admire Grey Funnel Lines. They always put their case well, and they always offer compelling arguments.
You only have to look at the 100th anniversary of Naval Aviation, which overshadowed the RAF's 90th birthday, and which will doubtless outshine the true 100th anniversary of military aviation in the UK in 2011. (The Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers was formed on 1 April 1911).
So what exactly happened in RN Air in 1909? What exactly are we celebrating 100 years of? Not the RNAS, which formed in July 1914. Not even the Naval Wing of the RFC (12 April 1912). Not even the start date of Navy pilot training (1911).....
So what was it? What is this glorious event whose anniversary we salute?
It was on 7th May 1909 that the Admiralty first set aside £35,000 for the development of an airship. Not for the rollout of that airship (which was hardly an event worth celebrating), nor the first flight (um, it didn't fly). But the anniversary of getting the funding for what turned out to be a farcical failure.
The airship in question was the HMA 1 (the Mayfly), which was initially too heavy too fly, and after it was lightened it was too weak and was broken by a gust of wind whilst being moved out of its hangar.
Isn't that what the Israelis call Chutzpah?
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And the primary role of the RAF is.....?!
Quote:
To support the boots on the ground !
No it isn't in the big picture, much to the army's consternation. You could call it defence of the UK and its territories or carrying out British defence policy or something similar. Sometimes that means supporting the "boots on the ground" sometimes it doesn't
So close air support and most tactical transport aviation ought to be Army functions under Army control, don't we all agree?
True for British Army as well as AUSA.
Quote:
To support the boots on the ground !
No it isn't in the big picture, much to the army's consternation. You could call it defence of the UK and its territories or carrying out British defence policy or something similar. Sometimes that means supporting the "boots on the ground" sometimes it doesn't
So close air support and most tactical transport aviation ought to be Army functions under Army control, don't we all agree?
True for British Army as well as AUSA.
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Jack,
So let me get this right - you are saying that the reason why there are not more (or more capable) helicopters on operations today is because the Fisheads decided to have their birthday to celebrate conception rather than the actual birth?
Let us assume that all of the Merlin CSP and FLynx fundings were rational and strategic decisions from DEC ALM and MoD Main Building, and that they have managed to justify it to those that question and also attempt to rectify the Battlefield Helicopter NAO report. Let us also assume that there really is no longer any funding for more capable Support Helicopters to deliver lift to the troops on the ground.
Whether the money has gone on birthday parties or Typhoon or Flynx - if the money has really gone and the DECs/MoD and the politicians really do believe that there is no requirement for immediate funding for more capable Support Helicopters to provide more lift to the troops on the ground then.....
Someone in the MoD should re-align the Foreign Office, Coalition and nations expectations as the tactical tasks on the ground and the quest for success at the pace that is being required by politicians (to avoid the Vietnam comparison) is not being resourced.
I fully understand the requirement for military ethos Jacko and I look forward to our celebrations, especially in a society that has very little understanding of what its military actually does for its nation (both today, in the future and silently). This bears no relevance as to why we are so short of capable helicopters - and I look forward to our celebrations (and actually am surprised that the one nation one air force contingent didn't get in there first!)
What I do not understand is that if the DECs/MoD have prioritised other spending whether Merlin, FLynx, Typhoon or whatever and there is no funding left for more capable helicopters, and the Sea King and Puma fleets are going to continue to 2022 (according to open press) then we cannot be surprised by the perceived stalemate on current operations and the inability to conduct current and future operations on a global scale in all environemnts (amphibious support helicopter lift-I think not). Lets be honest, and again in the open press, there are some Support Helicopters capabilities that are really struggling (even in GTI mode with a go faster stripe) that are limited when temperatures or altitude are increased which is pretty much the kind of environments that will be on the threat assessments today and for the years ahead.
As long as everyone knows that the FASH/ SABR/ FCR/ FMH elephant in the room has been growing in size for 10 years (which the NAO report did let everyone know about) and that it will undoubtedly continue to grow until 2022, then so be it - the commanders on the ground will do the best job that they can with the resources that are being delivered by those in positions of funding authority.
So let me get this right - you are saying that the reason why there are not more (or more capable) helicopters on operations today is because the Fisheads decided to have their birthday to celebrate conception rather than the actual birth?
Let us assume that all of the Merlin CSP and FLynx fundings were rational and strategic decisions from DEC ALM and MoD Main Building, and that they have managed to justify it to those that question and also attempt to rectify the Battlefield Helicopter NAO report. Let us also assume that there really is no longer any funding for more capable Support Helicopters to deliver lift to the troops on the ground.
Whether the money has gone on birthday parties or Typhoon or Flynx - if the money has really gone and the DECs/MoD and the politicians really do believe that there is no requirement for immediate funding for more capable Support Helicopters to provide more lift to the troops on the ground then.....
Someone in the MoD should re-align the Foreign Office, Coalition and nations expectations as the tactical tasks on the ground and the quest for success at the pace that is being required by politicians (to avoid the Vietnam comparison) is not being resourced.
I fully understand the requirement for military ethos Jacko and I look forward to our celebrations, especially in a society that has very little understanding of what its military actually does for its nation (both today, in the future and silently). This bears no relevance as to why we are so short of capable helicopters - and I look forward to our celebrations (and actually am surprised that the one nation one air force contingent didn't get in there first!)
What I do not understand is that if the DECs/MoD have prioritised other spending whether Merlin, FLynx, Typhoon or whatever and there is no funding left for more capable helicopters, and the Sea King and Puma fleets are going to continue to 2022 (according to open press) then we cannot be surprised by the perceived stalemate on current operations and the inability to conduct current and future operations on a global scale in all environemnts (amphibious support helicopter lift-I think not). Lets be honest, and again in the open press, there are some Support Helicopters capabilities that are really struggling (even in GTI mode with a go faster stripe) that are limited when temperatures or altitude are increased which is pretty much the kind of environments that will be on the threat assessments today and for the years ahead.
As long as everyone knows that the FASH/ SABR/ FCR/ FMH elephant in the room has been growing in size for 10 years (which the NAO report did let everyone know about) and that it will undoubtedly continue to grow until 2022, then so be it - the commanders on the ground will do the best job that they can with the resources that are being delivered by those in positions of funding authority.
Last edited by MaroonMan4; 10th Jul 2009 at 07:22.
What the element of funding earmarked for procurement and equipment development is spent on is down to the capability managers, scrutineers and various heads of capability right the way up to the respective heads of service. Is it not the responsibility of capability managers and heads of capability to argue their corners and fight for the necessary funding to ensure their capability is both qualitatively and quantitatively sufficient for the tasks the sharp-end are being asked to perform? If the requirement is pressing enough, and a robust enough case is presented, then funding could/should/might be able to be taken from other capabilities that are less pressing in the current circumstances.
Following this line of argument to its logical conclusion, is the lack of rotary assets in theatre not down to a failure of the capability managers up to heads of service to argue their cases robustly enough, as well as the MOD's complete inability to manage its budgets and procurement strategies to ensure that finite funding lines are not squandered?
Following this line of argument to its logical conclusion, is the lack of rotary assets in theatre not down to a failure of the capability managers up to heads of service to argue their cases robustly enough, as well as the MOD's complete inability to manage its budgets and procurement strategies to ensure that finite funding lines are not squandered?
Spot on. So much so, that the principle is enshrined in permanent instructions from the Chief Accounting Officer.
Problem is, and despite a highly critical internal report 13 years ago, the posts whose job it was to implement this policy were not resurrected, having been chopped in 1989. One of the more interesting jobs I've had. (It would surprise you at how low a level this was delegated).
Shortages of proper equipment for the Armed Forces
I was under the impression that, in certain circumstances & when the military situation warranted it, the Chief of the Defence Staff was able to approach the Queen direct. If this is the case, should not the CDS hot foot it to the palace, thus bypassing the present shower at Westminster & explain to HM the Q directly just how dire the present situation is. I am sure the gracious lady would take the appropriate action & have word or two in Gordon's ear.
MM,
I was using the 100 years celebrations merely as an illustration of how adroitly the Navy put their message across.
Even when it's complete bol.locks.
The point is that prioritising the spending of money on RN priorities like Merlin CSP and FLynx has taken all of the money from the helicopter pot, leaving the more urgent, more important requirement (to address the shortfall in helicopter lift) unfulfilled and unfunded.
The point is that (again and again) the Admirals seem to have been able to shout loudest and to get their priorities (which are often exceptionally costly) funded - often at the expense of higher priority capabilities. And with CVF, JCA, and Trident replacement, I predict that it will continue to happen.
That's great for the RN, but disastrous for the UK.
I was using the 100 years celebrations merely as an illustration of how adroitly the Navy put their message across.
Even when it's complete bol.locks.
The point is that prioritising the spending of money on RN priorities like Merlin CSP and FLynx has taken all of the money from the helicopter pot, leaving the more urgent, more important requirement (to address the shortfall in helicopter lift) unfulfilled and unfunded.
The point is that (again and again) the Admirals seem to have been able to shout loudest and to get their priorities (which are often exceptionally costly) funded - often at the expense of higher priority capabilities. And with CVF, JCA, and Trident replacement, I predict that it will continue to happen.
That's great for the RN, but disastrous for the UK.